What is effective in reestablishing normal life in a populous area after a great disaster and how best can a community make itself prepared for the unexpected (or half-expected)? Aldrich responds to these questions which are in many people's minds these days. Building Resilience does a thorough job of proving that social resources influence post-disaster recovery, explaining the variation in the pace of recovery by focusing on the role of social capital – the networks and resources available to people in different neighbourhoods and areas through their connections to others. Through extensive study of four major disasters in the twentieth century: Japan (1923 Tokyo earthquake and 1995 Kobe Earthquake), India (2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami), and the US (2005 Hurricane Katrina), Aldrich shows that social networks and connections form the core engine of recovery after the most devastating events. Although many disaster studies have been conducted, he contends that the fundamental question – which factors facilitate or impede recovery after floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and similar events – has remained largely unanswered. Against this background, the author disentangles the effects of social capital from confounding factors such as socioeconomic conditions, damage, and population density, employing complex methodologies including cross-tabulation, propensity score-matching, and time series cross-sectional panel data.
While many government disaster mitigation and recovery programmes are predicated on the idea of the amount of aid provided and the amount of damage caused by the disaster, Building Resilience adduces compelling qualitative and quantitative evidence, demonstrating that social resources, at least as much as material ones, are the foundation for resilience and recovery. The strength of his argument comes from his year of fieldwork, including in Japan and India, creating new data sets describing 225 disaster-affected neighbourhoods and hamlets across space and time. Based upon the in-depth investigations, his recommendations to policy and decision makers are important, including his advice that decision makers should, as they develop recovery plans, make every endeavour to group survivors from the same area together in temporary shelters, which can help ensure that existing stocks of social capital are not damaged by the move.
Having proved that ‘high levels of social capital serve as the core engine of recovery’, Aldrich seeks to explain the manner in which social capital operates after mega catastrophes. He observes that survivors with strong social networks have access to needed information, tools, and assistance, enabling faster recovery, while communities and neighbourhoods with little social capital may find themselves unable to keep up with their counterparts which have these deep networks. Moreover, he pays attention to the roles different types of social capital play. For example, he considers that linking social capital – connections with people in power whether in politically or financially influential positions (Woolcock and Sweetser Reference Woolcock and Sweetser2002) – is necessary for communities to access more relief/aid funding from outside agencies, which he proves makes a difference in the pace of recovery.
However, a student of social capital would argue that further research into the different roles that different types play is needed in order to respond to the question ‘how does social capital operate to achieve a quicker recovery?’. Although Aldrich shows a strong awareness of the negative consequences which can accompany social capital, and many studies of social capital point to ‘exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restriction on individual freedoms, and downward levelling norms’ (Portes Reference Portes1998), these are generally related to bonding social capital. Too much emphasis only on bonding social capital or on negative externalities, treating social capital as consisting only or predominantly of bonding social capital, may reduce the potentially enormous benefit that the combination of different types of social capital could produce.
To avoid this misfortune, the functions of different types of social capital should be clearly articulated in any discussion of it. For example, ‘bonding social capital’ helps collective learning and solidarity creation within communities, while bridging social capital, though it expands networks and information-flow between communities, may not lead to ‘collective action’, lacking strong enough linkages for it to occur; ‘bracing social capital’, generated by the interaction of widely connected individuals (of various sectors), citizen leaders, academics, and well-connected government staff members, across levels and geographical spaces, expedites the occurrence of collective action that in its absence would not happen or would take much longer (Rydin and Holman, Reference Rydin and Holman2004; Rydin and Falleth, Reference Rydin and Falleth2006; Kusakabe, Reference Kusakabe2012, Reference Kusakabe2013). The combination of different types of social capital can compensate for the weaknesses of each: Storper (Reference Storper2005: 33) holds that Putnam's bonding social capital ‘operationalizes’ the classical notion of gemeinschaft (community) and bridging gesellschaft (society) and that these two forces act as mutual checks and balances on their potentially negative effects, while allowing the positive contributions of each to economic efficiency; Fukuyama (Reference Fukuyama2002: 32) suggests the importance of bridging social capital to overcome the problem of ‘familism’ caused by the inward-looking side of social capital, in order to facilitate the building of cooperative relationships between groups that typically have had little to do with one another. Rydin and Holman (Reference Rydin and Holman2004) argue that, in addition to bonding and bridging capital, bracing capital is necessary to build relationships and common ways of working between actors across sectors and scales, and achieve change.
According to Aldrich (2012: 23): ‘Drawing on the investigations of the four megacatastrophes and building on new field evidence that social capital can be created both through indigenous efforts and through foreign intervention, Chapter 7 provides a series of policy tools.’ To say ‘social capital can be created . . . through foreign intervention’ is at first sight surprising, because studies have found that social capital is hard to construct through external interventions (Ostrom Reference Ostrom, Dasgupta and Serageldin1999:172; Kusakabe, Reference Kusakabe2013). A top-down manner of building social capital networks does not often work, because social capital is created by individuals spending time and energy working with other individuals to find better ways of making possible the achievement of certain ends (Ostrom 1995: 131). However, as the book unfolds, Aldrich clarifies what he means by this statement: not only indigenous decision makers in the public and private sectors but also foreign aid organizations should design and apply new policy instruments that strengthen social capital before and after crises, potentially resulting in the social fabric of the local community being enhanced and extended through the deliberate design of residential environments. Evidence he adduces suggests that what occurs in such cases is encouragement of social capital rather than creation of it. That said, the methods for increasing social capital that Aldrich suggests in the final chapter are valuable food for thought: for example the idea that urban and suburban infrastructure design itself can also influence levels of social capital.
The analysis in Building Resilience, based upon rigorous qualitative as well as quantitative methodologies, is powerful as it provides convincing evidence that social resources – the connections local communities have accumulated over the years to maintain their livelihood – can be as important as, or at times more so, than physical infrastructure for a quicker post-disaster recovery. The book will be useful for decision makers, helping them to achieve an effective preparedness to deal with unexpected disasters.
