INTRODUCTION
“Environmental justice” is defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of race, colour, national origin, culture, education or income, with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.Footnote 1 According to the EPA, “fair treatment” means that no group of people, including racial, ethnic or socioeconomic groups, should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local and tribal environmental programs and policies.Footnote 2 Environmental justice has become recognized as a theory in social justice research to provide guidance for the development and implementation of policy.Footnote 3 However, justice issues seem to be included as responses to community action rather than the formal input of social justice theory or data gathering. Bullard and Johnson reveal that community action to achieve justice seems greatly to outweigh action that attempts to develop policies which utilize justice principles in the first place.Footnote 4
This article examines the effects of Nigeria's Land Use Act (the Act)Footnote 5 on the oil-rich Delta region, specifically because it reflects the situation portrayed by Bullard and Johnson. The Niger Delta is located in the south of Nigeria and hosts oil exploration and production activities. The inhabitants of the region consist of several ethnic groups including the Ijaws, Itsekiris and Urhobos that are collectively considered a minority after the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas.Footnote 6 Oil exploration and production activities in the region have over the years either instigated and/or exacerbated conflicts in the region. Though these conflicts are multi-faceted and encompass socio-economic, political, cultural and environmental undertones, this article regards them as environmental conflicts. Environmental conflicts are described by the Environment and Conflicts ProjectFootnote 7 as traditional conflicts which are induced by environmental degradation and which manifest themselves as political, social, economic, religious or territorial conflicts, conflicts over resources or national interests, or any other type of conflict.Footnote 8 In essence, environmental problems may seldom be the only cause of conflicts but, when interwoven with such elements as population growth, poverty and injustice, they increasingly contribute to existing and future political tensions and their escalation to violent conflicts.Footnote 9
This article determines the role of the Act in exacerbating environmental conflicts in the oil-rich Delta region. It argues that the Act is a fundamental cause of the high incidence of violent conflicts in the region due to the environmental injustice it instigates. The second section of the article highlights the concept of environmental justice within an African context. The third discusses the Act itself. It traces the origin of the Act and argues that it was promulgated ostensibly to further unhindered access to oil resources by the federal government of Nigeria and oil multinationals. The argument is continued, revealing some of the peculiar effects the Act has on the Niger Delta region and oil operations. It also draws the causal link between these effects and the escalation of violent conflicts in the region. The fourth section of the article analyses why the Act has remained in force despite unending criticism against it generally and its role in the escalation of violence in the Niger Delta region in particular. Basically, it asserts that the absence of political and economic power from the Delta inhabitants who are mostly impacted by the Act is a fundamental reason why the Act has not been abrogated. The article concludes by recommending that the Act be reviewed to promote and ensure equality, equity and justice among the citizenry in its application and enforcement, without subjugating any group perceived to be less privileged.
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
The concept of environmental justiceFootnote 10 emanated from the USA to tackle the perceived inequities in the distribution of environmental hazardous waste sites.Footnote 11 Since then, the notion of environmental justice become very broad and is now applied to a widening spectrum of “serious social concerns”, particularly those related to communities that suffer from social inequity attributed to by environmental inequalities.Footnote 12 The concept is also defined severallyFootnote 13 to reflect the diversity in the socio-economic circumstances of the definer. The contextual ascription of the concept in the United Kingdom (UK) and Africa, for instance, differs from the US connotation. In the UK, environmental justice is defined along two dimensions. The first is that deprived communities, which may be more vulnerable to the pressures of poor environmental conditions, should not bear a disproportionate burden of negative environmental impacts. Secondly, all communities should have access to information and to the means to participate in decisions which affect the quality of their local environment.Footnote 14 The difference in the definitions is that, while the EPA definition takes cognizance of and emphasizes the different categories of ethnic and racial groups, the UK definition is more concerned with protecting “deprived communities” and is also more substantive in nature. However, both perspectives capture the core essence of environmental justice which the EPA terms “meaningful involvement”. According to the EPA “meaningful involvement” means that:
“(1) potentially affected community residents have an appropriate opportunity to participate in decisions about a proposed activity that will affect their environment and/or health; (2) the public's contribution can influence the regulatory agency's decision; (3) the concerns of all participants involved will be considered in the decision-making process; and (4) the decision-makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected.”Footnote 15
However, in the African context, which is more relevant to this article, the concept considers access to resources to be fundamental.Footnote 16 Obiora defines it as:
“[T]he equitable distribution of environmental amenities, the rectification and retribution of environmental abuses, the restoration of nature, and the fair exchange of resources. Its main insight challenges the uneven allocation of environmental risks as well as the benefits of environmental protection, industrial production, and economic growth. Given its structural focus, the environmental justice struggle could be seen, not simply as an attack against environmental discrimination, but as a movement to rein in and subject corporate and bureaucratic decision making, as well as relevant market processes, to democratic scrutiny and accountability.”Footnote 17
The salient points in this definition include the reference to the decision-making processes of corporations and governments, market dynamics as well as issues of accountability. This observation is very important to understanding the postulation that market dynamics influenced the promulgation of the Act, which contained provisions that culminate in the boycott of democratic scrutiny and accountability in its operations.Footnote 18 In summary, environmental justice in Africa emphasises access to natural resources, while in the USA and UK the focus is on maintaining the planet's well-being via active public participation.
Environmental injustices are premised on three theoretical models: the absence of political and economic power model; the eco-racism model; and the neighbourhood transition model.Footnote 19 Briefly, the neighbourhood transition model argues, on the basis of peculiar migratory dynamics of communities in the USA, that economics is the primary determinant for environmental injustices.Footnote 20 The eco-racism model argues that minority groups or countries are deliberately targeted for environmental injustices.Footnote 21 The absence of political and economic power model posits that communities suffer from environmental inequities because they lack political and economic power.Footnote 22 On the basis of the absence of political and economic power model, this article argues that the minority status of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region is a fundamental reason why the Act was promulgated and has remained in force. Agbola and Alabi posit that access to “political capital”Footnote 23 is a particular entry point for causal explanation of social and environmental injustice in Nigeria.Footnote 24 They argue that the social and environmental problems in the Niger Delta are linked directly to the unsustainable mode of petroleum resources extraction in Nigeria and to state policies and actions through which the major ethnic groups have made the Niger Delta an environmentally “peripheral region”.Footnote 25 Ikejiafor also argues that the major ethnic groups dominate the development of resources in Nigeria.Footnote 26 This article will now examine how the law, particularly the Act, has been used to establish the ruling elite's domination over the minority Delta indigenes.
THE LAND USE ACT: ORIGIN AND IMPACTS ON THE NIGER DELTA COMMUNITIES
The Act was originally promulgated as a decree in 1978 and annexed to the 1979 constitution on the eve of the military government handing political power to elected politicians that year. The Act significantly transformed Nigeria's oil industry and, as this article argues, is the fundamental cause of the violence that has become characteristic of the Niger Delta region that hosts upstream oil operations. This section highlights the origin of the Act to reveal that the Act was not popular from inception, and then analyses the peculiar impacts of the Act on the Niger Delta region within an environmental justice framework.
The origin of the Land Use Act
The Act was promulgated in 1978 to nationalize all lands in the country, purportedly due to the increasing difficulty experienced by private and government institutions in acquiring land for development. The Third National Development Plan had noted that the difficulties experienced in land acquisition for development purposes were partly responsible for the failure to implement the Second National Development Plan (1970–74).Footnote 27 Though legislation existed to empower governments to acquire land compulsorily for public purposes, it was observed in the Third National Development Plan that the cost was exorbitant in some of Nigeria's urban centres.Footnote 28 Consequently, the federal government set up the Anti-Inflation Task Force in 1975 to examine existing inflationary tendencies in the economy and identify their causes. The task force recommended that the government initiate a comprehensive national policy on land and promulgate a decree to vest all land in the state government. The federal government rejected the report and set up a rent panel in 1977 to investigate and make recommendations on the persistent difficulties in land acquisition for development purposes, as well as the incidence of high rents demanded by property developers.Footnote 29 The panel recommended that a land reform commission be established to study the various aspects of Nigerian land tenure systems and make recommendations to the federal government on the necessary steps to streamline them.Footnote 30
At this time, the country was undergoing the preliminary stages of returning to democratic governance. The constitution drafting committee, that had already been inaugurated to draft and recommend a constitution for the country, suggested that all undeveloped land in the country be nationalized. The federal military government inaugurated the Land Use Panel on 20 May 1977 to review Nigeria's land tenure system. The panel was mandated:
“(i) to undertake an in-depth study of the various land tenure, land use and conservation practices in the country and recommend steps to be taken to streamline them;(ii) to study and analyse the implications on a uniform land policy for the country, as well as examine the feasibility of a uniform land policy for the entire country and make necessary recommendations and propose guidelines for their implementation; and(iii) to examine steps necessary for controlling future land use and also opening and developing new lands for the needs of the Government and Nigeria's ever growing population in both urban and rural areas, and make appropriate recommendations.”Footnote 31
After it sat in 1978, the panel submitted both a majority report and a minority report to the federal military government. While the majority report advised explicitly against either the nationalization of land or the extension of the land tenure system of the northern states to the whole country, the minority report recommended that land be nationalized. It based its recommendation on the grounds that “the idea of Government being the custodian of land [as] in the Northern States is germane and should remain the acceptable base for land use”.Footnote 32 The federal military government accepted the recommendation of the minority report and promulgated the Land Use Decree no 6 of 1978 which in effect extended the law of “public ownership” of land hitherto practised in northern Nigerian to the whole of the federation.
A salient inference that may be drawn from the adoption of the minority report to nationalize land tenure as practised in northern Nigeria is that it would benefit the major ethnic groups that controlled the nation's political power. The argument advanced here is that the federal military government intended to ensure that the control of oil resources be the absolute and exclusive preserve of the federal government to obviate “minority” agitation over any form of ownership or participatory rights as earlier claimed.Footnote 33 This article hypothesizes that, if ownership of land had remained vested in the local communities, they would have maintained some influence over oil exploration and production activities. Therefore, they would have been in a position to dictate the mode and size of operations within their territory as well as the socio-economic and political benefits that must accrue to them. This would have enhanced their political and economic power substantially within a federation that relies extensively on oil revenues to sustain the national economy. This article argues further that, with the military dictatorship handing over political power to a democratically elected government, it was necessary to fit the “exclusion plan” into legal parameters. This article will later reveal how particular sections of the Act sought successfully to satisfy these intents.
The peculiar impacts of the Land Use Act on the Niger Delta region
The impact of the Act may be categorized in two broad areas. The first relates to the general or national effects of the Act while the second consists of its peculiar effects on the oil-rich Delta region. It is the latter that is of immediate importance to this article. However, it is also important to state that the general effect of the Act was to vest absolute ownership of land in each state in the state governor. In Abioye v Yakubu, the court held that the effects of the Act on customary land-holding included the:
“(1) removal of the radical title in land from individual Nigerians, families, and communities and vesting the same in the governor of each state of the federation in trust for the use and benefit of all Nigerians (leaving individuals, etc, with ‘rights of occupancy’); and
(2) removal of the control and management of lands from family and community heads/chiefs and vesting the same in the governors of each state of the federation (in the case of urban lands) and in the appropriate local government (in the case of rural lands)”.Footnote 34
The peculiar effects of the Act on the Niger Delta are considered below.
First, the Act legitimized the appropriation of land in the region. Section 28 provides that land may be appropriated for “overriding public interests” defined to include “the requirement of the land for mining purposes or oil pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith”. In essence, the inhabitants of the region may be dispossessed of their land whenever their land is required for oil exploration, making them tenants-at-will of the oil industry on land they have owned and inhabited for centuries. The Act thus complemented and completed the intent of previous legislation to grant the federal government exclusive ownership and control of oil resources.Footnote 35 Though Ayodele-Akaakar avers that the assumption of ownership reached its full scale with the promulgation of the Offshore Oil Revenue Decree in 1971,Footnote 36 it is contended that it is the Act that really completed the federal government's ownership and control of the oil industry. The impact of the Offshore Oil Revenue Decree merely abrogated the rights of the regions (states) to the minerals in their continental shelves. It vested the title to the territorial waters and continental shelf, as well as royalties, rents and other revenues derived from petroleum operations, in the federal government.Footnote 37 In practice, the decree did not preclude the oil communities from having enforceable rights to participate in the oil industry because they owned the land underneath which the oil was exploited. Before the promulgation of the Act, even though ownership of the oil was vested absolutely in the federal government, the communities owned the land beneath which the resource was situated. Therefore, they had to be consulted before oil operations began on that land. However, after the Act became effective, the region's inhabitants were stripped of this right and the federal government became vested with the sole right to determine where and when oil operations could be undertaken.
In addition to depriving the host communities of certainty in landholding rights, the Act was instrumental in depriving these communities from owning land within the region. Land in the oil-rich region was appropriated for the benefit of oil companies, government officials and their cronies to the detriment of the original (traditional) landholders. Francis, for example, revealed that groups of elite who had access to the state structure benefited disproportionately from the Act by consciously manipulating the allocations committee.Footnote 38 Thereafter, the region became a land speculators' paradise, driving up the economic value of land beyond the reach of its local population. The influx of these “foreign” land speculators who purchased land and later leased or resold it to oil companies circumvented the involvement of local communities in the management of land within the Niger Delta. This helped to deprive them of subsequent pecuniary benefits in the form of rent and participation in the decision-making process on land use and compensation, and further deepened poverty in the region. In other words, the absence of economic power of the region's inhabitants at the time further excluded them from participating in, and deriving benefits from, the oil industry.
The Act also eroded the authority of traditional rulers (elders) that is intrinsically linked to land as evidenced by customary land tenure practices, whereby the power to manage and control the use of land is vested in the community leader.Footnote 39 A major consequence includes the inability of traditional authority to mediate effectively and resolve land-related disputes in the region. The role of traditional authority in the administration of justice in land-related matters is particularly important in the region where there are disputes between individuals, families and oil companies literally daily. In the absence of traditional authority, the courts are the next viable venue to resolve these disputes. However, there are several limiting factors that render the role of the courts almost nugatory and thereby deny the inhabitants of the region access to justice. These factors include: the lack of funds to cover legal expenses; distance and transport logistics to attend court sittings; delays in administration of justice by the courts; and the overbearing influence of oil companies.Footnote 40 It is trite to note that the absence of traditional authority in the region is one of the contributory causes of conflicts that culminate in violence and youth militancy in the region.Footnote 41 Ebeku for instance pointed out that, from all indications, the violence in the region is a “direct result of the loss of [the inhabitants'] land rights” while Shell noted that the growing and increasing militancy is overthrowing traditional social order in some communities.Footnote 42
The right to be adequately compensated is also negated by the provisions of the Act. Section 29(2) provides that, where land is revoked by the governor for oil operations, the Minerals Act or the Petroleum Act or any superseding legislation shall apply. Section 77 of the Minerals Act provides that any person prospecting or mining shall: pay to the “holder or occupier” of private land such sums as may be fair and reasonable compensation for any disturbance of the surface rights of that owner or occupier and for any damage done to the surface of the land upon which his prospecting or mining is being or has been carried on; and shall compensate the owner for any crops, economic trees, buildings or works damaged, removed or destroyed by him or by his agent or servant. In essence, factors such as the inherent value of the land itself and its expected economic yield or the future economic benefit of trees or property at the time of revocation are not calculated. Furthermore, following the provisions of the Act on payment of compensation,Footnote 43 available evidence indicates that compensation for land compulsorily acquired under the Act is now paid to the governor of the state concerned and not to the community headman as before.Footnote 44 Therefore the communities hardly receive any portion of the money paid as compensation.Footnote 45
In the same vein, compensation for damage done to land during actual oil exploration and production activities is limited to the value of “improvements made on land”. In essence, just as noted earlier, neither the inherent value nor future earnings of the land are considered. Thus, even where the operating companies do not deny complicity in spills and other environmental harm resulting from their operations, the law shields them from paying adequate compensation. Indeed, these companies are quick to refer to such laws, notably the Act.Footnote 46 For instance, Shell claims to be a responsible company that obeys the laws of the country including the Act which vests ownership of all land with the government and as such gives compensation for the surface rights of all land acquired for its use and for damage from subsequent activity, including oil spills.Footnote 47 The effect of legal adherence is however a fundamental cause of conflicts. The report of a judicial panel of inquiry set up by the Rivers state government to investigate the shooting of Umuechem in 1990 made a noteworthy observation with regard to the adverse effects suffered from oil operations and the compensatory regime. It observed that:
“Their streams get polluted with the disposal of waste products from oil operations rendering the river void of fishes … their farm crops planted on the remaining areas of farmland get damaged by oil pollution; their economic trees are hewed down; their economic situation bites and there is no help for them. These deprivations without any compensatory benefits, cause frustration … The compensations paid for these deprivations are just pittance, meagre pittance, on which people cannot subsist for even six months and they become frustrated with life…”Footnote 48
Finally, the Act purportedly ousts the jurisdiction of the courts from determining the quantum of compensation payable for land compulsorily acquired under the Act or other related issues. Section 47(2) created the Land Use and Allocation Committees, whose members are appointed by state governors, who have no statutory obligation to ensure the independence and impartiality of these statutory bodies.
An analysis of the continued existence of the Land Use Act
This article has described what environmental justice entails, particularly in an African context, the development of the Act and its peculiar impacts on the Niger Delta region. It now explains why the Act remains in force, despite severe criticism regarding its impact on land tenure generally and the Niger Delta specifically (where the Act is most stringently enforced)Footnote 49 based on the absence of political and economic power model. The first major expression of the Niger Delta's political minority status was revealed before independence. With plans to bequeath Nigeria with a federal system of government, ethnic nationalities from the Delta region expressed fears of domination by the other “major” ethnic groups. For example, the Ijaws argued at the Willinks Commission, set up to look into the fears of the minority before independence was granted to Nigeria, that the peculiar problems of those living in the creeks and the swamps of the delta were not understood and indeed were deliberately neglected by both the regional and federal governments.Footnote 50 Also, the indigenous (traditional) rulers from the area, many of whom had concluded “treaties of protection” with the British in the 18th and 19th centuries, argued that the British should revoke the treaties and allow them to revert to their previous position of independence, rather than become a part of the Nigerian state.Footnote 51 The commission admitted that these fears were well founded, but it refused the request of the “poor, backward and neglected”Footnote 52 Ijaws that they be allowed to be independent of the Nigerian nation because the commission was unqualified to “form conclusions on any legal or moral obligation of Her Majesty's Government”.Footnote 53 It also rejected the request for the creation of new states on the ground that “it is seldom possible to draw a clean boundary which does not create a fresh minority”.Footnote 54 Instead, the commission proposed that a federal board be created to consider the problems of the Niger Delta and “to direct the development of the areas into channels which would meet the peculiar problems”, and the assumption of joint federal and regional responsibility for the “development of special areas”.Footnote 55 It is important to state that, at the time of the commission, oil had been discovered in commercial quantities and the significance of oil revenues was not lost on the concerned parties. The Niger Delta Development Board was established in 1961 on the recommendation of the Willinks Commission, but it had limited impact in developing the region.Footnote 56 The fears of the inhabitants of the region thus manifested themselves soon after Nigeria became independent.
Shortly after independence, oil-induced agitation in the region contributed to violent incidents, including the Adaka Boro-led Niger Delta Volunteer Force rebellion in February 1966Footnote 57 and the civil war between 1967 and 1970.Footnote 58 The federal military government promulgated several laws at this stage, including the Petroleum Act,Footnote 59 Oil in Navigable Waters Act,Footnote 60 Oil Pipelines ActFootnote 61 and the Offshore Revenues Act,Footnote 62 ostensibly to re-assert its absolute control over oil resources and revenues in Nigeria. It is posited that the government's intention at this time was firmly to establish its exclusive control over the resources, and to quell oil-induced agitation and violence especially from the Delta region. A common theme of these laws is that they all abrogated ownership and control of oil and its revenues to the federal government without any reference to the oil-bearing communities. Despite the promulgation of sundry laws on the oil industry that legally vested complete ownership of oil in the federal government, the oil-bearing communities remained relevant to the oil industry, as their permission was still a legal requirement since they owned the land beneath which the resource was exploited. Consequently, oil companies were required to negotiate land use issues such as rent, lease tenure and compensation with every community on whose land their operations would be carried out. It is argued that the Act was promulgated partially with the intent to end this practice and make it relatively easier and cheaper for oil operations to be developed. In fact, Omeje regards the Act as one that “technically facilitates the acquisition/use of land for oil activities” and classifies it as the “most dramatic of the barrage of pro-oil statutes”.Footnote 63
An interesting case that lends credence to this argument is In Nzekwu v Attorney-General East-Central State.Footnote 64 In that case, the government sought compulsorily to acquire 800 acres of land near Onitsha and offered to pay the Ogbo family that owned 397 acres of the land rent at the rate of £10 per annum for 20 years. The family rejected the offer. The family claimed that, before the notice of acquisition, it had co-operated with the oil companies having leased part of the land to Total Oil for 95 years at a rent of £945 per annum in 1957 and another to Shell-BP for a ferry ramp at a rent of £200 per annum. The family subsequently sued the government and the Supreme Court awarded the family the sum of £252,600 for the land and the houses on it. There are certain salient issues to note in this decision. First is the right (prior to the promulgation of the Act in 1978) of the family or community to own land. Secondly, as owners of land, they had the right to negotiate directly with interested oil companies on land use and, thirdly, the right to adequate compensation where the land was to be acquired compulsorily. Another point is to ask why a law was needed to allow the Government to abrogate land when it could already do so. It is argued that the government's intention with the Act was to be able to abrogate land legally, without having to bear the responsibility of compensating the “owners” of such lands adequately, as the facts in Nzekwu suggest.
After it became apparent that the effects of the Act in the Niger Delta included the inhabitants' complete dispossession of land for oil-related activities without adequate compensation, irritation and agitation in the region increased significantly. However, the agitation was not taken seriously because the region was believed to be a minority in political and economic terms. For instance, AsioduFootnote 65 opined in 1984 in this regard that: “… [given] the small size and population [of oil-producing communities] it is not cynical to observe that even if the resentment … continue[s] they cannot threaten the stability of the country nor affect its continued economic development”.Footnote 66 This statement gives an insight into the official reckoning of the resentment and agitation of the oil-bearing communities that have allegedly remained marginalized due to their perceived inability to influence national opinion because of their small size.Footnote 67
The minority status of the region was an issue at the National Political Reforms Conference in 2005. The representatives of the region under the auspices of the south-south delegation attempted to persuade the conference to increase the derivation percentage of oil revenues allocated to the region. However, they were unable to garner the support required to obtain the conference's approval.Footnote 68 The delegation subsequently staged a walk-out at the conference amidst allegations of other sections' betrayal to support them. At the closing ceremony, President Obasanjo declared in their absence that, if a small percentage of conference delegates were not satisfied with the results of the proceedings and staged a walk-out, it was not enough to label the conference a failure.Footnote 69 The president failed to recognize and sympathize with this group that had been frustrated by years of neglect, underdevelopment, environmental devastation and human rights abuse since the commercial exploitation of oil began in 1957. The direct reference to their minority status at such a crucial period is argued to be an act of political indiscretion influenced by the perceived lack of political and economic power of the oil-rich region to improve its situation. This observation thus begs the question as to whether the same opinion would be expressed had any of the majority ethnic groups staged the walk-out. However, it is apparent that the minority political status of the region formed since the pre-independence era has remained ingrained in the psyche of the political leadership who have contributed to its persistent political and economic marginalization.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the Act is antithetical to environmental justice, particularly with regard to the indigenes of the Niger Delta region. It has revealed that one consequence is the escalation of violent conflicts in the region. The impact of the spates of violence in the region is noteworthy, including social disharmony within the Niger Delta and the country generally. There is also a negative impact on the economic planning by the oil companies and the global economy that relies extensively on the supply and pricing of oil. It is therefore imperative and beneficial to all stakeholders (local and global) in Nigeria's oil industry that these conflicts be resolved. As a ministerial fact-finding team on the problems of the Niger Delta observed: “A new and increasingly dangerous awareness and sensitivity is sweeping through the oil producing communities across the country. It is in the interest of the oil industry and the nation that urgent and lasting solutions should be put in place to prevent the situation from getting worse.”Footnote 70
Unfortunately, rather than address the fundamental issues of host community participation in the oil industry, the federal government persistently attempts to “dump” development on the region while also attempting to subdue agitation with force. Issues of environmental justice (in the African context) as highlighted in this article are issues that should form the core of reforms in the oil industry. Without diminishing the role of other laws in depriving the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region of environmental justice and precipitating the resultant violent conflicts in the region, it is safe to aver that the Act is a primary cause of the deprivation and conflicts. As Fekumor noted, because of the Act, “the people have become antagonistic … they have been deprived of their main stay, and yet the damage is not paid for. Because they are not adequately compensated, the slightest misunderstanding is conflict”.Footnote 71 According to Ojo, the reasons for the pervasive violence include the “the decision of hitherto voiceless, subordinate and under-privileged minority groups to take up the gauntlet and challenge state structures and institutions controlled by majority groups who have been grossly unjust over time in the distribution of national resources”.Footnote 72
In a nutshell, this article has argued that the Act is a legal tool that completed the plan to exclude the oil-bearing communities of the Delta region from active participation in the oil industry. It argued further that the Act was promulgated and remains in force because the indigenes of the oil-rich Niger Delta region that bear the brunt of its adverse effects are incapable of bringing forth a peaceful change to the status quo. Consequently, this article suggests that the legislative framework regulating the oil industry must be reviewed with particular attention to the offensive Act. Sections of the Act that deprive inhabitants of environmental justice must be reviewed with due consideration to the realities of the circumstances prevalent in the region. The goal of such a review should be to achieve equality, equity and justice among the citizenry, without subjugating one less privileged group to others. Thus far, as Omorogbe suggests, Nigeria's environmental legal regime has refused to “give voice to the voiceless”, which has led to the “voiceless” forcing their way into reckoning through “extra-legal” procedures based essentially on violence.Footnote 73 In Nwabueze's opinion, the violence provides “data on imitative mass revolt but more importantly for the covert processes, gestation and brazen expression of revolt and rejection of structures and institutions of state power and authority”.Footnote 74 As revealed in this article, the state's power and authority are the exclusive preserve of the “majority” ethnic groups, which excludes those from the oil-rich Niger Delta region.
