Introduction
The formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution stands as a pivotal moment in global history.Footnote 1 Due to the anti-Western stance of the newly established regime, the Islamic Republic faced significant challenges in establishing and maintaining stable relations with much of the world, particularly Western nations. Many of the revolution’s leaders, as well as the new republic itself, were subjected to sanctions that led to political and economic isolation. Western efforts to reverse the revolution proved futile, prompting the IRI to pivot towards forging alliances with non-Western regions. A strategic move at that time was formalizing its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), aligning itself with anti-imperialist sentiments and broader global resistance to Western dominance.Footnote 2 The primary objective of the Islamic Republic then was to establish strong diplomatic ties beyond the West and rally support against perceived Western imperialism. Over time, these initial efforts not only expanded but also evolved into a sophisticated utilization of soft power and strategic engagements, serving as the cornerstone of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy towards non-Western nations.
The IRI’s engagement with non-Western countries is intricate and distinctive, marking a significant improvement from merely seeking support for immediate foreign policy objectives following the ousting of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (d. 1980).Footnote 3 Despite years of isolation through sanctions (especially from 2002–2010), Iran has adeptly employed various forms of “soft power” and strategies to advance its foreign policy goals.Footnote 4 In contrast to its dealings with other regions, where the focus often revolves around nuclear issues, proxy conflicts, sectarian interests, or ideological motivations, a pragmatic approach is evident in Iran’s foreign policy engagements with non-Western nations. Such engagements have evolved in multifaceted ways and cover multiple sectors, such as education, health, agriculture, economy, and active cultural engagement with Muslim communities. As Iran seeks an Eastern (non-Western) alternative in its multilateral relations, it has embraced initiatives that aim to reorganize the current, Western-dominated global order. Hence, the Islamic Republic became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by China and Russia, and, more recently, has attained permanent membership in the BRICS alliance, also led by both countries.Footnote 5
This article discusses the transformative role Iran could play in such a shift towards a non-Western-led world order by examining its motivations, opportunities, and the challenges associated with its BRICS membership. The article starts with a brief historical background of Iran’s interactions with non-Western countries, followed by an assessment of its shift in foreign policy towards alternative partnerships and the implications of its BRICS membership for itself, its allies, other regions, and a transformative global order.
Brief historical background
Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the IRI has evolved significantly, going beyond simply seeking support for its immediate foreign policy goals.Footnote 6 One of the revolution’s key aims was to liberate Iran from its substantial reliance, particularly under the rule of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, on the United States and other Western powers. Interestingly, one might expect that such a shift would automatically lead to Iran’s alignment with the East (i.e., engagement with non-Western countries). However, the newly established republic instead sought complete independence, refusing to rely on neither East nor West, as famously articulated by Khomeini.Footnote 7 This vision likely influenced Iran’s decision to formalize its NAM membership in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, positioning itself as a neutral member of the international community. However, multilateral pressure—particularly Western-led sanctions and embargoes—pushed Iran to strengthen its ties with non-Western countries, especially those within the NAM fraternity. The United States spearheaded unilateral sanctions until 2002 and, from 2005, multilateral sanctions followed. The years between 2002–2010 marked a period of heightened pressure, compelling Iran to reassess its policy objectives and move from neutrality to overt alignment with non-Western nations, primarily Russia and China. During the inception of the revolution, Iran was initially skeptical of these nations, particularly Russia, perhaps due to Russia’s occupation of Iran during both world wars. However, Iran found itself compelled to gravitate towards these pivotal non-Western powers as it grappled with a myriad of stringent sanctions and embargoes.
A shift in foreign policy towards non-Western countries
Since 2001, Iran has steadily strengthened its relations with non-Western countries—particularly China, Russia, and other countries in the non-Western bloc—due to its near total isolation as a result of (primarily) Western measures in the 2000s.Footnote 8 These stifling measures made Iran’s engagement with other countries, especially Western countries, totally different, as the focus mostly revolved around nuclear issues, involvement in proxy conflicts, and sectarian or ideological interests. A number of countries, including the United States, Israel, and some EU member states, consider Iran’s nuclear program to be a security threat. In its immediate geopolitical context, Iran’s positive relationship with organizations deemed “terrorist” by Western states and their allies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, makes its neighbors see it as a security threat. In fact, seeing the IRI as a security threat in the region has shaped much of its relations with the United States and Israel. This has been conspicuously demonstrated by the recent (2025) targeting of Iranian nuclear sites by both Israel and the United States after the failure of nuclear negotiations. As such, the IRI feels continuously isolated, leading it to intensify its interactions with non-Western countries, particularly those striving to alter the current global order. The IRI’s securitization in the region has led to the visibility of its “harder face,” but Iran’s “softer side” is evident when examining its foreign policy with non-Western countries or those that do not regard it as a security threat in the region.
Iran’s engagement with these non-Western countries has developed in multifaceted ways: contributing to regional orders, influencing broader global initiatives, and directly impacting the ongoing “reshuffling” of the current global order. In 2023, Iran became a member of the SCO, which aims to offset Western institutions and foster cross-sector collaborations—such as economic cooperation, political collaboration, defense, and security—between member states. It is hoped that a successful endeavor in this regard, demonstrating a powerful union, would undoubtedly shift the balance of the existing global order.Footnote 9 Additionally, towards the end of 2024, Iran joined the BRICS group, which shares similarities with the SCO but with a more global perspective and membership.Footnote 10 This strategic move indicates Iran’s earnest approach to organizations striving to reshape the global order, potentially assisting the Islamic Republic in aligning with a favorable, non-Western alternative global framework.
BRICS membership as a game changer for the current global order
Originally coined by Jim O’Neill in the early 2000s, the term BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China.Footnote 11 South Africa later joined in 2010, leading to the transformation of BRIC into BRICS. Unlike formal unions such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the European Union (EU), BRICS is not an official political or economic bloc; rather, it is a coalition of like-minded nations seeking to strategically foster trade and economic growth. Additionally, BRICS members aim to coordinate and strengthen diplomatic and political cooperation among themselves.Footnote 12
Beyond these general objectives, the BRICS group also seeks to alter the current world order by advocating for reforms in international financial institutions and reducing Western economic dominance. To support such ambitions, the bloc has established several key institutions.Footnote 13 One notable example is the New Development Bank (NDB), which functions as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank by providing infrastructure financing for member states. Another significant financial mechanism is the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA): a financial safety net designed to support member states in times of economic crisis.Footnote 14 For many observers, what inspires confidence in the BRICS group is its significant global footprint, particularly its large population and expanding membership. Currently, the BRICS group represents over 40% of the world’s population and its combined GDP of approximately 25% of the global economy.Footnote 15 Despite various challenges, the group continues to grow, especially with the introduction of the BRICS Plus (BRICS+) membership model, which recently included Iran as a permanent member.Footnote 16
Iran’s inclusion in the BRICS group comes as no surprise to analysts and observers. Iran’s membership aligns with its long-standing objective of seeking an alternative to Western-dominated economic and political structures, particularly considering the re-election of Donald Trump in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. This cautionary measure stems from Iran’s experience during the first Trump administration, during which time he withdrew the U.S. from the nuclear deal and reimposed sanctions on the Islamic Republic.Footnote 17 Iran’s BRICS membership offers insight into the role it envisions for itself in shaping a new global order, using BRICS as a strategic platform. However, critical questions remain: can Iran’s participation in BRICS help it navigate suffocating sanctions while simultaneously contributing to reshaping the global order? What are the implications of this membership for both the country itself and the broader international system?
In pursuing the opportunities that come with permanent BRICS membership, the IRI is seeking alternative avenues to establish multilateral relations while also actively contributing to reshaping the current global order. One of the key opportunities Iran stands to gain from BRICS membership is the positive impact on its energy sector and broader economy.Footnote 18 As a major petroleum producer, Iran could strategically expand its export market by targeting the BRICS energy market. Additionally, membership could facilitate increased investment from BRICS nations in Iran’s energy production infrastructure. Simultaneously, Iran could play a role in setting global benchmarks for petroleum production levels and pricing whenever necessary. Recognizing the influence of key Arab states, particularly their capacity to control energy production and supply, as essential to reshaping the global order, the BRICS group has invited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to join. While these two Gulf nations have historically been regional rivals, China successfully mediated between them, leading to the UAE’s inclusion in BRICS. Saudi Arabia, however, is currently hedging its position and has yet to join. If Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia were to align under the BRICS framework, it would represent a significant shift in global oil production and pricing dynamics, potentially allowing the bloc to exert greater influence over the energy market and, by extension, the global order.Footnote 19 Furthermore, although it may take time, creating a common BRICS trade currency among member states could be a lynchpin in transforming the global financial system.Footnote 20 The BRICS group has already demonstrated steps towards this goal, with some members moving away from using the U.S. dollar for trade in favor of national currencies. India, Russia, and Iran are notable examples, as these countries are conducting transactions using local currencies or alternative financial mechanisms rather than relying on the U.S. dollar.Footnote 21 Against this backdrop, Iran, like other BRICS members, could also benefit from the alternative financial structures offered by institutions such as the NDB and BRICS CRA, both of which provide financial support and economic resilience for member states.
On the diplomatic front, the BRICS group aims to challenge Western dominance in global affairs. Through the BRICS+ initiative, both current and future members can bring their respective agendas to the table, using BRICS as an alternative platform to amplify non-Western voices. Iran’s entry into BRICS strengthens its diplomatic standing, further distancing the country from past episodes of isolation. For Iran, BRICS provides an alternative channel to express grievances, gain support, and engage in collective decision making. For BRICS, Iran’s inclusion reinforces the notion that reliance on the Western-dominated world order is no longer absolute. The growing partnerships and shifting geopolitical trends indicate an increasing push for an alternative global framework. However, an important issue regarding BRICS+ as a challenge to the current global order is the group’s outward-looking approach to forging a common foreign policy front while remaining largely indifferent to the democratic values and human rights records of its members. While this may be criticized within the Western-dominated system, it also represents a direct challenge to a global order, which often justifies interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of promoting democratic values.
Challenges facing the BRICS group and Iran’s role
Despite its promise and potential, BRICS faces numerous complex challenges, both as a group and for Iran as a member. While the BRICS+ expansion model enhances the organization’s global reach, it also presents significant difficulties. A larger group means divergent interests and competing priorities, making consensus building more challenging and time consuming. The decision-making process within BRICS+, which relies on consensus, may become slow and cumbersome as a result. These challenges combined with the strong diplomatic ties most BRICS+ members have with the Western bloc, particularly Europe and America, would render any decision-making process with the potential to impact relations with Western countries quite challenging. In the case of Iran, its longstanding rivalry with Saudi Arabia could resurface at any moment, despite the recent diplomatic thaw facilitated by China and Iraq. Moreover, tense geopolitical competition between China and India could pose a significant obstacle, potentially leading to increased fragmentation and factionalization within the group.
Another critical challenge of Iran’s approach lies in its desire to spark a transformation in the global order through the BRICS group while simultaneously dealing with strained relations with Western nations. Navigating this complex problem is hampered by the significant sanctions imposed by some Western nations, which affect Iran’s capacity to operate effectively on the global scale. These sanctions extend beyond Iran’s direct engagement with some Western countries, also affecting its interactions with non-Western states. For instance, Iran’s non-membership in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) impedes its financial transactions with other countries, including those outside the Western bloc. These complications cannot be resolved solely through BRICS membership, instead requiring Iran to engage in some level of diplomatic and economic cooperation with dominant Western countries to enhance its global influence. Despite this, it is worth highlighting that the BRICS+ bloc remains a buffer for Iran amid regional isolation and internal weakness. Iran may be isolated (and internally weak) in its own backyard but, through BRICS+, has the capacity to interact with other, farther away states to get what it needs.
Conclusion
Iran’s BRICS membership reflects a strategic initiative to counteract Western economic and political dominance while maintaining closer ties with non-Western nations in attempting to establish an alternative global order. BRICS opens up broader trade opportunities for Iran and strengthens its diplomatic influence in a multipolar world outside the BRICS group. Furthermore, Iran secures access to alternative banking systems, such as the NDB, which could help lessen the impact of sanctions. However, some challenges remain, including internal divisions within the BRICS group, geopolitical tensions between member states, and the lasting effects of sanctions. Although BRICS provides Iran with a platform to engage globally free of some Western influence, Iran’s ability to reshape the world order will depend on its ability to strategically navigate group dynamics, enhance regional cooperation, mitigate inter-regional conflicts, enhance its image (not to be viewed as a regional security threat), and tackle urgent economic limitations that are increasingly weakening it. Finally, Iran’s membership represents a step towards reducing its global isolation, but its ability to fully capitalize on this alliance to achieve long-term aims is not certain.
