Rahim Acar's Talking about God and Talking about Creation provides a well-balanced comparison of Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas' conceptions of God and the divine creative act. His thesis is that these thinkers' different positions regarding theological language affect their understanding of the way perfections are attributed to God, and in turn their conceptions of God's perfections affect their subsequent theories of creation. Acar approaches these topics from a philosophical perspective rather than a historical one inasmuch as he does “not attempt to situate Avicenna's views, or those of Aquinas, in their historical context, nor trace how much they owe to their predecessors” but attempts “to give an analytically clear and reasonable statement of Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions” (p. 14). Still, students of medieval intellectual history, whether Islamic or Christian, and students of philosophy of religion should find this volume of interest.
The work begins by considering the similarities and differences between Avicenna's notion of tashkīk, which we might loosely translate as “(pros hen) equivocation,” although Acar does not, and Aquinas' more developed theory of analogy, and then how these theories, when applied to theological language, allow the theological or religious elements of both thinkers to be philosophically assessed. Next, in perhaps Acar's most philosophically rich discussion, he argues that although Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of God's perfections, such as simplicity, necessity, knowledge, will, and the like, the way each thinker talks about these perfections is informed by his theory of theological language. For example, Avicenna, given his view of divine simplicity, took a reductionist approach to the divine perfections and so argued that they are all existentially and conceptually identical, whereas Aquinas on the basis of his theory of analogy maintained that although all the divine perfections are existentially identical, they are still conceptually distinct. Acar goes on and argues persuasively, and I believe effectively, against the standard interpretation that for Avicenna creation is a voluntary action rather than a necessary act following on God's nature. Finally, he provides a catalogue of arguments that Avicenna used to show the sempiternity of the universe and then Aquinas' objections to those arguments, which in turn is followed by Acar's own assessment of the philosophical merit of each thinker's position, where he maintains that Avicenna's position is more consistent given the two men's shared philosophical sources.
The book has a quite readable and clear style, even though frequently repetitive, and Acar demonstrates a solid knowledge of the secondary literature. Because secondary literature abounds on Aquinas' conception of God and creation, it is not too surprising that Acar's discussion of Thomistic positions is not overly original. The work's real contribution is in its systematic presentation of Avicennan positions and particularly its reliance on primary Arabic sources rather than the Latin Avicenna. Acar draws chiefly on the Metaphysics of Avicenna's Shifaء, although I believe his discussion of Avicenna's position would have benefited from also consulting the parallel subjects in Avicenna's other encyclopedic work, the Najat, as well as the relevant passages from the Physics of the Shifaء.
Oddly, I found myself in general agreement with Acar's global conclusions while frequently disagreeing with him on the local level. In other words, I believe that for the most part Acar's overarching conclusions and assessments are correct and the similarities and differences he finds between Avicenna and Aquinas are insightful and thought provoking, even if I think that at times the details leading up those conclusions and relations are incorrect.
A case in point is Acar's treatment of arguments for the sempiternity of the world based on time, as opposed to arguments based on divine formal features, such as God's eternality and necessity. Again Acar relies almost exclusively on Avicenna's discussion from the Metaphysics of the Shifaء, where Avicenna presented a truncated version of his argument, referring his reader back to the more complete discussion in the Physics. The Metaphysics version of the argument assumes that time is infinite, and thus a temporal creation would entail that there was a time before creation. Because time is the measure of change with respect to before and after, if there is time, there must be change, which implies there is a body undergoing change. Consequently, concluded Avicenna, a first moment of creation would absurdly involve the existence of a body when no body existed. This argument, however, fails if one does not assume that time is infinite and rather argues that time itself is created at some first moment, as Aquinas would do. Indeed, in his Physics, Avicenna conceded that one might try to take “before,” as well as tensed terms, in a way that does not imply a prior time. Avicenna thus constructed a set of arguments intended to demonstrate, rather than assume, that a first instant of time in fact entails either a preceding time or a subject of change, in which case Avicenna's first argument applies.
Because Acar does not consider the Physics arguments against time being created at a first instant, he fails to appreciate how Aquinas invoking “imaginary time” is a response to Avicenna. Despite this confusion, Acar's overall assessment of Aquinas' refutation turns out to be correct, because Avicenna modified his argument against a first instant of time in the Najat, of which the section on natural philosophy was not translated into Latin and so not known by Aquinas. Consequently, Aquinas' objection does not seem to be applicable to Avicenna's arguments based on time, which is Acar's general assessment.
At most this observation shows that more work needs to be done on Avicenna's theory of creation and its relation to Thomistic thought. Acar's Talking about God and Talking about Creation has certainly provided a solid foundation and helpful framework for such future research.
