Among the oldest of problems in the interpretation of Plato is how to understand Socrates's relationship to the intellectual ferment that preceded him and from one articulation of which he famously “turned.” The sophistic enlightenment, as it has been called, produced numerous intellectual luminaries, yet behind the “singular turning point and vortex” of world history, it always threatens to recede into the homogeneous blur of “pre-Socratic” thought, taking with it an apprehension of the distinctive features of the Socratic revolution. Robert Bartlett's new book Sophistry and Political Philosophy: Protagoras’ Challenge to Socrates both revives and focuses this old problem. By examining Plato's presentation of the challenge posed to Socrates by Protagoras, as that challenge is dramatized in the dialogues Protagoras and Theaetetus, Bartlett shows that Protagoras as much as Socrates is to be distinguished from the other pre-Socratics and sophists: perhaps they could as well have been called pre-Protagoreans. At stake in clarifying the distinction between Protagoras and Socrates is the rational soundness of the Socratic way of life and the very possibility of its self-justification before the tribunal of the most exacting standards of reason.
As the contributors to this symposium show, the potency of the inquiry is expressed in the number of deep and trenchant questions raised by the encounters between Socrates and Protagoras. What is the relationship between a certain Protagoras in the Theaetetus and that of his eponymous dialogue? How does this dramatic relationship inform the philosophic question of the relationship between the moral-political dimension of Protagoreanism and the cosmological, or as Bartlett stresses, theological principles at stake? What is the relationship between Protagoras's—real or apparent?—hedonism and his attachment to a certain noble sense of himself? How does this, in turn, figure in the question of the place of courage in the unity of the virtues? Is courage identical to or is it the basis of the other virtues? How does knowledge relate to the steadiness Bartlett discerns as the core of the Socratic way of life, and how is such steadiness to be related to the virtues?
In what follows, Ryan Balot, Roslyn Weiss, Waller R. Newell, and Paul Stern take up versions of these questions in their engagements with Bartlett. Bartlett responds in a short reply.
