This is a comparative study of policies to combat unemployment in Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, from the 1973 oil price shock to 2010. Methodologically, Mass Unemployment and the State is an exemplary qualitative comparative case study. The primary sources are official documents, mainly the government's or finance ministry's economic policy statements. Johannes Lindvall supplements these official documents with approximately 90 interviews with prime ministers, finance ministers, senior civil servants, and heads of central banks, as well as with the extensive comparative political economy literature on the four countries in five languages (English and the four national languages).
Lindvall aims to explain three transformations: 1) why Austria and Sweden successfully continued macroeconomic policies focused on maintaining full employment in the 1970s and 1980s, while Denmark and the Netherlands began to prioritize other macroeconomic goals with only a short lag after the first oil shock; 2) why Austria and Sweden also abandoned the prioritizing of full employment in the late 1980s and 1990s; and 3) why, beginning around 1990, Denmark and the Netherlands more aggressively introduced micro measures, active labor market policies, and unemployment insurance reforms, in order to achieve employment goals.
The author contrasts his argument to the “structural-institutional approach” to comparative political economy in which “variation in economic policy priorities in the 1970s and 1980s” is explained by variations in “labor market institutions and the relationship between governments and central banks” (pp. 2–3). Lindvall does not contend that this literature is wrong, but rather that it does not explain the contrasting developments in the four countries that he is interested in explicating. He points to developments in the party system and the patterns of corporatist bargaining in each country. Part of the explanation with regard to the party system is the increase in the number of parties in Denmark and the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, whereas in Austria and Sweden this did not happen until after 1980 (pp. 81, 118). But the sheer number of parties is only part of the story; more important is the development of parties that upset the traditional pattern of bargaining and coalition building. Thus, the development of right-wing anti-immigrant or populist parties in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, as well as the conversion of the Austrian liberals (FPÖ) to anti-immigrant populism, was much more destabilizing than just an increase in the number of parties.
The second part of Lindvall's explanation is the weakening or breakdown of corporatist interest-group bargaining. Here, the author does not depart so much from the received wisdom in comparative political economy. He rightly points to the distinction in the corporatism literature between those authors who emphasize the centralization of bargaining and union–employer confederations (e.g., Philippe Schmitter) and those who emphasize the tripartite policymaking (e.g., Gerhard Lehmbruch). It is that latter which is central to Lindvall's explanation. Thus, it is political: In Austria and Sweden, the highly integrated and tightly coupled arrangements in the party and interest-group bargaining systems remained in place in the 1970s and 1980s and macroeconomic policy remained focused on full employment. In Denmark and the Netherlands, these relationships decayed, and this was accompanied by a shift in macroeconomic policy to other targets, balance of payments and exchange rate (hard currency), respectively. As the postwar political and labor market relationship began to unravel after 1990, Sweden and Austria also ceased to target full employment, substituting low inflation and balanced budgets as their primary macroeconomic goals.
Lindvall's final empirical puzzle is why the Netherlands and Denmark turned more aggressively to microeconomic reform after the mid-1980s. As he points out, scholars (he cites economist Oliver Blanchard, sociologist Lane Kenworthy, and political scientist Cathie Jo Martin, but he could have cited many more) have increasingly come to agree that employment is maximized by labor market reforms that combine “enabling” (or positive) and “demanding” (or negative) activation. The package promoted by the European Employment Strategy (EES) typically involves shortening the duration of unemployment benefits and increasing job-seeking requirements, increasing spending on active labor markets policies for training and employment subsidies, among other things, and decreasing employment protection. Lindvall examines the first two. He finds that the long periods of high unemployment in Denmark and the Netherlands stimulated the turn in policy, and it was further facilitated by a revival of corporatism and new political coalitions enabled by the changing party systems.
Overall, the argument is convincing and, as I indicated previously, the book is very well researched. One can always quibble with some of the details. For example, I find it somewhat curious that Lindvall chose not to examine change in employment protection legislation (EPL), because it is part of the standard “flexicurity” package promoted by the EES. Moreover, changes in EPL follow a pattern that is predictable from Lindvall's argument: The reductions in EPL follow periods of high unemployment, and Austria, which has never had unemployment over 5.1%, has cut EPL very little.
I do find one ambiguity in the book. At several points, Lindvall addresses the argument that globalization, in particular capital market deregulation, made the changes in macroeconomic policy inevitable. While he initially says the he does “not argue that countries could have gone on pursuing full employment-oriented economic policies forever” (p. 25), he later seems to imply that these small countries had choices (pp. 134–36). I cannot rehearse the full argument here (see Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, “State Economic and Social Policy in Global Capitalism,” in Thomas Janoski et al., eds., A Handbook of Political Sociology, 2005, pp. 607–29), but let me focus narrowly on the question of the effects of decontrol of cross-border capital movements.
As Lindvall points out (p. 136), even before the end of capital controls, these small countries effectively lost control of cross-border capital movements. As a result of the elimination of controls on capital flows between countries, governments cannot control both the interest rate and exchange rate. If a government decides to pursue a stable exchange rate, which all of these countries did, it must accept the interest rate that is determined by international financial markets. The absence of capital controls makes the option of setting low interest rates while accepting a depreciating currency unattractive, as it results in inflation, which greatly complicates wage bargaining. With membership in the Economic and Monetary Union or fixed exchange rates, the wage gains above the European norm are translated immediately into loss of export markets and thus into higher unemployment. Thus, the only way for a small open country to achieve full employment is to target low inflation. Therefore, it is not really correct to say that Sweden and Austria abandoned the goal of full employment. Rather, the political leaders became convinced in this new international economic environment that full employment could only be reached if the country succeeded in keeping inflation low, which was exactly what Ingvar Carlson and Allan Larson, prime minister and finance minister, respectively, in the social democratic government in the early 1990s, told the author when he interviewed them a decade later (p. 112).
Lindvall's ambiguity on this point should not obscure the fact that Mass Unemployment and the State is a major accomplishment. I highly recommend it to scholars interested in the comparative political economy of contemporary Europe.
