Does this short and fascinating study of Bose in Germany answer the questions that hang over this highly controversial figure in the history of Indian nationalism? The author sees him as arriving in Berlin 3 April 1941 as a “bruised and battered politician” but, by the time of his departure on 8 February 1943 on board U-180 for Tokyo, accompanied by “a burnished political reputation”. The thrust of the argument in the book is to dispute an account of Bose as an Indian Quisling and to insist on his credentials as an anti-imperialist nationalist. The story of Bose and the Indian National Army retains a lurid glamour, one that Paul Scott drew on for his Raj Quartet. When Bose fled India in February 1941 he no doubt saw himself as of greater use in the struggle for independence as a free man but could not have foreseen that, with the arrest of the entire Congress High Command in August 1942, he would indeed be the only leading figure out of prison and remained so till Gandhi's early release in 1944. History, E. H. Carr argued, is on the side of those who succeed and, in the end, Bose failed. Is his reputation profoundly compromised by his alliance with the Axis powers? I think the real question to put to his time in Germany is whether it acted as a catalyst for his radical right tendencies or, as it is here argued, was but part of a realpolitik strategy for freedom?
A narrative approach is adopted in the book and this requires real concentration, for not only is it written with a great economy of style — there is never a wasted sentence — it is often tricky keeping up with Bose's ever adapting tactical moves. But then the situation was highly volatile, hence Bose was taken by surprise by Operation Barbarossa, Pearl Harbour and the fall of Singapore. On arrival he presented the German Foreign Office with his Plan for Co-operation Between the Axis Powers and India, its setting up an Indian government in Berlin and organising a 100,000 strong German army to invade India. Hayes suggests a more nuanced version of his plan: “what Bose hoped for was not a German invasion of India as much as a military spark which would incite Indian troops to revolt”. (p. 151) Were they to do so, the Raj would collapse. He shuttle-cocked between Rome and Berlin in his quest, though having earlier in his European journeys of the 1930s got on so well with Mussolini, he began to share German doubts about his reliability. In time he abandoned hopes of a tripartite declaration by the Axis powers on the future independence of India, partly through gaining piece-meal some of his objectives. The Free India Centre was, for example, set up in Berlin, 2 November 1941, together with the Free India Radio. Bose shared a Nazi belief in the importance of propaganda. Increasingly, as Japan became ever more involved with India, Bose's priority was to find a way to reach Tokyo and then S E Asia and the Indian National Army, be it in a suspect experimental Italian plane or by a Japanese or German submarine. The Provisional Government of Free India was set up in Singapore in October 1943, and Bose, apart from already being Supreme Commander of the INA, was its Head of State, Prime Minister, Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Japan gave it the Andaman Islands in December.
Just how sympathetic was Bose to fascism? There can be no doubting from this account on how well he got on with the Nazi leadership. He and Ribbentrop immediately jelled through a common dislike of Britain; Ribbentrop felt he had been humiliated whilst Ambassador. It does throw the whole story of wartime India into a new perspective to discover how engaged the Nazi leadership became with Bose and India. Goebbels looked on Gandhi as a fool and Bose as the coming man. Himmler gave Free India unstinting support, as so happily had a cohort of Indians trained for the Gestapo, and he Himmler displayed a surprising knowledge of Indian sacred literature. Why, he wanted to know, had the Aryan warrior tribes, the Rajputs, Mahrattas and Sikhs, been subdued by the British? Hitler in contrast saw the Raj as an Aryan achievement. If long delayed, there was Bose's extraordinary meeting with Hitler greeting him as a fellow old revolutionary. Hitler and Bose shared, it is here argued, an emotional and extremist temperament, both high risk-takers. Hitler, in his usual fanciful way, wondered what to do after Barborossa and conjured up the idea of invading India. In the end a surprising realism took over and he would only entertain any idea of an independent India were the German army to be with any real possibility of ‘liberating’ India.
Hayes claims, however, that Bose increasingly dominated this dialogue: “Bose acted with remarkable independence, at times even contempt, to Nazi policy” (p. 147); “in the end, Bose obtained more from Germany than it did from him” (p 162). But the appalling fact remains that Bose at no point, then or later, spoke out against the atrocities of this genocidal state. Is it enough just, as one reviewer has done, to see him as a myopic anti-imperialist? And just as one might really doubt if the Nazi leadership in courting Bose did act so out of character with its racial agenda — Himmler was obsessed by Aryanism and Hitler was just opportunist in disclaiming his anti-Indian diatribe of Mein Kamf in his meeting with Bose — so the claim that Bose stood his ground with the Nazi leadership cannot remove the worrying possibility that he shared the values of the radical right.
Versions of socialism and nationalism are essential ingredients of fascism. But commitment to both does not necessarily lead to fascism as the very different trajectories in the outlook of Nehru and Bose reveals: Nehru was always a staunch anti-fascist. Yet Bose shared Nehru's intellectual charm. In the inter-war period political idealists like Bose had also to adjust to the radical modernising tendencies of the totalitarian systems of Soviet communism and later Nazism. Bose quite probably was always more strongly attracted to the Soviet model. Bose made sure the Indian Legion in Europe was never diverted to the Eastern front. At the least his ideology was a synthesis of both Communism and Fascism. Early on Bose displayed worrying fascist tendencies. He turned up at the Calcutta Congress in 1928 in his capacity as Commander of the Congress Volunteer Militia wearing military uniform. In a speech to as mayor to the Calcutta Corporation in August 1930 he looked to the efficiency and discipline of fascism for India's future. In his The Indian Struggle 1920–34 in his vision of a rapidly industrialising economy he defended the supremacy of the state and one-party rule. In a major speech in Tokyo in 1944 he saw the first priority as the reform of the army and the making of a new officer corps. Here was no democrat. But nor was a he a racist. The enigma of Bose lies rather in his version of nationalism.
Highly indicative was his relationship with Gandhi. His first encounter, 16 July 1921, the young Bose having rejected a place in the ICS in favour of joining the freedom struggle, was a disaster. Bose never really altered his belief that Gandhi's non-violence and rural outlook was the wrong strategy, though such was his own nationalist sensibility he always rankled when others attacked Gandhi. Occasionally Gandhi pleased him, such as by meeting Mussolini in 1931.Gandhi himself always sought ways of placating the Young Turks in Congress and engineered Bose's election as President n 1938 only to sabotage his attempts at re-election in 1939. Bose was driven to set up his own faction, the Forward Bloc, if still within Congress. Then came that extraordinary seeming convergence of attitudes as Gandhi rejected the Cripps proposals and instigated the Quit India satyagraha in August 1942, Azad convinced that Gandhi was influenced by Bose. The extraordinary out burst of feeling for Bose following the false rumour of his death in an air crash showed that Bose still held great sway in India. But the convergence is misleading, for Gandhi was above all concerned to preserve his policy of non-violence and stood for neutrality. He was ready to compromise with Nehru's wish to support the Allies though by allowing the presence of British troops in India to meet the threat of Japanese invasion. Bose meanwhile told his German friends Gandhi was no longer relevant to the struggle. Besides, he felt the rebellion had come too soon — he wanted it to coincide with the German or Japanese invasion. In total contrast to Gandhi, Bose believed the ends justified the means and was prepared to do anything to attain independence: “it was always all or nothing: now or never”. (p. 35)
Bose encountered many varieties of nationalism in the course of setting up his army in exile. There was Mohammed Shedai in Italy, a former Ghadar activist, with his abortive Free India Detachment. Here was mutual contempt, with Bose wholly hostile to Shedai's pro-Muslim stance: Bose always argued Indian Muslims would have to be assimilated. There was the communist A.C. Nambiar who, under Bose, set up another Free India Centre in Paris: it was he who wrote of Bose's ‘perfect naturalness’. Hayes claims such communist loyalties was always no more than a screen for anti–imperialist nationalism. And was the reason why Bose himself did not become a communist, a reluctance to give up an Indian loyalty for a Soviet? Interestingly, there was to be real racial tension in France, with the Indian Legion hated for its behaviour. Bose was an integral nationalist and insisted that all India POWs, whatever caste or religion, in contrast to the Indian army, should all be as one in the Legion. But there were but 15,000 POWs in Europe and the real focus of Bose's military activity had clearly to be in SE Asia and there he encountered the former Bengal terrorist and would-be assassin of Lord Hardinge, Rash Behari Bose. It would be wrong to see Bose as a precursor of the Hindu nationalism of the RSS and the BJP, for he was always an aggressive secularist. Had Bose not been on the wrong side of History he would have brought a far more authoritarian version of nationalism to bear on India, with a rejection of Nehru's soft state as Gunnar Myrdal defined it. He would surely have had no qualms in endorsing Mrs Gandhi's Emergency Regime. Is there any parallel to a maverick figure like Bose, his supping with what he should have seen as India's natural enemies? But he is more of a Roger Casement figure than a William Joyce.
This is Hayes's first book and it is an impressive beginning. The book also has striking photographs, a telling chronology of Bose's place in world events, some key documents and a Bose bibliographical essay. An interesting follow-up would be a similarly detailed account of Bose's subsequent dealings with Japan.
