I

On 1 May 2011, United States (US) Navy Seals departed Afghanistan for an obscure compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. US intelligence officials had determined that this compound housed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qa'ida, which was responsible for the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks inside the United States, as well as others in Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Jordon, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The Navy Seals' objective was to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.Footnote ¹ They accomplished this objective, killing bin Laden in the midst of the raid and, thus, ending a ten-year hunt for the man ultimately held responsible by the United States and its allies for the deaths of thousands. But the story of al-Qa'ida did not end with his death. One year later, in May 2012, a Saudi undercover spy alerted his handlers to a plot by Yemen's al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to once again bomb American passenger jets, using a device that would likely have been undetected by security scanners.Footnote ² Further, in August 2013, multiple US, British, German, French, and Dutch embassies closed in response to an unspecified al-Qa'ida threat and Interpol warning on prison breaks by al-Qa'ida fighters.Footnote ³

These recent plots underscore that much has yet to be learned about al-Qa'ida. What factors have influenced al-Qa'ida leaders over time as they have made and executed strategic decisions? And, how have they defined their relationship with affiliated groups in the context of these decisions? Government officials, terrorism experts, and pundits have posited the answers to some of these questions. Al-Qa'ida more often than not has been understood as a franchise with branches in Iraq, Somalia, Mali, and elsewhere, independent from senior al-Qa'ida leadership.Footnote ⁴ Osama bin Laden was assumed to be the charismatic figurehead of al-Qa'ida with strategic thinking provided by his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.Footnote ⁵ And, equally significant, the death of Osama bin Laden led many to conclude that al-Qa'ida senior leaders were irrelevant and, increasingly, the primary threat to Western countries emanated from individual terrorists.Footnote ⁶

This article presents an alternative perspective to this conventional wisdom. It argues that, until his death in 2011, Osama bin Laden played an active role in al-Qa'ida's strategic direction. Since that time, other al-Qa'ida leaders have remained relevant to the jihadi movement, even if their central role has been questioned.Footnote ⁷ It also addresses al-Qa'ida's struggle to define its relationship with allies. Rather than interpret this struggle as a sign of weakness, this present article instead argues that it is to be expected of an organization broadening its appeal beyond a few clandestine supporters. So it is too soon to conclude that al-Qa'ida has been degraded and no longer represents a global threat.

To make these arguments, this article relies primarily on new evidence gathered by US and allied security forces on the battlefield that became available in May 2012. During the raid on his Abbottabad compound, US Navy Seals not only killed Osama bin Laden, but also confiscated computers and thumb drives that reportedly contained thousands of al-Qa'ida letters, memos, and other communication.Footnote ⁸ One year later, the US government released a small fraction of these original source materials. Seventeen letters to and from Osama bin Laden, written between September 2006 to April 2011, were provided to the public via the West Point Military Academy in their original Arabic and English translations. Albeit limited in number, when combined with other documents captured in Afghanistan and Iraq (235 have been released via West Point), these letters represent a valuable archive of source material for those interested in historical research on clandestine groups.

II

A number of challenges exist for scholars who wish to conduct historical research on clandestine organizations. These challenges often are the same for those who examine intelligence agencies, terrorist groups, transnational gangs, or even more obscure underground networks. Membership is hidden. Separate cells or components of the organization do not know what others are doing. Documents routinely are destroyed either by group members or security officials. Thus, much of the exploratory work on clandestine groups tends to fall to investigative journalists. For example, Parmy Olson, the London bureau chief for Forbes, recently published a book on computer hackers, entitled, We are anonymous. Olson layered interview on top of interview to form a narrative of the hackers who wreaked havoc on PayPal, Fox, Sony, and the CIA, amongst others. Yet Olson acknowledged that she did not know the true identity of many interviewees and they often lied to her.Footnote ⁹ Similar limitations exist for individuals who attempt to investigate terrorist groups. Interviewees may or may not fully disclose their role in a clandestine organization. They may otherwise lie to researchers; lies that are difficult to disprove. Of course, these limitations do not negate the value of interviews-based research, but they require researchers to overcome many challenges.Footnote ¹⁰

One approach to overcoming these challenges is to utilize letters, diaries, internal memos, and other private documents. The advantage of these materials is that they allow scholars to interpret events through the lens of those who experienced them, at the time that they were experiencing them. As such, archival materials of this type provide valuable insight into the evolving attitudes, beliefs, and deliberations of their authors. In 2008, the Historical Journal published an article entitled, ‘The early history of al-Qa'ida’.Footnote ¹¹ This article argued for the application of historical methods to the study of terrorism. It observed that the utility of historical research is especially evident if archives of clandestine organizations exist. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization moved its private documents to the Orient House, East Jerusalem, following the 1993 Oslo Accords. The National Archives in London contain documents captured from the Provisional Irish Republican Army. And, more recently, the US government has begun to release captured al-Qa'ida documents through the West Point Military Academy.

As an extension of ‘The early history of al-Qa'ida’, this present article uses these archived materials to inform its core analysis. Many of the al-Qa'ida documents cited were captured by security forces on the battlefield and released to the general public. The materials include, for example, letters written by Osama bin Laden to the leaders of associated groups, such as Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the leader of Yemen's AQAP, or Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of Harakat ‘al-Shabaab’ al-Mujahideen in Somalia. The materials also incorporate letters written to Osama bin Laden by colleagues and sympathizers, providing criticism, encouragement, and advice. Finally, the materials also include private communications between senior al-Qa'ida leaders as they debated strategic decisions. These primary sources help illuminate the perspectives, attitudes, and eventual decisions made by al-Qa'ida leaders over time.

Yet historical research of this nature comes with its own pitfalls. Sometimes, only a small fraction of archived materials exist or, in this case, are released by government agencies. These gaps require historians to contextualize the writings within broader geopolitical dynamics as well as understand personalities, biases, and internal debates that might also affect the authors' perspectives. To account for these pitfalls, this present article augments the archived sources with other historical accounts, such as autobiographies, leaflets, and other materials released by media-centres connected to al-Qa'ida. While it would be easy to dismiss these alternative sources as propaganda, they often highlight how al-Qa'ida leaders interpret geopolitical events. Equally important, they illustrate how al-Qa'ida leaders have attempted to explain their own actions to sympathizers over time. And, fortunately, for students of al-Qa'ida's broader network, these documents abound. Al-Qa'ida pamphlets have exploded onto the internet, hosted by its website, as-Sahab, as well as mainstream media. This article, therefore, combines archived materials with public statements and other accounts to revisit al-Qa'ida's trajectory between 2004 and 2013.

The following paragraphs are organized chronologically. This organizational structure parallels the previous article entitled, ‘The early history of al-Qa'ida’. Section III addresses al-Qa'ida's rapid operational expansion into Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and North Africa between 2004 and 2006. It argues that during this period of its trajectory al-Qa'ida senior leaders failed to anticipate the inherent tension between affiliates' tactical objectives and the need for al-Qa'ida to maintain a wide network of sympathizers beyond the immediate areas of conflict. Section IV examines a scramble by al-Qa'ida senior leaders to adjust to criticism emanating from sympathizers and regain its broader appeal, which remained the priority until Osama bin Laden's death in 2011. Finally, section V discusses the post-Osama bin Laden al-Qa'ida, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, and specifically the conflict in Syria.

III

Between 2004 and 2006 al-Qa'ida experienced unprecedented support and expansion. It appeared as if new branches of al-Qa'ida emerged in country after country, such as al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).Footnote ¹² These affiliated groups articulated an allegiance to bin Laden, affirmed a basic belief in al-Qa'ida's revolutionary objectives, and pledged to do their part locally.Footnote ¹³ In theory, this entailed armed struggled against a combination of the near enemy (Arab or other Muslim governments) and the far enemy (US or other Western targets).Footnote ¹⁴ Yet affiliates' interpretation and execution of ‘their part’ created new challenges for al-Qa'ida senior leaders in Pakistan.

Much has been written about al-Qa'ida's basic ideology and revolutionary objectives.Footnote ¹⁵ The primary rationale can be found in a leaflet entitled, Defense of Muslim lands, which was written and published in the 1980s by Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Arab and one of the founders of Maktab al-Khidamat, the precursor to al-Qa'ida.Footnote ¹⁶ Azzam's leaflet argued that it was an individual religious duty (fard ayn) for Muslims, as well as the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifaya), to support the Afghan jihad, because the Afghans were helpless in the face of invading forces.Footnote ¹⁷ Ayman al-Zawahiri subsequently expanded Azzam's argument to include overthrowing ‘corrupt’ Arab regimes, naming them kuffar (infidels) and murtadeen (apostates).Footnote ¹⁸ Further still, others within the jihadi movement, sometimes referred to as takfiris, have used al-Zawahiri's logic to justify attacks against entire Muslim communities deemed apostates, primarily Shia populations.Footnote ¹⁹ Simply put, while most within the jihadi movement arguably agree with Azzam's defensive jihad, schisms exist beyond that basic rationale. And, along with these schisms, come strategic challenges for al-Qa'ida senior leaders.

Indeed, the emergence of new al-Qa'ida affiliates brought pressure on the control exerted by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri over the strategic direction of al-Qa'ida as well as its reputation within the wider movement. Many of the new branches seemingly conducted attacks that undermined al-Qa'ida leaders' agenda. Some observers concluded that al-Qa'ida must function like a franchise, with senior leaders providing strategic guidance and local leaders making day-to-day decisions on tactics.Footnote ²⁰ Recently released letters from bin Laden's compound suggest an alternative explanation: al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan were not simply issuing guidance that was ignored writ large. Instead, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri did not anticipate the extent to which tactical mistakes on the battlefield would negatively affect al-Qa'ida elsewhere. Moreover, because al-Qa'ida leaders were in the midst of expanding their campaign beyond Afghanistan, they prioritized a relationship with affiliates above any potential backlash.

Some debate remains on whether or not Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri expected the United States and its allies to invade Afghanistan in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Peter Bergen, in his book entitled Manhunt, argued that bin Laden believed the United States would retaliate with a missile strike.Footnote ²¹ In contrast, al-Zawahiri's book, Knights under the prophets banner, suggested that al-Qa'ida anticipated a US invasion.Footnote ²² Regardless, it is abundantly clear that al-Qa'ida leaders did not foresee the subsequent invasion of Iraq in March 2003. From al-Qa'ida's perspective, the Iraq invasion presented it with an unprecedented opportunity to expand the revolution into the heart of the Arab world.

This perspective was articulated in an oft-cited letter sent by al-Qa'ida senior leaders (specifically al-Zawahiri) in Pakistan to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQI, in July 2005. This letter was captured in Iraq by security forces and released to the public. It opened as follows,

It would be easy to interpret this statement as hindsight from al-Zawahiri and conclude that he changed his focus from Afghanistan to Iraq only after al-Zarqawi's successes. But it makes sense that al-Zawahiri would be interested primarily in the Arab world. He came to join al-Qa'ida through his membership, and indeed leadership role in, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. According to his autobiography, ‘Bitter harvest’, al-Zawahiri began to believe as a youth that Arab governments were kuffar and thus it was a duty to wage war against them.Footnote ²⁴ Moreover, a former colleague of al-Zawahiri's, Montasser al-Zayyat, testified that al-Zawahiri tried to convince bin Laden that Arab fighters in Afghanistan should form their own units, rather than integrate with Afghan fighters.Footnote ²⁵ This testimony can be substantiated further through other autobiographies that have described tensions and divergences in priorities between Arabs and non-Arabs within al-Qa'ida over the years.Footnote ²⁶ Given this context, it is easy to believe al-Zawahiri's enthusiasm for an al-Qa'ida-driven revolution in the Arab world.

Events initially confirmed the perspective of al-Qa'ida leaders that the Iraq invasion represented an unprecedented opportunity. Foreign fighters flowed into Iraq. Suicide bombings wreaked havoc on US and other allied forces. And al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan benefited from the publicity generated by tactical successes against Western forces in Iraq. Two years after Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, things began to go wrong for al-Qa'ida. AQI fighters soon expanded their targets to Shia pilgrims and holy sites. In September 2005, al-Zarqawi went so far as to declare war against Iraq's Shia population.Footnote ²⁷ AQI also executed politicians and Sunni tribal leaders. These attacks, and others conducted outside of Iraq, caused media outlets to observe and report a backlash against al-Qa'ida.Footnote ²⁸ Surveys also indicated a retraction of public sympathy for al-Qa'ida in the Muslim world between 2002 and 2005.Footnote ²⁹

Things only got worse for al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. In November 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claimed a series of suicide bombings at Western hotels in Amman, Jordan on behalf of al-Qa'ida in Iraq. These three bombings killed approximately fifty people, primarily Muslims, including twenty guests of a wedding reception.Footnote ³⁰ In response, tens of thousands of Jordanians marched against al-Qa'ida and in support of King Abdullah.Footnote ³¹ Other significant voices in the Muslim world also responded negatively to this attack and, correspondingly, so did al-Qa'ida senior leaders.Footnote ³² ‘Atiyah Abdul Rahman wrote another letter to al-Zarqawi in December 2005, rebuking him for this attack in Jordan and requiring him to co-ordinate all future attacks outside of Iraq with al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan.

These two letters, and al-Zarqawi's reaction to them, provide insight into the relationship between al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan and affiliates during this period of expansion. Senior al-Qa'ida leaders rebuked al-Zarqawi two times, first, somewhat softly in July 2005 and, second, more strenuously in December 2005. Between these two communiqués, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi not only continued his brutal campaign, but also declared war against Shia populations in Iraq. It is, therefore, easy to conclude that al-Qa'ida leaders could not control AQI. The question remains, however, why didn't al-Qa'ida senior leaders publicly repudiate al-Zarqawi?

The logical conclusion is that al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan valued their ties to affiliates above public sentiment. Or, as a corollary, at least believed that al-Qa'ida could absorb any negative attention without irreparable damage. Part of this prioritization was pragmatic: AQI generated much-needed funds for al-Qa'ida leaders and fighters in Pakistan.Footnote ³⁴ But it also appears to have gone beyond mere funds supplied by AQI, because al-Qa'ida senior leaders dealt similarly with other affiliates. In fact, AQI was not the only affiliate causing problems for al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan at this time. Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula operated from Saudi Arabia from May 2003 through 2006. Estimated to have approximately 500 members, AQAP was responsible for a number of high-profile attacks, including three suicide bombings against Western housing complexes in Riyadh. In response, Saudi Arabia mounted an intensive counter-terrorism campaign against AQAP, their family members and supporters, in 2005 and 2006. Leaders were arrested. Safe houses were shut down. Financial and media centres were raided and all associated individuals detained.Footnote ³⁵ Many AQAP fighters were forced to flee to Yemen.

This campaign apparently prompted a close associate of bin Laden to write him a letter in an effort to persuade al-Qa'ida to halt attacks in Saudi Arabia. After establishing the author's credibility, this fascinating letter issued a rebuke, stating that bin Laden and his inner circle were not thinking clearly, ‘being chased, besieged, and distant is not the best environment for thinking and for forming the right opinion and decision’.Footnote ³⁶ The author continued on to argue that al-Qa'ida should focus its attacks in areas of ongoing conflict, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, rather than Gulf countries. He asserted that attacks in Saudi Arabia, and most likely the consequential actions by the Kingdom, had a negative impact on al-Qa'ida worldwide. The author's logic was that residents of Saudi Arabia supplied al-Qa'ida with most of its fighters and financial resources; thus, counter-terrorism pressure against the ‘rear base’ hurt all of al-Qa'ida.

Significantly, the author's description of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries as a ‘rear base’ was not new or unique. Senior al-Qa'ida strategist, Abu Musab al-Suri, also has made similar arguments.Footnote ³⁸ But, while it is possible that this letter was written by al-Suri to Osama bin Laden, it seems unlikely, as al-Suri was arrested in Pakistan in 2005 and extradited to Syria.

Despite its unknown authorship, this letter further illuminates the challenges faced by al-Qa'ida as they expanded their revolution throughout the Muslim world. First, al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan relied upon affiliates to execute al-Qa'ida's strategy, as well as generate funds and media attention. And, sometimes, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri could not control affiliates' actions. This first challenge has been discussed extensively.Footnote ³⁹ It was relatively simple for al-Qa'ida leaders to reconcile: they provided suggestions and guidance without threatening to terminate the relationship even if they could not have absolute command and control. The second challenge was more difficult for al-Qa'ida leaders to reconcile. Al-Qa'ida sympathizers, such as the author of the above letter, held bin Laden and al-Zawahiri responsible for affiliates' actions. And, through their actions, some affiliates began to damage al-Qa'ida's relationship with its broader network of sympathizers, who resided outside immediate areas of conflict. This threatened al-Qaida leaders' ability to recruit and fundraise. It also undermined al-Qa'ida's ability to broaden its appeal and, therefore influence.

IV

Beginning in 2007, in an effort to rebuild its relationship with sympathizers, al-Qa'ida leaders made a concerted effort to shape the tactical decisions of their affiliates. While they did not go so far as to disavow affiliates if they ignored or disobeyed these instructions, al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan issued public statements on how and when to conduct terrorist attacks; a departure from the previous confidential communiqués. Al-Qa'ida senior leaders also escalated a public outreach effort on the internet. These efforts suggest a shift in al-Qa'ida leaders' prioritization: while they likely still valued their relationships with affiliates – and affiliates' ability to promote al-Qa'ida's campaign – al-Qa'ida leaders believed it was equally important to prevent any future backlash.

For example, al-Qa'ida issued a statement by strategist Abu Musab al-Suri in February 2007 that contained instructions to fighters in Yemen,

It was not new for al-Qa'ida leaders to issue instructions – publicly or in private – to affiliates on the prioritization of targets. In December 2004, al-Qa'ida released a statement by bin Laden urging fighters to attack oil infrastructure in the Arab world.Footnote ⁴¹ But the outreach by al-Qa'ida senior leaders to affiliates, as illustrated by the above quotation, went beyond these propaganda-like statements and took on the tone of explicit priorities in 2007.

Some evidence also suggests that al-Qa'ida affiliates, if not obeyed, then at least attempted to adjust their behaviour to fall in line with the concerns of al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan. For example, in 2007 US forces captured a letter from AQI to a local Sheikh in Mosul, apologizing for causing the deaths of some of his people. AQI leaders also offer to compensate the Sheikh for his losses. The letter suggests awareness on the part of AQI that it needed to work to maintain popular support locally.Footnote ⁴² Other al-Qa'ida affiliates also adjusted their propaganda and behaviour, demonstrating new sensitivity both to local support populations and those outside their immediate areas of conflict. Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, for example, issued a public statement in February 2008 claiming its attacks were aimed solely at the ‘apostate government and its masters of the Jews and the Christians’ and not ‘innocent Muslim brothers’.Footnote ⁴³ Similarly, in May 2008, AQAP issued a statement declaring that they would work to remove all non-Muslim influences from the Arabian Peninsula and threatened to attack foreigners in Yemen.Footnote ⁴⁴ This statement was followed by attacks against the US embassy in Sana'a (2008) as well as tourists and government officials from South Korea (2009). These statements reflect a credible effort to portray al-Qa'ida fighters as attacking Western targets; ideologically speaking, these statements leaned away from a ‘takfiri rationale’ and towards defensive jihad. The statements also reached beyond residents of North Africa or Yemen and towards al-Qa'ida's wider audience. This suggests that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri's campaign had some impact.

Beyond providing guidance to its affiliates, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri also initiated a complementary effort to help address the backlash of public opinion that al-Qa'ida suffered between 2004 and 2006. Specifically, bin Laden issued a series of statements aimed at mollifying supporters, as illustrated by a December 2007 speech entitled, ‘The way to contain the conspiracies’, in which he commented, ‘I wish to reassure the Muslims in general and our people in neighbouring countries in particular that they will only see good from the Mujahideen, Allah willing, for we are your sons who are fighting for the religion of the Ummah and its sons.’Footnote ⁴⁵

Additionally, al-Zawahiri made himself available to questioners through an online forum. Published in the spring of 2008, al-Zawahiri's answers addressed many of the concerns articulated by sympathizers and critics in the open media and on the internet. These concerns ranged from AQIM's killings of innocent bystanders in suicide attacks in North Africa to AQI's beheadings of hostages to al-Qa'ida's absence from the fight against Israel in the Palestinian territories. One excerpt illustrates the theme in al-Zawahiri's answers to accusations of killing innocent – mostly Muslim – bystanders: ‘we haven't killed the innocents, not in Baghdad, nor in Morocco, nor in Algeria, nor anywhere else. And if there is any innocent who was killed in the mujahideen's operations, then it was either an unintentional error, or out of necessity as in cases of al-Tatarrus [taking of human shields by the enemy].’Footnote ⁴⁶

It would be easy to argue that these two parallel efforts to reverse disapproval amongst its supporters were not the result of a new strategic decision for al-Qa'ida, but rather more of the same. Private al-Qa'ida materials suggest otherwise. Perhaps one of the most insightful documents found in the Abbottabad compound was a letter from Osama bin Laden to ‘Atiyah Abdul Rahman, appointing him what could be considered al-Qa'ida's foreign secretary. In this May 2010 letter, bin Laden reflected over the successes and mistakes made by al-Qa'ida between 2004 and 2010. Al-Qa'ida's media campaign was identified as a success and the killing of Muslims on the battlefield as a mistake.

Equally interesting, in this same letter Osama bin Laden solicited ‘Atiyah's advice on how best to prioritize al-Qa'ida resources going forward. In shaping this question, it is clear that bin Laden still wanted to use al-Qa'ida resources to threaten the United States and, subsequently, support ongoing conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan or Yemen. Bin Laden also tempered his desire to attack US interests with concern over the potential for Muslim casualties.Footnote ⁴⁸

Some commentators have read this letter and concluded that Osama bin Laden did not realize the limited operational capabilities of al-Qa'ida at the time.Footnote ⁴⁹ But other explanations also exist. This present article argues that the letter is best interpreted within its broader context. As such, it is significant first, as a reflection of the continuing debate within al-Qa'ida leaders about whether to prioritize the ‘far enemy’ versus the ‘near enemy’. But, second, and more importantly, it reinforces the observation of bin Laden's concern, or even obsession with, restoring al-Qa'ida's position at the vanguard of the wider jihadi movement.

Finally, somewhat tangentially, within this same letter, Osama bin Laden told ‘Atiyah to inform al-Qa'ida affiliates that they must consult with both al-Qa'ida Central and other supporters within their respective regions as they move forward with their campaigns.

Osama bin Laden's borrowing of the term ‘Central al-Qa'ida’ in this statement is fascinating. It highlights one of the key arguments in this article: al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan struggled to define their relationship with affiliates and supporters, just as terrorism experts worldwide similarly struggled. This struggle, in part, might have been due to the overly ambitious agendas of affiliated leaders and their tactical mistakes. It is also likely that the counter-terrorism campaign waged by the United States and its allies had put enough pressure on al-Qa'ida Central by this time that much of the personal ties that held its network together had been broken. Either way, this article argues that the statement – and this letter to ‘Atiyah in its entirety – reflected a turning point for bin Laden; somewhere between 2009 and 2010 bin Laden had begun to weight al-Qa'ida's global reputation as more important than its relationships with local affiliates.

Other evidence further substantiates this argument. In August 2010, for example, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of al-Shabaab, requested to join al-Qa'ida officially. Portions of Osama bin Laden's response to al-Zubayr have been excerpted below. Essentially, bin Laden rejected al-Zubayr's application. Bin Laden provided al-Zubayr with a number of explanations for why he would not publicly recognize al-Shabaab. Amongst the more explicit reasons, this letter also suggests that Osama bin Laden was worried al-Shabaab's activities in Somalia would reflect poorly on al-Qa'ida worldwide.

Osama bin Laden further explained his rejection in this letter, claiming that if al-Shabaab officially joined al-Qa'ida, the United States and its allies would focus greater attention and resources on the conflict in Somalia. But, equally interesting, bin Laden also stressed that al-Shabaab needed to minimize its attacks and the suffering caused to Muslims in Somalia.Footnote ⁵² Taken together with the letter to ‘Atiyah, Osama bin Laden appears to have rejected al-Shabaab's application to join al-Qa'ida at least in part because he was worried that their attacks against other Somali Muslims would negatively affect not only al-Shabaab's popular support, but also al-Qa'ida's in general.

Not everybody in al-Qa'ida's leadership council agreed with this decision. The Abbottabad archives contain a letter written to Osama bin laden from an unknown person on the leadership council – possibly Ayman al-Zawahiri – that expressed his disagreement. The letter represents one of the few original source materials to provide insight into dissent between members of al-Qa'ida Central. It is notable that the author asked bin Laden to reconsider his decision, stating ‘please reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession of the brothers of Somalia so as not to be pressured later on to announce our disassociation with them or with others’.Footnote ⁵³ Interestingly, as mentioned in the introduction to this article, many experts believed at the time that al-Zawahiri had the greatest influence on al-Qa'ida's strategy, not bin Laden. This request suggests that, on the contrary, bin Laden still had the final say on matters of strategic import.

With respect to the substance of this letter, the author appears to be refuting those who thought that al-Qa'ida should have been more selective in its membership. This letter's author clearly believed that it was worth taking on new members – affiliated groups and other non-affiliated volunteers – and assuming the risk that their behaviour might hurt al-Qa'ida's global reputation.

It is unclear whether or not this letter of dissent was written by al-Zawahiri or another member of al-Qa'ida's leadership council. But no evidence exists to suggest that it persuaded bin Laden to change his mind between 2010 and his death in 2011. Osama bin Laden apparently remained risk averse when it came to anything that might weaken popular opinion of al-Qa'ida. After Osama bin Laden's death, al-Qa'ida Central did change course. In February 2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in his new leadership capacity, welcomed al-Shabaab into al-Qa'ida's broader network.Footnote ⁵⁵

In summary, al-Qa'ida documents, released by al-Qa'ida media forums and captured on the battlefield by US forces, reveal a shift in al-Qa'ida Central's priorities from expanding al-Qa'ida's affiliates to protecting its global reputation. Al-Qa'ida Central initially tried to split the difference: between 2007 and 2009 it attempted to make affiliates more sensitive to popular opinion both on the battlefield and in the wider Muslim world. This effort was somewhat successful. Success can be seen in statements issued by affiliates that stressed their objectives vis-à-vis Western targets. It also was evidenced by shifts in affiliates' behaviour. Yet, even with these successes, Osama bin laden, in particular, remained very concerned about al-Qa'ida's global reputation. By 2010, this concern held priority over expanding al-Qa'ida Central's relationship with local affiliates. It led bin Laden to reject al-Shabaab's overtures to join with al-Qa'ida; a decision that held sway until his death.

V

In what was likely one of Osama bin Laden's last letter's to ‘Atiyah prior to his death, he solicited advice on how al-Qa'ida should react to the Arab Spring. Dated 26 April 2011, bin Laden opened this letter with an assessment of the uprisings. He also wrote of his belief that the United States was concerned that the upheaval would provide opportunities for Islamists to gain control over large swaths of the Arab world.Footnote ⁵⁶ Osama bin Laden's commentary made it clear that al-Qa'ida was taken aback by the uprisings. And, while he wanted the uprisings to overthrow Arab leaders viewed by most of al-Qa'ida as corrupt, bin Laden was especially interested in supporting rioters who might replace contemporary leaders with those aware of Islamist principles.

Beyond Osama bin Laden's philosophical approach to the uprisings, this letter to ‘Atiyah also revealed that al-Qa'ida leaders felt some pressure from their membership to let fighters return home in support of these revolutions. Bin Laden instructed ‘Atiyah to grant permission to al-Qa'ida fighters in Pakistan to return home under certain conditions; namely, if the routes home were safe.Footnote ⁵⁸ Five days later bin Laden was killed.

Soon thereafter, Ayman al-Zawahiri replaced bin Laden as al-Qa'ida's most senior leader. While few internal al-Qa'ida documents have been released since the raid on Abbottabad, other statements and events suggest that al-Zawahiri has steered al-Qa'ida Central back to the priorities of the period between 2004 and 2009: namely, al-Zawahiri has been more willing to risk censure due to affiliates' actions. And, while al-Zawahiri has issued guidance regularly, he has not gone so far as to reject new members or repudiate those who contradict him, even under extreme circumstances. This position can be seen most clearly in how al-Zawahiri has responded to the conflict in Syria.

In February 2012, Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a video statement on the ongoing conflict in Syria between opposition forces, assisted by al-Qa'ida fighters under the rubric of Jabhat al-Nusra (or the al-Nusra Front) and Bashar al-Assad's regime. Entitled, ‘Move forward O Lions of Sham [Syria]’, al-Zawahiri praised al-Nusra fighters for their bravery and encouraged others to support their fight against the Assad regime. Yet, at the same time, al-Zawahiri warned al-Nusra against partnering with the United States, Turkey, or other Arab governments. In this sense, al-Zawahiri made it clear that al-Qa'ida Central, unsurprisingly, supported the creation of an Islamist government in Syria more than just the overthrow of the secular Assad regime.

Despite this video statement, al-Qa'ida's relationship with al-Nusra Front was debated extensively in the media and online forums.Footnote ⁶⁰ Was al-Nusra Front officially part of al-Qa'ida? Or was it simply drawing on the skills and expertise of al-Qa'ida fighters? The debate over al-Nusra Front and its relationship to al-Qa'ida Central culminated in a statement by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of AQI, in mid-April 2013. In this statement, al-Baghdadi claimed that AQI helped birth al-Nusra Front and, more importantly, that AQI and al-Nusra were merging into one al-Qa'ida affiliate. Part of this statement has been included below.

Unfortunately for Ayman al-Zawahiri and other members of the al-Qa'ida in Pakistan, al-Baghdadi apparently did not consult with them prior to making this announcement. In fact, he also did not consult with al-Nusra leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani. The next day, al-Jawlani released his own video statement, refuting the merger, and pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, not Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.Footnote ⁶²

Interestingly, albeit somewhat tangentially, al-Jawlani was careful to note that al-Nusra would not change its behaviour, even as it was joining officially with al-Qa'ida Central in Pakistan.Footnote ⁶³ He said, ‘We reassure our brothers in Syria that al-Nusra Front's behavior will remain faithful to the image you have come to know, and that our allegiance (to al-Qa'ida) will not affect our politics in any way.’Footnote ⁶⁴ It seems, from this statement, that al-Jawlani was concerned about a decrease in popular support if al-Nusra was linked directly to al-Qa'ida Central or possibly AQI. In subsequent months, al-Nusra's media forum Himam News released videos of al-Nusra fighters distributing food and other goods to those affected by the fighting, perhaps in an effort to bolster that support.Footnote ⁶⁵

Outside of Syria, online jihadi forums erupted with confusion and accusations on the power struggle between al-Baghdadi and al-Jawlani.Footnote ⁶⁶ Perhaps in response to this confusion, Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote a private letter to al-Jawlani, al-Baghdadi, and their supporters in May 2013. This letter was leaked to al-Jazeera news. According to reports, al-Zawahiri wrote that he had asked both al-Baghdadi and al-Jawlani to provide their rationale to him and the al-Qa'ida leadership council for debate and a ruling on the disagreement. And they did so.Footnote ⁶⁷ This event in-and-of-itself was not insignificant in the context of the relationship between al-Qa'ida Central and its affiliates. It suggests that both al-Baghdadi and al-Jawlani acknowledged that al-Qa'ida Central held authority outside of Pakistan and Afghanistan, at least in principle. But, more than the process, the subsequent results were surprising. According to this letter, al-Qa'ida Central decided the following,

Ayman al-Zawahiri continued on, in this letter, to instruct AQI and al-Nusra Front fighters to respect the boundaries of each other's conflict. Further, both AQI and al-Nusra Front were asked to minimize Muslim casualties as they continue to fight against the regimes in Syria and Iraq.Footnote ⁶⁹ Upon reflection, al-Zawahiri's decision was not too much of a divergence from al-Qa'ida's past trajectory. It had urged affiliates to minimize Muslim casualties since 2005–6. Ayman al-Zawahiri also was likely motivated by a desire to appease al-Jawlani and keep al-Qa'ida relevant to the fight in Syria.

But AQI leaders reacted negatively to this decision. On 19 June 2013, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, AQI spokesman, refuted al-Zawahiri's decision and claimed that al-Qa'ida fighters in Syria would continue to fight under the ISIL banner.Footnote ⁷⁰ This represented the first truly open defiance of al-Qa'ida Central by an affiliated group. Others, such as Mohktar Belmohktar, a regional leader within AQIM, had tiptoed towards open defiance. Belmohktar reportedly split from AQIM in an effort to form his own group, al-Mulathameen.Footnote ⁷¹ But, in the past, Ayman al-Zawahiri was able to avoid confrontation by simply ignoring Belmohktar and not recognizing al-Mulathameen. With the open defiance of al-Baghdadi, and al-Jawlani's desire to keep al-Nusra separate, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al-Qa'ida leaders were faced with a choice: do they repudiate al-Baghdadi or ignore his defiance and allow others in the broader jihadi community to rebuke him? As of the writing of this present article, it appeared that they had decided upon the latter.

Finally, in this context, it would be easy to argue that the fight over the merger of al-Nusra Front and its status represented a low point in al-Qa'ida Central's influence. Yet, some evidence contradicts that conclusion. Even as al-Baghdadi and al-Jawlani were tussling over control in Syria, al-Qa'ida Central issued broader guidance to affiliates worldwide. In September 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri published ‘Guidelines for the work of a jihadi’, in which he outlined his priorities for al-Qa'ida going forward. As part of that guidance, al-Zawahiri extolled supporters to ‘exert maximum efforts to free Muslim prisoners using all means possible, including raiding the prisons where they are being held or taking the citizens of the countries that are participating in the invasion of Muslim countries as hostages'.Footnote ⁷² This message echoed instructions issued by al-Zawahiri in July 2013 to help free al-Qa'ida fighters in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, engaged in a hunger strike.Footnote ⁷³ Significantly, in tandem with this guidance, affiliates in Libya, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen orchestrated a series of prison breaks that reportedly released thousands of al-Qa'ida fighters and caused Interpol to issue a warning to all of its member countries.Footnote ⁷⁴

These events underscore that much has yet to be learned about al-Qa'ida Central under the direction of Ayman al-Zawahiri. On the one hand, it is logical that the loss of Osama bin Laden would cause a parallel rise in the influence of charismatic affiliated leaders, such as al-Baghdadi. But this rise also is not incongruous with al-Zawahiri's overall vision of al-Qa'ida, as a network of multiple groups fighting independent insurgencies, and his tendency towards inclusion even at the risk of al-Qa'ida's global reputation. On the other hand, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan clearly expected AQI and al-Nusra Front to obey their edict in the case of ISIL. The public defiance, therefore, must have caused some consternation amongst al-Qa'ida senior leaders. The question, for outsiders, is how to reconcile this defiance with compliance in other arenas: specifically, al-Zawahiri's guidance to attack prisons.

VI

In conclusion, some limitations exist to the use of original source materials to inform the history of a clandestine group, such as al-Qa'ida. Specifically, for this present article, the US government has released only a small fraction of the reportedly thousands of documents captured in Osama bin Laden's Abbottabad compound. While it is possible to glean some insight from these seventeen documents, especially in combination with other sources, one wonders what the other archived materials contain. To help alleviate any possible misinterpretation, this article augments these seventeen documents with others captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Autobiographies and public statements by al-Qa'ida leaders also have been used to substantiate the findings. Combined, it is arguable that the entirety of publicly available al-Qa'ida documents is sufficient to confirm or deny theories previously developed by scholars.

Interpretations of these archived documents, of course, differ. This present article examined the archived documents through a historical lens and, thus, arrived at some unique conclusions. Primarily, others have interpreted dissent in the period between 2004 and 2006 as evidence that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri's influence had been degraded.Footnote ⁷⁵ But this seems unlikely. Instead, the limited evidence available to scholars suggests that Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others in the inner circle prioritized their relationship with affiliates above any anticipated harm that might come to al-Qa'ida from a backlash amongst sympathizers.

Similarly, commentators traditionally have viewed Ayman al-Zawahiri as providing strategic direction to al-Qa'ida with Osama bin Laden functioning primarily as a figurehead. Newly released al-Qa'ida documents, however, suggest that bin Laden made the final decisions on matters of strategic import, particularly the acceptance or rejection of new groups when they applied to join al-Qa'ida's network. Osama bin Laden's leadership over strategic decisions was evident especially in response to al-Shabaab's request to join al-Qa'ida's network. In responding ‘no’, in 2010, bin Laden essentially placed al-Qa'ida's global reputation above new affiliates. This represented a strategic shift from previous al-Qa'ida priorities.

Equally interesting, in his last letter to ‘Atiyah, Osama bin Laden discussed the possibility of al-Qa'ida fighters in Pakistan returning home and participating in the Arab Spring uprisings. While the Arab Spring presented al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan and elsewhere with a new opportunity to expand their global campaign, it also revealed a unique challenge. After the death of bin Laden, affiliated leaders started to exert their own priorities more forcefully. This manifested itself in the public argument between AQI and al-Nusra Front over control over al-Qa'ida fighters in Syria. And, worse for al-Qa'ida leader in Pakistan, exploded with the disobedience of al-Baghdadi to al-Qa'ida Central's ruling in resolving this conflict between AQI and al-Nusra Front. Questions remain, however, on whether or not this dispute has degraded the influence of al-Qa'ida Central more generally.

In conclusion, al-Qa'ida leaders clearly struggled between 2004 and 2013 to manage its expansion from a select few clandestine supporters to a wider movement. The core of this struggle was the need to rely upon local affiliates within key conflicts, while still maintaining some support amongst Muslim populations outside those conflicts. This struggle is not unique to al-Qa'ida. Many other terrorist groups over the years, have failed to expand their campaign beyond a core geographic community of supporters. Examples of this historical struggle include the Red Brigades in Italy, the Jewish Underground in Israel, and the Shining Path in Peru.Footnote ⁷⁶ Al-Qa'ida has been more ambitious than these groups, desiring a campaign that reaches from Afghanistan to Syria to Mali and beyond. It also has experienced intense counter-terrorism pressure from the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, its failure is not guaranteed. The historical trajectory of al-Qa'ida, outlined in this article, revealed an adversary with the ability to learn and adapt. Most likely, its defeat will necessitate parallel learning in counter-terrorism forces arrayed against it.