Nationalization was a fatal mistake and so was privatization. Both had the same adverse effect on industrial production. . . . The state could have achieved control over production by undertaking new investments without touching existing private entities. . . . The original size even of a company as large as Mahalla Spinning and Weaving Co. was only 10–12% of its subsequent size as a public sector company. . . . As Minister of Industry, I suffered the consequences of indiscriminate nationalization by having to spend disproportionate time on production issues of small industrial units. . . .
Likewise, large scale privatization is a similar mistake. . . . The private sector should have been encouraged to acquire an increasing share in production, as we tried to do in the 1987–1992 plan, without large scale sale of the public sector. But the new slogans in the 90s hailed privatization as an end in itself rather than a tool for industrial betterment. . . . As minister, I had to deal with pressure from visiting U.S. ministers and World Bank officials for full-fledged privatization. . . . The way privatization was practiced resulted in the liquidation of the public sector without creating new industrial capacity.
Starting in the 1990s, public sector companies were forbidden from reinvesting in their plant [on the premise that they would be imminently sold]. . . . I had a first-hand experience with this as an industrial consultant after leaving the ministry. One of the incidents was the case of Torah Cement Co., which had a promising market potential but badly needed an overhaul in its production lines. The company was not allowed to invest the necessary funds. As a way out, it converted a contract with ASEC, an engineering-consulting firm that I headed, from a technical assistance [contract] which involved consultancy only to a technical management contract which involved overhaul and operation. Subsequently, ASEC invested LE 185 million on overhauling and expanding Torah's capacity from 1 to 1.75 million tons p.a. . . .
The key to industrial progress in Egypt is not in changing ownership but in changing production habits, administrative structure, and administrative priorities. . . . The major administrative defect in the industrial public sector is the subjection of companies to direct ministerial control. . . . The rationale of public sector reform [during my last years in the ministry] was to let it go as private. . . . The legislative framework for this was articulated in Law 203/1992, which aimed at granting autonomy for public sector companies. . . by creating holding companies that act as an iron clad between them and the government, along the Italian model of “super holding companies”. . . . Later, this law became erroneously used as a “Privatization Act,” which was a serious diversion from its original intention. . . .Footnote 1
Four years ago, an experiment began at the American University in Cairo to compile the oral narratives of individuals who played leading roles in Egyptian public policy and enterprise during the past fifty years.Footnote 2 The present outcome of this ongoing experiment is more than 150 hours of oral records with some forty such individuals. Two-thirds of these interviews have been converted into print transcripts, and some participants have signed disclosure agreements.Footnote 3
One of the richest narratives in length and detail comes from engineer Muhammad Abdel Wahab, who served the second longest amount of time as minister of industry in Egypt since that ministry was established in 1956. In his testimony, he surveys his nearly four-decade career: his graduation in 1954, his thirty years in various design and production jobs, and his service as industry minister from 1984 to 1993. His career corresponds to crucial phases in the industrial history of Egypt, from gradual movement toward aggressive state-led industrialization in the late 1950s to retrenchment and disinvestment following the 1967 defeat and from slow withdrawal of state involvement since the mid-1970s to decisive moves toward privatization in the 1990s.
This primary source reflects the narrator's experience with a broad variety of topics. The selected excerpt is a digest of Abdel Wahab's views on nationalization and privatization, both of which he describes as “fatal mistakes.” Elsewhere, he reflects on the state of industrial development and opportunities for industrial employment for young engineers in the mid-1950s, production organization in the military–industrial complex, the state of research and development in Egyptian industry, the limits of CEO authority in the heyday of state control, and the formulation of public policy from the mid-1980s to early 1990s. Throughout the narrative, Abdel Wahab's reflections are animated by anecdotal details of manufacturing projects and industrial undertakings in which he was personally involved as a designer or as a policymaker. Some were milestone projects in recent Egyptian industrial history, such as the design of the armored personnel carrier al-Walid in 1959, the application of reverse engineering to the Swedish sewing machine Husqvarna in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the development of a new license in truck manufacturing in the 1980s, and the development of new technologies in the aluminum and sugar industries in the 1980s.
Abdel Wahab's narrative illustrates the usefulness of oral history, which comes from at least three related factors. First, oral narratives in Egypt—as in many other societies—generally take over from written memoirs as a means of preserving memory and communicating personal accounts of direct experiences. This is particularly the case with figures like Muhammad Abdel Wahab, who do not qualify as public figures beyond their small circle of direct operation. Each individual walks around with a perishable document in his head and heart until the moment an oral history account is taken (and transcribed). Second, there is the potential to enhance the process of narration through interactive interviewing and revision of transcripts. Third, allowing narrators to specify parts that they desire to classify for selected periods of time creates the incentive to add details that might otherwise never be disclosed, as long as narrators can trust that the underlying agreement of disclosure will be observed strictly.
In addition, compiling oral narratives may also provide an entrée into obtaining collections of private papers as trust-building proceeds. Needless to say, all of this should be taken with the usual caveat and critical approach that must guide our reception and handling of personal accounts, be they in print or oral forms.
