Why do even successful peasant rebellions fail to end peasant marginalization? Vasabjit Banerjee’s Undoing the Revolution suggests a response that is as convincing as it is pessimistic: rebellions succeed only if they have the support of economic or political elites outside the incumbent government. However, the resources that make these elites indispensable for rebellion success also put them in the position of shaping the post-rebellion political order in their own interests. Consequently, peasant rebellions can have only two alternative outcomes: either they fail to end peasant marginalization because they lack elite support, or they fail to end peasant marginalization because they have elite support.

The first chapter of the book introduces the three main parts of this argument. The collective action problem is at the core of the first part. High opportunity costs coupled with the nonexclusionary character of the benefits of successful revolutions prevent broad-based mobilization. Consequently, peasants need elites to provide collective and selective incentives (p. 7). But why should elites support peasant rebellions? Religion can be an important integrating force according to Banerjee: shared beliefs can create identity bonds across social classes, while religious organizations can reduce the costs of elite participation; for example, by providing financial resources. The third part of the argument closes the “trap” of peasant mobilization: elites’ greater resources and cohesion also allow them to strike an intra-elite bargain and co-opt parts of the peasantry in order to shape institutions and policies after successful rebellions.

The empirical part of the book builds on three rich case studies: Zimbabwe, India, and Mexico. Drawing mainly on secondary material and archival sources, as well as “contextualization” with local scholars (p. 13), Undoing the Revolution zooms into nine regional rebellions, presents comparisons within and across country cases, and provides thick descriptions of crucial periods of rebellion and state formation.

The first empirical chapter (chapter 2) investigates how elite participation can shape the course of peasant rebellions. Combining a “very different comparison” (Northern Mexico, 1910 vs. Northern India, 1930) with a “most similar comparison” (Northern India, 1918 vs. Northern India, 1930; p. 19), Banerjee assesses the explanatory power of elite–peasant alliances relative to potential alternative explanations of rebellion success (i.e., political opportunities, political exclusion, and barriers to economic advancement). Banerjee interprets the configuration of these variables across cases as indicating that “elite-peasant collaboration … is the key determinant of successful peasant rebellion” (p. 32).

He then moves on to investigate under what conditions such alliances are likely to emerge in the first place. Religion appears to be essential according to the three empirical cases covered in the third chapter: the Cristero rebellion in Mexico (1926–29), the Chimurenga rebellion in Zimbabwe (1972–79), and the Moplah rebellion in India (1921–22). Shared religion created bonds between peasants and elites in Zimbabwe and Mexico. In India, by contrast, pan-Islamic ideology fostered mobilization but also undermined support from Hindu elites. Banerjee then assesses the role of potential political and economic drivers of elite participation by drawing on two cross-case comparisons and two within-case comparisons of Mexico and India. The joint presence of economic and political grievances emerges as a “necessary” (p. 56) condition for elite participation (chapter 4).

In the second empirical part of the book, Banerjee moves from a strategy of case comparisons to more detailed single-case analyses of post-rebellion state-formation processes in Mexico, India, and Zimbabwe. Three chapters describe (1) how elites’ assets (fixed or movable) and origin (national or foreign) were essential in terms of shaping outcomes of rebellions; (2) how former nongovernmental elites made use of their direct and indirect (in terms of economic power) influence in peasant movements to shape the state-formation process; and (3) how these processes ended up creating institutions and policies that allowed and fostered corruption, repression, and low- or one-sided public goods provision.

The book makes several important theoretical and empirical contributions to research on rebellion and state formation in agrarian societies. I want to highlight one aspect. Focusing on the role of elites, Undoing the Revolution suggests a convincing argument for how the features and dynamics of rebellions shape the subsequent processes of institution-building. In contrast to Banerjee, I did not found the essential role of elite participation “counterintuitive” (p. 3): it reflects previous work that highlighted how successful revolutions often relied on cross-class support (e.g., see Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World,” Politics & Society, 17 (4), 1989). What I found much more fascinating and illuminating about Banerjee’s work is how these alliances fundamentally shaped the consequences of successful rebellions. The relevance of this finding goes beyond the analysis of peasant rebellions. It can and should motivate disaggregated research into other types of mass mobilization and their respective political and economic outcomes; for example, nonviolent campaigns or civil wars. In what ways do the specific resources and interests of various types of economic and political elites shape violent and nonviolent movements, and how does the empowerment of these elites determine subsequent phases of institution-building?

My main open question concerning the findings of Undoing the Revolution is about the robustness of the empirical analyses. Banerjee aims to identify the “causes” of successful revolutions and elite-favoring post-rebellion political order. The first four chapters, in particular, combine various case comparisons to test the suggested theoretical arguments. However, Banerjee’s empirical strategy hinges on the assumption that the country cases are “very different,” whereas subnational units (regions/rebellions) are “most similar.” How far this holds true when it comes to potential confounders is not obvious. The analyses consider only a relatively small number of specific alternative explanations, almost certainly leaving out others. Banerjee does not specify explicit observable implications of his main arguments (and of competing ones). At times, this makes it hard for the reader to evaluate the empirical evidence provided in the case studies. Thus, in my view, this work is stronger in terms of theory generation than of theory testing.

With this specific strength, the book paves the way for a very interesting research agenda that analyzes the role of elites in mass mobilization in more detail. First, it would be worthwhile to investigate more what specific characteristics of elites make them particularly effective in organizing rebellions and shaping postwar institution-building. Banerjee considers a rather wide spectrum of economic and nongovernmental political elites, some of whom may be more or less capable in terms of determining rebellion success or in shaping the postwar political order. Second, future research could focus more on the factors that may reinforce or weaken elite–peasant alliances. Banerjee highlights the role of religion and of economic and political grievances. These factors could be specified more (for example, with respect to sources and specific types of grievances). Moreover, other aspects may be equally important: for example, the relations among distinct groups of elites, the degree of peasants’ cultural and socioeconomic heterogeneity, or features of previous successful or unsuccessful rebellions.

All in all, Banerjee offers a compelling account of the role of elites in peasant rebellions. As such, Undoing the Revolution is an instructive and inspiring read for all researchers interested in the dynamics and outcomes of political mass mobilization.