In Counting the Many, Melissa Schwartzberg makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the evolution of democratic institutions. She profoundly challenges conventional wisdom about the development of supermajority procedures. They did not emerge initially as a response to issues with simple majoritarian procedures; instead, democratic decision-making bodies adopted supermajoritarian thresholds as a departure from then-preponderant unanimity rules. While unanimity rules were valued for their epistemic qualities, they had particular pathologies that in many scenarios made them unattractive. In tracing the practical and theoretical justifications for replacing unanimous thresholds, Schwartzberg raises serious concerns about commonly held beliefs regarding the value of supermajoritarian procedures—in particular, undercutting arguments about the virtues of such procedures with respect to protecting minority rights and interests. Instead, she advocates for the use of complex majoritarian procedures for especially momentous decisions, such as constitutional change. These procedures involve the use of deliberative assemblies and time delays to mitigate against narrowly partisan and whimsical changes.
As someone who has devoted a substantial part of his research agenda to studying supermajoritarian procedures in the U.S. Senate, I find the book fascinating and am intrigued by its connections to important debates in the field of legislative politics. There are numerous interesting parallels between the emergence of supermajority procedures in the history of democracy and the political development of the Senate into a supermajoritarian institution. Many claimed that the Senate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had evolved into a unanimity rule legislature due to the fact that it lacked a rule for cutting off debate and bringing items to a final vote. This lack of a previous question motion, along with extensive prerogatives possessed by senators with respect to participating in debate, established the procedural infrastructure that made filibusters possible. While senators rarely resorted to this tactic relative to today’s standards, there were a few notable instances where it appeared that a single senator prevented the passage of broadly-supported legislation by filibustering. This led many close observers of the Senate to believe that filibusters induced a de facto unanimity rule in the chamber, prompting explicit comparisons to the Polish Sejm. If this was in fact the case, then when the Senate in 1917 adopted a cloture rule requiring a two-thirds vote to end debate, it would have mimicked the grander historical arc of supermajoritarian procedures with respect to lowering the requisite threshold from unanimity. However, the instances of successful one-person filibusters were an anomaly and systematic research reveals that, despite ubiquitous opportunities to impose their individual wills on the rest of the institution, senators refrained from doing so, enabling the Senate to operate for the most part as a majoritarian institution—even on issues that touched the deepest cleavages in American politics. Footnote 1 The Senate did not adopt supermajority procedures to loosen the grip of unanimity on the chamber, and even after the adoption of supermajoritarian procedures, the Senate did not have to rely on them in the normal process of legislating until much later in its history. While unanimous consent for various procedural matters did—and still does—play a central role in the Senate, majorities could generally work their will, even while affording an unparalleled role for minorities.
While Counting the Many casts important new light on how we might understand the role of supermajoritarian procedures in the Senate within the context of a much broader sweep of history than previously contemplated, it leaves open numerous questions about how the Senate might deal with the current dysfunction that supermajoritarian procedures have induced. Unquestionably, this is one of the most pressing issues currently confronting American democracy.
Interestingly, the Senate appears to be offering a unique opportunity for an empirical test of Schwartzberg’s claims regarding the superiority of complex majoritarianism (CM). Although she does not recommend CM for “legislative decision making outside of the constitutional arena,” she acknowledges that some non-constitutional decisions may rise to the level of significance where these kinds of procedures would be desirable (see pp. 199–200). One could make a compelling case that confirmation of judges appointed for life rises to the level of importance where we would want to consider procedures more nuanced than standard majoritarianism—especially considering the ever-increasing role that the judiciary plays in policy decisions that have enormous impact on social, political, and economic life in the U.S. (including marriage equality, which is a focus of the book).
In November 2013, then-majority party Democrats executed a procedure that circumvented existing supermajority requirements for invoking cloture on proposed rules changes, effectively reducing the threshold to a simple majority for invoking cloture on presidential nominees and nominees for judicial office below the Supreme Court. But the parliamentary maneuver, popularly known as the nuclear option, left the rest of the procedural infrastructure for confirming nominees unchanged. In particular, provisions that build in time delays and require deliberation until a final up-or-down vote can occur on a nominee were kept in place. Thus, the Senate has tacitly implemented a form of CM, enabling us to ask whether the results of the change are in line with what we would expect to see based on the arguments in Counting the Many.
What occurred for the remainder of the 113th Congress points to what might be an important general limit on the effectiveness of CM. Minority party Republicans took full advantage of retained provisions for delaying decisions and requiring deliberation. Republicans forced Democrats to jump through procedural hoops and consume incredibly scarce floor time to get relatively uncontroversial nominees to final votes, apparently in retaliation for the nuclear maneuver. As Binder valuably elucidates, Footnote 2 Republicans, rather than agreeing to waive procedural requirements as is often done, would generally oblige Democrats to follow the cloture procedure to the letter, vote against cloture for a nominee, and then demand that the Senate consume all of the post-cloture debate time required under the rules (two hours for trial judges and thirty hours for appeals court judges). But in the end, Republicans would vote overwhelmingly—in some cases unanimously—for confirmation.
While undoubtedly the confirmation process is working better in purely numerical terms of filling vacancies, it is not clear that higher quality judges are making it to the bench, or that Senate minorities or American democracy as a whole are better off. One could argue that the Senate is an unusual case given its hyperpartisan atmosphere, but if CM would not work in such an atmosphere, that is an important limitation to know. The Senate’s experience also raises questions about what negative sentiment is produced by reducing supermajoritarian thresholds and how that negativity might limit the benefits of CM.
One key issue with the contemporary Senate is that there seems to be equal intensity of preferences on either partisan side. Counting the Many is largely silent on the issue of differential intensities possessed by majorities and minorities. Majority rule processes are “inefficient” because they do not take intensities into account. Footnote 3 Prior to the age of the silent filibuster, when senators had to take and hold the floor when filibustering, obstruction in the Senate served as an intensity-revelation mechanism. Footnote 4 It was possible, though unusual, for intense minorities to prevail over majorities who were more ambivalent about a particular issue. In the era of silent filibusters with a three-fifths cloture threshold, cohesive minorities could block confirmation of judges they opposed without much intensity. Under the current system, minorities will almost always be rolled even if they care more about blocking a judge than the majority cares about confirming her.
There are alternatives to majoritarian thresholds not considered by Schwartzberg that place intensity front and center, could better protect minority interests than CM, and possibly lead to welfare increases for the majority as well as the minority. The voting procedure known as storable votes, introduced by Casella, Footnote 5 involves clustering multiple decisions together and granting individuals an endowment of votes equal to the number of decisions to be made, which they can distribute as they see fit over those decisions. A minority that feels particularly intensely about decision X can concentrate its votes on that decision, giving up influence on other decisions in the cluster. If the majority feels less intensely about X, the minority side can produce a majority of votes in favor of its preferred decision and can actually prevail despite its numerical inferiority.
Casella, Turban, and Wawro have demonstrated how storable votes might be used for confirmation of judicial nominations. Footnote 6 Through a series of simulations, they show that storable votes make both the minority and the majority better off in utility terms under a broad range of likely scenarios. Although the approach, involving formal models and computer simulations, is much different from that adopted in Counting the Many, the normative concerns are the same with respect to the design of majoritarian institutions to strike a better balance between majority rule and the protection of minority rights. With its intriguing and comprehensive history of the evolution of supermajoritarian procedures and provocative arguments regarding the poor performance of such procedures in protecting minorities, Counting the Many promises to propel the debate over these concerns forward and inspire others to think more creatively about a core concern for democratic governance. It is the kind of work of normative political theory that demands attention from positive political theorists as well as empiricists, crying out for formalization of the key arguments made in the book and investigation of cases, such as the U.S. Senate after November 2013, that would help us better understand the impact of alternative thresholds for democratic decision making.
