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When Tenure Protects the Incompetent: Results from a Survey of Department Chairs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 December 2013

John M. Rothgeb Jr.*
Affiliation:
Miami University (Ohio)
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Abstract

This research uses data from a national survey of political science department chairs to explore when tenure protects incompetent faculty. The characteristics of the responding institutions and the procedures and standards they use when evaluating tenure applications were analyzed to determine how they related to the protection of the incompetent. The results reveal that tenure is most likely to shield incompetent faculty when collegiality plays a role in tenure decisions and when departments focus on the quantity of articles an applicant publishes. The findings also show that when departments demand that candidates publish in prestigious journals and when higher authorities at the institution have reversed positive departmental tenure recommendations, the probability that the incompetent are protected declines.

Information

Type
The Profession
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2014 
Figure 0

Table 1Institutional Characteristics and Incompetence

Figure 1

Table 2Tenure Evaluation Procedures and Incompetence

Figure 2

Table 3Research and Publishing and Incompetence

Figure 3

Table 4Teaching and Incompetence

Figure 4

Table 5Service and Incompetence