Demande de contrôle judiciaire — exportation des véhicules blindés légers vers l’Arabie saoudite — requête de radiation

Turp c Canada (Affaires étrangères), 2018 CF 12 (9 janvier 2018). Cour fédérale.

Tel que noté dans le tome précédent de l’Annuaire, en janvier 2017 la Cour fédérale a rejeté la demande du professeur Daniel Turp que la Cour se prononce sur la légalité et le caractère raisonnable d’une décision du ministre des Affaires étrangères approuvant l’octroi de licences d’exportation pour des véhicules blindés légers (VBL) vers l’Arabie saoudite.^{Footnote 1} (L’appel de cette décision est examiné ci-dessous.) Dans la présente affaire, le professeur Turp invite la Cour à se prononcer sur le refus — exprès ou implicite — de la ministre actuelle de suspendre ou d’annuler ces mêmes licences en se prévalant des pouvoirs énoncés à l’article 10 de la Loi sur les licences d’exportation et d’importation.^{Footnote 2} Le demandeur s’appuie sur de nouvelles preuves de l’utilisation saoudienne des VBL canadiens contre des civils en 2017. La ministre répond avec une requête de radiation de cette nouvelle demande au motif qu’il est clair et évident que celle-ci ne présente aucune chance de succès, qu’elle est redondante et qu’elle constitue ultimement un abus de procédure.

Le juge Martineau rejette la requête de radiation. Contrairement aux arguments de la ministre, la présente demande n’est ni redondante ni un abus de procédure. Elle repose plutôt sur une nouvelle décision ministérielle et de nouveaux faits: le refus ministériel de suspendre ou d’annuler les licences d’exportation en dépit de la preuve que l’Arabie saoudite se prévaut des VBL contre sa propre population. Le juge accepte que cette demande de contrôle judiciaire soulève une nouvelle cause d’action à la lumière des faits nouveaux allégués dans l’avis de demande.^{Footnote 3}

Bien que les faits allégués par le demandeur sont tenus pour avérés pour les fins d’une demande de radiation, le juge Martineau n’hésite pas de décrire le fond de l’affaire comme suit:

De plus, le juge qualifie les allégations du demandeur comme n’étant “pas dépourvues de tout fondement et … pas faites gratuitement,” incluant les allégations que l’ambassade saoudienne a elle-même reconnu que des VBL canadiens avaient été utilisés contre la population civile pendant le siège d’Awamiyah, que la ministre refuse d’agir, et que la ministre détient la preuve que des VBL canadiens ont été utilisés contre des minorités religieuses.^{Footnote 5}

Aspect remarquable de ce jugement, le juge Martineau fait référence au Traité sur le commerce des armes de 2013,^{Footnote 6} traité auquel le Canada n’est ni partie ni même signataire. Après avoir cité un échange dans la Chambre des Communes entre un député et la ministre où le député fait référence au désir du gouvernement de faire entériner le traité, le juge explique:

Il s’agit d’un cas rare où un juge canadien prend note de la pratique courante du gouvernement fédéral de s’appuyer sur des lois en vigueur pour s’acquitter d’obligations conventionnelles envisagées ou nouvellement acquises.

Les motifs du juge font quelque peu fausse note lorsqu’il dit: “À proprement parler, le Canada n’est lié par des normes internationales consignées dans un traité que si celui-ci a été incorporé au droit canadien par une loi.”^{Footnote 8} La vérité est exactement le contraire: les obligations internationales du Canada lient le Canada, en tant qu’État sur le plan international, que le Canada les ait ou non mises en œuvre en droit interne.^{Footnote 9} Un traité ne peut entrer directement en vigueur en droit canadien sans mise en œuvre législative ou réglementaire. Mais un manquement de mise en œuvre au plan interne ne libère pas l’État de ses obligations internationales.

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction — determination of habitual residence — hybrid approach

Office of the Children’s Lawyer v Balev, 2018 SCC 16 (20 April 2018). Supreme Court of Canada.

A Canadian couple living in Germany agreed that the mother would take the children to Ontario for sixteen months in the hope that they would do better in school. While the mother and children were in Germany, the father changed his mind and sought the children’s return under the Hague Convention.^{Footnote 10} He proceeded in Germany initially and later in Ontario. The trial court in Ontario ordered the children’s return to Germany. The Divisional Court reversed, and the Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed again. The case was moot by the time it reached the Supreme Court of Canada. The German courts had granted the mother sole custody, and she had returned with the children to Ontario. The Supreme Court nevertheless heard the case and gave reasons.

The key question that divided the lower courts, and, as it turned out, the Supreme Court of Canada, was how in law to determine where the children had been habitually resident at the time of the mother’s allegedly wrongful retention of them in Ontario. If the children were habitually resident in Germany, the mother’s retention was in breach of the Hague Convention (which, the Court noted, is implemented by legislation in every province and territory).^{Footnote 11} If, however, the children’s habitual residence had become Ontario, the mother’s retention of them was not wrongful. The parties, including the Ontario Office of the Children’s Lawyer, advanced three approaches to determining habitual residence. The first was a child-centred approach that emphasized the situation and perspective of the children at the time of the father’s application for their return to Germany. The second was a parental intention approach whereby the parents’ intention as to the children’s residence at the time they left Germany would govern. The third was a hybrid approach that considered both parental intentions and the children’s circumstances.

Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada eschewed the parental intention approach — which had prevailed in most Canadian jurisdictions to this point — and the child-centred approach in favour of the hybrid approach. In doing so, McLachlin CJC made a number of significant comments on the meaning of habitual residence under Article 3 of the Hague Convention, the significance of a child’s views under Article 13(2), and the interpretation of multilateral treaties by domestic courts. In dissent, Justices Suzanne Côté and Malcolm Rowe (Justice Michael Moldaver concurring) would have approved the parental intention approach. Both the majority and the dissent contended that their approaches best represented the meaning of the Hague Convention.

The chief justice began by summarizing the relevant principles and provisions of the Hague Convention, which aims to enforce custody rights and secure the prompt return of children to their habitual residence in cases where they have been wrongfully removed or retained. Return orders under the Hague Convention are not custody determinations; rather, their purpose is to facilitate the child’s return to the jurisdiction in which determinations of custody and access are properly made. Prompt return is key to the scheme because it protects children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal or retention, it deters parents from abducting children, and it encourages speedy adjudication of the merits of custody and access disputes. The heart of the Hague Convention’s prompt return mechanism is Article 3, which provides that the removal or retention of a child is wrongful where it is in breach of custody rights in the child’s state of habitual residence. Where Article 3 applies, Article 12 requires the judge in the requested state to order the child’s return forthwith unless certain exceptions apply. Article 13(2) includes an exception where a child of sufficient age and maturity objects to being returned.^{Footnote 12}

The chief justice next turned to the relevant principles of treaty interpretation. She began by noting that the Hague Convention is implemented in Ontario by section 46(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act ^{Footnote 13} and that “[s]ince the purpose of that section is to implement the underlying convention, this Court must adopt an interpretation consistent with Canada’s obligations under it.”^{Footnote 14} She noted Canada’s adherence to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the requirements of Article 31(1), which she described as generally paralleling the domestic approach to statutory interpretation.^{Footnote 15} She then observed:

The chief justice returned to this theme later in her reasons, dubbing the imperative of adhering to other state courts’ decisions on multilateral treaty questions the “principle of harmonization”:

Continuing her consideration of the relevant principles of treaty interpretation, McLachlin CJC noted (in response to submissions from a party) that there was, “[f]or present purposes … no conflict between” the Hague Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989.^{Footnote 18} She also rejected the notion that the Hague Convention should be interpreted consistently with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.^{Footnote 19} “The Charter cannot be used to interpret the Hague Convention or any international agreement,” said the chief justice, citing Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) and Articles 27 and 31 of the VCLT.^{Footnote 20} In any event, McLachlin CJC observed, the Hague Convention as interpreted by her revealed no conflict with the Charter.^{Footnote 21}

Having reviewed the applicable treaty interpretation considerations, McLachlin CJC turned to the three prevailing approaches to habitual residence under Article 3 of the Hague Convention. She noted that the parental intention approach has support in US and UK case law and “currently dominates Canadian jurisprudence, where courts in a number of jurisdictions consider parental intent to be the primary consideration in determining a child’s habitual residence.”^{Footnote 22} Her discussion of the child-centred approach was brief, citing one Québec and two US authorities.^{Footnote 23} Finally, the chief justice reviewed the hybrid approach, whereby the application judge determines the focal point of the child’s life immediately prior to removal or retention, considering all relevant links and circumstances. Relying heavily on European Union authorities, McLachlin CJC endorsed such considerations as the duration, regularity, conditions, and reasons for the child’s stay in the territory as part of a review of the child’s entire circumstances. These circumstances included the intention of the child’s parents, but the chief justice noted that “recent cases caution against over-reliance on parental intention.” In particular, there is no rule that the actions of one parent cannot unilaterally change the habitual residence of a child. Quoting a UK authority, the learned judge warned against “overlay[ing] the factual concept of habitual residence with legal constructs.”^{Footnote 24}

The chief justice concluded that the hybrid approach to the determination of habitual residence should be adopted in Canada. Two considerations favoured its adoption here. First, the hybrid approach is supported by the principle of harmonization, introduced above. “Absolute consensus” in favour of the hybrid approach “has not yet emerged,” yet “the clear trend is to rejection of the parental intention approach and to adoption of the hybrid approach.”^{Footnote 25} McLachlin CJC illustrated this trend with reference to recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, the High Court of Australia, and certain US appeal court decisions. “The desirability of harmonization weighs heavily in favour of following the dominant thread of Hague Convention jurisprudence, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary,” observed the chief justice.^{Footnote 26}

This brought the chief justice to the second consideration in favour of the hybrid approach, namely the text, structure, and purpose of the Hague Convention itself. Her discussion here particularly emphasized that the Hague Convention requires courts to determine a child’s habitual residence immediately prior to the wrongful removal and detention and not at the time the parents initially formed an intention as to the child’s residence.^{Footnote 27} In particular, courts must not treat time-limited consent agreements (such as the Ontario agreement at issue on the facts of this case) as

The chief justice next turned to Article 13(2) of the Hague Convention, according to which domestic judicial or administrative authorities may refuse to order a child’s return where the child objects “and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” After noting that the Hague Convention does not specify particular requirements or procedures to prove the Article 13(2) exception to the prompt return rule, McLachlin CJC described the decision as a determination of fact for the application judge, which, in most cases, “can be achieved by a single process in which the judge decides if the child possesses sufficient age and maturity to make her evidence useful, decides if the child objects to return, and, if so, exercises his or her judicial discretion as to whether to return the child.”^{Footnote 29} Expert evidence may be appropriate in some cases, but “this should not be allowed to delay the proceedings.”^{Footnote 30}

The chief justice’s reasons concluded with a notable consideration of delay in Hague Convention proceedings. She remarked that the proceedings in this case were “unacceptably long” and cited the R. v Jordan decision, observing: “Complacency towards judicial delay is objectionable in all contexts, but some disputes can better tolerate it. Hague Convention cases cannot.”^{Footnote 31} The chief justice reviewed the Hague Convention’s provisions requiring expeditious procedures, noting, in particular, that “[r]esponsibility for performing Canada’s Article 11 obligation” to act expeditiously “falls to judges and court administrators”^{Footnote 32} and observing: “I am doubtful that we did so.”^{Footnote 33} The chief justice concluded on this point:

As noted earlier, Côté and Rowe JJ, in dissent (Moldaver J concurring), would have endorsed the parental intention approach. In remarkably strong language, these judges accused the majority of “an unprincipled and open-ended approach — untethered from the text, structure, and purpose of the Hague Convention — that creates a recipe for litigation.”^{Footnote 35} Like the majority, the dissent asserted that its interpretation was consistent with international treaty interpretation principles. As for the “emerging international consensus” in favour of the hybrid approach, Côté and Rowe JJ would not afford this factor significant weight because “the hybrid approach stems from an improper analysis of the Convention’s text, structure, and purpose.”^{Footnote 36} The dissent also cautioned that the exception to prompt return found in Article 13(2) “should not be lightly invoked so as to systematically undermine custody rights of left-behind parents” and that “[j]udges should therefore not apply this exception in a manner that does not routinely override shared parental intention.”^{Footnote 37} This direction seems unlikely to be followed by lower courts, however, given the majority’s rejection of the parental intention approach.

Investor–state arbitration — North American Free Trade Agreement — Chapter 11 — application to set aside award

Canada (Attorney General) v Clayton, 2018 FC 436 (2 May 2018). Federal Court.

The Government of Canada applied to the Federal Court to set aside the arbitral award against it under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)^{Footnote 38} in Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v Government of Canada.^{Footnote 39} The claim arose from Canada’s and Nova Scotia’s failures to approve a proposed quarry and marine terminal in Nova Scotia following the recommendation of a joint federal-provincial environmental review panel against the project. The investors claimed to have invested many years and millions of dollars into the project, only to see it refused. The majority of the tribunal affirmed the investors’ claim that Canada had violated NAFTA Articles 1105 (minimum standard of treatment) and 1102 (national treatment). The dissenting panelist, Donald McRae, found no violation.

Canada argued that the majority of the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by asking itself whether the joint review panel’s actions complied with Canadian law when the question ought to have been whether the panel breached international law. Canada relied on the majority’s findings that the panel’s environmental assessment was “a fundamental departure from the methodology required by Canadian and Nova Scotia law” and that the investors had not been treated “in a manner consistent with Canada’s own laws.”^{Footnote 40} Canada also sought to rely on the well-known (indeed, notorious) decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia setting aside a NAFTA arbitral award in United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation to the effect that the tribunal had decided a matter beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.^{Footnote 41} NAFTA tribunals do not sit in appeal of decisions made under domestic law, Canada noted, and not every regulatory deficiency will rise to the level of a breach of the international law obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment to investors.^{Footnote 42} For their part, the investors accused Canada of attempting to re-argue the merits of the case and argued that the majority of the tribunal had only treated Canadian law as part of the factual matrix against which the relevant international law principles were applied.^{Footnote 43}

Justice Anne Mactavish dismissed Canada’s set-aside application. The errors Canada alleged were not true questions of jurisdiction of the sort reviewable by the Federal Court under the Commercial Arbitration Act, Canada’s federal legislation implementing the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Model Law.^{Footnote 44} Relying on the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s decision in United Mexican States v Cargill, Inc.,^{Footnote 45} Mactavish J structured her review of the arbitral award around three questions: (1) what was the issue the tribunal decided; (2) was that issue within the submission to arbitration; and (3) is there anything in NAFTA, properly interpreted, that precluded the tribunal from making the award it made?^{Footnote 46}

The issue the tribunal decided, said Mactavish J, was whether Canada’s conduct in relation to the environmental assessment and approvals process for the project and its treatment of the investors breached NAFTA.^{Footnote 47} Turning to the second question, the learned judge affirmed that this issue was within the investors’ submission to arbitration and that the tribunal’s consideration of domestic law was incidental to the international law issues and not an excess of jurisdiction. In particular, Mactavish J explained:

She added: “Indeed, some disputes giving rise to international claims can likely only be assessed by considering the requirements of domestic law incidentally to the issue of international liability.”^{Footnote 49} Concluding on this point, Mactavish J succinctly observed:

This brought Mactavish J to the third Cargill question — namely, whether anything in NAFTA precluded the award. She recalled the standard of review applicable here: “I am not judicially reviewing the reasonableness of the decision of the majority of the NAFTA panel, nor am I determining whether the Tribunal erred in fact or law in arriving at its decision.”^{Footnote 51} She noted that the dissenting arbitrator, McRae, described his disagreement with the majority as being, in large part, with the majority’s assessment of the facts and that the assessment of facts does not involve a jurisdictional question.^{Footnote 52} She then noted the “fierce” criticism of the Metalclad decision in the Supreme Court of British Columbia for being “far too intrusive into the merits of the case”^{Footnote 53} and distinguished it. She concluded that nothing in NAFTA precluded the majority of the tribunal from making the award it made. She dismissed Canada’s application.

The temptation to intervene and set aside the Bilcon decision was no doubt real. Mactavish J. acknowledged “there may be many reasons to criticize” the award^{Footnote 54} and noted both academic criticism of the decision and the NAFTA parties’ own express disapproval of its Article 1105 reasoning in a joint submission filed in Mesa Power Group, LLC v Government of Canada.^{Footnote 55} The learned judge nevertheless commendably applied the limited grounds for setting aside international arbitral awards set out in Article 34(2)(a)(iii) and underscored the inapplicability of domestic review standards to international arbitral awards.

Freedom of information — application to records of Children’s Lawyer — Convention on the Rights of the Child

Ontario (Children’s Lawyer) v Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2018 ONCA 559 (18 June 2018). Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In a custody dispute between a mother and a father, the court appointed the Children’s Lawyer to investigate, report, and make recommendations. The Children’s Lawyer decided to represent the children pursuant to section 89(3.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.^{Footnote 56} The court eventually terminated the father’s access to the children and all forms of communication with them. The father later sought to vary that order, and the Children’s Lawyer represented the children in that proceeding as well. The father then applied to the Ministry of the Attorney General for Ontario (MAG) for the Children’s Lawyer’s litigation files, relying on provisions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).^{Footnote 57} The Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, acting as adjudicator, granted the request. The Children’s Lawyer applied for judicial review to the Divisional Court, which upheld the adjudicator.

Justice Mary Lou Benotto for the unanimous Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal. Whether the child–client’s litigation records with the Children’s Lawyer were subject to a freedom of information request turned on whether those records were “in the custody or under the control” of the MAG for the purposes of section 10(1) of FIPPA. Benotto JA held that they were not and that the adjudicator’s decision betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the Children’s Lawyer, her relationship to the MAG, and her statutory duty to protect children.

A preliminary question for the court was what standard of review should be applied to the adjudicator’s decision. The Divisional Court had applied the more deferential standard of reasonableness, in keeping with recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions requiring deference to administrative decision-makers’ legal interpretations of their “home statutes.” There is an exception, however, for questions of general law that are “both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise.”^{Footnote 58} Benotto JA determined that that exception applied here. In support of that conclusion, she relied on a recent Supreme Court decision applying correctness review in the interpretation of freedom of information legislation where it might impact solicitor–client privilege.^{Footnote 59} Notably for our purposes, however, Benotto JA also invoked Canada’s status as a party to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Children’s Convention).^{Footnote 60}

The learned judge began by situating the legal issue in the following context: “[T]he best interests of the child; the voice of the child; the confidential role of the Children’s Lawyer; the child’s privacy interests; the fact that confidentiality is broader than solicitor-client privilege; and the fact that the records belong to the child.”^{Footnote 61} She derived this statutory context directly from the Children’s Convention, beginning with Article 3(1) (“In all actions concerning children … the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”) and approving an earlier Court of Appeal authority that the convention “can help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.”^{Footnote 62} In her view, the FIPPA and other statutes at issue in the appeal “must be viewed through this lens and interpreted in a way that gives primacy to the best interests of the child.” The adjudicator and the Divisional Court had fallen into error by failing to consider the best interests of the child.^{Footnote 63}

Benotto JA also relied on Article 12 of the Children’s Convention, requiring states parties to assure that children capable of forming their own views have the right to express them freely in all matters affecting them. The institution of the Children’s Lawyer is a model for addressing the challenge “to find a way for children to express their views without exposing them to further trauma or causing more damage to the family” in custody disputes or child protection proceedings.^{Footnote 64} The learned judge continued:

Benotto JA invoked the Children’s Convention again in considering the threat that disclosure of the Children’s Lawyer’s documents would represent to children’s privacy interests. Relying on both the convention’s preamble and Article 40(2)(b)(vii) (requiring respect for children’s privacy at all stages of proceedings), she noted that the Children’s Lawyer gathers information from and about her child clients in numerous ways, including with the assistance of social workers, therapists, and teachers, to ensure the child’s voice is heard. Not all of these records will be subject to solicitor–client privilege, but the Children’s Lawyer’s duty of confidentiality will apply to all of them.^{Footnote 65} Furthermore, children enjoy heightened privacy rights “as mandated by the Convention.”^{Footnote 66}

Having established the context in which the interpretive exercise must occur, Benotto JA turned to the question of whether the MAG had custody or control of the Children’s Lawyer’s records. She rejected the adjudicator’s conclusion that the Children’s Lawyer is a branch of the MAG, finding that while the Children’s Lawyer is “administratively structured under and has a funding relationship with MAG, they are not connected with respect to her core functions: there is no statutory relationship between the two entities; she does not receive direction from MAG; she does not report to MAG; and her fiduciary duties are to her child clients, not to MAG.”^{Footnote 67} Nor were the records of the Children’s Lawyer within the MAG’s custody or control. These records did not contain government information or any information that would advance the goals of government accountability and transparency.^{Footnote 68} Notably, Benotto JA rejected the Privacy Commissioner’s reliance on the MAG’s past practice of forwarding certain FIPPA requests to the Children’s Lawyer for response, calling past practice not determinative, and adding that “the evolving nature of the functions of the Children’s Lawyer with respect to advancing children’s interests and the voice of the child, particularly in light of the Convention, requires new scrutiny.”^{Footnote 69}

Scholars of the Children’s Convention as a purely international legal instrument may not learn much from this decision. The Court’s engagement with the Children’s Convention is not (and did not need to be) interpretively profound. The importance of this decision lies in the Court’s reliance on the Children’s Convention to enable judicial review of an administrative decision and to inform the interpretation of domestic law. In Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court of Canada declared — wrongly, in my view and that of others — that the Children’s Convention is unimplemented in Canadian law.^{Footnote 70} But the Court allowed that Canada’s treaty obligations can be a contextual consideration in scrutinizing executive decisions on judicial review. Benotto JA’s reasoning here rightly ignores Baker’s depiction of the Children’s Convention as unimplemented and rightly follows (without citing) Baker’s resort to the convention as a relevant (perhaps even a mandatory) consideration in judicial review.

The Court of Appeal’s resort to the Children’s Convention here is framed entirely as a contextual analysis and not as an application of the interpretive presumption that statutes conform with Canada’s international obligations. The presumption of conformity is nowhere mentioned in Benotto JA’s reasons. In my view, however, the court’s strong application of the Children’s Convention as a contextual factor in statutory interpretation is, in effect, an application of the presumption. The two ideas are closely related. Courts apply the presumption of conformity with international law at the contextual stage of statutory interpretation “in keeping with the international context in which Canadian legislation is enacted.”^{Footnote 71} Even without expressly invoking the presumption of conformity, Benotto JA’s Children’s Convention-informed approach to the FIPPA in this case achieves the presumption’s objective — namely, to promote the domestic performance of Canada’s obligations under the Children’s Convention.

Exportation des véhicules blindés légers vers l’Arabie saoudite — effet interne des Conventions de Genève — connaissance d’office du droit international

Turp c Canada (Affaires étrangères), 2018 CAF 133 (6 juillet 2018). Cour d’appel fédérale.

Tel que noté dans le tome précédent de l’Annuaire, en janvier 2017 la Cour fédérale a rejeté la demande de contrôle judiciaire initié par le professeur Daniel Turp d’une décision du Ministre des Affaires étrangères approuvant l’octroi de licences d’exportation pour des véhicules blindés légers (VBL) vers l’Arabie saoudite.^{Footnote 72} Dans la présente décision, l’appel par le professeur Turp est rejeté, le juge Nadon exprimant au nom de la Cour d’appel fédérale son accord entier avec les motifs de la juge de première instance.^{Footnote 73}

Les motifs du juge Nadon sont admirables dans au moins deux aspects: leur considération de la retenue judiciaire qui s’impose lorsqu’un tribunal est appelé à réviser une décision impliquant la conduite des affaires étrangères, et la connaissance d’office que doivent prendre les tribunaux quant au contenu et à la signification du droit international. Pourtant, il y a raison de douter la conclusion du juge Nadon que les individus manquent l’intérêt voulu pour se plaindre d’une violation des Conventions de Genève devant les tribunaux canadiens.^{Footnote 74}

Les parties conviennent, et le juge Nadon affirme, que la norme de contrôle applicable est celle de la décision raisonnable. En outre, le juge Nadon conclut, compte tenu du libellé de la Loi sur les licences d’exportation et d’importation (LLEI),^{Footnote 75} que la cour “doit exercer une grande retenue lorsqu’elle est appelée à réviser une décision du ministre, à savoir s’il doit ou non accorder des licences d’exportation telles que celles demandées en l’instance.”^{Footnote 76} Il poursuit:

Dans cette même optique, le juge ajoute: “Il va sans dire qu’il pourrait y avoir des conséquences ou répercussions politiques résultant de la décision du ministre d’accorder les licences mais il ne peut faire de doute que le débat qui pourrait s’ensuivre n’est pas du ressort de notre Cour.”^{Footnote 78} L’application de ces propos est souvent controversée dans les cas difficiles, mais leur explication par le juge Nadon en l’espèce ne l’est sûrement pas.

L’aspect le plus important des motifs du juge Nadon est peut-être ses observations, bien qu’elles soient exprimées en obiter, sur le recours à l’expertise afin de prouver le contenu et la signification des obligations juridiques internationales du Canada. Dans une discussion intitulée, “La preuve du droit international par expertise,” le juge exprime son avis qu’il “n’est pas nécessaire pour les parties de déposer des rapports d’expertises pour faire la preuve du droit international puisque la Cour peut prendre connaissance judiciaire de ce droit.”^{Footnote 79} Le juge tire cette conclusion de trois autorités, à savoir R v The North, Jose Pereira E Hijos, SA c Canada (Procureur général), et la décision écossaise bien connue, Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2000).^{Footnote 80} Il conclut:

Les propos du juge Nadon laissent espérer que le droit canadien rattrapera enfin les autorités britanniques et australiennes^{Footnote 82} et qualifiera les avis juridiques d’experts sur des questions de droit international de généralement inadmissibles. Les positions juridiques doivent être avancées par les avocats et non par les experts. Les questions de droit international doivent être réglées par les tribunaux comme des questions de droit et non de fait.

Les observations du juge Nadon quant à la preuve du droit international méritent un accueil chaleureux, mais ses conclusions quant à l’intérêt nécessaire des individus pour soulever une violation des Conventions de Genève méritent un examen minutieux. Le juge s’exprime ainsi:

Avec beaucoup d’égards au juge Nadon, qui est (à mon avis) parmi nos juges les plus sophistiqués quant à la réception du droit international en droit interne, ces propos confondent la position en droit international avec la position en droit interne. Il est vrai que les individus ne peuvent exercer de recours contre un État responsable d’une violation des Conventions de Genève — en droit international. Mais il est beaucoup moins clair que ces mêmes conventions obligent aux états parties d’interdire en droit interne qu’un individu puisse invoquer ces conventions pour des fins internes telles la révision judiciaire de décisions gouvernementales.

De plus, si les Conventions de Genève incluaient une telle obligation, la règle voulant que les dispositions conventionnelles soient mises en œuvre par voie législative pour avoir un effet direct en droit interne s’appliquerait. Comme le constate le juge Nadon plus tôt dans ses motifs,^{Footnote 84} un traité doit normalement être expressément intégré au droit canadien pour avoir force de loi. Cette règle s’appliquerait tant à un traité qui supprime un droit qu’à un traité qui l’octroie. Il est dejà clair en droit canadien qu’un justiciable peut invoquer une obligation découlant d’un traité à l’appui d’une demande de contrôle judiciaire.^{Footnote 85} Comme l’affirme le juge Stratas:

Pour que, dans le cadre d’une demande de contrôle judicaire, le droit d’un justiciable d’invoquer une obligation internationale du Canada — et la liberté d’un tribunal de considérer cet argument — ne s’applique pas à l’égard des Conventions de Genève, il faudrait que cette interdiction soit mise en œuvre par une loi.

International commercial arbitration — recognition and enforcement of judgments — meaning of “binding” in UNCITRAL Model Law art. 35(1)

Popack v Lipszyc, 2018 ONCA 635 (12 July 2018). Court of Appeal for Ontario.

Popack and Lipszyc were businessmen with a commercial real estate dispute in the Greater Toronto Area. They submitted their dispute to arbitration before a rabbinical court in New York known as the Beth Din. The arbitration agreement provided that the Beth Din was a tribunal subject to the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, an Ontario statute that implements the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law.^{Footnote 87} In August 2013, the Beth Din made an award in favour of Popack and his associated entities, though for much less than they had sought. They applied to set aside the award under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. That application was dismissed,^{Footnote 88} and this dismissal was upheld by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.^{Footnote 89} The Popack parties then applied for recognition and enforcement of their award. Lipszyc resisted, saying he planned to return to the Beth Din to claim further costs and damages arising from the Popack parties’ unsuccessful set aside proceedings. In June 2017, the Beth Din purported to stay the award pending a hearing of Lipszyc’s further claim.

The application judge heard both the Popack application to enforce the award and the Lipszyc application to stay it. He agreed with Lipszyc that the award was not yet “binding” within the meaning of Article 36(1)(a)(v) of the UNCITRAL Model Law and Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention and, therefore, could not yet be enforced. The Popack parties appealed.

Justice David Brown for the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, set aside the order below and substituted an order recognizing and enforcing the Beth Din’s award. The standard of review was correctness,^{Footnote 90} and the application judge had erred in his interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Brown JA began his analysis with an observation by the well-known practitioner and author, Gary Born, to the effect that the meaning of the term “binding,” as found in the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law “has always been a mystery.”^{Footnote 91} While Born takes the view that an award should be considered binding “when the parties’ arbitration agreement provides that it is either final or binding, regardless of the possibility of subsequent judicial challenges of any sort,” a number of national courts do not share his view.^{Footnote 92} In particular, Brown JA noted that some courts distinguish between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” avenues of recourse and consider an award binding when avenues of ordinary recourse (excluding set aside proceedings under the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law) have been exhausted.^{Footnote 93}

Yet, Brown JA observed, the Supreme Court of Canada appears not to take this approach. In Yugraneft Corp v Rexx Management Corp, the Court held that the availability of set aside proceedings under the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law may render an award not binding under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention.^{Footnote 94} Having pointed out this apparent discrepancy between Canada and other jurisdictions, Brown JA observed that he need not “express any definitive view on whether an award is not ‘binding’ while an avenue of ‘ordinary recourse,’ such as a review or appeal, remains open to a party,” for in the case before him the arbitration agreement expressly forbade appeals, thus precluding “ordinary recourse” against the award on the merits.^{Footnote 95}

Brown JA went on to reject Lipszyc’s other arguments that the award was not yet binding. Article 33(1)(a)’s provisions for correcting computational, clerical, or typographical errors did not apply, nor did Article 33(1)(b)’s provisions for seeking an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Also inapplicable was Article 33(3)’s provision that a party may request that the tribunal make an additional award as to claims presented in the proceedings but not addressed in the award. Quoting Born, Brown JA explained that all of these provisions represent “very narrow categories of ‘errors’ that may be corrected under the Model Law” and that “errors in the tribunal’s reasoning in the body of its award are not subject to correction.”^{Footnote 96} In response to Lipszyc’s argument that the Beth Din enjoyed continuing jurisdiction, Brown JA held that the court below had wrongly conflated two issues: whether the award was “binding” for the purposes of recognition and enforcement and whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to accept new claims following issuance of the award.^{Footnote 97} Arbitration proceedings are terminated by the final award (Article 32(1)), and the Beth Din had made such an award.

The Lipszyc respondents countered that the tribunal had yet to award costs. But this, said Brown JA, was because their request that the Beth Din consider costs came only after issuance of the award and was therefore a new issue. Even if the Beth Din enjoyed continuing jurisdiction to make a costs award (about which Brown JA made no comment), that did not affect the binding nature of the existing award.^{Footnote 98}

Canadian Security Intelligence Service — foreign intelligence collection power — extraterritoriality

In the Matter of an Application by [Redacted] for Warrants pursuant to Sections 16 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 and In the Matter of [Redacted], 2018 FC 738 (date redacted). Federal Court.

In the Matter of an Application by [Redacted] for Warrants pursuant to Sections 16 and 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 and In the Matter of [Redacted], 2018 FCA 207 (date redacted). Federal Court of Appeal.

These proceedings arose from an application by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for a warrant pursuant to sections 16 and 21 of its governing statute.^{Footnote 99} What precisely CSIS sought judicial authority to do is not revealed by the reasons, which are redacted at various points on national security grounds. We know only that CSIS, at the behest of either the minister of national defence or the minister of foreign affairs, and with the approval of its own minister, the minister of public safety, sought to collect information or intelligence with respect to the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an unidentified foreign state. Section 16(1) grants CSIS the power to do this “within Canada.” But the proposed operation had an extraterritorial dimension (the nature of which is redacted from the reasons). The legal question was whether section 16(1), properly interpreted, included some tolerance for extraterritoriality.

Justice Simon Noël found it did not. He rejected the Attorney General’s purposive interpretation of section 16(1) and adopted the amicus curiae’s submission that section 16, unlike section 12, was territorially limited. The learned judge’s reasoning was rooted in a textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of the disputed provision, including considerations of international law and comity. He also relied on Federal Court jurisprudence insisting on “[s]trict limitations and controls on intelligence gathering powers,” which he called “guiding principles in the interpretation of national security legislation.”^{Footnote 100}

The CSIS Act sets CSIS’s primary mandate in section 12(1) as to “collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada.” CSIS may perform these duties and functions within or outside Canada; section 12(2) expressly says so. CSIS also has secondary mandates, one of which (section 16(1)) is to assist, “within Canada,” the minister of national defence or the minister of foreign affairs “in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of” foreign states, persons, and companies. This activity is not limited to threats to the security of Canada, as is section 12(1), but is limited — on its express wording — to activities within Canada. Finally, section 21 permits CSIS to apply to a Federal Court judge for a warrant “to enable the Service to investigate, within or outside Canada, a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties and functions under section 16.” The extraterritorial powers in the CSIS Act were added in 2015 by Bill C-44. Notably, no extraterritorial expansion of the section 16 power was included in those amendments.

Reviewing these provisions individually, in their statutory context, and in light of legislative history (notably, the McDonald and Pitfield reports that led to the creation of CSIS), Noël J considered there was no extraterritorial dimension to section 16(1). He then considered, but rejected, the Attorney General’s arguments for a purposive interpretation that would support an extraterritorial dimension when providing assistance “within Canada.” The nature of the Attorney General’s arguments in favour of this approach is considerably obscured by the redactions in the reasons. Whatever the nature of the activity for which CSIS sought a warrant, it appears to have been one that would involve CSIS acting from within Canada to collect information or intelligence from abroad. It appears also to have involved signals intelligence of the sort for which the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has primary jurisdiction.^{Footnote 101} The Attorney General argued that to confine section 16(1) to a strictly territorial reading would create a “foreign intelligence gap” in its powers. Yet Noël J considered that the historical record indicated that

He added: “[C]ollecting foreign intelligence outside Canada was deemed to be too high of a risk to our diplomatic relations by Parliament to be permitted in law.”^{Footnote 103}

Finally, under the heading “The Presumption of Conformity with International Law,” Noël J set out certain international legal considerations. Applying R v Hape, the learned judge recalled that “customary international law is adopted directly into Canadian domestic law through the common law without any need for legislative action” and that respect for the sovereignty and equality of foreign states are “foundational parts” of that custom.^{Footnote 104} Sovereignty and equality “mandate the non-intervention and the respect for the territorial sovereignty of all foreign states.”^{Footnote 105} Similarly, adherence to the principle of international comity requires those interpreting domestic law to “avoid interpretations that could impact or infringe the sovereignty of a foreign state out of deference and respect for a state’s action legitimately taken within its borders.”^{Footnote 106} Finally, the learned judge recalled “the well-established principle of statutory interpretation that legislation is presumed to conform to international law, unless clearly contradicted by an Act of Parliament” and the related presumption against extraterritoriality.^{Footnote 107}

Having reviewed these principles, Noël J observed that the Attorney General’s interpretation of “within Canada” in section 16(1) “undermines interstate relationships and cannot be said to conform with the principle of comity of nations.”^{Footnote 108} He was prepared to assume that the activity CSIS sought to engage in was contrary to the foreign state’s domestic law. The legality of the act as a matter of international law was, however, unclear.^{Footnote 109} Yet the learned judge nevertheless concluded, following a heavily redacted discussion, that to adhere to the Attorney General’s argument he would “need to turn a blind eye to settled principles of international law.”^{Footnote 110} While this turn of phrase suggests the learned judge’s unwillingness to do so, he observed later in his reasons that Parliament could easily give the court the power to grant warrants for extraterritorial activities but that, for now, “much as I wish I could, I cannot stretch the words of the Act as they are currently written to remedy this worrisome situation”^{Footnote 111} — as if to say he would willingly endorse the internationally unlawful warrant sought in this case had he the power to do so.

The Attorney General’s appeal of Noël J’s order was dismissed by the Federal Court of Appeal, but without endorsing his reasoning. Instead, Justice John B. Laskin for the court concluded that the record before the court did not provide an adequate evidentiary basis to fully consider whether the warrant CSIS sought was available under sections 16 and 21 of the CSIS Act. “Sufficient details are lacking to explain what would be done under the warrant if it was granted and how these activities would be carried out,” despite the designated judge’s request for such evidence.^{Footnote 112} The inadequacies the Court of Appeal found in the record are obscured by the redactions to its reasons, but one difficulty, it seems, was knowing the location of the activities for which the warrant was sought.^{Footnote 113} Laskin JA therefore dismissed the appeal, but left CSIS with some hope of overcoming Noël J’s concerns another day: “I would not foreclose the possibility that in a future warrant application, the evidence might be sufficiently specific to demonstrate that the granting of the authority refused in this case would be consistent with the ‘within Canada’ requirement of section 16.”^{Footnote 114}

Solitary confinement — Mandela Rules — legal significance in Canada

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 BCSC 62 (17 January 2018). Supreme Court of British Columbia.

The plaintiffs British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and the John Howard Society of Canada brought a series of constitutional challenges to the practice of administrative segregation as authorized by sections 31–33 and 37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.^{Footnote 115} They contended that the impugned provisions permit indeterminate and prolonged solitary confinement, as that term is understood in international law and accepted worldwide. The Attorney General of Canada defended, arguing that administrative segregation as practised in federal correctional facilities is not solitary confinement since inmates have daily opportunities for meaningful human contact and that administrative segregation is a necessary tool in certain circumstances.

In lengthy reasons, Justice Peter Leask found for the plaintiffs and declared the impugned provisions unconstitutional as contrary to sections 7 (life, liberty, and security of the person) and 15 (equality) of the Charter.^{Footnote 116} The learned judge found (among other things) that administrative segregation conforms to the definition of solitary confinement in the 2015 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules),^{Footnote 117} that inmates in administrative segregation are confined without meaningful human contact,^{Footnote 118} and that a central feature of administrative segregation is its indefiniteness.^{Footnote 119}

While Leask J clearly considered, and to some extent engaged with, the Mandela Rules, he gave no guidance as to their legal significance in Canada. Aside from briefly declining to address the plaintiffs’ argument that the rules reflect jus cogens and, as such, principles of fundamental justice for the purposes of section 7 of the Charter,^{Footnote 120} the court’s reasons included almost no consideration of the legal status of the Mandela Rules in international law or how a formally non-binding, but widely supported, international instrument is to be used in Charter interpretation.^{Footnote 121} His review of the general international law position on solitary confinement was only slightly more thorough.^{Footnote 122} It begins, and very nearly ends, with the claim that there is “an emerging consensus in international law that under certain circumstances solitary confinement can cross the threshold from a legitimate practice into cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, … even torture.”^{Footnote 123} This is a defensible claim, but there is little reasoning offered in support of it.

An appeal from this decision was heard by the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in November 2018 and is, at the time of writing, under reserve. It will be addressed, if warranted, in a future edition of the Canadian Yearbook of International Law.

Child abduction — States not parties to the Hague Convention — Convention on the Rights of the Child

Ojeikere v Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372 (17 April 2018). Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In a custody dispute, the father argued that the Nigerian courts had jurisdiction, while the mother (supported by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer) argued for Ontario. The court below found for the father. Justice John I. Laskin for the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that Ontario lacked jurisdiction but nevertheless reversed on the ground that the children would likely suffer serious harm if returned to Nigeria. The jurisdictional point was not governed by the Hague Convention because Nigeria is not a party.^{Footnote 124} It therefore fell to be decided under sections 22 and 23 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.^{Footnote 125}

The Court of Appeal nevertheless made some notable observations about both the Hague Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.^{Footnote 126} For the majority, Laskin JA held that the “serious harm” standard established by section 23 of the Act is less stringent than the “grave risk” of harm standard in Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. Thus, Ontario courts considering child abduction cases involving non-parties to the Hague Convention have somewhat greater latitude to refuse to order an abducted child’s return to the child’s habitual residence. In Laskin JA’s view, the section 23 standard must be less stringent than the Article 13(b) standard for two reasons. First, the Legislature was clearly aware of the Article 13(b) requirement of grave risk of harm placing the child in an intolerable situation, yet opted instead for the concept of serious harm.^{Footnote 127} Second, Laskin JA ventured that the Hague Convention standard is

Laskin JA turned to Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention again in considering the views of the three children at issue, as required by section 64(1) of the Act (“a court where possible shall take into account the views and preferences of the child to the extent that the child is able to express them”). Laskin JA considered this provision to be a parallel to the second clause of Article 13(b), which provides that judicial or administrative authorities may refuse to order the return of a child if they find the child “objects to return and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.” Having previously concluded that the children faced a serious risk of physical harm from their father if returned to Nigeria, he observed that the children’s views were relevant to assessing the risk of psychological harm they would face were they returned. While noting again that the case before him was not a Hague Convention case, he nevertheless considered Article 13(b) “relevant because it reflects widespread international agreement that in jurisdictional disputes over custody, a mature child’s objection to returning to the place of habitual residence should be considered.”^{Footnote 129}

In concurring reasons, Justice Bradley Miller agreed that the children ought not to be returned, but for different reasons. Like Laskin JA, Miller JA found that there was a risk of physical harm to the children that justified their retention in Ontario. He disagreed, however, that the children faced a risk of psychological harm. In his view, the children’s views about returning to Nigeria amounted to disappointment, but not harm, let alone serious harm. Additionally, Miller JA did not accept that the Act’s serious harm standard (in section 23) ought to be interpreted as a lower threshold than that imposed by the Hague Convention. In particular, Miller JA observed:

Immunité de poursuite — Organisation des Nations Unies — UNICEF

Bouchard c IKEA Canada, 2018 QCCS 2690 (13 juin 2018). Cour supérieure du Québec.

Dans cette affaire, la Cour supérieure du Québec rejette la tentative de la demanderesse de poursuivre l’UNICEF pour violation de ses droits d’auteur en invoquant l’immunité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) (dont fait partie l’UNICEF). La demanderesse soutient que l’UNICEF et le Groupe Ikea collaboraient pour la production et vente de peluches ayant les mêmes caractéristiques que celles qu’elle a créées.

En traitant d’une demande d’exception déclinatoire initiée par le Procureur général du Canada, le juge Jacques affirme l’immunité absolue de l’UNICEF. Il commence avec l’article 105 de la Charte des Nations Unies,^{Footnote 131} qui prévoit pour l’ONU “des privilèges et immunités qui lui sont nécessaires pour atteindre ses buts.” Ensuite, il prend note de la Convention sur les privilèges et immunités des Nations Unies de 1946,^{Footnote 132} qui, dans son article 2, prévoit une immunité de juridiction complète et absolue à l’ONU et, dans son article 34, oblige à chaque pays membre de l’ONU d’appliquer cette immunité dans son droit interne. Passant au droit canadien, le juge Jacques conclut que l’immunité de l’ONU est établi par l’effet conjoint de l’article 5(1) de la Loi sur les missions étrangères et les organisations internationales (LMEOI)^{Footnote 133} et l’article 3 du Décret d’adhésion aux privilèges et immunités (Nations Unies).^{Footnote 134} Le fait que l’UNICEF bénéficie de l’immunité de l’ONU est établi par l’article 11 de la LMEOI et un certificat délivré en vertu de celle-ci. L’article 11 établit que le ministre des Affaires étrangères peut délivrer un certificat attestant de l’assujettissement d’une organisation à un décret pris en vertu de l’article 5: “Or, un tel certificat a été délivré par le ministère … reconnaissant que l’UNICEF est bel et bien sujet au décret et à la même immunité que celle dévolue à l’ONU.”^{Footnote 135}

En réponse à la prétention de la demanderesse selon laquelle l’ONU était obligée, en vertu de l’article 29 de la convention, de mettre sur pied un mode approprié de règlement des différends, ce qu’elle a omis de faire, le juge Jacques affirme que ce défaut “n’a pas pour effet de lever l’immunité absolue et de conférer compétence à la Cour.”^{Footnote 136}