This volume is hardly staple reading for economic historians. Many in our trade care little about archives and less about writing. Worse still, as Kathryn Burns readily admits, this book should probably have a title in which notaries feature prominently, because it really is about the notarial records created by dozens of notary publics in Spanish Cuzco (today's Peru). In other words, this is a book about an out-of-the-way place, written by a cultural historian, on a legal figure, the notary public, that is essentially unimportant in the Anglophone world. Surely it is not a book for economic historians?
Yes, it is. It helps that this is a concise and engagingly written book, which entertains and educates with about the right amount of anecdote from the archive. More important, however, economic historians who are willing to read outside our own jargon will be rewarded with a book that has much to say about our field. For this is a book about property rights and the enforcement of legal institutions, barriers to entry and moral hazard, apprenticeships and training, secondary markets in legal titles and credit contracts even if it never says so explicitly.
To begin with this book offers a readable introduction into the central role of notaries in Spanish America and Spain. And although Burns does not mention this, it might well serve as a guide for anyone who tries to understand the function of these vital players in the legal structure of most continental European countries. This makes it an obvious starting point for any economic historian new to these kinds of sources.
Yet beyond this, Burns' account of the standardized and the nonstandard contracting recorded in the Cuzco protocolos illustrates the challenges in understanding property rights in Europe and the Americas. Arguably, the unfamiliarity of Anglophone economic historians with the institution of the notary has skewed the record towards a model that holds that property rights in Anglophone legal systems were historically particularly strong. From the vantage point of a Spanish American and continental European economic historian debates about this model at times appear like discussions about creationism: we hurl thousands of contracts from the notarial archives at the faithful who ignore them steadfastly and declare their true faith in the superiority of the common law will not be shattered by this unfamiliar evidence.
For those willing to doubt that scripture, Burns has plenty of examples of how property rights were established, transferred, and defended in Spanish America. Complex contracts allowed the mortgaging of real property but also of most other types of property and of current and future income streams. If a property itself was not to be used as collateral, the written ownership record could be pawned. Credit transactions between religious institutions (the “banks” of the early modern Spanish world) were so common that they were set up by the notary (read: credit broker) with presigned papers from the convent's “investment committee.”
That does not mean that property was always secure of course. Corrupt notaries were complicit in petty infractions and large schemes to literally cheat widows and orphans out of their inheritance. Their reputation was dismal. They might overcharge their customers, pass on confidential information, and rig the witness accounts in a trial in favor of the highest-bidding interested party. Some made the purchase of the office pay off handsomely and became conspicuously rich.
They were the keepers of privileged information and of the record of property. That role on its own gave them power over others. In rural places where only one notary was within reach, this power was even easier to abuse than in a larger town where there was competition within the profession, even if access was restricted to a limited number. Notaries became part of what Burns calls “power groups.”
However, Burns also shows that notaries had to be properly apprenticed. They were not legal scholars. But only trained scribes could purchase an office illustrating how much tacit knowledge there was even in this most literate of crafts. They were subject to regular inspections. Egregious incompetence or corruption landed more than one notary in prison. They were not allowed to turn customers away. Thus their services could be purchased (at customary rates) by a powerful Spanish official or an Inca nobleman who tried to infringe on the property rights of the disadvantaged. But, they might equally help a poor, illiterate, Quechua-speaking Indian defend his rights to a potato field, a battered woman to guard her dowry, or a poor Spanish official to protect himself against a corrupt superior.
Burns stresses that what notaries wrote down should not be mistaken for what those who paid for the notarized documents said. Notaries translated (sometimes literally, often stylistically) and standardized the account. Yet, in doing so they also provided a service that gave practically everyone a chance to put his or her side of the story down in a legally valid form that judges could not ignore. Whom such a document empowered depended very much on local circumstance and on the notary himself.
This points to the weakest argument in Burns‘ book. Throughout the reader wonders if there was anything particularly “colonial” about notaries in sixteenth to eighteenth centuries Cuzco. No matter if one frames such an account within a literature that tries to understand “coloniality” and the subaltern, as Burns does, or if one reads it as an account of property rights and power structures, as I have suggested one could, Walter Mignolo and Daron Acemoglu would both insist that there should be something particularly colonial about this story. Yet, Burns struggles to find anything that would look very different from notaries’ activities in Spain. She suggests that a particular kind of document was uncommon in Seville and that Cuzco notaries were more likely to add irreverent “doodles” to their dry tasks.
That is hardly the stuff of exploitative colonial institutions. It sounds more like the difference between a more specialized and competitive notariat in a large city (Seville) and its more pedestrian cousin in a smaller town (Cuzco). Having spent a decent amount of time in peninsular Spanish small town notarial archives, Burns‘ account sounds all too familiar. A Basque-speaking illiterate iron worker from the Vizcayan valleys had to rely on the notary's truthfulness in just the same way as the Quechua peasant in Cuzco.
Issues such as if colonial institutions were systematically exploitative and how property rights were created and enforced do not have to remain a question of faith though. Hopefully, creative economic historians with some language skills will delve deeper into these archives and mine the exceptionally rich contractual evidence for their model building. Thanks to Burns, that is now a little easier.
