No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2004
Selim Deringil's review of my Politicization of Islam in IJMES reflects an all-out effort to “demolish” the book rather than present the reader with a reasoned and fruitful evaluation. His arguments defy collegial courtesy, exaggerating the trivial and making distorted or erroneous assertions. Perhaps he fears that my work will outdate his Well-Protected Domains (1997–99) even though the two differ totally in approach, orientation, and scope.
In the Preface I indicated that “the idea of this book has been in my mind since the start of my academic career,” and added, “I commenced work on this book some twenty years ago, when access to Ottoman archives was exceptionally difficult. Since 1989 the use of the archives has been greatly liberalized, and consequently a dozen or so more scholars, mostly Turks, have published dissertations and books on the Hamidian period, based in part on the materials used in this work. To the extent possible, all these works are indicated in the references” (p. vi). The first fourteen chapters of my book were completed in late 1996, but publication was postponed while I added the chapters on nationalism, identity, and Islam because of their mutual interaction and convergence. Already in my Turkish Foreign Policy (Madison, Wis., 1996, p. 103, fn. 2), while mentioning some “Islamic” questions, I stated “these issues are treated at length in Kemal H. Karpat, Islamism–Panislamism: The Recreation of State, Nation and Religion in the Late Ottoman Empire (forthcoming),” the initial title of my book. Then health problems further delayed the work until April 2000, when I wrote the Preface. Actually, as I stated in Ottoman Population, 1830–1914 (Madison, Wis., 1985), I undertook the study on population as preparation for my broader study of the socio-economic and political transformation of the Ottoman state. The subtitle “Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State” is the central theme of The Politicization of Islam, and I therefore tried to take into consideration “every major, domestic and international, factor that affected the transformation of the Ottoman society and state as well as reconsider the true role of Islam and of the sultan-caliph in this process.” With 422 pages of text (small script), it covers a great variety of issues, from revivalist movements in Russia, South Asia, and Africa to the rise of the modern Ottoman middle classes, migration, and education, roughly from 1800 to 1918. Deringil's 176-page book, as he indicates in his Introduction, deals merely with legitimization of authority at home and image-making abroad from 1876 to 1909. I read it in late 1999 and inserted its title wherever relevant while correcting the proofs.
Deringil's eagerness to find something wrong in my book, however trivial and insignificant, exposes his own carelessness. Deringil criticizes me for not citing enough the works by Engin Akarlı, Carter V. Findley, and so on. Akarlı (a former student of mine) is cited in three different chapters (chaps. 6, 7, 8), and Findley is cited in four (chaps. 3, 10, 15, 16). Instead of Findley's work, however, I often refer directly to Aşçıdede's own memoirs and to a German dissertation (chap. 14, fn. 5). Deringil's careless inconsistency is obvious. In his review, the name is spelled Ahçı Dede, while in his book it is Aşçiı Dede (p. 7) and misplaced alphabetically in the index. However, Findley, in his two books, spells the name “Aşçıdede” in all bibliographical entries, as I do.
Of course, any author has some discretion in selecting his or her sources, especially in a study encompassing social change, reform, Islamism, and the like, where viewpoints and approaches can vary greatly. Yet besides writing a bibliographical essay, I cited all the major works on Abdulhamid, including Ph.D. dissertations from the United Kingdom and Turkey and journal articles by Azmi Özcan, Gökhan Çetinsaya, S. Tufan Buzpınar, Cezmi Eraslan, and Orhan Koloǧlu. None—yes none—of these major books, plus 25 to 30 other relevant Turkish works and Abdulhamid's own memoirs, are even mentioned by Deringil in his book. In addition, I cited several of Deringil's own articles, although he ignored more than twenty of mine dealing with 19th century Ottoman history, including a lengthy one on Abdulhamid. And yet, he has the temerity to criticize (p. 180, fn. 26) Ulrich Trumpener for ignoring Turkish sources in the classic Germany and the Ottoman Empire (1968). Moreover, to downgrade my book, Deringil cites pedantically at random many “unused” works, with which I am familiar but that have little or no direct relevance to my subject, although some of their authors, such as Ilber Ortayli, I greatly admire.
The usual careless haste again compounds Deringil's bias when he tries to identify “factual” errors in my book. For instance, he claims that I stated that Abdulhamid did not introduce religious courses in school curricula. In fact, I wrote that “the introduction of religious courses occurred chiefly after 1890 to counter the spread of nationalism and foreign missionary activity” (p. 232) and then explained why and how the sultan introduced courses on Islam. Although Deringil notes that the citizenship law was introduced not in 1864 but in 1869, I was contending that citizenship laws (plural) actually were introduced in 1864, when the laws dividing the country into provinces and subdivisions and introducing reforms in the Tuna (Danube) province, etc., were passed, for these laws, following the reforms of two Christian religious millets in 1862–63, transformed Ottomans from subjects of the sultan into citizens of the state. On Abdulhamid's “gazi” title, I stated Abdulhamid did not use it in public talks and appearances because he wanted to emphasize his position as caliph. I knew this all along but had no reason to mention it, because it was obvious that it was on the sultan's seal. Finally, Deringil claims that I stated that the warship Ertuǧrul did not stop in South Asian ports. My point was that the Ertuǧrul did not stop in Muslim countries, despite insistent demands by local Muslims, lest Abdulhamid be accused of Islamic propaganda. The ship did stop in non–Muslim ports to pick up needed supplies.
The Ottoman state was officially known throughout its existence as Devlet-i Ali-i Osmani (The Sublime State of Osman or Ottoman), as indicated by Ahmedi (d. 1412/13) and repeatedly in Asafname by Lütfi paşa (d. 1562), whom I quote on page 242. When Deringil reports my observation that the title “Ottoman” was not used before the 19th century, he should know that I was referring to an individual's political identity, not to the state.
Deringil not only highlights, but also manages to compound, several minor printing errors. As no spelling “error” exists in note 14 of Chapter 4, he probably means note 17. It refers to Benjamin Fortna not as D. C., which Deringil claims, but as B. C. Fortuna. While “correcting” the wrong part of this misprint, Deringil spells Fortna's name as “Forna.” Likewise, he “corrects” my use of Güldaǧlı-Güven to Gül Çaǧıalı-Güven, not Gül Çaǧalı-Güven. True, on page 478 I referred to Sinan Kuneralp as Siman, but on pages 488 and 507, the spelling is correct. Such trivial typos do not merit discussion, and I take full responsibility for them. If Deringil makes so many “errors” in a two-page review, then my typos in a nearly 500-page book become more understandable.
Unfortunately, Deringil often distorts or imagines to heap criticism on my book. For instance, I claimed nowhere that Abdulmecid minted the expression “L'empereur des Ottomans.” Maybe that is what he had in mind when he mentioned the “medallion struck in 1850” in his book (p. 27). I do not deal with the “center–periphery” theory but merely analyze land-tenure transformation and its impact on the rise of agrarian Muslim middle classes.
Bordering on slander, Deringil claims that I used his Well-Protected Domains without giving him proper credit. My short Chapter 10 (pp. 223–41) deals with various Ottoman symbols of statehood and authority, such as coats of arms, marches, investiture, etc. Combining art and history, this is one of the most widely studied topics in Turkey and abroad. Midhat Sertoǧlu, Ernst Kühnel, Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, Esin Atıl, Mahmut R. Gazimihal, Etem R. Üngör, Münir Atalar, Zdzislaw Zygulski in his unique Ottoman Art in the Service of the Empire (New York, 1992), and Douglas S. Brookes have treated this subject in depth. They are my basic sources, in addition to primary documents, and are cited at length (pp. 455–56), as are Deringil's relevant articles (in chap. 10, fn. 5). Deringil, however, does not mention a single one of these basic sources on Ottoman political symbols, apparently under the self-delusion that he was the first to “discover” this familiar topic. Rather, he finds it significant that I used the term “sitare-i şerif” (holy cover of Ka'ba), as he did in the first edition of his book, before changing it to “setre-i şerif” in the new edition. Of the two terms derived from the noun “setr” (cover), “sitare” is far more appropriate as “cover” of Ka'ba. According to Ferit Devellioǧlu's Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lügat (Ankara, 1962), “sitare” means “the cover of something” while “setir” can be used in many different ways: “setr-i avret,” according to Redhouse, is simply the cover of a delicate part of the human body. The New Redhouse Turkish–English Dictionary defines “setre” as an “old fashioned form of frock-coat,” and popularly it can mean pants. Consequently, Deringil's less appropriate switch to “setre” would be the more suspicious usage to have duplicated. Anyway, this entire discussion borders on the ridiculous, and I leave it there.
I am really saddened that I have to engage in this kind of unpleasant effort to refute Deringil's outrageous contentions, which give him no credit. I would have preferred to debate, taking the Ottomans as a model, whether the need for change and reform in Islamic societies was caused by domestic forces; whether political and social change and democracy could be achieved by using Islamic arguments and forms of legitimacy; or whether the differences between the Islamic societies and the West derived from culture or socio-economic environment. In this context, I found that Sultan Abdulhamid used his caliphal credentials and influence to preserve the Tanzimat reforms and to introduce massive new cultural, economic, social, and integrative reforms. These reforms in turn laid the foundations of modern Turkey and Turkish democracy, in spite of the sultan's own defense of absolutism as a legitimate form of Islamic government. Abdulhamid opposed the conservative Islamists and the Şeyhulislamate (Bab-ı Meşihat) and used pragmatic arguments by his Islamic aides to advance his reformist agenda; hence, my extensive treatment of Ahmet Cevdet paşa. Reform in the Ottoman state was carried out successfully through the medium of Islam; the caliphate became the central Muslim institution not because of Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamic ambitions, but because Muslims sought guidance and legitimacy for change from a basic Islamic institution.
My current book has been praised by impartial and acknowledged authorities who more than balance Deringil's prejudiced and unscholarly review. To downgrade and dismiss any work that appears to challenge their own seems to be a common “sultanic” or “me and nobody else” characteristic of some of my fellow Turkish scholars. When I published Turkey's Politics in 1959, one of my former professors, who had written a similar book, charged that books on that subject written by dilettantes were better than mine. Years later, Turkey's Politics is still in use and has been translated and reprinted several times in Turkey. Only time, not Deringil, will tell whether my present work has staying power.
Professor Deringil declined to responsd.
In Julia Rubanovich's review of Paul Losensky, Welcoming Fighani: Imitation and Poetic Individuality in the Safavid-Mughal Ghazal (IJMES 35 [2003]: 188–90), the word taẓkiriahs on pages 188 and 190 should read taẓkirahs, and the word taẓkiriah on page 188 should read taẓkirah.