Introduction
This article analyzes the positioning, withing Russia's socio-political order, of institutions for the representation of ethnic minority interests based on nonterritorial cultural autonomy (NTCA): national cultural autonomies and peoples’ congresses.Footnote 1 NTCA institutions can be broadly situated within the country’s political communityFootnote 2 in the sense that they—for the most part—recognize the government’s rules of engagement and its role as decision maker, leading to overarching consensus and pursuit of shared objectives. At the same time, they remain at the periphery of Russia’s political community, with scarce influence on decision-making or on society more broadly—resulting in feeble voices for the articulation of minority concerns. On the basis of qualitative data from interviews in Russia, this article outlines the reasons for NTCA institutions’ peripherality and limited impact upon Russia’s minority policies. Such reasons are linked to obvious external factors—Russia’s undemocratic political system—but also to conditions intrinsic to NTCA institutions themselves—forms of passivity and (non)participation, and blurred boundaries between NTCA institutions and state actors. The interaction of such external and internal factors generates the noted prevailing consensus between NTCA institutions and the Russian state. Interview data further reveal that representatives of NTCA institutions are far from monolithic: external and internal factors affect them in different ways, resulting in variations in forms of consensus and cooperation with state actors. This, in turn, allows for multiple interpretative frameworks of state-civil society coexistence in the sphere of Russia’s diversity management. This article can be located within the broader research on state-civil society relations in authoritarian contexts (Hilliker Reference Hilliker2012; Horvath Reference Horvath2011; Korosteleva Reference Korosteleva2012; Jamal Reference Jamal2007; Lewis Reference Lewis2013; Spires Reference Spires2011; Ziegler Reference Ziegler and Charles2010; Bindman Reference Bindman2015; Cheskin and March Reference Cheskin and March2015) looking at cases of (quasi-)civil societyFootnote 3 through the prism of diversity management.
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were carried out between June 2015 and June 2016 in six cities of the Russian Federation, including in four ethnic republics—Saransk (Republic of Mordovia), Petrozavodsk (Karelia), Kazan (Tatarstan), and Ufa (Bashkortostan)—as well as the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. In total, 76 persons were interviewed, from civil society (national cultural autonomies, peoples’ congresses, and minority NGOs), as well as academics and public officials.Footnote 4 I refrain from indicating the exact number of respondents who expressed particular views: given the relatively small sample of respondents, this could be misleading. Rather, I offer my interpretation of the body of data taken as a whole; I only give a general indication as to whether particular views were common or rare to guide the reader—this should, however, be treated with caution and not seen as a claim of representativeness of specific groups of respondents.
Nonterritorial Cultural Autonomy: International and Russian Conceptions
NTCA is generally understood as a system that provides for the ethno-cultural accommodation of minorities without carving out autonomous regions within a state. Hence, they are of particular relevance to minorities that are territorially dispersed. The idea of national cultural autonomy first appeared at the end of the 19th century and was promoted by the Austro-Marxists Karl Renner ([1899] Reference Renner and Nimni2005) and Otto Bauer (2000 [Reference Bauer1907]) as a mechanism to address various groups’ ethno-cultural and linguistic needs while maintaining intact the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a polity. It is based on the personality principle: the notion that minority groups can be autonomous within a multi-ethnic state, regardless of place of residence. The model envisages self-government in the spheres of culture and education, with minority-language or bilingual institutions at the local level.
The notion of NTCA has recently roused the interest of academics (Malloy, Osipov, and Vizi Reference Malloy, Osipov and Vizi2015; Nimni Reference Nimni1999, Reference Nimni2005, Reference Nimni2007; Nimni, Osipov, and Smith 2013; Roach Reference Roach2005; Smith and Cordell Reference Smith and Cordell2008) and some of its features have been incorporated into the law and practice of a number of countries, including post-communist ones.Footnote 5 Multiple forms of NTCA have been developed in a range of historical and political contexts (Malloy, Osipov, and Vizi Reference Malloy, Osipov and Vizi2015). While the exact scope of NTCA remains somewhat undefined, autonomy implies communities being in a position to regulate matters relating to their cultures and languages.
Despite this basic understanding of NTCA as self-governance, for the purposes of this article I place cultural autonomy in the wider context of participation. The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (hereinafter the Lund Recommendations)Footnote 6 divide participation into participation in decision-making (arrangements at central, regional, and local government, and elections) and self-government (encompassing nonterritorial and territorial arrangements). Consequently, cultural autonomy (as self-governance) can be situated within the framework of (broadly defined) participation. Indeed, successful forms of NTCA have been linked to participation in the life of the state, with relevant competences devolved to minority communities through a diffusion of powers.
This approach reflects a growing consensus on the vital importance of minority participation as a vehicle to societal integration and stable intergroup relations (Hofmann Reference Hofmann2006; Weller and Nobbs Reference Weller and Nobbs2010). International standards and commentators point to a form of participation that is effective, in the sense that minorities not only have a voice, but their voice is taken seriously, enabling them to influence decision-making, particularly on matters affecting them (Marko Reference Marko2006, 3–4).Footnote 7 The analysis of contemporary cases has shown that strong forms of NTCA, enjoying effective participation, are characterized by various factors, of which a fundamental one is their development in a democratic environment (Kössler Reference Kössler, Malloy and Palermo2015). In line with this, Malloy classifies NTCA on the basis of levels of participation, from that of “voice” (self-governing institutions and effective participation), to “quasi-voice” (partial self-governance), to “nonvoice” (lack of autonomy and symbolic policies) (Malloy Reference Malloy2015, 3–4). Similarly, the Lund Recommendations refer to guarantees for minorities to have an effective voice at the level of the central government (Recommendation 6).Footnote 8 The reason for the emphasis on voice is the preemption of political—as well as cultural—marginalization. Of particular significance are degrees of inclusiveness in the development (and periodic review) of institutional designs upon which the interaction of state organs and minority organizations hinge.Footnote 9
Thus, I treat NTCA as a framework comprising minority self-governance and voice through nonterritorial arrangements, analyzing Russia’s forms of NTCA as mechanisms directed at minority accommodation through the realization of said framework. There is another reason why NTCA institutions in Russia deserve scholarly attention specifically from the perspective of participation. While the introduction of NTCA institutions in Russia was not motivated by compliance with international standards (nor did it aim to reproduce the Austro-Marxists’ model), the Russian government has linked NTCA to participatory processes, including by referring to the sharing of competences with state structure. It has done so, inter alia, in its reports to the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which enumerate measures toward the treaty’s implementation. The Russian authorities further identified a special role for NTCA institutions within the wider network of minority-related organizations in the realization of Russia’s minority policies, including through cooperation with state organs within the education system and toward legal reform.Footnote 10 Hence, NTCA institutions should also be examined in the context of international instruments to which Russia has acceded—particularly through membership of the Council of Europe and the OSCE—and of participation-related principles stemming from them.
Russia’s NTCA system consists of a vertically integrated system of organizations established at the local, regional, and federal levels. National Cultural Autonomies (NCAs) have been established following the adoption of the Federal Law on National Cultural Autonomy (NCA Law) in 1996.Footnote 11 This law can be seen as an attempt to accommodate Russia’s ethnic diversity while assuaging age-old fears of instability and state fragmentation, heightened by the country’s territorial vastness and ethno-linguistic diversity. Since 1996, the NTCA system has been widely endorsed by the numerous organizations that have chosen to register as NCAs.
Russia’s NTCA framework also comprises peoples’ congresses, another type of representative institution that operates alongside (and at times jointly with) NCAs. Peoples’ congresses are ethnicity-based representative assemblies which predate NCAs, having first developed in the early 20th century (Osipov Reference Osipov2011). The main difference between the two institutions is that NCAs are registered according to the NCA Law and, by the same law, they must operate outside a particular group’s ethnic republic (if it exists);Footnote 12 by contrast, peoples’ congresses are registered as ordinary public organizationsFootnote 13 and can operate both inside and outside the relevant ethnicity-based territorial formations. Like NCAs, peoples’ congresses have a pyramidal structure comprising organizations at the local, regional, and federal levels; unlike NCAs, they also operate at the international level through links with co-ethnics outside Russia.Footnote 14 I use NTCA as an umbrella term to designate both NCAs and peoples’ congresses.
The NCA Law stressed the function of “independently regulating the issues of their [communities’] identity preservation and their linguistic, educational and national cultural development” (Article 1). This is the role of “cultural autonomy” as self-governance, rather than participation in decision-making more broadly.Footnote 15 Yet, as noted, I treat the two forms of participation as interlocking. With reference to decision-making, Russia’s NTCA institutions remain at the margins of political processes, which means they are called upon to comply with existing rules of engagement, but not to be active members in the shaping of such rules (Prina Reference Prina2018). Meanwhile, Russian NCAs are closer to NGOs than to bodies vested with public functions so as to exercise minority self-governance and articulate minority voices. The NCA Law’s provisions are often declarative and devoid of detailed responsibilities of government organs. Consequently, NCAs have been criticized as ineffective (Bowring Reference Bowring and Nimni2005; Reference Bowring and Nimni2007) and described as “a deteriorated version” of NGOs (Osipov Reference Osipov2011, 3).Footnote 16 Restricted (ineffective) participation likely impairs the NTCA institutions’ self-governing functions by confining their engagement in cultural matters to that of regular civil society organizations, while the declarative nature of the NCA Law’s provisions results in the limited institutionalization of NTCA organizations within the Russian system of diversity management.
In this article, I do not ask whether, in light of the shortcomings mentioned above, Russia’s NCAs and peoples’ congresses should be analyzed as NTCA institutions, or whether they should be located outside this framework. Rather, I examine the institutions as they are, unpacking the reasons why they function in a particular manner and how minority representatives navigate them, taking into account variance among the respondents. Moreover, while interviews were also conducted with non-NTCA organizations—to gain a deeper understanding of the environment in which minority organizations as a whole operate—I focus on NTCA institutions, given the special role attributed to them by the Russian government.
NTCA and the Russian State: Consensus and its Dynamics
Interview data point to a prevailing consensus between NTCA institutions and government organs. The majority of NTCA respondents expressed satisfaction with the existing institutional design in the sphere of diversity management, and laws and policies did not raise major concerns. Respondents tended to subscribe to the view that government officials strive to accommodate them where possible—for example, by providing venues for events and exhibitions upon request—and that programs promoting minority cultures and languages were circumscribed by limited resources rather than by a lack of willingness to engage in or support such activities. When NTCA respondents were asked about potential difficulties they encountered, they—for the most part—pointed out that obstacles they may face, such as scarce funding, were common to all organizations and cut across ethnic groups.Footnote 17 Some stressed that problems arising from financial constraints transcend Russia’s borders, given the linkages between Russian and international markets. It was not infrequent for questions on possible difficulties affecting NTCA institutions to lead to an uncomfortable atmosphere and somehow to a defensive attitude, with the respondents emphasizing that ethnicity-based organizations had no disadvantages compared to other public organizations.
Certainly, in some instances, these positive attitudes might have been exaggerated, or faked, with respondents refraining from criticism of the authorities for fear of possible consequences, particularly given that interviews were conducted by foreign researchers. At the same time, Russian scholar Alexander Osipov (Reference Osipov, Malloy and Palermo2015a) has similarly recorded a generalized tendency for minority groups to regard the NTCA system as legitimate. In light of the common acceptance of existing practices, NTCA institutions can be located within Russia’s political community.
The cooperation (and consensus) between NTCA institutions and the Russian authorities result in a political environment where these organizations do not act as a counterweight to the Russian government. They rather consent to their peripherality by adjusting to it. This condition implies a departure from the heroic narrative of civil society (Lewis Reference Lewis2013, 327), which has treated NGOs as drivers of democratization (Cheskin and March Reference Cheskin and March2015). In conceptualizing civil society’s positionality in authoritarian states, Lewis (Reference Lewis2013) identifies a cluster of interpretations to account for cases in which civil society succeeds in coexisting with the state. Explanations include a common political culture shared by state and nonstate actors, and a complementarity of functions,Footnote 18 engendering a mutually beneficial relationship (functionalist approach). An alternative reasoning focuses on civil society being tolerated by the state but being effectively excluded from the public sphere. This scenario is drawn from Young (Reference Young2000, 163–180) and the dual approach to civil society as “self-organization” and as “public sphere;”Footnote 19 the former relates to an association’s expression of group consciousness and services provided to the group and the latter to the input of civil society into the public sphere.Footnote 20 Lewis (Reference Lewis2013) argues that, in many authoritarian states, civil society is allowed to operate in the mode of self-organization, but is prevented from publicly articulating unofficial discourses (this approach can be referred to as the discursive interpretative framework). While the political culture and functionalist approaches enable us to understand situations in which civil society and the state cooperate (particularly in cases of mutual dependency), Lewis sees the third interpretative framework as shedding light on instances in which contestation is present along with high, or relatively high, levels of state coercion.
The analysis of NTCA in Russia has to be approached from the point of view of multiple forms of consensus: taking into account this variance, all three frameworks outlined above coexist in Russian society. The discursive framework applies in all cases considered here, as shown below, while the political culture and functionalist approaches apply in numerous, but not all, cases. In this sense, while dominant narratives on interethnic relations are resilient, alternative interpretations of social reality also exist, although the practical means to transform them into widespread social phenomena continue to be absent.
NTCA’s Peripherality and Consensus
It has already been noted that, while NTCA respondents were largely confined to the margins of Russia’s political community, in interviews they mostly recognized the government’s rules of engagement and role as decision-maker. At the same time, the opinions expressed, while often positive vis-à-vis the state, were not uniform: many respondents were (at least outwardly) fully pro-government, some disagreed with government policies, and the remaining respondents could be located somewhere between these two poles. The respondents engaged in various forms of cooperation with government structures in the presence of varying levels of agreement (or disagreement) with official positions.
I leave aside considerations as to whether a consensus between two sides with a highly skewed power imbalance—in a situation of political centralism, with the state dictating the terms of the consensus—leads to instability in the long term (or whether this can be called “consensus” at all). I focus on the fact that existing practices and rules of engagement appear to have generally been accepted by the stakeholders, despite the fact that the influence (“voice”) of NTCA institutions remains feeble. The few respondents from NTCA institutions who expressed critical or partially critical opinions, as well as observers located outside of the NTCA system, elucidated some of the reasons for the widespread acceptance of ongoing practices.
The External Environment: Russia’s Political Centralism
The inflexibility of Russia’s political system is undoubtedly a highly significant factor in reducing the influence of civil society’s (including NTCA institutions’) voices, along with the impenetrability of what is known as Putin’s “power vertical.” The tight networks of the “vertical” complicate the process of locating points of pressure within the system that may yield to intervention by civil society actors. Russia has been classified as a “hybrid” regime: a system with authoritarian traits (Ambrosio [Reference Ambrosio2009] 2016), which nevertheless legitimizes itself through a veneer of democratic processes (Shevtsova Reference Shevtsova2001; Wilson Reference Wilson2005). Meanwhile, under Putin, the idea of Russia’s exceptionalism vis-à-vis the international community has been heavily promoted, including by embracing the authoritarian-liberal hybrid model of “sovereign democracy” in the second half of the 2000s (Okara 2007).
In this type of (semi-)authoritarian regime, loyalty and mass support are of vital importance (Gel’man and Starodubtsev Reference Gel’man and Starodubtsev2016, 102). In order to contain dissent, the political system needs to absorb civil society, while also presenting a semblance of invincibility which can discourage calls for the subversion of the existing political order (Gel’man and Starodubtsev Reference Gel’man and Starodubtsev2016). One of the means to this end is the vetting of civil society organizations, resulting in either their “licensing” or repression (Robertson Reference Robertson2009). Even when endorsement is granted, it can be arbitrarily withdrawn, thus encouraging only acceptable forms of civic activism and political participation (Robertson Reference Robertson2009, 541, 545). Civil society can be easily discredited through the labeling of its organizations as “foreign agents,” while the Putin leadership has introduced an array of legal and policy changes that have severely reduced civil society’s ability to function in Russia (Gilbert Reference Gilbert2016; Lavinski Reference Lavinski2013; Horvath Reference Horvath2011). In this context, a respondent observed that (potential) beneficiaries of the NTCA system fear possible risks of contradicting the state authorities when engaging in activities for the promotion of minority cultures and languages: “A proportion of citizens are afraid. For example, when I go to some provincial city, I am asked: ‘Are you allowed to do this? Does the FSB [Russian security services] or government allow you to do this?’ I reply that I am just doing it, not asking for permission. However, some people, especially older ones, have this fear in their blood.” (Respondent 1, 2016)
Some respondents believed that minority issues remain a low priority in government programs, thereby reinforcing NTCA’s peripherality, while also being situated in a securitized context. The securitization of domestic policies can trigger minority groups’ concern that they may be labeled as “extremists” if they do not demonstrate sufficient loyalty to the Russian state (Respondent 2, 2016; Respondent 3, 2016).Footnote 21 If political centralization is added to the legal and administrative complexity of a geographically vast country such as Russia, it becomes apparent how deviating from ongoing practices and engendering any type of reform is arduous if not beyond the bounds of possibility.Footnote 22
Disempowered NTCA Institutions
Russia’s political environment has produced, unsurprisingly, a weak and inflexible NTCA system. According to a respondent critical of the system, the purpose of the NCA Law was merely to give an illusion of accommodation of minority concerns, as its provisions are devoid of a mechanism of implementation (Respondent 4, 2016). He argued:
Although these [NTCA] institutions have a certain unifying role, they do not have opportunities to preserve [a minority] language. They do not have instruments. They [NTCA representatives] can gather, talk, and leave. For example, in Tatarstan, people are united under the umbrella of the World Congress of Tatars. Of course, you can raise a question [in a meeting of the Congress]; a record of it will be made. However, their [the Congress’s] resolutions are the same from year to year…. You will not be able to find a line about the realization of these resolutions…. They cannot realize them, because they do not have instruments to do so. They do not have structures, bodies, mechanisms of influence.
The respondents referred to two ways in which the absence of “instruments” to operate effectively manifests itself: in a lack of institutionalized channels involving mechanisms to influence minority-related matters (as per the citation above) and in a scarcity of resources, which affects NTCA institutions’ capacity. The first issue was raised by a small number of respondents, who referred to a facade of participation. For example, a respondent had been invited to take part in public discussions in the Duma on legislative initiatives in the sphere of interethnic relations, which he described as follows:
The decision is already made. The rest is just imitation [of dialogue]. It looks like this: … first, MPs speak, and then they give the floor for five minutes to some representatives of NGOs. Five minutes for all those invited. Of course, people get angry, since they do not understand why they were invited only for five minutes. Then they say, “Okay, seven minutes.” [On one occasion] we delegated a very active [spokesperson]; he started accusing them [public officials] furiously. After this incident, they did not invite any of those present during this hearing. (Respondent 3, 2016)Footnote 23
Second, respondents referred to limited financial resources (Respondent 2, 2016; Respondent 3, 2016). NCAs (like NGOs) can participate in competitions for grants from the state but they cannot count on a regular inflow of funds. In many cases, the respondents noted that, while more funding would certainly be welcome, they were appreciative of what was made available to them. Others were more critical: a respondent (from a federal NCA) argued that irregularity of financing and inconsistences across regions causes NCA activity to be similarly unsystematic and erratic (Respondent 1, 2016).Footnote 24 One may add that the requirement for organizations to apply for grants for individual projects eases the vetting (followed by the “licensing” or repression) of civil society, while the 2012 “Foreign Agents” Law restricts funding from abroad.Footnote 25
Besides the scarcity of financial and political capital, the situation of Russian NTCA institutions is well-captured by the discursive interpretative framework described above. NTCA institutions’ activity centers on internal management and cultural programs which do not influence Russia’s political processes (and are thereby nondiscursive, as the institutions are precluded from articulating unofficial discourses). They are expected to refrain from political activity, interpreted very broadly: as per the “Foreign Agents” Law, “political activity” encompasses acts “with the objective of impacting on decision-making by the state organs, with a view to changing their policies, and also … the formation of public opinion” (Article 2, section 2).
Internal Factors: Civil Society and Participation
The foregoing shows that part of the reason for the acquiescence to unwritten rules of state–civil society interaction is to be found in the controls placed upon civil society by the Russian government. At the same time, other factors are also at play: forms of passivity in civil society activism; blurred boundaries between the state and NTCA institutions; and illusory forms of participation.
Passivity in Activism
Some respondents—insiders to the NTCA system and also observers—pointed to a generalized passivity in many of their colleagues. A respondent argued that, when he joined his national movement during perestroika, there were “people who wanted to solve problems and those who wanted the state to solve their problems.” (Respondent 1, 2016) He believed that “the Soviet system created apathy in civil society,” and that, consequently, in post-Soviet Russia, infringements upon citizens’ rights were not followed by public outcries: “although civil society made a huge step forward, it is in its early development stage. Well, let’s say it has a big development potential.” (Respondent 1, 2016)
The expression passivity is employed here in the sense of acceptance (or acquiescence) of existing practices and modi operandi. This does not preclude that some NTCA institutions may have very actively engaged in projects and events. At the same time, when referring to their work toward the preservation of minority cultures and language, NTCA respondents tended to situate it within the existing institutional and legal framework: they did not suggest possible alterations to the NTCA system, or that additional competences be transferred to them—for example, to have more control, or direct management, of minority-language schools.Footnote 26 It was rare for interviewees to argue that NTCA organizations ought to be involved in policy-making: some believed that this was the role of experts and politicians, rather than public organizations.Footnote 27
Respondents critical of the NTCA system linked this form of passivity to a lack of “democratic experience” in Russia and to “state/civic institutions” (Respondent 1, 2016)—such as the Presidential Council on Interethnic Relations, the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, and Public Chambers, as well as others with competences in the sphere of inter ethnic relations:
All these institutions are established from above. Each state body has such an institution…. Of course, there are people in these organizations who are actually doing something, they are proposing something. However, in the majority [of cases], people are just spending their time there; either they have their own interests to be there, or they represent somebody’s interests, etc. They don’t represent society. (Respondent 2, 2016)Footnote 28
Similarly, another respondent argued: “If anything is provided from above, it will not be adopted by the people.… Only if a person is born in a free environment … he can become a true citizen.… All these chambers and committees … are only instruments for letting off steam.” (Respondent 3, 2016)
These citations expose the conviction—in a small sample of critical respondents—that an undemocratic environment obstructs the flourishing of civil society. The lack of involvement of civil society in establishing and defining the rules of engagement of consultative councils—whose members include NTCA representatives—was seen as resulting in a top-down process that reconfirms civil society’s “passivity.” This perspective gives credence to accounts of “marionette” organizations in Russia, or organizations that are “created by the state or governmental officials and have no leadership or constituency in society”: they are described as “official constructs” whose representatives “participate in consultations with political leaders as putative representatives of civil society” (Cook and Vinogradova Reference Cook and Vinogradova2006, 34–35).
Yet a partial convergence of state and civil society activities is not necessarily (or exclusively) the result of top-down management of civil society. Similarly, the said passivity might not stem from consciously opting for subservience vis-à-vis state authorities, but from a form of inertia that might have been internalized—possibly as a Soviet legacy, as suggested by one of the respondents cited above. With reference to the sphere of interethnic relations, minority organizations largely reproduce the Soviet practice of channeling the expression of minority identity into cultural activities, often in the form of ethnic festivals. The reproduction of narratives and behaviors stemming from Soviet legacies by both state and nonstate actors is in line with the interpretative framework that sees a political culture as shared by the two (Ziegler Reference Ziegler and Charles2010). NTCA institutions might have remained trapped in a restrictive framework without challenging it due to the difficulty, for many, to imagine a different scenario. The fact that civil society organizations and state organs share the same social space and cognitive frames results in particular (dominant) interpretations of social reality being treated as “evident” (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu1989, 18). In a similar fashion, Osipov argues that Russian NTCA can be seen as “an instrument for the exercise of power” (Reference Osipov2010, 55; Reference Osipov2012, 438): the acceptance of existing practices occurs without direct coercion, being based on a convergence of perceptions and agendas that unifies various societal strata.
Rather than challenging an authoritarian state, civil society can then effectively legitimize it by reproducing analogous discourses (Lewis Reference Lewis2013, 327–328), “patron-client tendencies,” and “vertical ties” (Jamal Reference Jamal2007, 20).Footnote 29 And, as a result of the acceptance of the socio-political status quo, minority representatives can be humble about their expectations, as another (critical) respondent suggested:
The former head of [organization X] once mentioned that ‘it is good that we have been recognized as a separate ethnic group so far and we are allowed to preserve our culture and ethnicity.’ I think this is because this person does not think about herself as a Russian citizen, having the same rights as everybody else living in Russia.… This kind of statement might serve as an indicator that something is wrong in Russia. (Respondent 5, 2016)
A range of respondents expressed an appreciation for the Russian state’s recognition of their ethnic identity. They observed that their experience as national minorities in Russia was positive because they could celebrate (and show others) their culture at festivals and other events. Ethnic festivals were valued, despite the narrow scope of cultural expression they envisaged.Footnote 30 Certainly, the respect with which many NTCA respondents referred to the Russian government may have derived from fear of the potential consequences of criticism. At the same time, other interpretations are possible: the previous respondent suggested that minority representatives’ “humility” could be linked to perceptions of an “inferior” status for not belonging to the ethnic majority. Indeed, a widespread attitude among respondents was that Russia’s minorities could not simply “claim” (pretendovat’) resources or initiatives from the state. There were rarely references to the Russian state’s positive obligations to promote minority cultures, as foreseen by international treaties in the sphere of minority rights to which Russia had acceded.Footnote 31 In the majority of cases, responsibility was redirected to individual minority representatives, who themselves were to preserve their cultures and languages by practicing them and passing them on to younger generations. In most cases, respondents did not refer to international minority rights law, while public officials have tended to consider international standards as having only limited relevance to Russia (Prina Reference Prina2016).Footnote 32 This creates an endogenous political culture (and insularity from international norms) which constitutes an additional commonality of NTCA institutions and the state.
Us or Them? Blurred Boundaries and Restricted Autonomy
These commonalities are reinforced by the blurred boundaries between state and non-state structures, in the sphere of interethnic relations and more generally. In consultative councils and committees on interethnic relations, members include public officials,Footnote 33 giving rise to hybrid institutions, positioned in between state and non-state actors (those that the respondent cited above had categorised as “state/civic institutions”). This fuzziness can advance the absorption of civil society into the political system.
An extra layer of complexity exists in the ethnic republics. Some respondents were—or had been, at different stages—involved in both NTCA institutions and government structures. This emerged, in particular, in interviews in Mordovia: as one respondent put it, the Mordovian people’s congress unites representatives of the Mordovian community (narod); and at the same time, public officials in charge of nationalities policy in Mordovia also belong to the same narod when they are of Mordovian descent (Respondent 6, 2016). (This is perhaps inevitable: in the ethnic republics, public officials responsible for interethnic relations often belong to the titular group). Similarly, in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, some respondents were involved in both state structures (including as MPs in the republics’ legislatures) and NTCA institutions. Even when respondents had not taken up a double function, the partial convergence of NTCA and state institutions meant that some might have commented positively on state programs as a reflection of their own (NTCA) activities, while simultaneously consolidating a perception of NTCA and state institutions cooperating toward shared purposes.
In these cases, state and civil society actors see themselves on a continuum. They do not only share the same political culture, itself stemming from common historical, social, and political contexts (Ziegler Reference Ziegler and Charles2010), but also the same networks. They are immersed in “a complex and multi-layered network of materials transactions, personal connections, and organizational linkages” (Lewis Reference Lewis2013, 326; see also Cheskin and March Reference Cheskin and March2015; White Reference White2015, 318). This is particularly significant in Russia, given the preeminent role played by informal practices (Ledeneva Reference Ledeneva2013)—or “patronal politics,” as Hale (Reference Hale2014) calls them—in social and political processes. Many respondents indicated that state-civil society cooperation is preferred to confrontation.Footnote 34 These attitudes mirror the functionalist aspects of the interaction, with civil society complementing the state by carrying out social functions, including assistance with migrants’ integration.Footnote 35 This complementarity is locked into the NCA Law, particularly 2014 amendments introducing NCA functions that are desirable to the state as they contribute to social stability, including “the harmonization of interethnic relations” and “the social and cultural adaptation and integration of migrants.”Footnote 36
In this context, ethnic leaders’ relations with public officials become more crucial than those with members of the minority communities that they purportedly represent. And, while elections generally take place within NTCA institutions, as well as internal decision-making during official gatherings, their members tend to be drawn from the minority’s elite. This can result in a lack of horizontal links between NTCA institutions and their constituents (Respondent 7, 2015; Respondent 8, 2015) and ease the absorption of minority leaders into a unified political elite.Footnote 37 These processes are, in turn, facilitated by Russia’s neopatrimonialism, by which the politico-economic order serves the interests of the ruling group (Gel’man Reference Gel’man2016), including in the sphere of interethnic relations (Osipov Reference Osipov2015b). Elite-level networks can create a scenario which alleviate personal but not group exclusion (McGarry and Agarin Reference McGarry and Agarin2014, 1977).
Effective Participation or Nonparticipation?
Respondents displayed different perceptions of what amounted to “participation,” “dialogue,” “influence,” and “effectiveness.” In some cases, they considered the activities of NTCA institutions important, but judged them insufficiently effective: for example, one respondent (a Tatar in Bashkortostan involved in NTCA institutions), on the one hand commended the activity of World Congress of Tatars in preserving a cultural link with Tatarstan for Bashkortostan’s Tatars; on the other hand, he believed that exclusively cultural activities were not sufficient to reverse the erosion of the Tatar language and the impoverishment of the Tatar cultural landscape in the republic (Respondent 9, 2016). Yet, in most cases, respondents interpreted the influence and effectiveness of NTCA institutions as being active, in the sense of engaging in sustained cycles of events and activities without these necessarily leading to long-lasting, tangible outcomes.
Meanwhile, NTCA respondents who referred to the existence of a dialogue with the authorities did not tend to elaborate on the details of such dialogue or its impact.Footnote 38 They spoke about discussions that were, in their opinion, open and helpful,Footnote 39 without additional information, while data from government sources (official websites of state institutions responsible for interethnic relations) are scarce. Thus, data are insufficient to assess how, or to what extent, civil society’s cooperation with the government may feed into policy-making and implementation. In general, there is little, if any, evidence of this type of impact (ACFC 2006: §14, 88–95).
The evaluation of effectiveness in the exercise of minorities’ participatory rights is complicated by the absence of a clear definition of NTCA institutions and their functions, which are replaced by general narratives on “cultural development” of nationalities. Such vagueness likely complicates the anchoring of debates, while the difficulty of ascertaining progression toward cultural development can advance an acceptance of illusory forms of participation. For example, festivals can give an impression of participation, in the sense of active involvement in events, even though NTCA institutions may display the (already mentioned) “passivity” by following preexisting rituals. Most respondents considered festivals’ rituals of folkloristic performances as highly meaningful to the life of the community: engagement with these events tends to create feelings of social inclusion. A minority of respondents, however, saw festivals and cultural production—while not unimportant—as having only a minute impact on the life of the community and longer-term cultural preservation; they could be regarded as forms of non-participation camouflaged as participation. Conversely, involvement in these events contributes to legitimizing existing narratives of interethnic relations through the symbolism of rituals during holidays and festivals (Adams Reference Adams2010; Cummings Reference Cummings2010). It consolidates the state’s discursive (near-)monopoly, reinforced through the media, the practices of state institutions and public events (Lewis Reference Lewis2013, 331–333).
The type of minority voice emerging from these dynamics relates to the expression of group consciousness and mutual support between members (Young Reference Young2000, 165). NTCA institutions provide a modicum of representation of interests and services to persons who are often starved of resources. At the same time, this limits NTCA institutions to “self-organization,” or an “internal voice,” rather than “voice” in the sense of “effective participation” (Malloy Reference Malloy2015) that could be projected outside the group and reverberate across society. Yet, in the presence of illusory forms of participation, not all are equally captured by the illusion.
Alternative Narratives as “Internal Voices”
Interviews also exposed alternative narratives. In the first instance, we should note that the acceptance of existing practices at times occurred with reluctance, given the scarce practical opportunities to implement activities beneficial to minority communities. This is a case that Cheskin and March (Reference Cheskin and March2015, 266) call “dissentful compliance” (or “begrudging compliance that lacks ideological motivation”), as opposed to “consentful compliance.”Footnote 40 For example, a respondent who had averred that her minority’s regional NCA was ineffective (and who instead ran her own non-NCA organization) later revealed that she was a member of the regional NCA’s executive council: “We are all in the council. What [else] can we do?” At the same time, different attitudes with regard to passivity and loyalty create fractures within some NTCA institutions, weakening horizontal links.Footnote 41
Second, while many respondents placed the state and NTCA institutions on a continuum, a small number distanced themselves from the authorities. In these cases, respondents expressed disapproval of government policies as well as, at times, approval.Footnote 42 Among specific rejections of existing state narratives, one respondent disagreed with the view, common among her colleagues (and already reported above), that minority groups should be appreciative of the opportunity to express their cultural distinctiveness through festivals:
Why do I have to be grateful for this? I was born here; I am an active citizen and I think that the state has to help and encourage me in what I am doing, not just allowing or not to sing Ukrainian songs or dance Lithuanian dances. I feel very strongly that … the state has to protect minorities. (Respondent 5, 2016)
The varied reactions to dominant narratives point to heterogeneity among representatives of NTCA institutions specifically and Russian social strata more generally. This finding challenges the view that large sections of the population—state officials, academics, media professionals and civil society—share the same perceptions and priorities in relation to Russia’s NTCA system and interethnic relations more generally (Osipov Reference Osipov2012, 438). While dominant narratives certainly exist and many appear to have been internalized through invisible mechanisms, alternative views are also present.
Despite the existence of alternative views, the reality is a scarcity of options to turn them into social mobilization. Thus, the status quo is preserved through the pervasiveness of dominant social narratives and the lack of practical means to produce (and disseminate) counter-narratives. Besides the absence of mechanisms and resources, the coercive nature of the Russian state plays a significant role. Despite this, coercive elements in relation to Russia’s NTCA have been relatively understated in the literature, as scholars have searched for reasons for the willing internalization of practices (Osipov Reference Osipov2010; Reference Osipov2012; Reference Osipov, Malloy and Palermo2015a). It is a combination of both external (including coercive) and internal factors that leads to a form of state-NTCA interaction that can only be regulated by an overarching agreement on rules of behavior.
Conclusion
This article placed Russia’s NTCA institutions in the context of (broadly defined) participation. It looked at attitudes of the majority of respondents from NTCA institutions through the lens of a few critical voices, both insiders and observers (academics or representatives of non-NTCA minority organizations). Interview data point to a generalized consensus (on rules of engagement and objectives) between the state and NTCA institutions. This consensus continues to prevail despite the fact that, while existing rules and opportunities may be used by minority groups, representatives of NTCA institutions are largely precluded from involvement in the actual shaping of such rules and remain confined to the margins of Russia’s political community.
NTCA institutions’ peripherality is linked to a combination of external and internal factors. With regard to the former, NTCA institutions have developed in an undemocratic environment, which has excluded them from participating in shaping the institutional framework upon which they hinge. This has resulted in an overall weak form of NTCA and noninstitutionalization of mechanisms to advance minority rights, including in the sphere of self-governance—as NTCA institutions operate primarily as regular NGOs. With reference to internal characteristics, NTCA organizations often display a form of passivity in that they internalize existing practices and leave them unchallenged. Other internal factors include a partial convergence of NTCA institutions and state organs and illusory forms of participation.
The said external and internal factors are mutually reinforcing: their interaction consolidates a prevailing consensus, impeding potential challenges to the status quo. While the state gives little, NTCA organizations generally refrain from asking for more, particularly with regard to structural changes that might lead to more effective participation. Consensus can then become a double-edged sword, promoting cooperation between civil society and the state, but also limiting opportunities for civil society’s substantive input—creating, instead, a situation where the state envelops civil society.
At the same time, NTCA institutions—like civil society more generally—are multifaceted. Consequently, multiple interpretative frameworks may be employed to shed light on these institutions’ actions and their positioning vis-à-vis the state, encompassing political culture, functionalist, and discursive approaches. In order to access the NTCA system and its (albeit limited) benefits, its stakeholders must have at least a degree of acceptance of the social contract behind it. Thus, the nondiscursive scenario applies in all cases here described, as all actors are prevented from introducing alternative discourses into the public domain. The political culture and functionalist frameworks seem to be true for many (but not all) respondents, who have largely internalized existing practices.
While the critical respondents’ voices are enfeebled due to the restrictions placed on their discursive activities, some have rejected the principles underpinning the social contract on which NTCA is based. The fact that competing agendas—and a movement from internal activity to external discursive activity—can at least be imagined by some exposes cracks in the system. It further reveals multiple layers of peripherality, along with multiple forms of consensus.
Financial Support.
This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/L007126/1).
Disclosure.
Author has nothing to disclose.
