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Does it pay to be SMarT?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2008

T. SCOTT FINDLEY
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USAe-mail: tfindley@unm.edu
FRANK N. CALIENDO
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Finance, Utah State University, UT, USA
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Abstract

The Save More Tomorrow™ (or SMarT) plan has proven effective in raising employee saving rates and appears to be popular among participants and the media. An important question has remained on the minds of economists despite this success: just how close does the prescriptive SMarT plan come to approximating the normative life-cycle/permanent-income consumption rule? That is, does it pay (in a lifetime utility sense) to participate in a SMarT plan? We attempt to provide some rigorous answers to this question by employing a quantitative-theoretic model to perform dynamic welfare analysis, and our results tend to support the SMarT plan as a decent first approximation to the life-cycle/permanent-income rule. We also consider the problem of an altruistic employer seeking to maximize the lifetime utility of employees by appropriately choosing the default SMarT parameters in the face of employee heterogeneity in saving rates and uncertainty about whether they will actually stick with the plan. The employer's problem is augmented to include employee heterogeneity concerning risk taking, and we also consider the possibility that SMarT saving may be met with increased borrowing.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008
Figure 0

Table 1.Baseline parameter values

Figure 1

Figure 1.Life-cycle consumption for three consumers

Note: The thin solid line is life-cycle/permanent-income consumption, the thick solid line is SMarT consumption with the SMarT rate set optimally to 32%, and the dashed line is rule-of-thumb consumption with no SMarT plan.
Figure 2

Figure 2.The wealth equivalent: measuring the deviation from life-cycle/permanent-income behavior

Note: The lower thin line corresponds to no SMarT plan but with a baseline saving rate of 3.5%, the upper thin line is for a hand-to-mouth agent, and the thick line is the wealth equivalent with a SMarT plan.
Figure 3

Table 2.Sensitivity of efficiency gain to rate of real wage growth

Figure 4

Table 3.Sensitivity of efficiency gain to base saving rate

Figure 5

Figure 3.Effective household size over the life cycle

Figure 6

Figure 4.Life-cycle consumption for three consumers with family-size dynamics and immediate SMarT entry

Note: The thin solid line is the life-cycle/permanent-income consumption, the thick solid line is the SMarT consumption with the SMarT rate set optimally at 20%, and the dashed line is rule-of-thumb consumption with no SMarT plan.
Figure 7

Figure 5.Life-cycle consumption for three consumers with family-size dynamics and delayed SMarT entry

Note: The thin solid line is the life-cycle/permanent-income consumption, the thick solid line is the SMarT consumption with the SMarT rate set optimally at 97%, and the dashed line is the rule-of-thumb consumption with no SMarT plan.
Figure 8

Figure 6.Optimal SMarT default when low-savers are less likely to participate: under saving heterogeneity and participation uncertainty

Note: The employee with a higher base saving rate has 100% probability of participation, while the likelihood that the other employee with a lower saving rate will participate is 75% (solid line), 50% (dashed line), and 25% (dotted line). In all the cases, the average saving rate is 3.5%.
Figure 9

Figure 7.Optimal SMarT default when high-savers are less likely to participate: under saving heterogeneity and participation uncertainty

Note: The employee with a lower base saving rate has 100% probability of participation, while the likelihood that the other employee with a higher saving rate will participate is 75% (solid line), 50% (dashed line), and 25% (dotted line). In all the cases, the average saving rate is 3.5%.
Figure 10

Figure 8.Optimal SMarT default with equal participation across saver types: under saving heterogeneity

Note: Employees are equally likely to participate, regardless of their base saving rate.
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Figure 9.Optimal SMarT default with heterogeneity in risk taking

Note: The solid line is the case where 90% of the employees are risk-takers, and the dotted line is the case when 10% are risk-takers.
Figure 12

Figure 10.Optimal SMarT rate when consumers borrow against SMarT saving

Note: The solid line is the case where 75% of SMarT saving is offset by borrowing, the dashed line is the case where 50% is offset, and the dotted line is the case of 25%.