Albert Hirschman’s many fans will enjoy this absorbing biography of his life and work. Jeremy Adelman, professor of Spanish Civilization and Culture at Princeton, where he has taught Latin American history since 1992, was well placed for this formidable challenge. He first read Hirschman as a teenager and from 1992 knew him at Princeton, where Hirschman ended his long career. As an historian of Latin America, Adelman was also acquainted with many of the people and places that figured prominently in Hirschman’s work in Latin America (notably Colombia) after 1952. And he was intimate with Hirschman’s family, who gave full access to his personal diaries, letters, and extensive notebooks. Hirschman’s wife Sarah, who died shortly before its publication, read two drafts and had a significant “hand and voice in crafting it.” This no doubt influenced its often very personal, even adulatory (but not totally uncritical) tone. Albert (and Adelman is often on first name terms with his subject) died at age ninety-seven after a long illness in December 2012. His notebooks were filled with cherished aphorisms, bon mots, and petites idées that are a recurring theme in Hirschman’s wide-ranging approach to economics.
Born in Berlin in 1915 to a wealthy family of assimilated Jews, Hirschman was educated at a French lycée and a demoiselle lived with the family as a French tutor for several years. Her family would later help him settle as a student in Paris when he sensibly chose to leave Berlin in 1933, aged almost eighteen, at a time of ugly anti-Semitism and increasingly violent street clashes between Nazis and Communists. He was a serious teenage student whose extensive reading included Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, Friedrich Nietzche, and Niccolò Machiavelli, but he also found time for political activism in the youth wing of the anti-fascist Social Democratic Party (while his older sister joined the Communists).
Throughout his life he proudly exploited with Machiavellian virtù (boldness) whatever Fortuna put in his way, with more than a little help from influential friends who could open doors and the purse strings of rich foundations. These helped finance his studies in Paris (mainly accountancy, 1933 to 1935); London (for nine months at the London School of Economics, 1935 to 1936, with carte blanche to study whatever he liked, with no exams, but where Abba Lerner and P. Barrett Whale were important influences); the University of Trieste (December 1936 to June 1938, where, writing a short thesis on the French balance of payments, he obtained a laurea degree that Hirschman “would later translate as a doctorate” [Adelman p. 143]); and to a research institute at the Sorbonne from mid-1938 until he escaped Paris in May 1940, when the German army swept into northern France.
During these turbulent years he maintained his anti-fascist activism. This included three months in the summer of 1936 with the POUM (the Workers Party of Marxist Unification) in Catalonia. Hirschman said little about this violent episode except that he was slightly injured in a fall. Dramatizing somewhat, Adelman invokes (with no evidence) a possible connection with George Orwell when actually Hirschman left Spain two months before Orwell arrived. And whereas Adelman promotes Hirschman as a “discrete [sic] hero,” he deprecates Orwell’s “somewhat self-dramatizing account” of his experiences without mentioning that the man barely survived a bullet wound through his throat.
Just before the outbreak of war in 1939 Hirschman enlisted in the French army. But as the Germans advanced into France he escaped to Marseilles, where he did valuable work for the Emergency Rescue Committee (headed by Varian Fry) in obtaining exit visas that enabled over 2,000 refugees (including many eminent Jewish intellectuals) to leave France and make their way through Portugal to the United States. Hirschman himself would get thus to New York in January 1941. His fluency in German, French, Italian, and Spanish were great assets for his work with the Rescue Committee, and later he would be used as a top interpreter for the US army in North Africa, Italy, and at the Nuremberg war crime trials, though he resented that he had not been assigned to intelligence work instead.
Before sailing for New York, he secured a lucrative two-year Rockefeller grant to study at Berkeley. This would eventually stretch to more than three years until his enlistment into the US army in February 1944. At Berkeley he met his wife and friends such as Alexander Gerschenkron, Alexander “Sandy” Stevenson, and others who would later play key roles in advancing his career. There, he wrote his first book, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945). This built on his fascination for Machiavelli that led him to question the mutual beneficence of trade. Instead, he wanted to describe how strong states use trade to exploit weaker ones. Adelman records that Hirschman was influenced by Jacob Viner’s writings; but Viner, generally a free trader, was actually decrying, not defending, the temptation to manipulate trade during crises such as the Great Depression. Hirschman had remained aloof of the debates raging in the 1930s between the Keynesians and the Austrians. However, Adelman does not link this with his decision to concentrate on the relative political power of nations (a general issue) rather than on the particular way that “beggar-thy-neighbor” responses to depression led to Keynesian vicious circles that damaged everyone: a negative-sum game. For Hirschman, by contrast, protectionism was not irrational because it benefits some but not all: at worst, a zero-sum game.
Returning from the war and Nuremberg in 1946, Hirschman found government work in Washington, first at the Commerce Department under Averell Harriman—work he found tedious because, according to Adelman, “he was too good for it”—and later at the US Fed (thanks to Gerschenkron). This led to an appointment as Fed representative on the European Recovery Program, where he analyzed exchange control problems and, inter alia, ambitiously urged not only a European customs union but also a European common currency. The US Treasury was, very understandably, opposed, though Adelman does not judge. Later, Hirschman even made a pitch for what was essentially a United States of Europe with its own army; but this too was going nowhere. He felt increasingly isolated, uncreative, and anxious to leave Washington.
So, in 1952 he approached his old friend Sandy Stevenson, now at the World Bank, who put him in touch with the Colombian ambassador. This led to a two-year contract for him at the Colombian central bank, but linked to the World Bank, as adviser to a newly formed National Planning Council. Adelman confuses this body with an Economic Development Committee formed two years earlier to appraise the advice of the World Bank’s big survey mission to Colombia in 1949–50. This had been directed by Lauchlin Currie, an eminent Harvard and New Deal economist who had served as President Roosevelt’s domestic and foreign economic adviser in the White House from 1939 to 1945.
In 1950 the Colombian government persuaded Currie to return to advise on the implementation of his own report with its overall development program designed to break (with World Bank support) what Currie diagnosed as the vicious circles of underdevelopment. Adelman, however, describes his report as “lifeless” and follows Hirschman in criticizing the arrogance of foreign “experts” who—supposedly unlike Hirschman—are said to talk down to the locals and ignore their advice.
Currie and Hirschman were at loggerheads from the start. Involved was an element of jealousy as well as, on Hirschman’s part, insecurity arising from Currie’s far greater initial knowledge and experience of Colombia (and elsewhere). But the conflict involved deep disagreements on program-versus-project advice and on monetary policy. This disagreement—as well as their personality clashes—are fully documented in a recent study by Michele Alacevich, The Political Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years (published by Stanford in 2009). Alacevich gives a different and more balanced impression of the respective strengths and weaknesses of the two protagonists’ theoretical and policy approaches and political effectiveness. Adelman’s selective quotes downplay Colombian and World Bank criticisms of Hirschman’s advice and personality.
Hirschman remained in Colombia as a consultant, mainly on individual projects, until 1956 (Currie, until his death in 1993), though he returned to Latin America frequently thereafter. The Colombian experience was hugely important to his reputation as a development economist and as a philosopher on the state and the market more generally. In 1956 he was angling for a Rockefeller grant to set up his own private survey research center with links to the University of Michigan but was turned down on the grounds that the foundation did not support profit-making ventures. Luckily, Yale came to the rescue with a one-year non-teaching fellowship that Rockefeller extended for a further year to 1958 when Yale published his influential Strategy of Economic Development. This made Hirschman famous and opened doors to other Ivy League appointments. These included Harvard, Stanford, and Princeton, but on leaving Yale he was hired by Columbia, where he had to give just one lecture a week. Adelman reports, rather poignantly, that even this light teaching load was a stomach-churning nightmare for Hirschman. One interviewee described him as a “catastrophically bad” lecturer, and he mentored very few students. This contrasts with Hirschman’s amazing gift and passion for the written word and his love of good conversation. Fortunately for him, he found ways to buy himself out of teaching for the great bulk of his academic career.
Adelman is also eloquent in tracing Hirschman’s disillusion with extremist ideologies, resulting from his traumatic personal encounters with fascism in Germany, Italy, and Spain that provoked its equally dictatorial Marxist antitheses. Not only in the Strategy but also in much of his subsequent work, he advocated a middle ground for what he called the optimistic “possibilism” of “reformmongering.”
But this began with his clash in Colombia with Currie over a master plan within which to prioritize individual projects. In line with Paul Rosenstein Rodan’s famous call for a “Big Push” to overcome low-level equilibrium traps and vicious circles, Currie had proposed a coordinated program of monetary and exchange-rate stabilization together with infrastructure, social programs, and related administrative reforms (which Adelman debatably characterizes as “wooly”). These were all designed to integrate the country’s transport and communications network and foster greater competition, mobility, and urbanization to extend the effective size of the then-fragmented national market. This would increase the specialization and capital intensity that Adam Smith thought pivotal to the wealth of nations, producing endogenously self-sustaining rather than self-exhausting growth. (Incidentally, Adelman is wrong to claim that Currie, unlike Hirschman, downplayed the role of the private sector in all this.) Currie also stressed the need to follow the natural direction of income and price elasticities of demand by promoting the migration of labor from zero and low-productivity agriculture to higher productivity urban industry and services, as the indirect but more effective way to alleviate rural poverty.
By contrast, Adelman enthusiastically notes that Hirschman dedicated his Journeys Toward Progress (1963) to Carlos Lleras Restrepo (later Colombia’s president) for his direct—some would say simplistic—approach to rural poverty through the setting up in 1961 of an agricultural Land Reform Institute designed to break up large farms, promote colonization, and extend the Green Revolution. There was little awareness that increased farm productivity for the beneficiaries would greatly intensify the competitive pressure on less favored farmers. One risks the fallacy of composition in generalizing from microeconomic case studies and petites idées. Greatly increased productivity for some does not translate into similar increases in overall production. Due to relatively slow growth of demand, it displaces even more farmers into the ranks of the openly or disguisedly unemployed, absent much more energetic urbanization policies than Carlos Lleras supported.
Similar criticisms could be levelled against Hirschman’s later enthusiasm for subsidized micro-credit and cooperatives for disguisedly unemployed tricicleros in the Domincan Republic in 1983 (Adelman, p. 586); or, likewise (Adelman, p. 582), for artisans in the Colombian ‘jungle’ [sic] town of Raquirá (there is no jungle at 7,200 feet) when the overcrowded market for their goods was saturated.
But Hirschman rejected the notion of disguised unemployment and was “crestfallen” when in 1979 Arthur Lewis, rather than himself, won the Nobel prize for his model of the development of the labor-surplus economy. For, as Adelman put it: “If there was going to be a Nobel for a development economist, there would be only one. Lewis got it.” In fact, that year Chicago’s Theodore Schultz shared the prize for notable work on the development of (inherently rational) traditional agriculture. Although Schultz was also skeptical of disguised unemployment, Hirschman scorned his Chicago School “ideology” of the rational economic man—in farming as elsewhere. (Hirschman and Adelman are also scathing about the Chicago School’s role in post-Allende Chile but do not mention that Chicago was a likely reaction to Allende’s monetary excesses.)
So Hirschman spurned the Big Push and other master plans. In the very early 1950s Ragnar Nurkse was interpreting the Big Push as consistent with “balanced growth,” by which he meant simultaneous and coordinated promotion of all sectors. In the Journal of Political Economy 1954, Tibor Scitovsky more helpfully defined “balance” as balance between growth of supply with growth of demand for sectors whose prospective demand elasticities differ significantly. Unlike Nurkse, he also emphasized international trade opportunities. Thus it is wrong to caricature balanced growth as calling for every sector to grow at the same pace or as denying a case for prioritizing sectors facing the greatest potential demand. There is much that Latin American countries could have done in this regard, if served with better advice. For example, they could have done more to avoid the unnatural distortions associated with monetary mismanagement and chronic inflation without heaping blame on inevitable structural obstacles or “inherently adverse” terms-of-trade movements.
Hirschman’s thesis in his 1958 Strategy and later in Development Projects Observed (1967) was that a deliberately unbalanced growth of supply and demand was to be preferred. Since he believed that the scarcest resource in underdeveloped countries was “the capacity to make decisions” and that “directly productive activity” rather than “social overhead capital” was strategic, the private sector should be motivated by the tensions and opportunities that an unbalanced strategy could deliberately create (as if there were not tensions enough already). This also made him relatively complacent about population growth, and he even argued that traditional village attitudes could be transformed if caravans containing the cornucopia of luxury consumer goods were parked in villages to motivate them to work more avidly for higher incomes. Most famously, there was his novel “Principle of the Hiding Hand”: that planners should deliberately exaggerate benefits and understate costs when advising allegedly excessively risk-averse private investors to invest their money (not Hirschman’s or the planners’). Adelman does not question whether this might be not only bad economics but even worse morality.
However, it was original—and beguiling (“even the sceptics swooned at his prose,” p. 654). The elaboration of this thesis, along with his espousal of the “backward and forward linkages” criterion for project selection, would assure him of fame and academic fortune, with generous funding for fieldwork observing case studies of individual development projects that further filled his notebooks with petites idées and Flaubertian and Montaignesque aphorisms. These added up to one grande idée: that big ideas are bad (except perhaps for his own earlier idea of a United States of Europe).
Adelman (p. 401) highlights the “centrality of side effects” in the form of those backward and forward linkages and tensions. Thus, effectively, failure may be counted success. For example, in a September 1957 article in the American Economic Review that cautiously defended capital-intensive projects, Hirschman gave his retrospective support for a controversial recent decision to accede to pressure groups, against the strong advice of the World Bank, in approving a highly subsidized integrated steel mill in a poor and remote region of Colombia. Hirschman saw steel as a prime example of a sector with many backward and forward linkages that could spur innovation. However, this is to neglect parallel negative offsets. In this steel project these offsets were due to the poor quality of the ore, exorbitant transport and mining costs, and a ban on much cheaper imported steel. Other industries, taxpayers, and consumers suffered the consequences for several decades. But politics and regional interests prevailed and Hirschman too optimistically wrote in the article that this project “will probably turn out to be ... an effective development move compared with any program to provide such an area with plentiful social overhead capital whose capacity may go begging for many years.”
Adelman regrets that Hirschman had only a limited engagement with the emergent field of public choice theory at the time of his other widely admired book, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (1970). He feels there was much scope for constructive dialogue, given Hirschman’s deep interest in the strengths and weaknesses of state intervention and the interaction of politics and psychology with economics (also developed in The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph [1977] and in Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action [1982]). However, despite strenuous attempts by Mancur Olson to keep him engaged, Hirschman was too unsettled by Gordon Tullock’s sharply hostile review of Exit, Voice and Loyalty with its positive approach to “reformist” state intervention, “hidden rationalities,” and side effects. So he disengaged and his subsequent work in “trespassing” across social science boundaries remained well to the left of many in the public choice school.
Many readers will be most appreciative of Adelman’s review of Hirschman’s excursions into the history of economic and political thought from the “sanctuary” of Princeton’s Institute of Advanced Studies, to which he was briefly affiliated in 1972 and permanently from 1974. While working toward The Passions and the Interests, he immersed himself in, among many others, Max Weber, the Physiocrats, Machiavelli again (“of course”), and figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, notably David Hume and Adam Smith, including the latter’s Lectures on Jurisprudence and Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Adelman highlights Hirschman’s interest in Smith’s “How the Commerce of Towns Contributed to the Improvement of the Country” (Wealth of Nations, Bk.III, ch. IV), which, in this reviewer’s judgment, offers a better account of the symbiotic relations between town and country and on the role of the merchant than in Hirschman’s interpretations. Adelman (p. 513) writes that Smith “had no love of merchants” (which is true in that he urged that public policy should focus on the interest of consumers rather than producers; hence his virulent attack on mercantilism), but there is nothing “sneering” (p. 517) about Smith’s allusion to the merchants’ “peddler principle of turning a penny wherever a penny is to be got.” His attack is instead on the folly of the “great proprietors,” with their love of trinkets, not the merchants whose promotion of commerce (and dilution of the power of the landed gentry) is entirely laudable (except insofar as they act in restraint of trade, which it is the main role of government to prevent). For it is commerce that extends the market; and for Smith, this is what increases the wealth of nations. It is amusing that much of Hirschman’s later work focuses on the folly of consumerism while Adelman apparently sees no irony in Hirschman’s own love of new cars and the most dapper Brooks Brothers clothes.
In short, this biography is a brilliantly stimulating, if often quite irritating, read. And while we may not quite swoon over Adelman’s prose, Hirschman would surely have been delighted that his highly literate and erudite biographer also loved his subject’s wordplay and paradoxes. But, as Paul Streeten wrote, in commenting on Hirschman’s “Dissenter’s Confession” (in Pioneers in Development, 1984, edited by Gerald Meier and Dudley Seers): “In listening to Albert Hirschman, we are sometimes tempted to reflect: ‘It is paradoxical but nevertheless false.’”
It is notable that in that autobiographical essay, Hirschman admitted that his attempted confession of sins tended to end up as a confession of faith. There was no recanting of the Principle of the Hiding Hand!
