It appears that although Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru, and Oestereich (Reference Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru and Oesterich2017) have considered many of the arenas where industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology intersects with impoverished or atypical populations, an oft-overlooked domain is that of I-O psychologists working in military settings. Arguably the largest humanitarian aid and development organization in the world, national militaries offer a rich opportunity for I-O psychologists to study not only the more “POSH” aspects of work, but also the difficulties surrounding employees who must address impoverished citizens, lack of resources, bureaucracy far removed from the front lines, discrimination, threats to safety, and all kinds of cross-cultural interactions. As such, this humanistic, humanitarian movement could do well from studying the ways military units have successfully and not-so-successfully approached a timely and difficult subject.
Recent I-O psychology research in a military setting has focused largely on resilience (e.g., Rothstein, McLamon, & King, Reference Rothstein, McLarnon and King2016), with the occasional consideration of counterproductive behaviors in soldiers (Fine, Goldenberg, & Noam, Reference Fine, Goldenberg and Noam2016), most of whom are reported to be on active duty and engaged in some kind of combat. Yet, soldiers are frequently required to engage in humanitarian missions rather than combat operations, as they often act as first responders during times of natural disaster, drop food and supplies to war-torn areas, and offer medical care to those with limited access. Naturally, these tasks serve to fulfill a dual purpose—both that of aid and development both domestically and internationally, and to assist in peacekeeping within and between other countries. However, these actions have gone largely unstudied in I-O psychology and could provide a clear path regarding the “how” of engaging in aid and development work on a large scale with many overarching goals.
Undoubtedly, the military has a long history of recruiting, selecting, and training large numbers of people in a short period of time. Regardless of personal beliefs, the military's capability to move thousands of people through a system in a regimented manner with relative ease is admirable and speaks to the value of efficiencies created by maintaining a highly organized system. From anecdotal reports and previous experiences, many humanitarian aid and development volunteers and professionals alike often report chaos and difficulty in engaging in aid and development work, let alone ensuring the right people and resources make it to those who are truly in need. As such, all the “want” in the world could exist, but those in peril are not actually being reached by the organizations seeking to contribute, due to a lack of rigor rather than a lack of resources. As I-O psychologists interested in aid and development success, we must begin to understand how to take some of the rigor of military operations and apply it to NGO and nonprofit work in the humanitarian arena.
Although potentially unpopular to some, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides an interesting study in the ability to support humanitarian goals despite a militaristic focus. For example, NATO forces were key in providing assistance to those affected by hurricane Katrina, acting as first-responders during a time when relief through both air support and supply delivery was critical and disaster relief professionals were overwhelmed by the volume of need. Other examples of humanitarian efforts by the US military globally include relief efforts to provide food, water, additional supplies, clean-up assistance, and medical treatment following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines, and the 2014 tsunami in Indonesia. These efforts all required highly skilled response teams that could leverage medical and psychological expertise as well as move a large volume of supplies and address logistical considerations in a short period of time in order to be successful.
As I-O psychologists, we could learn from the deployment of coordinated relief efforts by large-scale units such as NATO or the US military in many ways. I-O psychologists could speak to the way training programs are created and deployed—the predictors of team success based on highly demanding outcome requirements—and the process of developing strong leaders who can manage and direct large-scale efforts. Overall, I-O psychology could help to improve the selection and performance of aid, development, and relief workers in order to help humanitarian organizations to flourish if only we knew how to find a seat at the table.
Therefore, perhaps a parallel track to the focal article is identifying the “how” of the issue, in addition to the “who” or the “where” the issues exist. Many I-O psychologists are willing and even eager to use their relevant KSAOs (knowledge, skills, abilities, and others) to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and disadvantage, but the entry point to such research and practice is unclear and intimidating, especially to early-career I-O psychologists. By using an existing framework such as military operations, it is possible that we as a profession might be able to understand the current processes and avoid known pitfalls rather than trying to find some people who we believe will benefit from our knowledge and capitalizing on their plight.
So often, when curious researchers ask how to get involved in this area of I-O psychology, the response of folks with experience tends to be a story about how they “got lucky” and connected with the right person at the right time. As a field, if we are committed to expanding our borders to include those folks who do not fit into a “POSH” paradigm, we must also be committed to finding and providing accessible, detailed, well-organized projects and opportunities for students and early-career professionals, lest they become disillusioned by the lack of structure and order. It seems as though military operations involving humanitarian aid and development would be an ideal training ground for such learning and research to take place.
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It appears that although Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru, and Oestereich (Reference Gloss, Carr, Reichman, Abdul-Nasiru and Oesterich2017) have considered many of the arenas where industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology intersects with impoverished or atypical populations, an oft-overlooked domain is that of I-O psychologists working in military settings. Arguably the largest humanitarian aid and development organization in the world, national militaries offer a rich opportunity for I-O psychologists to study not only the more “POSH” aspects of work, but also the difficulties surrounding employees who must address impoverished citizens, lack of resources, bureaucracy far removed from the front lines, discrimination, threats to safety, and all kinds of cross-cultural interactions. As such, this humanistic, humanitarian movement could do well from studying the ways military units have successfully and not-so-successfully approached a timely and difficult subject.
Recent I-O psychology research in a military setting has focused largely on resilience (e.g., Rothstein, McLamon, & King, Reference Rothstein, McLarnon and King2016), with the occasional consideration of counterproductive behaviors in soldiers (Fine, Goldenberg, & Noam, Reference Fine, Goldenberg and Noam2016), most of whom are reported to be on active duty and engaged in some kind of combat. Yet, soldiers are frequently required to engage in humanitarian missions rather than combat operations, as they often act as first responders during times of natural disaster, drop food and supplies to war-torn areas, and offer medical care to those with limited access. Naturally, these tasks serve to fulfill a dual purpose—both that of aid and development both domestically and internationally, and to assist in peacekeeping within and between other countries. However, these actions have gone largely unstudied in I-O psychology and could provide a clear path regarding the “how” of engaging in aid and development work on a large scale with many overarching goals.
Undoubtedly, the military has a long history of recruiting, selecting, and training large numbers of people in a short period of time. Regardless of personal beliefs, the military's capability to move thousands of people through a system in a regimented manner with relative ease is admirable and speaks to the value of efficiencies created by maintaining a highly organized system. From anecdotal reports and previous experiences, many humanitarian aid and development volunteers and professionals alike often report chaos and difficulty in engaging in aid and development work, let alone ensuring the right people and resources make it to those who are truly in need. As such, all the “want” in the world could exist, but those in peril are not actually being reached by the organizations seeking to contribute, due to a lack of rigor rather than a lack of resources. As I-O psychologists interested in aid and development success, we must begin to understand how to take some of the rigor of military operations and apply it to NGO and nonprofit work in the humanitarian arena.
Although potentially unpopular to some, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provides an interesting study in the ability to support humanitarian goals despite a militaristic focus. For example, NATO forces were key in providing assistance to those affected by hurricane Katrina, acting as first-responders during a time when relief through both air support and supply delivery was critical and disaster relief professionals were overwhelmed by the volume of need. Other examples of humanitarian efforts by the US military globally include relief efforts to provide food, water, additional supplies, clean-up assistance, and medical treatment following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2013 typhoon in the Philippines, and the 2014 tsunami in Indonesia. These efforts all required highly skilled response teams that could leverage medical and psychological expertise as well as move a large volume of supplies and address logistical considerations in a short period of time in order to be successful.
As I-O psychologists, we could learn from the deployment of coordinated relief efforts by large-scale units such as NATO or the US military in many ways. I-O psychologists could speak to the way training programs are created and deployed—the predictors of team success based on highly demanding outcome requirements—and the process of developing strong leaders who can manage and direct large-scale efforts. Overall, I-O psychology could help to improve the selection and performance of aid, development, and relief workers in order to help humanitarian organizations to flourish if only we knew how to find a seat at the table.
Therefore, perhaps a parallel track to the focal article is identifying the “how” of the issue, in addition to the “who” or the “where” the issues exist. Many I-O psychologists are willing and even eager to use their relevant KSAOs (knowledge, skills, abilities, and others) to contribute to the alleviation of poverty and disadvantage, but the entry point to such research and practice is unclear and intimidating, especially to early-career I-O psychologists. By using an existing framework such as military operations, it is possible that we as a profession might be able to understand the current processes and avoid known pitfalls rather than trying to find some people who we believe will benefit from our knowledge and capitalizing on their plight.
So often, when curious researchers ask how to get involved in this area of I-O psychology, the response of folks with experience tends to be a story about how they “got lucky” and connected with the right person at the right time. As a field, if we are committed to expanding our borders to include those folks who do not fit into a “POSH” paradigm, we must also be committed to finding and providing accessible, detailed, well-organized projects and opportunities for students and early-career professionals, lest they become disillusioned by the lack of structure and order. It seems as though military operations involving humanitarian aid and development would be an ideal training ground for such learning and research to take place.