The Kennedy Administration and Cold War Communications

In the United States, the military developed the first communication satellites to satisfy national security concerns along with telecommunications and aerospace companies interested in serving profitable communication routes. The development of civilian communication satellites was wound up in a debate between private and state involvement. AT&T was the most important company active in developing communication satellites during the late 1950s. As the dominant U.S. telecommunications company, AT&T aimed to supplement undersea cables for international communications along the most lucrative international routes, especially between the United States and the developed countries across the Atlantic and Pacific, which the chairman argued were “ready and eager to cooperate with us.” ^{Footnote 5} During the last year of the Eisenhower administration, AT&T announced plans to spend $170 million to develop an international communication satellite system. It assumed the federal government would continue an earlier policy in international communications by treating commercial satellite communications as simply another form of privately-owned international telecommunications, which the company largely dominated. Toward the end of 1960, Eisenhower announced his policy preference for satellite communications, essentially allowing established communication companies like AT&T to develop the new technology according to these traditional practices. Although Eisenhower pushed the country to fight a total Cold War, he also worried about the potential negative social and economic implications of an extreme mobilization. The Eisenhower administration accordingly sought to avoid plunging the country into an unlimited race with the Soviet Union for spectacular space achievements of questionable scientific or commercial value.

The Kennedy administration did not share Eisenhower’s concerns and did not allow AT&T to pursue its plans. Key officials criticized the Eisenhower administration for favoring a private industry initiative that would “proceed at a pace which is justifiable in terms of business purpose, not necessarily national purpose.” They complained that the Eisenhower policy statement did not discuss using communication satellites “as an instrument of foreign policy.” ^{Footnote 6} Instead of allowing private companies to create separate systems that would likely primarily serve profitable communication routes to Europe or other major “developed” regions, the Kennedy administration decided to establish a single global system fulfilling Cold War objectives rather than simply maximizing private profits. ^{Footnote 7}

The Kennedy administration’s decision was fundamentally driven by the Soviet Union’s dramatic launch of the first human into orbit, the Yuri Gagarin flight on April 12, 1961. ^{Footnote 8} This event rivaled Russia’s launch of Sputnik, the first artificial earth satellite, as a major psychological blow to the United States. Kennedy asked Vice President Lyndon Johnson, the head of the Space Council, to conduct an “overall survey” of American accomplishments to identify space programs that promise “dramatic results in which we could win.” ^{Footnote 9} Johnson saw the political advantage of taking the lead in a major high-profile national activity, but he also clearly saw the important strategic value of space. ^{Footnote 10} In his first report to the president, Johnson emphasized that countries “will tend to align themselves with the country which they believe will be the world leader—the winner in the long run. Dramatic accomplishments in space are being increasingly identified as a major indicator of world leadership.” Among the programs Johnson identified as fulfilling these objectives were the “manned exploration of the moon” and satellites for worldwide communications. The United States had an “advance position” in satellite communications that it could use to “attain world leadership” if “properly programmed with the interests of other nations.” ^{Footnote 11} NASA administrator James Webb argued that although communication satellites were “not as dramatic as manned flight,” creating a worldwide satellite communications system would both directly benefit people throughout the world and enhance national prestige. ^{Footnote 12} Kennedy’s famous speech to a Joint Session of Congress on May 25, 1961, calling for an American on the moon by the end of the decade also emphasized making the “most of our present leadership by accelerating the use of space satellites for world-wide communications.” ^{Footnote 13}

The Kennedy administration prioritized connecting poorer countries in the “Global South” to the planned satellite communications system. Later administrations also worked to ensure that the COMSAT system was truly global. In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson directed government agencies to “take active steps to encourage the construction” of earth stations for the global system “in selected less-developed countries.” ^{Footnote 14} And NASA played an important role, effectively subsidizing the system beginning in the mid-1960s by leasing unused circuits for the Apollo Program. ^{Footnote 15}

The Kennedy administration decided to establish a global satellite communications system when increased tension with the Soviet Union specifically renewed focus on the Third World in the global Cold War struggle. After initial optimism about reduced tensions at the start of the Kennedy administration, the Gagarin flight and Kennedy’s embarrassment over the disastrous outcome of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba five days later emboldened Khrushchev to test the new American leader by challenging him globally. ^{Footnote 16} Tensions peaked in October 1962, when Khrushchev’s policy of nuclear brinkmanship led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The 1962 Communications Satellite Act only provided general guidelines for organizing the global system. William Carter, special assistant for International Space Communications in the State Department, who played a key role in the early international negotiations during the fall of 1962, argued that when the act passed, there was certainly no agreement within the U.S. government and “very little thought as to what the international arrangements would in fact look like.” ^{Footnote 17} Although the Act called for foreign participation, it did not detail the form of this participation. The United States would need to negotiate with other countries on specific issues, but beforehand officials with the U.S. government and COMSAT would need to decide their own positions on whether other nations should jointly own the system or participate in such issues as management, manufacturing components, and system design. Traditionally, private U.S. companies, especially AT&T, had negotiated agreements for international radio and cable with telecommunication administrations of foreign governments, generally without the active involvement of foreign offices. Since the satellite legislation established COMSAT as the chosen instrument of U.S. foreign policy, the new organization would have to consider not only traditional business and technical planning but also political calculations.

The U.S. State Department Takes the Lead, September 1962–April 1963

Although the UN had passed a resolution declaring general support for global satellite communications in 1961, U.S. government officials did not formally consult with other countries about implementing this resolution before passing the Satellite Communications Act. ^{Footnote 18} The State Department first consulted with the UK and Canada in September 1962. A special Commonwealth Conference on Satellite Communications had instructed the two countries to discover U.S. intentions. ^{Footnote 19}

British officials had begun to seriously consider becoming involved in satellite communications as early as 1960. ^{Footnote 20} The UK had long held a leading position in international communications, using both cables and radio to connect Commonwealth countries. The British Post Office Department, the main government agency responsible for civil telecommunications in Britain, initially believed the Commonwealth should consider constructing its own system. ^{Footnote 21} It recognized that satellites might threaten the Commonwealth cable system, but officials believed the new technology would likely complement—rather than replace—overseas cables, just as shortwave radio had complemented international telegraph cable systems in the 1920s. The Post Office had responded to President Kennedy’s call for a global satellite communications system by holding a special conference in London in the spring of 1961 for countries belonging to the Commonwealth telecommunications network. A Post Office representative argued that “unless the U.K. worked quickly, there was a danger” that the country would lose its “profitable place as a world telecommunications carrier.” ^{Footnote 22}

To provide leadership for the Commonwealth, British postal officials organized an interdepartmental working group. During meetings of the working group early in 1962, the Post Office and the Ministry of Aviation both argued for developing an independent satellite communications system involving Commonwealth and Western European countries. ^{Footnote 23} They initially favored only minimal involvement in the U.S. system; this would allow British and European industry to develop the capability to launch a profitable independent system. ^{Footnote 24}

Largely because of the efforts of staff member Ronald C. Hope-Jones, the Foreign Office eventually convinced the Post Office and most members of the working group to support U.S. efforts to develop a single system. ^{Footnote 25} The Foreign Office believed working within the single system would secure maximum advantage for British industrial and communications interests. “The quickest way of getting technical experience,” Hope-Jones argued, would “be to co-operate operationally in the establishment of the original system.” ^{Footnote 26} The Commonwealth conference agreed with Hope-Jones’s evaluation that a “purely Commonwealth system is out of the question, as it could not pay its way.” ^{Footnote 27}

Representatives from the Foreign Office also successfully convinced other members to pursue greater cooperation with Western European countries to maximize the Commonwealth’s “bargaining position” with the United States. ^{Footnote 28} This decision was consistent with similar simultaneous efforts by the UK to work with countries in Europe on space activities. During 1962, Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain signed an agreement establishing the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), a civilian agency committed to the peaceful pursuit of scientific investigation. During that same year, the first six of these countries, along with Australia, signed a pact authorizing the European Space Vehicle Launcher Development Organization (ELDO). ESRO and ELDO laid the foundation for the European Space Agency. ^{Footnote 29}

In general, two technical institutions representing different models for organizing space interests inspired the European space program’s founders: the high-energy physics laboratory built during the early 1950s near Geneva known as CERN and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), established in 1958 to create a common European market for nuclear energy. Although both organizations reflected the broad desire to integrate European institutions, CERN maintained a political separation from the supranational European institutions created during the 1950s, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Euratom, by contrast, was created alongside these two institutions, with which it shared a Parliament and Court of Justice. ^{Footnote 30}

The founders of ESRO were mainly committed to the CERN model, but because of the national security implications of launchers, national governments played a more important role establishing ELDO. ESRO’s founders worried that if Western Europe did not pool its resources to support a space program, its citizens would remain “mere spectators of the grand endeavors to the East and West of our continent,” but they wanted scientists in charge, free from political, military, or industrial meddling. Although ELDO was not connected to the EEC, Britain’s involvement in ELDO was linked to its unsuccessful effort in 1961 to join the Common Market. Britain’s ELDO involvement supported its bid to join the EEC by demonstrating “European credentials” to continental countries, especially the French. ^{Footnote 31}

The UK’s decision to cooperate with EEC countries also needs to be understood in the context of decolonization, which had weakened the country internationally. Increasingly, the UK sought to pool limited Commonwealth resources with the economically powerful emerging alliances in Western Europe. Western European governments, however, tended to oppose Commonwealth countries joining European collaborative efforts, especially as members with an equivalent standing. ^{Footnote 32}

When Britain and Canada first asked the United States to discuss global satellite communications in the fall of 1962, the State Department did not know how to respond. ^{Footnote 33} Staff member William Carter claimed there were “no positions, there was not even conceptual papers as to what the international organization might look like or how we should get there.” ^{Footnote 34} But during an initial meeting in September, State Department and other U.S. government officials agreed on two key issues.

First, they decided that the UN, in particular the member agency the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), was not a “satisfactory” forum for planning or managing the global system. The ITU operated according to the principle of one nation, one vote, which seemed inappropriate for the new international satellite communications organization and the private company established by the 1962 Satellite Act, COMSAT. ^{Footnote 35} Nonaligned countries from Africa, Latin America, and Asia had been increasingly asserting their independence at the UN during this period. The United States feared that if the UN was involved in managing or operating the global system, these countries could use the UN as a “forum to attack the system as ‘a rich man’s club’” or act as a bloc to demand special treatment, which might prevent rapid initial development of the system, a priority for the Kennedy administration. ^{Footnote 36} Finally, the Americans worried that if they conducted negotiations in the UN, the Soviets might use the format to delay the global system. Unlike most Western countries, which were major users of international communications, the Soviets mainly needed long-distance communications for internal needs. Since they would not have a practical reason to support the development of global satellite communications at the UN, they likely would oppose it as a U.S. initiative. ^{Footnote 37}

Second, U.S. government officials decided that initially they needed to negotiate with a “core group of countries” especially interested in international communications “in order to make progress in defining the international arrangements.” This decision implied that only heavy users of international communications would play a major role in initial negotiations. ^{Footnote 38} Although the 1962 Satellite Communications Act called for “broad international cooperation” and directing “care and attention . . . to economically less developed countries and areas,” it did not clearly mandate the immediate or near-immediate internationalization of the system. ^{Footnote 39} During the meeting with the UK and Canada in September 1962, R. N. Gardner, deputy assistant secretary of state for International Organization Affairs argued that although the United States used “the name of ‘universality’ so as to get the cooperation of certain nations,” it would “be principally concerned” with the nations of the “North Atlantic Community.” Seeming to downplay the role of developing countries, he told the British officials in particular that the phrase “global and nondiscriminatory” in the 1962 Satellite Act “is a symptom of the lesser developed countries’ desire to participate.” ^{Footnote 40} British Foreign Office official Hope-Jones also supported a view about the role of developing countries that was becoming dominant within the U.S. government: although “underdeveloped countries” should be “allowed some voice” later, their participation “should be deferred until the world organization is reasonably sure of where it is going conceptually.” ^{Footnote 41} The British likely felt they could represent the interests of many of these countries because they were former colonies now part of the Commonwealth. And the United States probably wanted to avoid including former European colonies in the initial negotiations because France and Britain might view this as interfering with their interests. ^{Footnote 42} Not deferring to France and Britain when dealing with their former colonies also might have unnecessarily emphasized British and French weakness in international relations following decolonization.

France also worked to develop an official state policy for satellite communications (national and global). Some French officials believed the country should avoid becoming dependent on a global system likely dominated by the United States. A similar motivation led the country to simultaneously develop a separate nuclear arsenal. ^{Footnote 43} British diplomats reported that France would likely treat “the question as an entirely political matter, linking it to General de Gaulle’s concept of ‘a European Third Force.’” ^{Footnote 44}

The French worried especially about the cultural or political implications of television transmissions from satellites, in particular the potential for broadcasting from satellites direct to individual homes, which could allow foreign countries, especially the United States, to inject ideas, propaganda, and English-language programming into former French colonies and undermine French influence. In early December, the British embassy in Paris reported that a key member of the French Foreign Ministry, Jean de la Grandville, was “obsessed by the television angle.” He feared that “in the quite near future” U.S. television programming in Africa would “give the Americans an enormous political advantage.” ^{Footnote 45} De la Grandville believed the dramatic success during the summer of 1962 of the first live television transmissions across the Atlantic using Telstar “had completely changed the dimensions of the problem.” ^{Footnote 46} But British officials criticized de la Grandville for apparently not realizing that direct broadcasting from satellites to individual sets “cannot be done now” and would very likely become only a routine service in the 1990s at the earliest. ^{Footnote 47}

France’s discussions with Carter and other U.S. officials in late 1962 did not allay concerns that the United States would not “allow other countries a worthwhile form of participation.” ^{Footnote 48} France (and independently Sweden) requested that the Telecommunications Commission of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (known by the French acronym CEPT) consider a joint effort to finance and organize satellite communications during a special meeting in December 1962 in Cologne. The French wanted Western Europe to organize a regional satellite communications organization that would serve a function similar to COMSAT in the United States. Nineteen countries, primarily in Western Europe, had established the CEPT in 1959 to coordinate state postal and telecommunications organizations (PTTs). The Council of Europe had first proposed a common European postal organization as early as 1951, but the support of the six founding members of the EEC in 1958 was a crucial factor in its establishment. ^{Footnote 49}

Most members of the British government opposed the proposal for a new European organization supporting satellite communication. ^{Footnote 50} Hope-Jones believed the UK could consider supporting a loosely organized group, but he did not “welcome the creation of a closely-knit European organization of a kind which would speak with a single voice.” ^{Footnote 51} His position reflected increased tensions between the UK and France during this period. President de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s bid to join the EEC in January 1963, immediately after the Cologne meeting, and had been sending mixed signals about the application. As a representative of the Foreign Office, Hope-Jones supported the Commonwealth communications network and also valued the special relationship with the United States. De Gaulle opposed UK’s membership in the Common Market partly because he first wanted Britain to break free from the United States and the Commonwealth. ^{Footnote 52}

The British view generally prevailed at the Cologne meeting. The representatives did not agree to establish a major new organization. ^{Footnote 53} They favored European participation in the global system being developed by the United States, but individual delegates did not indicate whether their respective governments preferred a separate system. The CEPT represented the technical and business interests of telecommunications administrations. In most cases, individual governments had not yet thoroughly considered the political implications of the U.S. proposal. ^{Footnote 54} For example, French officials warned other countries, especially the British, that President de Gaulle would make the final decision about French participation in the proposed global system. ^{Footnote 55} But the use of the regional organization, the CEPT, was important because it underscored the fundamental tension between regional and global considerations in satellite communications.

COMSAT Negotiations and Intergovernmental Meetings in Europe, May 1963–January 1964

National considerations represented by bilateral discussions were also important and were in tension with regional or global considerations represented by multilateral negotiations. This was especially clear in the conflict between the State Department and COMSAT. During the spring and early summer of 1963, while Western European countries were becoming better organized, the newly created Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) started to consider the global system. COMSAT initially indicated that it would pursue international negotiations using traditional models developed by AT&T and other companies—negotiating directly with individual foreign countries with minimal involvement of the State Department. ^{Footnote 56} State Department officials believed that although the Communications Satellite Act was not entirely clear about the proper relationship between the corporation and the department, the legislative history indicated that Congress had wanted to give authority to the Secretary of State as the president’s representative. ^{Footnote 57} The secretary grudgingly agreed that under these conditions State Department personnel need not be present during the early discussions between COMSAT staff and foreign representatives. But he also received assurances that COMSAT officials would tell the foreign operating agencies that they were not “speaking for the United States Government.” ^{Footnote 58}

During “bilateral discussions” in Europe with telecommunication officials from the UK, France, West Germany, and Italy from May 27 through June 1, COMSAT officials discussed planning for the global system. The French director of the National Telecommunications Research Center, Pierre Marzin, warned the COMSAT officials not to overemphasize the single global system; he reminded them that it “had become a political hot-spot in some quarters.” The French representative cautioned that for some Europeans, a single global system still “implied complete American dominance.” He reported that French government officials in charge of space research had told President Charles de Gaulle that they still planned to eventually establish a separate system. Marzin admitted that although he would be satisfied if his country launched “one good operating satellite” in ten years, “politically he must tell the French Government that the Europeans can launch a satellite by 1967.” He did not believe the other French officials realized the complications and expenses of establishing a satellite communications system. ^{Footnote 59}

Instead of emphasizing that other countries, including developing countries, should be involved in the initial stages of planning, U.S. officials argued that all countries should be “able to participate in the system as soon as practicable.” ^{Footnote 60} Although the State Department supported this particular decision, it generally opposed COMSAT’s efforts to ignore political considerations. Carter later recalled that there was a “state of dynamic tension” between COMSAT and the State Department during this period. ^{Footnote 61}

As a commercial company, COMSAT tended to reflect the traditional view of “telecommunicators” such as AT&T. The company sought to make decisions based on commercial considerations and tried to limit the role of the State Department and foreign offices from other countries. According to Carter, “the telecommunicators didn’t like foreign offices and foreign ministries mucking around with” their established practices. ^{Footnote 62} When COMSAT executives conducted their own negotiations with Europeans, they emphasized that the global system should be based on “good business rather than primarily political considerations.” ^{Footnote 63} The State Department accepted the company’s emphasis on traffic volume and agreed to first seek an interim agreement with a “key or nucleus group” of countries, which included not only Western European nations but also Canada, Japan, and Australia. According to a U.S. study, over 90 percent of intercontinental commercial communications traffic “either originates or terminates within the United States or members of this group.” ^{Footnote 64} Under pressure especially from COMSAT, the U.S. government also agreed that financial assistance to developing countries to aid their participation “would be the responsibility of national and international sources of capital assistance and not of the entities participating in the satellite system.” ^{Footnote 65}

Partly in response to some U.S. government officials’ concerns about the State Department’s lack of involvement in COMSAT’s bilateral discussions in Europe, on June 5, 1963, government officials decided to establish an Ad Hoc Communications Satellite Group, directed by Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, attorney general, and Jerome Wiesner, special assistant to the president for science and technology, to coordinate the work of government agencies in dealing with the Communications Satellite Corporation. ^{Footnote 66} U.S. officials were especially worried that COMSAT executives seemed to ignore “extensive reporting of European attitudes and actions,” which clearly indicated they did not want to be treated as junior partners and preferred multilateral agreements. ^{Footnote 67}

The United States and European representatives continued informal discussions during 1963. But Western European countries did not begin formal negotiations with the United States until February 1964. Before these formal negotiations could begin, the interested European countries needed to conduct their own discussions to decide on a formal political response.

The first official intergovernmental political effort in Western Europe to consider satellite communications, involving foreign ministry rather than telecommunication or space-oriented officials, took place in Paris during May 1963. The Europeans then held two additional major intergovernmental meetings during 1963—in London in July and Rome in November—as well as a series of smaller meetings of special committees established to investigate technical, financial, and administrative issues.

During these three meetings, officials debated whether Western Europe should pursue a separate satellite communications system or exclusively join the U.S. global effort. They also discussed a related proposal to treat the separate-system idea mainly as a negotiating tactic. During the May meeting, the French and the British agreed that Europeans should use the threat of an independent “subsystem” to obtain the maximum number of concessions from the Americans. At least initially during the meeting, the French favored a separate system not only as a negotiating strategy but also as official policy. ^{Footnote 68} By the July meeting, however, the French position had changed. Although the French still had “strong reserves” about the American proposal for a single global system, they recognized their isolation on the issue and no longer “openly” opposed it. ^{Footnote 69} By the November meeting, the Europeans had effectively abandoned the idea of using a separate system as a negotiating tactic. The chairman of one special committee who also served as an official with the Dutch Foreign Ministry, S. Meijer, acknowledged in October that the “separate system concept [was] dead as of now.” ^{Footnote 70}

A second major issue debated at the intergovernmental meetings was the type of organization the UK, France, and other Western European countries would adopt. Britain opposed immediately establishing a formal European satellite organization, favoring instead “some loose form of European organization” that would not require “elaborate negotiations” and would somehow provide for the country’s “special Commonwealth connexions and responsibilities in the telecommunications field.” ^{Footnote 71} However, during the July meeting in London, the smaller countries—including Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian nations—teamed up with France to create a formal regional organization to provide a “united European front” in negotiations with the Americans. ^{Footnote 72} The organization was named the European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS). The British reported that the West Germans “played little part” in the London conference. Ireland was the only other country besides Italy supporting Britain’s call to hold off organizing a regional group with centralized decision-making. ^{Footnote 73} Following the London meeting, Britain moved closer toward the general European position. ^{Footnote 74} Major divisions remained over whether the new satellite communications organization should become the main European representative of the planned international organization or allow countries participating in the international organization to “apply for individual membership, speaking, however, with a single voice.” Regional and local considerations remained in tension with the global ideal. ^{Footnote 75}

The fourteen earlier members of the European Conference on Satellite Communications (CETS) and three new members—Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland—participated in the Rome meeting in late November. Delegates from Australia also attended as observers because of the country’s membership in ELDO. ^{Footnote 76} This meeting resulted in a clear decision to form a new regional organization as a corporation to serve as a European partner working with COMSAT in establishing an international satellite communications organization. ^{Footnote 77}

A third major issue discussed at the three interdepartmental meetings in 1963 was Western European industry’s desire for a U.S. guarantee allowing different countries to support local manufacturing by supplying components to the planned system. ^{Footnote 78} Although by the July conference the European satellite communications group seemed to acknowledge that U.S. companies would likely construct nearly all the components for the first generation of the communications system, all the countries—especially the smaller ones—continued to argue that COMSAT should allow them to eventually participate as both users and manufacturers of later generations of the system. ^{Footnote 79} Europe’s Common Market institutions also sought to coordinate European industry, but they viewed economic integration as especially important for maintaining peace in Europe and achieving political integration. The satellite group, by contrast, was especially concerned about pooling resources and integrating economically to compete with U.S. industry.

The United States, Europe, and the Interim Agreements, February–August 1964

Exploratory talks in Rome during early February 1964 gave U.S. officials their first opportunity to formally discuss organizing the global system with the entire European Conference on Satellite Communications. The United States satisfied the Europeans by sending an official government delegation. But by placing the president of COMSAT, Abram Chayes, in charge of the delegation, they also provided the corporation with the negotiating authority it desired. The Department of State awarded Chayes the title of legal adviser and explicitly stated that his decisions within the delegation would be “final and binding.” ^{Footnote 80}

Chayes had to follow guidelines developed in cooperation with the State Department, the Federal Communications Commission, and other federal agencies involved in communications policy. The U.S. government’s Ad Hoc Committee on Satellite Communications coordinated. Katzenbach, representing the committee, and Chayes also met with key members of Congress—including Senators John Pastore, Warren Magnuson, and William Fulbright—to ensure that they approved a “Position Paper” and a draft agreement formulated to guide the U.S. delegation’s work. ^{Footnote 81}

The guidelines laid out in these documents emphasized that the delegation should first explore the establishment of interim agreements before discussing—“in rather generalized terms”—the characteristics of the final or “definitive” agreements based on a “fully developed global system.” But the guidelines emphasized that the United States should prolong the interim agreements as long as possible. They stressed that the country should take advantage of its “monopoly of the boosters and of the communications technology” to establish as strong a position as possible for the final agreements. The guidelines reminded the delegation that Europe’s “primary interest” would be to prevent the United States from continuing “to monopolize the system indefinitely.” ^{Footnote 82}

The guidelines also directed the delegation to explore ways other nations could participate in all stages of the system. U.S. officials preferred having countries invest directly in the system rather than lease channels, but COMSAT emphasized that if necessary it could finance the system “entirely” and simply lease out channels to other countries. Reflecting a continuing commitment to the global ideal, the guidelines directed the delegates to take into account the interests of “countries in underdeveloped areas” unable to substantially invest in the early phases of the system. ^{Footnote 83}

U.S. officials also spelled out their preferred management and organizational arrangements. Most U.S. officials recognized that they would likely need to agree to an Interim Communications Satellite Committee, which would set policy for the initial basic system. Only countries investing a minimum amount of capital would participate in the Interim Committee. A country’s level of investment in the system would determine its influence in decision-making. The guidelines instructed the delegates to lay the groundwork for creating “as large a role as possible” for COMSAT in the system’s “day-to-day management.” Finally, the delegates needed to stress the now definite U.S. position that the country would not guarantee procurement for Europeans, at least during the interim period. Getting the Europeans to agree to these key aspects of the interim agreements would likely result in their pressing “hard for assurances on the ultimate organizational structure.” The position paper warned that “this may be the price that they demand for permitting the Corporation to manage the interim system.” ^{Footnote 84}

In preparation for negotiating with the Europeans, the U.S. decided to include other countries to avoid “a purely European-American negotiation and possibly a European-American stand-off.” The U.S. already had Canada’s support, but it included Australia and Japan as two further potential allies. The United States arranged a meeting with Japanese and Australian officials in Tokyo during January 1964, and after a week of intense negotiations gained their general support for the U.S. position. ^{Footnote 85}

AT&T also provided crucial support. The company would be the largest user of the global satellite communications system and would control the major competing technology, undersea telephone cables. After AT&T announced in the fall of 1963 that it planned a new high-capacity transatlantic telephone cable, the U.S. government feared AT&T and the European PTTs would use transatlantic cables rather than the global satellite system for international telecommunications. Under pressure from the U.S. government, AT&T committed to the planned global system in December 1963 and agreed to pressure the European PTTs to use satellite circuits before laying new undersea cables. ^{Footnote 86}

The negotiations leading to the two interim agreements signed in July and August 1964 occurred during meetings from March through July in Rome, Montreal, London, and Washington, D.C. An intergovernmental agreement established a single commercial system that would provide global service “as soon as possible” and be “open to all nations on a non-discriminatory basis.” Each government signing the agreement would also designate a “communications entity” (governmental or private) to participate in the system. For the United States, this entity was COMSAT. A “special” operational arrangement between the communication entities designated by each government spelled out operational policies, management and administrative procedures, and financial understandings. ^{Footnote 87}

Participants would jointly own the space system, including the satellites as well as the associated tracking and command-and-control equipment. Individual nations would own their earth stations and earth-station transmission facilities. Each government agreed that its entity would contribute a percentage of the estimated total costs for the space segment, approximately $200 million over the first five years. Each country or group of countries contributing at least 1.5 percent would be represented on an Interim Communication Satellite Committee with “overall responsibility” for developing and operating the system. COMSAT, as the manager of the system, would implement Committee policies. ^{Footnote 88}

One of the most controversial issues and one of the last to be negotiated was the initial division of investment shares and the corresponding voting formula. Voting percentage was equivalent to investment or ownership quota. In using a weighted system of voting that favored the United States as the largest contributor, Intelsat followed the governance structure of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The United States effectively used its economic weight and technological dominance for political gain. ^{Footnote 89}

Western European countries initially requested a 40 percent ownership share. They wanted to see future reductions in the U.S. share as new participants joined the system. The U.S. representatives preferred an investment share closer to two-thirds, which was calculated based on the country’s share of international telecommunications traffic, but finally settled for 61 percent during a late-night negotiating session in June with leaders of the European delegation in the hotel room of a COMSAT executive. They agreed that all Western European countries together would have 30.5 percent (half of the U.S. ownership), with 8.4 percent for the UK and 6.1 percent each for France and West Germany. Canada, Japan, and Australia would divide the remaining amount, 8.5 percent. ^{Footnote 90} The Europeans accepted the U.S. proposal that as new countries joined the consortium and received an appropriate quota, all the original participants’ percentages would be reduced on a pro rata basis. The relative relationship would thus remain nearly the same. But crucially the parties agreed that COMSAT’s quota would never be less than 50.6 percent, assuring the United States a majority while the interim agreements held. ^{Footnote 91}

The related issue of voting structure was finally decided during a July meeting in Washington, D.C. Although the United States had a clear voting majority and the resources to go it alone after COMSAT raised $200 million through the sale of stock, American officials recognized that politically they needed other countries to concur with important decisions about the construction of the global system. But they were also concerned about “European obstruction” hindering developments. ^{Footnote 92} The United States initially proposed that at least two other countries needed to vote with the United States on major decisions. The Europeans rejected this suggestion because the two countries could have very small voting percentages or the United States could simply rely on Canada, Australia, or Japan without the support of a single European member. ^{Footnote 93} The Europeans initially proposed that the United States should need the support of at least 30 percent of the remaining votes. The head of the European delegation worried that the four “Pacific countries”—the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan—could “act as a bloc” against Europe. Although they generally supported the U.S. proposal, the Canadians and the Australians urged the United States to negotiate a new position with the Europeans. ^{Footnote 94}

All parties agreed on a complicated compromise. If the Interim Committee could not “act unanimously” on fourteen key categories of decisions, then the United States would need the support of 12.5 percent of the remaining votes. ^{Footnote 95} But if the committee did not take action on certain cases within sixty days, then this amount would be reduced to 8.5 percent (Canada, Australia, and Japan’s combined voting percentage). The United States requested this last requirement to prevent European obstruction. U.S. representatives expressed satisfaction with the final voting formula. One analyst at the State Department claimed that the compromise formula would actually “in time” allow COMSAT to gain more voting control than the original U.S. proposal. ^{Footnote 96} Importantly, although the European Conference negotiated with the United States as a unified entity, it accepted the British request to allow members to vote separately on an individual national basis. The UK had been especially concerned about reserving the “right to express national views” because it “had commonwealth interests to protect.” ^{Footnote 97} The United States accepted the compromise voting formula partly because it believed it could exploit differences among the Europeans.

Procurement was another major concern. The Europeans worried that they could not compete for procurement contracts because of U.S. industry dominance and because of the U.S. demand that contracts be rewarded competitively based on the best equipment at the best price. Although Article X of the intergovernmental agreement stated that the consortium should try to distribute contracts to the nations that had signed the agreement, it also emphasized that this would be done “provided that such design, development and procurement are not contrary to the joint interests” of the parties to the agreement. The United States managed to finesse the issue to satisfy the concerns of the original countries invited to the negotiating table, but the United States’s dominant position in procurement was clear. ^{Footnote 98}