The second volume of his six-part Science and the Shaping of Modernity, Stephen Gaukroger's The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility is not as good as its predecessor, but nevertheless makes for a welcome contribution to the history of science. As in The Emergence of a Scientific Culture (2006), Gaukroger is primarily interested to map ‘the emergence of scientific values, considered both as a cognitive norm – a model for all cognitive claims – and as a development that explicitly goes beyond technical expertise and articulates a world-view’ (p. 1). The plan for The Collapse of Mechanism thus turns on an exploration of the decline of mechanism and the rise not only of sensibility – as the title suggests – but also of rational mechanics, and their influence on Western culture, broadly conceived. Within the natural-philosophical movements Gaukroger identifies, he focuses on what he has termed ‘cognitive’ values and their broader standing in a nascent ‘scientific culture’. From the start, the most obvious problem – and one that it shares with the first volume – is the inherent ambiguity and ahistorical usage of the word ‘cognitive’ as employed throughout: the word was uncommon in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, primarily referring to faculty psychology, and its contemporary medical meaning is even further removed from the context in which Gaukroger has introduced it. Perhaps ‘intellectual’ would have better suited the historical context within which the subject matter is treated. Nevertheless, Gaukroger indubitably has his own reasons (whatever they may be) for his ongoing choice of ‘cognitive’, and it is probably better to give him the benefit of the doubt.
The core of the book consists of Gaukroger's consideration of three historical developments between the years 1680 and 1760: the first, the ‘attempt to subject all areas with cognitive aspirations, including natural philosophy and theology, to metaphysical foundations which embodied canons of rational[ity]’, (p. 2) consists of an extended examination of Leibniz's attempt at the unification of knowledge through the provision of an overarching metaphysical system; the second is an examination of the ongoing effort of the natural-philosophical enterprise to acquire legitimation from Christianity and, in turn, weave itself into the dominant, Christian, world view; and the third – the most fascinating development considered – is ‘the idea, associated with Voltaire and the philosophes, that natural philosophy embodied ultimate cognitive standards’ (p. 3), in which Gaukroger explores the intellectual climate of the French Enlightenment which established rational mechanics and sensibility, and more importantly made natural-philosophical intellectual standards the arbiters of all intellectual claims.
Gaukroger identifies the decline of mechanism – and the failure of the mechanist programme to reduce all natural philosophy to a unified mechanics – as intrinsically intertwined with the development of Lockean sensationalism. One of the fundamental questions raised in The Collapse of Mechanism is whether the explanatory success of natural philosophy depended upon its being a ‘unified field of enquiry’ (p. 97). Although it appeared mechanism might realize this goal in the wake of the publication of Newton's Principia, developments in electricity, physiology and chemistry proved intractable to the reductionist aims of the mechanists. Indeed, Gaukroger continues, ‘The collapse of mechanism as a route to a unified natural philosophy was not solely, or even primarily, the result of the change in standing of mechanics’ (p. 149). Rather, it was foremost the result of the success of a Newtonian/Lockean ‘experimental philosophy’ which provided an alternative justification for a mounting field of experimental phenomena recalcitrant to mechanist reduction.
In Part III, the development of sensibility and rational mechanics is placed squarely within the French Enlightenment. Gaukroger does an exceptionally good job of untangling the often exceedingly complex web of interconnections between natural philosophy and the Republic of Letters. He convincingly demonstrates how the intellectual authority of natural philosophy was promoted through Fontenelle, the Académie des sciences and the Republic of Letters, and how a Lockean-inspired natural philosophy informed the development of the philosophe. Indeed, Gaukroger claims that the emergence of the social critic, the philosophe himself, was effected in large part through natural philosophy, ‘albeit not by natural philosophers claiming this role for themselves but rather by someone from outside claiming this role for natural philosophy’ (p. 268). While Gaukroger's historical interpretations are well supported by his impressive wealth of knowledge, this wealth occasionally turns into an overabundance of information which detracts, at times, from the overall presentation of the volume: Mechanism is punctuated by a few too many technical digressions, informative in themselves, but often of little value to the overall aim of the volume.
The biggest disappointment appears in the last seventy pages, where the overall intelligibility of The Collapse of Mechanism unravels quite frustratingly within the greater schema of the volume: only a small fraction of the more than five hundred pages are dedicated to a developed notion of ‘sensibility’, and the selection that does concern the transition from sensibility to a ‘sensibilism’ is not adequately articulated. In fact, just what Gaukroger means by ‘sensibilism’ is unclear: is ‘sensibilism’ a fully fledged form of Lockean sensibility, more than just empiricism? Or does it denote the inclusion of the ‘human sciences’ into the scientific world picture? It is unfortunate, for Part V presents some of Gaukroger's most striking ideas, but suffers on account of its comparative brevity. The most obvious complication arises when Gaukroger attempts to account for the broader impact of natural philosophy on the fortunes of the ‘human sciences’. His general contention is ‘that the naturalization of the traditional humanistic disciplines proceeded’ (p. 453) from the natural-philosophical sensibility of the eighteenth century, but in this he fails to draw a crucial distinction: that between naturalism and natural philosophy per se. The claim that naturalism in historical method, for example, was a result of eighteenth-century sensibility seems, among other such claims, far too broad: it is not at all apparent from the evidence provided that the naturalization of the traditionally humanistic disciplines was actually the result of the rise of a dominant natural-philosophical culture. While there can be no doubt that natural philosophy did play a role here, Gaukroger's account is too equivocal and, as a result, may be somewhat misleading. Indeed, the final section on sensibility is underdeveloped in what is otherwise an excellent study. Gaukroger is a first-rate historian of science, but Part V of The Collapse of Mechanism concludes the volume in such a way that it fails to do justice to the true calibre of his ideas.
