Both James Greenaway's The Differentiation of Authority and Francis Oakley's The Mortgage of the Past offer panoramic views of the history of political thought in medieval Europe. While Greenaway's book is a single-volume study, Oakley's is the second installment of a trilogy entitled The Emergence of Western Political Thought in the Latin Middle Ages. As Greenaway notes (17), medieval political thought rarely enjoys serious treatment in textbooks of the history of political thought, let alone in classroom instruction in universities. The two books both attempt to demonstrate that decisively important historical changes in political ideas occurred in the Middle Ages. The perspectives that they adopt, however, differ significantly: Greenaway challenges the conventional narrative that is framed by the relationship between two competing authorities, ecclesiastical and secular, in the medieval world—the traditional outlook that is inherited by Oakley.
Greenaway's book is deceptively difficult to categorize. It is certainly not a work of historical scholarship in the proper sense of the word: chapter 1, “The Medieval Political Order to 1150,” for example, is a sweeping survey based on a handful of secondary sources including Christopher Dawson's (now dated) Religion and the Rise of Western Culture and C. Warren Hollister's college textbook Medieval Europe. The bewildering dearth of historiographical engagement throughout the book is evident in the absence of works by leading experts in the field: for instance, the writings of Antony Black, Francis Oakley, and Cary J. Nederman are incomprehensibly omitted from the bibliography. To be sure, Greenaway is not a historian but a philosopher. However, one cannot find—again perplexingly—in this book any close philosophical analyses of primary texts. The discussions of John of Salisbury and William of Ockham make sporadic use of the excerpts of the English translation of Policraticus and Dialogus respectively, while references to and analysis of the texts of Marsilius of Padua are simply absent.
The book's central thesis is the medieval “emergence of individuals” as a third authority, which constituted an alternative to the two “external” authorities: ecclesiastical and secular. Greenaway's narrative, however, is paradigmatically determined by Eric Voegelin's account of the history of political thought. Indeed, Greenaway's main idea is anchored in Voegelin's “two histories” (5): the history of existential authority that resides in the individual, and the history of institutional authority that is external to the individual. The entire book is therefore an updated re-presentation of Voegelin's view of medieval political thought bolstered by a set of recent secondary sources, which are selected to suit Voegelin's thesis. This idiosyncratic approach to medieval political thought, had it rested on Greenaway's own reading of primary sources, would have been a novel contribution. Alternatively, the book could have been presented as a historiographical reappraisal of Voegelin's interpretation in light of more recent—and rapidly growing—literature on medieval political thought and medieval political history. The book is neither of these, and yet Greenaway writes that it is “not intended as a commentary on Voegelin's commentary” (4), which is perplexing indeed.
Oakley's work, by contrast, is ostensibly very traditional. His narrative proceeds along two axes: one is the tension between spiritual and temporal power, starting with the conflict between Gregory VII and Henry IV and ending with another crash between Boniface VIII and Philip IV. The other is the ways in which medieval intellectuals encountered and exploited the rich legacy of Greek, Roman, and Christian antiquity. Behind the conventional façade, Oakley's story unfolds with the focus on one theme: the desacralization of kingship. He begins his book by highlighting a paradox of the Gregorian Revolution: the Gregorian reformers “set in motion a process of desacralization that was destined progressively to tarnish the sacred nimbus with which early medieval Europeans had been so easily moved to adorn and hallow their rulers” (39). Oakley's journey of two and a half centuries ends with the observation that John of Paris's “move to mediating ground” in response to the papal absolutism of Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo was subtle yet radical; John shifted “the critical line between the sacred and the profane” from “that separating clergy from laity to that separating divinely instituted ecclesiastical office from human conferred incumbency” (222). The pope's power of jurisdiction (potestas iurisdictionis) is not of divine origin but rests on consent. The disenchantment of European political thinking had a deceptively modest beginning.
The point Oakley tries to make in this masterly work is not just that the exalted status of consent as well as representation, which shaped the constitutionalist tradition, was established in the Middle Ages; the ideas of consent, representation, and constitutionalism “turned us [sc. Europeans] into western political animals.” Indeed, Oakley's book presents a case for the birth of distinctively European political ideas in the Middle Ages. The exploration of the European identity of medieval political thought is clearly predicated on his earlier study, Kingship (Blackwell, 2006), the focus of which was kingship's intimate connection with the sacred in the global context.
Thus, Oakley's book is not intended as a comprehensive survey of medieval political thought. The focus on the question of consent and representation is most evident in his elegant and erudite exploration of the “roots of consent theory” in chapter 6. On the other hand, one does not find significant discussion of some typical topics in medieval political thought, such as the Poverty Controversy, which shaped ecclesiological ideas in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Likewise, the treatment of John of Salisbury is conventional and thinner than one might expect.
Perhaps one problematic aspect of the book is that the question of desacralization is acutely reduced to the questions of consent and representation. The emergence of secular political ideas was examined by generations of scholars including Georges de Lagarde, Walter Ullmann, and most recently Matthew Kempshall. In particular, the dearth of critical engagement with Kempshall's paradoxical thesis that attributes secularization to the medieval appeal to Augustine and the Bible is questionable.
Another issue may be a discussion of the rediscovery of Aristotle. While it is a general trend in recent scholarship to claim that there was no such thing as an “Aristotelian revolution” in thirteenth-century political thought, downplaying the impact of Aristotle's Politics based on the discussion of Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and James of Viterbo may not be described as even-handed. Again, it is puzzling that Cary Nederman's extensive work on the limits of medieval Aristotelianism is hardly discussed in this book.
These criticisms, however, are not intended to understate the magnum opus of this distinguished scholar. Oakley's ultimate aim lies in highlighting the emergence of European political thinking in the Middle Ages, and the book under review constitutes only a part of it, though a very important one. Perhaps one could not do justice to the book without seeing the final installment of the trilogy, which is keenly awaited.
