During the last couple of decades the axiomatic equation of the “growth of the modern state” with increasingly centralized and directly controlled systems of procurement, manufacture and resource management has been under attack. Recognition has grown that governments respond in a variety of ways to the challenges of warfare, expanding administration, or facilitating trade and commercial expansion, the great majority of which seek to co-opt the resources, connections and know-how of private contractors, and to draw them into roles that might conventionally be seen to intrude on the state's “monopoly of violence” or its direct control of state resources and administration. The present set of essays is drawn from the 2011 conference of the Contractor State Group. Starting from the premise that a great deal of attention had been devoted by early modern political and economic historians to the ways in which states raise money, but much less to the ways in which that money was spent, the Group has contributed to a substantial re-evaluation of the relationship between private enterprise and the state. Unsurprisingly, given the priorities of the early-modern military-fiscal state, the great majority are devoted to military contracting. That said, Patrick O'Brien's chapter offers an ambitious global survey of the challenges faced by states in revenue raising, and the limitations of a purely coercive approach to tax gathering, above all in states that had expanded through dynastic accretion or conquest. Other essays, focusing on both land and naval warfare, divide between broad overviews and detailed case studies. Amongst the former are Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox's survey of current debate about the British contractor state between 1740 and 1815. As the authors are the source of the term “contractor state,” deployed throughout this volume, it is excellent to have their reflections on the wider issues involved in naval contracting. In fact they express some concern that the term “contractor state” threatens to become so all embracing in an early modern context as to be almost meaningless. They draw attention, for example, to the flexibility and effectiveness with which the British government could benefit from well-developed commercial markets and an abundant supply of private contractors—ideal territory for a cost-effective and quality-conscious negotiation of manufacturing and supply contracts. In contrast, governments in France and Spain, dealing with a less-developed and less-expansive private sector were drawn towards contractor monopolies, reliance on individuals or particular consortia, shutting themselves off from the possibility of shifting contracts to more reliable or cheaper suppliers. Whereas the Board of Ordnance could simply terminate all contracts for cast-iron cannon with the Carron Company in Scotland in 1773, French and Spanish governments were too frequently locked into contracts, which were manifestly incapable of meeting military needs. An excellent case study by Rafael Torres Sánchez develops this point in the context of hemp manufacture for the Spanish Navy. The advantages of encouraging the growing of hemp and the manufacture of sailcloth in Spain were recognized by economic theorists and the Castilian government. But dependence on particular hemp suppliers such as Felipe Chone, who combined commercial interests in Baltic hemp with involvement in tax farming at home, led to a damaging monopolistic approach to contracting, which not only undermined attempts to stimulate domestic production, but found the government underwriting Chone's costs when he refused to honor his existing contracts as the price of hemp on the Baltic market increased. A similar set of issues is explored in Jöel Félix's excellent survey chapter examining the role of the French munitionnaire des vivres de Flandres et d'Allemagne through the eighteenth century. Félix demonstrates the steady pressure towards contractual monopoly, and the resultant problems of contractors who were “too big to fail” and the distortion of any real “market” for supply services. Once again the most obvious and significant complicating issue was the willingness to use the contractors not only as army suppliers but also as a source of loans and financial credit for the crown. Other essays carry the discussion outside of Europe to look at the colonial trading companies, whether Huw Bowen's excellent chapter on British private traders and the supply of arms to both the East India Company and its enemies on the subcontinent, or Helen Paul's study of the contractors working for the Royal Africa Company for the period between 1705 and 1713. Compared to the supply needs of the Royal Navy or the East India Company, the RAC was a small player, but precisely because of this enjoyed advantages of flexibility in dealing with suppliers, and could also benefit from the close working relationship with the navy and its vast network of contractors. Back in Europe, Richard Harding's study of warship construction for the Royal Navy between 1739 and 1748 demonstrates that the percentage of navy ships built under private contract in a period of intensive shipbuilding was high: of 313 vessels added to the fleet, 211 (67 percent) were built or hired from private contractors. If the heaviest gunned-rated ships remained the preserve of the naval dockyards, 40- and 50-gun ships were preponderantly built in private dockyards. Moving to the supply of British-financed land armies, Stephen Conway shows how extensive and elaborate the network of British and German contractors was for the supply of the combined Army in Germany during the Seven Years’ War. British suppliers benefited in large part from the inability of German contractors, whether through transport difficulties or military disruption, to keep the troops fed, but Conway cautions against an overly positive view of the success of supply operations by the later eighteenth century when seen through the eyes of the civilian populations and the soldiers themselves. Further chapters offer detailed and important insights into aspects of French and Spanish military supply contracts, with essays also addressing Portugal, the Dutch Admiralties, and early eighteenth-century Tokugawa Japan.
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