Ming Wan explores the paradoxes of Japanese economic and political power in its attempts to simultaneously pursue its national interests globally and regionally in East Asia. Wan's book is a noteworthy contribution to the literature on Japan's foreign policy and on U.S.-Japan relations. He documents Japan's relations with the United States and with East Asian countries, focusing on Japan's exercise of economic power. He finds that Japan is more often a supporter of American interests, although not always as strong an ally as the United States expects. In short, Japan seeks to minimize the cost of its strategic partnership with the United States.

Wan surveys U.S.-Japan relations since the American occupation in Chapter 2. He traces American efforts to get Japan to spend more on defense and to employ economic sanctions in situations favored by the United States. The bilateral relationship is characterized by Japan's response to American demands regarding burden sharing: choosing economic versus defense strategies that are generally less expensive both materially and politically. Wan argues that Japan's sizable foreign aid program is in part a response to American pressure for Japan to engage in greater burden sharing. Even though the United States is by all measures the senior partner, Japan has been able to pursue its own national interests within the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. The story told by Wan is of a Japan that engages in numerous tactics to mollify American demands and acquiesces to outside pressure, that is, gaiatsu only when it is largely coterminous with Japan's self-interest.

In Chapter 3, Wan explores Japan's relations with East Asia countries. In particular, he examines Japan's efforts to serve as a regional leader, efforts that are viewed warily by many in East Asia in light of Japan's imperialism earlier in the twentieth century. He explains that Japan's leadership is welcome primarily in economic and financial issues, not security issues. The author focuses on Japan's official development assistance (ODA) and its reluctance to impose economic sanctions. He paints a picture of a Japan that is eager to prove it is a great power, while reluctant to move out of the security shadow of the United States. On several occasions, Japan did challenge the United States but failed to realize its goal of establishing itself as a regional leader. For example, Wan describes how Japan, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, proposed a regional monetary fund, an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), which would exclude the United States and not follow strict neoliberal economic orthodoxy. The United States, some East Asian states, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) itself opposed and quickly rejected this regional alternative to the IMF. Wan suggests that this was an embarrassing failure to Japan's leadership efforts in East Asia. But the author does not answer a basic question: Why did Japan propose the AMF in the first place?

A large part of the answer is found in Chapter 4, where the author surveys Japan's efforts to increase its role in the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank (ADB). Japan initiated a series of diplomatic efforts in the early 1980s to achieve a number two ranking in terms of voting weight in the IMF and World Bank and to have its development strategy recognized as a legitimate path for developing countries to undertake. The former goal was mainly about Japan's percentages of votes in the IMF and World Bank. Japan found itself in the early 1980s the second largest economy in the world but the fifth in terms of its voting weight in both the Fund and Bank. Part of the problem for Japan was that the U.K. Germany, and France resisted Japan's rise in influence. Although Japan achieved number two ranking in the Fund and Bank during the 1980s, this quantitative increase in relative influence did not necessarily result in a concurrent augmentation of Japan's qualitative influence over IMF and World Bank policymaking. The latter goal meant that Japan had to confront neoclassical economic orthodoxy prevalent at the Fund and Bank. Wan documents how Japan's efforts, manifest in projects such as the famed East Asian “miracle” report, largely failed. In short, Japan had limited success turning its newfound voting weight into tangible influence over policy.

Wan does not recognize that part of the motivation for its AMF proposals grew out of Japan's frustration and dissatisfaction with the IMF. More generally, throughout this text, the author does not fully link events, problems, and issues across chapters. He attempts to bring together the chapters in his conclusion but is only partially successful. Furthermore, little of his research on Japanese relations with the IMF, World Bank, and ABD cites investigations of how influence is apportioned in these institutions and how decision-making rules impact policy outcomes. On the ADB in particular, Wan relies too heavily on his 1995 article, “Japan and the Asian Development Bank” (Pacific Affairs 68 [Winter 1995]: 509–28.), with only minor updating of data. Even with these weaknesses, Japan Between Asia and the West should be required reading for students of Japan's relations with the United States and East Asia. His work is not the definitive answer, but nevertheless is a valuable account that moves the discussion beyond basic catchphrases.