Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T02:47:32.311Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Reform of the tax on reversions of excess pension assets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2008

GAOBO PANG
Affiliation:
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 901 N. Glebe Road, Arlington, VA 22203, USA (e-mail: Gaobo.Pang@watsonwyatt.com)
MARK WARSHAWSKY
Affiliation:
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 901 N. Glebe Road, Arlington, VA 22203, USA (e-mail: Mark.Warshawsky@watsonwyatt.com)
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This study quantifies the possible consequences to stakeholders of reforms to the excise tax on reversions of excess pension assets. Under the US Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, funding in defined benefit (DB) plans is likely to improve significantly. Many plans may become overfunded over time, owing to the shortfall amortizations mandated by the PPA, as well as to precautionary contributions by sponsors and to plan investment returns. This analysis shows that a more moderate excise tax rate together with a reasonable funding threshold for asset reversions would not only enable sponsors to spend the excess funds on other corporate needs, thereby lowering the cost of sponsorship of DB plans, but also would open a considerable revenue source for the government, with only a small increase in bankruptcy cost for the PBGC. Plan participants could also gain in an alternative reform, which would require a partial transfer of excess assets to them along with a still-lower reversion tax rate. These findings also hold for plan sponsors with various degrees of risk tolerance or only making the PPA-required minimum contributions.

Information

Type
Issues and Policy
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Table 1.Benchmark Assumptions

Figure 1

Figure 1.Average funding ratios – payoff-maximizing plans Source: Authors' simulations.

Figure 2

Figure 2.Distributions of contributions/reversions – payoff-maximizing plans Source: Authors' simulations.

Figure 3

Table 2.Redistribution of excess assets – payoff-maximizing plans ($millions, PDV)

Figure 4

Table 3.Number of possible plan freezes/terminations – payoff-maximizing plans (out of 10,000 simulations)

Figure 5

Table 4.Redistribution of excess assets – payoff-maximizing plans ($millions, PDV)

Figure 6

Table 5.Redistribution of excess assets – contribution-minimizing plans ($millions, PDV)

Figure 7

Figure 3.Average funding ratios – contribution-minimizing plans Source: Authors' simulations.

Figure 8

Figure 4.Distributions of contributions/reversions – contribution-minimizing plans Source: Authors' simulations.

Figure 9

Figure 5.Average funding ratios – varying asset allocations Source: Authors' simulations.

Figure 10

Table 6.Redistribution of excess assets – varying asset allocations ($millions, PDV)

Figure 11

Table 7.Redistribution of excess assets – payoff-maximizing plans with effective federal corporate income tax rate of 25% ($millions, PDV)

Figure 12

Table 8.Redistribution of excess assets – contribution-minimizing plans with conservative investment portfolio (20% equity and 80% bonds, $millions, PDV)

Figure 13

Table 9.Redistribution of excess assets – payoff-maximizing plans ($millions, PDV)

Figure 14

Table 10.Redistribution of excess assets – initial funding 90–110% ($millions, PDV)