Guo Xuezhi outlines four major objectives in China's Security State. In his words, the book “analyzes the evolution and development of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) security and intelligence organizations”; “examines the organizations' pursuit of social control … and their influence over elite politics”; “explores the function of the security and intelligence apparatuses … for protecting the regime and … guaranteeing compliance to party leadership”; and “reveals the manner in which the CCP organizes and motivates the security and intelligence organizations to ensure effective social control and the compliance of party and state officials with party discipline” (p. 1). Combining these four objectives into one volume is highly ambitious; regrettably, the result is mixed, leading to a diamond-in-the-rough product rather than a coherent, polished exposition of the complex nature and history of the intelligence and security services and organizations.

This book is not for the casual reader, nor is it well suited for a student or scholar without a solid background in the history, politics, personalities and organizational dynamics of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or military. The book addresses complicated subject matter and complex organizations, with intertwined themes, personalized interpretations of historical events by participants, and extensive episodes of manipulation and intrigue among leaders of the security apparatuses in China. Some aspects are strong. The historical coverage of early CCP security organizations is well sourced and explained. Chinese leaders' memoirs provide interesting insights of organizational developments and elite activities during the early days of the Republic through the Cultural Revolution, particularly highlighting the role and dominating influence of Mao Zedong. The analysis of organizations and elite politics under Deng Xiaoping and during the subsequent reform and modernization period, however, is clouded by attempts to explain organizational functions while addressing individual leaders' use of the organizations in their struggles for personal power, the often contending goals of meeting CCP legitimacy needs, and the competing philosophies and methods for governing while pursuing social control, political stability, absolute Party loyalty and discipline. At the same time, Guo injects an examination of the manipulations by individual leaders (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao) to gain, maintain, and exercise control over security organizations and the military. The results of trying to do too much in one volume are confusing and hard to follow. Additionally, the analysis of military organizations shows a lack of in-depth knowledge of the PLA, of military terminology and, in some cases, roles, functions and relationships of the organizations. The result is an oversimplification of complex processes associated with PLA modernization, professionalization and institutionalization. Furthermore, the sources for the military discussion, mostly Western, do not reflect the many reforms in the PLA in the last decade (Swaine, The Military and Political Succession in China, 1995; Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, 1998; You Ji, The Armed Forces of China, 1999; Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military, 2002).

There are readability challenges in this book starting with an excessively long, poorly edited text that would be much more effective if condensed. Problems include numerous redundant descriptions of organizational functions and history that confuse the analysis; contradictory information from one section to the next; distracting typographical errors (for example, using CBG instead of CGB for Central Guard Bureau, p.108; Lin Baio instead of Lin Biao, p. 110; PLA General Chief Staff instead of PLA Chief of the General Staff, p. 122; Dangshi buolan instead of Dangshi bolan on p. 392; Qing Jiwei instead of Qin Jiwei on p. 425); occasional factual errors (for example, the PLA 38th army (corps) was not the first “motorized” corps; it was the first “mechanized” corps); inconsistency in translations of organizations and duty positions, especially among the military; and sections where sources should be provided for information presented as factual rather than analytical.

One example that calls into question the accuracy of Guo's research is the nine-page section on “Security and intelligence services in the PLA” (pp. 426–434) that uses only two footnotes on the eighth page of the section, both citing Xu Jiatun's memoirs after he defected to the US. In this section, he misses the point that the Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) ceased to exist as a PLA organization in 1998. Guo claims but does not substantiate that “The PLA has historically kept a powerful influence over and remained in control of the top CCP intelligence organizations” (p. 433), a statement to which the leadership of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security would probably take exception.

Also problematic is the analysis of the roles of the elites in power struggles. Except for the discussions of Mao's manipulations of security organizations and their leaders, such as during the Cultural Revolution, Guo consistently transposes organizations for the elites. He speaks of an organization acting as if it was the elite actor, particularly during the pre-1949 period, omitting the critical aspect of identifying the individuals who orchestrated the intrigue and manipulated the participation of the organizations. For example, Guo records, without identifying who is in charge or who is benefiting, that the State Political Security Bureau (SPSB) “aimed to achieve control over every level of the CCP and the Red Army, and it planned to do so by any means possible, including military operations, torture, and execution of suspected traitors” (p. 114). Missing is identification of the specific leaders/elites that gained or asserted control of the organization, how they manoeuvred to co-opt or build alliances with leaders of those organizations and, then, how they manipulated the behaviour of the organizations. This pattern of interchanging organizations for the leaders in charge of the organizations re-emerges repeatedly during Guo's examination of Hua Guofeng's, Deng Xiaoping's, Jiang Zemin's and Hu Jintao's relationships with security organizations following Mao's death.

On the positive side, Guo has made excellent use of memoirs published by participants that provide unique insights into historical events, as well as into the organization, evolution and functions of various security and intelligence agencies involved. These personal recollections, often by individuals victimized, then rehabilitated, shed light on the more narrow, time-specific details of the organizational history while feeding into the description of the broader evolution of the various agencies. This is useful in describing developments during the early days of the People's Republic through the Cultural Revolution, particularly as various elites crossed swords and lost to Mao's machinations.

Overall, my assessment is that Guo does not succeed in producing a readable examination of China's security system. The reader must know the subject associated with the Chinese military, intelligence and security apparatuses well, then review carefully the sourcing and accompanying analysis, and work hard to find the diamonds therein.