Otherness in the centre-periphery binary (1910–1945)

The current section examines how the global centre-periphery classifications emerged in Korea during the Japanese colonial era, which is often described as the ‘Orientalism of the Orientals’. When Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910, Japan was actively practising a European version of colonialism, which was inherently tied to Orientalism. As both a cause and consequence of European expansion, Orientalism is fundamentally a power relation between the East and the West, a ‘Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’ (Said, Reference Said1979: 3). The binary distinction between ‘us’ (The Occident) and ‘the other’ (the Orient) constructed Europe and the United States as occupying the upper rung of the ladder of civilization, while the Orient was placed at the bottom rung on the basis of what they lacked (Dirlik, Reference Dirlik1996). When Japan began its relentless modernization efforts in the 19^th century during the Meiji era (1868–1912), it adopted the Eurocentric logic of modernization in an effort to ‘exit from Asia and enter Europe (datsua nyuo)’ (Paik, Reference Paik2000: 76). As an Asian surrogate of Euro-American colonialism, Japan applied the centre-periphery binary to its oriental neighbours including China, Korea and the island of Taiwan, which was by then already governed as a Japanese imperial colony.

The move was further inspired by Social Darwinism, characterized by a belief in ‘the survival of the fittest’ socio-political groupings of people, which Japan leveraged to justify its annexation of Korea as an essential step to achieve modernization of the country under the guidance of an advanced civilization (Chung, Reference Chung2002). By converging Orientalism with Social Darwinism, Japan represented itself as the nation of the most enlightened race, while Korea was considered by Japan to be ethnically and nationally inferior. This centre-periphery distinction was, in a way, more hierarchical and insidious than the East-West binary, because in this recursive appropriation of Orientalism ideologies, the East was further reduced and despised by a regional ruler keen to be accepted as part of the Western global powers by copying their practices. As Korea was relegated to an uncivilized and barbaric country in the Japanese Orientalist discourse, a strong sense of inferiority was inculcated in the national psyche of Korean people (Chung, Reference Chung2002).

The widespread anti-Japanese sentiment during Japanese rule led Koreans to be more receptive to the West, fuelling escapist Eurocentrism in a way that would have been unlikely had Korea been ruled by a European nation. Coupled with Koreans’ determination to sever themselves from what they saw as the inferior past that led to the Japanese colonization, Koreans thus were quick to establish the West as a model of modernization (Lee, Reference Lee2013). For example, Yi Kwangsu (1892–1950), a founder of modern Korean literature, published in 1922 an essay entitled Minjok gaejoron (‘Ethnic reconstruction’) in which he urged a sweeping reform of the national character (minjokseong). By framing the Korean populace as nothing but inferior and weak, Yi uncritically upheld the West as a model of enlightenment, and argued that only through wide-ranging reforms could Korea expect to become as strong and independent as Western nations.

But why was it the United States, rather than Europe, that came to dominate Korean visions of post-colonial, Westward-looking development? The reason for this is closely related to the newly emerging social and cultural phenomenon of American modernity in Korea in the early 20^th century. The phenomenon of American modernity refers to popular consumption of American movies, books and food products imported during the Japanese colonial era (Yoo, Reference Yoo2001). Imported American cultural products contributed to a positive construction of American imageries promoted in popular movies and books, in which the United States was characterized by civilization, striking gold, liberation and pioneering spirits (Lee, Reference Lee2013). With the rise of representations of American culture in the desolate local landscape, an ability to appreciate American culture and speak English fluently came to serve as signifiers of colonial modernity among Korean people (Min, Reference Min, Wee, Goh and Lim2013). This fashion was especially evident among colonial elites who felt hopeless and frustrated at the colonized reality (Cho, Reference Cho2017). Many of them were from a privileged background and had greater access to American cultural products and the leisure time in which to embody novel cultural practices (Watson, Reference Watson2007). The centrality of the United States and English is well illustrated in the new fiction or sin soseol written by elite colonial writers. A number of new fictions extolled American culture and ideology, and going to the United States for study is described as the only solution for protagonists in crisis (Watson, Reference Watson2007). Popular novels of the time often featured Korean characters fluent in English, which was regarded as a symbol of advanced civilization in the colonial binary position based on the superior United States versus inferior Korea (Kim, Reference Kim2008).

The popularity of English and American cultures was largely limited to people from a particular socio-economic background, who consumed English and American modernity as cultural capital for distinction (Bourdieu, Reference Bourdieu1986). While the Korean public became increasingly exposed to American cultures, learning English and/or enjoying American cultural products was a luxury for most people having to eke out a day-to-day living under harsh colonial conditions. This naturally raises the question of how the hierarchic construction of the United States and Korea became internalized at a wider societal level and, more importantly, how the burgeoning self-orientalizing attitudes became enmeshed with the emergence of American superiority. This can be best examined in the post-liberation era that began in 1945, when the United States stepped in as a new colonial master for Korea.

From the colonized to the Americanized (1945–1980)

American identification continued to gather strength in the post-independence Korea, in which the removal of the Japanese gave way to American dominance on the peninsula (Cummings, Reference Cummings1981). Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by the allied forces led by the United States, Korea was freed from Japanese rule in 1945. Since Korea was excluded from the liberation process, its independence was seen as a gift from the United States, which earned itself a reputation as a benevolent liberator among Korean people (Choi, Reference Choi1993). Immediately after the liberation, the American Military Government (1945–1948) was established to ensure a smooth transition from Japanese rule in Korea's effort to become a fully fledged nation, and Koreans entered a phase of ‘post-colonial coloniality’ in which the Japanese colonial rule was simply replaced by de facto colonization by the United States (Cho, Reference Cho2017).

The cultural dominance of American modernity became even more prominent under military rule with the massive import of American cultural products (Choi, Reference Choi1993). In particular, the American Forces in Korea Network (AFKN), which was launched in 1950, had a significant impact on young Koreans in their aspirations and hopes for the future (Maliangkay, Reference Maliangkay2011). The AFKN was not only a source of information about the outside world but also an inspiration for young people feeling hopeless at the widespread famine and poverty of the nation (Maliangkay, Reference Maliangkay2011). At the same time, large-scale economic assistance from the United States to Korea further strengthened the reputation of the United States as a benefactor-liberator. Politically, the United States saw the southern part of the peninsula as an effective response to the communist threat from North Korea and Russia, and established itself as a sole protector of Koreans by spreading anti-communism in Korean society. Given this ‘state of internal displacement and external dependency’ (Choi, Reference Choi1993: 81), Koreans admired and idealized the power of the United States and desired to be part of the imagined American community.

The perceived superiority of the United States as the centre of the world was further strengthened throughout Korea's nation-building processes. When pro-U.S. Syngman Rhee was elected as the first President of Korea in 1948, Rhee adopted American political systems such as a democratic republic, fixed presidential terms, an institutionalized separation of powers among the executive, legislature and judiciary, and the American Bill of Rights which served as a basis for the constitution. As the United States played a formative role in the nation-building processes, the country was identified as a kind of father, who gave birth to a new Korea (Joo, Reference Joo2004). The widely perceived superiority of the United States served to strengthen the existing inferiority complex held by Koreans, who regarded themselves as lacking compared to the United States (Joo, Reference Joo2004). This sense of inferiority and simultaneously growing admiration of the United States as the centre, in turn, further contributed to self-orientalization among Koreans, and it is against this backdrop that the phenomenon of pro-U.S. sentiments or chinmi began to emerge as a social phenomenon in Korean society. With the United States viewed as the central place from which power radiated, some Koreans even worshipped the United States. This phenomenon was called sungmi. For Koreans who worshipped the United States, ‘whatever was American was Western and therefore universal’ (Moon, Reference Moon2004: 48).

The phenomenon of sungmi can perhaps be best examined in the development of local higher education, in which planners looked up to the United States as the global academic centre. In the post-liberation era, it was American universities that had a considerable influence on the shape of Korean higher education (Shin, Reference Shin2012). The U.S. model characterized by the dual systems of undergraduate and graduate education, department systems and course-based credit hours was adopted in the local higher education sector as part of its modernization effort (Shin, Reference Shin2012). Apart from the structural adoption, American ideas and values were also embraced by an increasing number of Korean people who sojourned in the United States. The deeply entrenched superior-inferior binary logic naturalized the local practices of learning from the United States, and American degrees soon dominated the local intellectual scene (Kim, Reference Kim2015). As scholars with American education and/or fluency in English became prominent in Korean educational institutions, local degrees were devalued, which in turn led to a divide between overseas-educated scholars and domestically educated scholars (Goodman, Reference Goodman1986). This divide worked in favour of American-educated Korean scholars, thanks largely to state policies that prioritized economic development between the 1960s and 1970s. As the policy linked the quality of higher education with national development, the imported knowledge of those who had studied in the United States was deemed essential for the nation to achieve economic development, and returnees even received special treatment (Goodman, Reference Goodman1986). As the system worked in favour of people who made academic pilgrimages to the centre, it encouraged more people to prioritize studying in the United States, which in turn perpetuated the perceived inferiority of local higher education. Throughout the local practice of learning from the United States, fluency in English served as important academic capital which was critical to the acquisition of advanced knowledge and degrees as forms of cultural capital in institutionalized form as well as professional networks as social capital (Kim, Reference Kim2012). The centre-periphery binary between the United States and Korea was further consolidated during the modern era of Korea. The perceived superiority of the United States was strategically leveraged by Korean military dictatorship and local media, which is discussed in the next section.

Media collusion in centring the United States (1980-present)

Dirlik (Reference Dirlik1996) argues that for Self-Orientalism to be sustained in society, it requires systematic efforts or complicity of the Orient themselves who benefit from the very ideology. As such, Self-Orientalism serves the interest of the powerful, and it is conservative media that lie behind the promotion of the United States and English as the language of the master in modern Korea. Under the era of military dictatorship which began in 1980, Koreans’ perceptions of the United States experienced notable changes due to shifting political circumstances. The benevolent father figure of the United States was seriously challenged following the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1981. The military dictatorship led by Chun Doo-Hwan mobilized combat forces to crack down on citizens calling for democracy, and the movement ended tragically with numerous civilian casualties. The failure of the United States to stop the dispatch of the military forces under its operational control and the Reagan administration's expedient endorsement of the Chun regime sparked massive anti-American sentiments or banmi among the Korean public (Moon, Reference Moon and Steinberg2015). In the late 1980s, a phenomenon of ‘loathing of the United States’ or hyeommi emerged due largely to trade structures biased in favour of the United States and the continued presence of American soldiers and their misbehaviours against Koreans (Moon, Reference Moon and Steinberg2015).

These emergent negative perceptions of the United States did little to weaken the overwhelmingly pro-US sentiments promulgated in the conservative media. Therefore, the role of powerful media outlets in the preservation of the positive imagery of the United States is worth exploring further. The local press in Korea is broadly divided into three categories (conservative–neutral–progressive) depending on its political-ideological positions, and it is the conservative media that are the most powerful and influential. The three biggest conservative newspapers, i.e. Chosun Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo and Dong-A Ilbo, are the biggest of all newspapers in the local market. Collectively referred to as Cho-Joong-Dong, the newspapers have maintained strong ties with dominant conservative political parties (Park, Reference Park2010), and the political parties have long been pro-United States or chinmi (Nam, Reference Nam2017). Based on the shared political ideology, the mainstream media were engaged in a collusive relationship with the military dictatorship, which saw an inculcation of an inferiority complex as an effective strategy to pre-empt potential public resistance to the regime (Kang, Reference Kang2014). The conservative media played a key role in the process, and one of the strategies was to mobilize the centre-periphery dichotomy, in which Korea was framed as peripheral and inferior and was urged to rely on the United States to secure its future development. The binary logic was further rationalized by alleged threats from North Korea and its socialist neighbours. As Korea was depicted as too weak to exercise self-defence, the most powerful nation in local consciousness, i.e. the United States, was naturalized as Korea's protector (Kang, Reference Kang2014). By reproducing and reinforcing the pro-U.S. sentiments, the conservative media have effectively defended the status quo, from which they have benefitted materially as well as ideologically (Kang, Reference Kang2011).

In America-centred discourses led by the conservative media, anything to do with the United States tends to be perceived favourably. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the major newspapers have been highly active in promoting English as a medium of instruction for local universities in the context of 21^st-century globalization. While internationalization is often mobilized by the conservative media to justify an expansion of English-medium lectures, internationalization is frequently equated with Americanization in local higher education. As an example, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (henceforth ‘KAIST’) introduced in 2006 a controversial policy that mandates teaching all subjects in English only for the stated purpose of becoming a ‘global leader’ in higher education (Cho, Reference Cho2012). However, the KAIST case shows that internationalization in Korean higher education actually means ‘Americanization’. A closer analysis of news articles published by the conservative newspapers regarding KAIST's language policy reveals that the degree to which local universities are internationalized, or ready to meet challenges in the highly competitive global arena, is measured and judged by what is considered as ‘best practice’ at American institutions (Cho, Reference Cho2016). The analysis also demonstrates that the need for enhanced institutional competitiveness is invariably justified by the alleged gap between KAIST's current status and those of top American universities, such as Harvard, MIT and Stanford, in terms of measures including the number of foreign academics, rigour of tenure reviews and global university rankings.

In the shared sense of intellectual inferiority when measured against the United States, local institutions have strived to emulate best practice performed by American institutions. Teaching in English represents one expedient strategy to move away from the periphery to join the global academic centre led by the United States. It is not a stretch to say that the deep-rooted centre-periphery divisions in Korean higher education, which has long admired the United States as the centre, have perhaps led local universities to be more willing to adopt English as a standard medium of instruction than they otherwise would have been. Ongoing efforts to expand English-medium lectures among local universities serve as a poignant reminder of the psychological dimension of the centre-periphery binary that has long colonized the minds of Koreans throughout the historical process. While globalization is often regarded as a cause behind the phenomenon of ‘English fever’, the historical analysis powerfully illustrates that the popularity of English in Korean society is, in no small part, a historical construct, which is strongly grounded in the superior-inferior divisions between the United States as the centre and Korea forever occupying the periphery.