At some time around August 324 b.c., Antipater, the regent of Macedonia received orders from Alexander the Great that he was to be replaced with another eminent officer in the Macedonian court, Craterus.Footnote ¹ In addition to his removal from office, Antipater was ordered by Alexander to leave Macedonia for the East, bringing with him fresh levies to replenish those that comprised Craterus' own contingent of veterans from Opis. Though Craterus left Alexander's court shortly thereafter, neither man can be said to have made the journey speedily or directly. A range of reasons has been given to explain Craterus' slow advancement, including the construction of infrastructure to allow the transportation of military resources from east to west, the poor state of his health, and the need to recruit more men.Footnote ² By the time of Alexander's death in June of 323, Craterus and his forces had only reached the province of Cilicia in southeastern Anatolia.Footnote ³ Antipater's immediate reaction to his new role is not recorded, but what is known is that he remained steadfast in Macedonia, seemingly in defiance of Alexander's orders. It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate Antipater's refusal to depart from Macedonia, to explore whether tensions between Antipater and his replacement could account for Craterus' sluggish advance and to highlight the impact that Greek domestic politics had on Antipater's position in Macedonia.

Craterus' slow progress has been the focus of previous investigationsFootnote ⁴ and Antipater's apparent unwillingness to leave Macedonia has been one suggestion offered to explain Craterus' pace as well as his extended stay in Cilicia.Footnote ⁵ However, when Antipater's position is contextualized within concurrent events in Greece, especially the rising tensions amongst the Greek cities following the enactment of the Exiles Decree, the hypothesis that the delay in Antipater's departure had an impact upon Craterus' mission weakens. Maintaining Macedonian control in Greece was vital, and Antipater's departure from the region before the arrival of his replacement presented a hazardous opportunity for unrest in Europe. While not attempting to offer a definitive explanation for Craterus' time-consuming westward expedition, this paper rejects the premise that Antipater's inaction had a bearing on the new regent's return to Macedonia. By contextualizing Antipater's position in relation to Craterus, as well as to the Greek cities, it can be argued that it was impossible for Antipater to vacate Macedonia prior to the arrival of his replacement. While this position appears an uncontroversial one, the impact that Greek domestic politics had on Antipater's ability to leave the Macedonian homeland has gone without academic affirmation.

There is unfortunately little discussion of Craterus' mission by the ancient literary sources and those examples that exist survive in highly compressed states. Reconstruction of this episode relies upon piecing together passing references to the subject found in a wide range of texts. Arrian provides some level of detail, discussing Craterus' dispatch to Macedonia and the order summoning Antipater to bring fresh troops to Babylon.Footnote ⁶ He then relates a rumour that Alexander was planning the execution of Antipater as a result of growing animosity between the two men.Footnote ⁷ Diodorus, when writing on Alexander's final plans, notes that Craterus had reached Cilicia with 10,000 discharged men.Footnote ⁸ Justin, in his epitome of Trogus' work, mentions that Craterus was to replace Antipater in Macedonia, also mentioning the order for the regent to bring a fresh levy to the East.Footnote ⁹ In his typically brief style, however, he gives little detail. Finally, Curtius Rufus, in almost the final words of his history, states that Craterus' true mission was not to replace Antipater but in fact to execute him, although he admits this was hearsay and rumour.Footnote ¹⁰ With regard to these authors, however, any discussion regarding Antipater must be approached with some caution, given the negative bias held by their sources.Footnote ¹¹ It is from these scattered accounts that we must reconstruct the relationship between Craterus and Antipater. What can be stated is that Craterus was making his way back to Macedonia with a large force of troops, a position agreed upon by all four authors. Both Arrian and Justin state that Craterus was to replace Antipater, who was to come to Babylon. Diodorus is less clear on what Craterus' purpose was, stating only that Alexander had given him written orders to carry out. Finally, both Arrian and Curtius suggest that Alexander may have given Craterus orders to kill Antipater.

The movements of Craterus and Antipater during the years of 324–323 have been the subject of discussion among modern scholars.Footnote ¹² However, fewer works specifically engage with Craterus' return to Macedonia as Antipater's replacement. The corpus centres primarily on the output by BosworthFootnote ¹³ and Anson.Footnote ¹⁴ By the time of Alexander the Great's death on 11 June 323 b.c., Craterus was in the satrapy of Cilicia, some ten months after his departure from Alexander's court at Opis in 324 b.c.Footnote ¹⁵ The most substantial and significant body of work devoted to Craterus has been produced by Anson over the last decades. Over this period of time, he has presented a number of fundamental works, most recently in 2012,Footnote ¹⁶ aiding in our understanding of Craterus within the context of the greater Macedonian Empire.Footnote ¹⁷ While Craterus is not the sole focus of this work, because of his significance to the shift in the political dynamic that Alexander intended for Europe, his relation to Antipater and his movements following his appointment in Macedonia deserve comment.

Various reasons have been proposed for Craterus' supposedly slow progress, including poor health, desertions from his army, preparations for future actions, and possible unrest within the region,Footnote ¹⁸ all in addition to the possibility that Craterus was waiting for Antipater to leave before proceeding. While the focus of this article is on contextualizing Antipater's inaction, it is prudent to consider some other possibilities, such as the suggestion from Arrian's account of Alexander dispatching Craterus to Macedonia, in which he is described as being in poor health.Footnote ¹⁹ Whether this was due to illness or injury is not specified. Nevertheless, Craterus was sufficiently unwell to concern Alexander, who sent Polyperchon as his second-in-command with orders to take control should Craterus become unable to lead.Footnote ²⁰ Heckel has raised the issue of Craterus' health previously,Footnote ²¹ and there is little reason to doubt the reality of his infirmity. Arrian does not mention his source for this episode.Footnote ²² Regardless, there seems little reason to believe that the story was fabricated by one seeking retroactively to disparage Craterus, since in the previous section of Arrian's narrative, he is praised as being Alexander's most trusted friend.Footnote ²³ It therefore seems likely that Craterus was indeed in poor health on this march. But while Craterus' infirmity can be accepted,Footnote ²⁴ to what extent this delayed his progress, if at all, is difficult to determine owing to the lack of detail provided by Arrian.

With regard to this discussion, though, it is more important to focus upon the proposed reasons that involve Antipater and Craterus' relationship with the regent. There has also been discussion regarding the precise nature of Alexander's orders regarding Antipater, and how these may have impacted upon Craterus. Griffith in particular made this point in an article focussed on the contemporaneous relationship between Alexander and Antipater.Footnote ²⁵ He suggests that Alexander explicitly ordered that Craterus delay until Antipater had left; this comes from the notion that Alexander was preparing against a potential rebellion by Antipater, and did not wish to provide a hostile Antipater with more troops to add to his power base.Footnote ²⁶ Certainly, there exists in the source tradition an undercurrent of tension between king and regent.Footnote ²⁷ Arrian devotes some discussion to the animosity between Antipater and Olympias, describing how she attempted to undermine him in her son's estimation.Footnote ²⁸ Carney follows through with this line of argument, stating that Antipater's recall was proof of Alexander's waning faith in his regent.Footnote ²⁹ Such a statement does initially seem secure. If the relationship between Alexander and Antipater had indeed reached a level of animosity, then it would have been wise for Alexander to avoid handing Antipater ten thousand extra troops. This explanation may be further strengthened by Griffith's observation that the troops being sent home were those who had grown disaffected with their continuing role in the East.Footnote ³⁰ If this were so, then Antipater would be equipped not only with more troops but also with troops that were not positively disposed towards Alexander. Given this, it is possible to see why Alexander may have simply ordered Craterus to wait until Antipater's departure before advancing to Macedonia, resulting in his slow progression.

However, these points fail to consider every aspect of the situation, and often rely on speculation to justify their position. It must be said that nowhere in any of the sources is it mentioned that Alexander gave such an order. This assertion is purely speculative. Crucially, though, as Bosworth states, there is no suggestion that Antipater was slow in ceding his position, nor did he receive any further instruction to vacate Macedonia more quickly.Footnote ³¹ Alexander never displayed any annoyance at the delay in the execution of his orders. The lack of response to Antipater's inaction throws significant doubt upon the claim that the king ordered Craterus to wait for the regent to leave Macedonia. Alexander's non-response shows that he held no issue either with Craterus' slow progress or with Antipater waiting in Europe. Moreover, subsequent gestures by Antipater reveal that the relationship with Alexander was not unsalvageable, even if there were elements of animosity between the pair.Footnote ³² Specifically, it would be unlikely that Antipater would send his son Cassander to Babylon in his stead, placing his son in a vulnerable position, if his own relationship with Alexander were overtly hostile.Footnote ³³ Griffith raises this exact point.Footnote ³⁴ As a final piece of suppositional evidence, though, the idea that the troops would consider defecting from Alexander's control to join Antipater is curious, considering that they were being discharged partly because of their desire to go home.Footnote ³⁵ Fear of these soldiers switching allegiance seems unfounded, given that through Alexander's orders to return home, they were gaining what they had demanded of him.Footnote ³⁶ Overall, then, there appears to be little evidence that Alexander gave the order for Craterus to remain in Cilicia. No clear reason presents itself for such an order, and those that have been given in the past appear unfounded. Nothing suggests that Antipater was disobeying the king's wishes by remaining in Macedonia, nor that significant animosity between him and Alexander or Craterus is evident. Possible motives for Alexander not to want the armies to meet in Macedonia are vague and suppositional.

The next question to consider is whether or not any personal relationship between Craterus and Antipater could have had an impact upon Craterus' actions at this time. In particular, a poor relationship between the two could have led Craterus to delay his approach to avoid confrontation.Footnote ³⁷ While nothing exists to shed light on their relationship at this point in time, there is evidence that the two were amicable in the years immediately after Alexander's death.Footnote ³⁸ Several key events occurred during this period. Shortly after Alexander's death and the outbreak of the Lamian War, Antipater sent out a request for aid to several leaders, including Craterus.Footnote ³⁹ Craterus responded by coming to his aid, marking the point at which he finally crossed over into Europe.Footnote ⁴⁰ It has been noted that Craterus took a considerable period of time in responding to Antipater's request, possibly suggesting some hesitation or ulterior motive.Footnote ⁴¹ This is contentious, as the fact is that he did still come to assist Antipater. Indeed, Anson later qualified his claims, stating that excessive emphasis has been placed upon interpreting the cause for the delay.Footnote ⁴² Upon arriving in Macedonia, Craterus forfeited his position of ultimate command to Antipater.Footnote ⁴³ During the effort to subdue the rebellious Greeks, the two men presented a united front to reinstate Macedonian control in the region.Footnote ⁴⁴ In the aftermath of this series of events, Antipater sought to forge an alliance with his counterpart Craterus, one example of which included giving his daughter, Phila, to him in marriage, thus cementing an alliance between the two men.Footnote ⁴⁵ In the years following 323, then, Craterus and Antipater had a solid working relationship and alliance, allowing them to deal with the uprising of the Greek city-states after the death of Alexander.

While retrospective assertions are hardly ideal if there are alternative methodologies,Footnote ⁴⁶ in this case, given the scarcity of sources and details, few options are available. If the premise that Antipater and Craterus were willing to work in cooperation after Alexander's death is taken and applied backwards, it may then be possible to reach some conclusions regarding their relationship during Craterus' time in Cilicia. Baynham has already made the observation that during this period ‘enmity need not have existed between Antipater and Craterus if their future cooperation may be taken as an example’.Footnote ⁴⁷ Not only may it be possible to take these examples as evidence, as Baynham suggests, they also downplay the impact that the men's relationship would have had on Craterus' progress. It is crucial to note that this series of events occurred shortly after Craterus' time in Cilicia. At the death of Alexander in 323, all of Craterus' interactions with Antipater happened within three years, prior to his own demise in 320.Footnote ⁴⁸ It seems unlikely that any existing negative relationship could become so positive within such a short period of time as to enable the two men to work together and for the two families to be joined through marriage. Given this, it is likely that Baynham is correct in asserting that there was no enmity between Craterus and Antipater, and that, at the time under investigation, they were able to implement an effective working relationship.

But then, what of Bosworth's statement that Craterus delayed his help to Antipater until he was at his most desperate, ostensibly in order to dictate favourable terms?Footnote ⁴⁹ Such an act does suggest that Craterus was manipulating the situation in which Antipater found himself. But even if Anson's claims about the over-investigation of this event are put aside,Footnote ⁵⁰ and even if it is assumed that Craterus did delay help in order to elicit some personal benefit, this still does not necessitate the existence of a hostile relationship between the two. It would merely indicate that Craterus was taking advantage of an opportunity that became available to him.Footnote ⁵¹ No evidence exists for the relationship of these men prior to Craterus' return to Europe, but the speed at which they formed a workable and amicable partnership upon his return does suggest that there were no significant prior hostilities between them. Because of this, it is difficult to assert that Craterus would have delayed his return in order to avoid an awkward or hostile encounter with Antipater.

Owing to the significant focus devoted to Craterus in his venture west and the status of the dynamic between the regent and his replacement, the situation facing Antipater in Greece has been largely overlooked. Surprisingly, the role that Greek politics played in the movements of Antipater has gone without substantial comment by modern scholars. Errington, in his appraisal of Greek hostility towards Macedonian hegemony in 324 comes close to this point,Footnote ⁵² but the significance of this interpretation must be strengthened by the explicit statement that it was this which was the central cause of Antipater's failure to depart from Macedonia when Alexander's orders arrived to him.

For this discussion, it is vital to consider the status of Antipater, the man whom Craterus was sent to replace. Of central concern to Antipater's position in Macedonia before his replacement by Craterus was the stability of the Greek cities. Upon Alexander's departure from Europe, Antipater was put in charge of affairs at home.Footnote ⁵³ His primary role was to maintain the region during the absence of the king and a substantial contingent of Macedonian military strength.Footnote ⁵⁴ In addition to the absence of the king and his army, Antipater had to contend with the ever-present possibility of Greek insurrection and revolt. The conquests of Philip II and Alexander the Great did not equate to the placation of the Greek states, nor did it remove their readiness to rebel against Macedonian hegemony, were the opportunity presented.Footnote ⁵⁵ In order to confront any hostility at its source, Macedonian garrisons had been placed in areas of Greece where unrest appeared likely.Footnote ⁵⁶

Antipater's time in office was by no means peaceful. His ability to govern the region was tested soon after Alexander's departure from Macedonia. Unrest began to emerge in 331, when Alexander's governor in Thrace, Memnon, led an uprising against Pella.Footnote ⁵⁷ At much the same time and with the aid of Persian funding,Footnote ⁵⁸ Agis III of Sparta launched a campaign in the Peloponnese calling on the Greek cities to rise up against Macedonian rule.Footnote ⁵⁹ While Antipater swiftly and thoroughly checked both the upheaval in Thrace and the war with Sparta,Footnote ⁶⁰ and a measure of stability was restored in Greece by 330,Footnote ⁶¹ what is evident is that dissatisfaction among the Greeks with Macedonian authority was rampant.Footnote ⁶²

While it is unfair to suggest that Antipater was not capable of fulfilling the demands of his office,Footnote ⁶³ by 324 the situation had improved little and a Greek uprising was once again a real prospect that required attention. This new level of unrest emanated from Alexander's envoy, Nicanor, and from the announcement at the Olympic festival in the summer of 324 of the Exiles Decree.Footnote ⁶⁴ This would facilitate the return of those exiled by the Greek cities to their homeland,Footnote ⁶⁵ possibly in an effort to tilt political favour towards Macedonian authority, by giving, as Blackwell notes, ‘the exiles an investment in maintaining Alexander's rule, thus reducing the manpower available to a rebellious state’.Footnote ⁶⁶ What is significant to note about Alexander's orders is that they were precisely that. Those states that refused to fulfil their obligation as stated by the Decree would be compelled by force to allow the return of those they had expelled.Footnote ⁶⁷

Whether as a result of willing compliance or inability to defy the order, many cities submitted to the autocratic nature of the declaration.Footnote ⁶⁸ However, this was not the case for all, and resentment toward Macedonian authority was exacerbated.Footnote ⁶⁹ The dissatisfaction among the Aetolians and the Athenians at the potential losses they would incur through the repatriation of expelled citizens to their respective holdings is a prime example.Footnote ⁷⁰ As a result of this mutual resentment of the Decree, the two states forged an alliance with the purpose of overthrowing Macedonian rule, should the opportunity arise.Footnote ⁷¹ It would be too speculative to assert that Antipater had knowledge of this particular alliance when it came into existence; however, it is reasonable to assume that the regent was aware of the growing dissatisfaction in Greece with the Exiles Decree and its potential to incite revolt. As with Agis and Memnon in 331, another semblance of military strength had emerged in Greece with the potential to present a serious threat to the integrity of Macedonian hegemony in 324.Footnote ⁷² This was the situation in Greece facing Antipater at the time of his replacement by Craterus.

The contextualization of the apparent stagnation at their respective locations by both Craterus and Antipater is vital when evaluating Craterus' return-mission to Macedonia. For Craterus, a number of factors contributed to his prolonged time in Cilicia. These included the preparations for Alexander's western campaign as argued by Bosworth. As for Antipater, he was too preoccupied with the implementation of the Exiles Decree and dealing with the agitation it caused within Greece to embark on the long road east with the replacements for Craterus and the Opis veterans. Such circumstances within Greece, events that required Antipater's close attention, provide a simple explanation for his apparent inaction during this period, which do not rely wholly upon rumours of tensions between regent and king.

The final issue that becomes apparent is whether Craterus would have waited for Antipater to depart Macedonia before he led his troops into Europe and assume the regency. Craterus must have been aware that, while Antipater could not disobey the orders for his relocation to the East, his attentions would be focussed on the South. The developing tensions in Greece and the risks it posed to Macedonian hegemony following the declaration of the Exiles Decree made Antipater's departure impossible, particularly when he knew the location of his replacement. Craterus was neither close to Macedonia, nor was he actively underway to Europe. It must also be stated that, following the initiation of the Lamian War in 323 and Antipater's call for aid, it took Craterus' relief-force around twelve months to cross into Europe in response to Antipater's requests.Footnote ⁷³ While it is true that Craterus was delayed at the Hellespont owing to Athenian naval aggression,Footnote ⁷⁴ even if this interruption is taken into account, a period of several months would still have existed in 324 when the homeland of the Macedonian Empire was without a resident regent, without the replacements for Antipater's departing forces, and without the new regent being in a position to take immediate command. This situation would be entirely unacceptable for Alexander in Babylon, as well as for both Antipater and Craterus, and would seriously compromise the already strained authority that Macedonia had in Greece. A substitute officer could have occupied the regent's position in a caretaker capacity during the intervening period. Nevertheless, Macedonian military strength would still be significantly depleted during transition.

A more plausible scenario is available. In order to facilitate Antipater's departure from Macedonia to Alexander's court in Babylon, Craterus' arrival in Europe was essential. This would allow for a transition of power between the outgoing and incoming regents of Macedonia without placing unnecessary stress on the Macedonian military reserves, thereby keeping their numbers at roughly the same level as they were before Alexander's orders arrived. This plan would also explain why Alexander did not appear to be concerned with Antipater's delay in vacating Macedonia. There have been a variety of potential reasons to explain Craterus' slow westward progress from Opis. Craterus' health, the preparations for Alexander's western campaign and the unrest in Cilicia are all possible causes to account for his delay. Theories such as desertions or possible hostilities between Craterus and Antipater are less likely and fail to consider the situation in Greece. While the contextualization of Antipater's position in Macedonia during 324 does not provide a definitive explanation of Craterus' prolonged occupation of Cilicia, it does indicate that Antipater's departure was reliant on his replacement's arrival. This then allows for Antipater's perceived inaction to be removed from the possible causes put forth by modern scholars explaining why Craterus required a period of nearly two years to reach his destination.