There are not many scientific papers that start out in the following manner:
I stand at the window and see a house, trees, sky.
For theoretical purposes, I could now try to count and say: There are … 327 brightnesses (and color tones).
Do I ‘have’ 327? No; I have sky, house, trees. Having the 327 as such is something no one can actually do.
This is the striking beginning of Max Wertheimer's (1880–1943) foundational paper on the principles of gestalt psychology from 1923 (p. 127 of the volume under review). The gist of this paper is familiar to anyone who has taken an introductory course in psychology, elucidating, as it does, mainly through the force of compelling illustrations, some of the ‘rules’ of gestalt psychology pertaining to figural organization.
The present book provides a new translation by Michael Wertheimer and K.W. Watkins into English (from the original German) of this paper as well as of Wertheimer's earlier paper on the perception of motion from 1912. Both papers are classics of perceptual psychology, previously available only in partial English translations. Thankfully, both are now available in full, enabling a greater appreciation of Wertheimer's important contributions to psychology and to the study of perception in particular.
The beginnings of gestalt psychology are usually traced to the year 1910 when Wertheimer carried out experiments on the perception of apparent motion at the Institute of Psychology in Frankfurt am Main. Among the participants in these experiments were Kurt Koffka and Wolfgang Köhler, who, along with Wertheimer, were to form the leading triumvirate of gestalt psychology over the next decades. Since it is generally agreed that Wertheimer's studies of apparent motion formed the impetus to the gestalt revolution, it is a curious historical fact that opinions have been divided as to what precisely Wertheimer had shown with these experiments.
Briefly, Wertheimer conducted numerous investigations into apparent motion using tachistoscopic displays (when we see, say, two separate blinking lines not as such but as one line moving back and forth). Additionally, Wertheimer also described ‘pure motion’ when the two stimuli are seen blinking in their place but some kind of ‘objectless motion’ is seen between the blinking stimuli. Wertheimer's name for this was ‘phi-phenomenon’.
Wertheimer's phenomenological findings were linked to a physiological hypothesis. The two stimuli lead to spreading excitation in the brain. When these meet they lead to the perception of apparent movement by a ‘short circuit’ between the two centres of excitation. It was this physiological hypothesis which made an indelible impression on one of Wertheimer's participants, Kurt Koffka:
In two words, what he [Wertheimer] said amounted to this: Let us think of the physiological processes not as molecular, but as molar phenomena. If we do that, all the difficulties of the old theory disappear. For if they are molar, their molar properties will be the same as those of the conscious processes which they are supposed to underlie (Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (1935), p. 56).
This emphasis on the ‘molar’ properties of perception forms the foundation of gestalt psychology and links the two papers translated here, dealing with seemingly quite different aspects of visual perception.
In addition to Wertheimer's two seminal papers, Viktor Sarris provides synopses of Wertheimer's two studies, as well as a biographical sketch of Wertheimer in Frankfurt and his subsequent career. The synoptic chapters are helpful to new readers of Wertheimer's papers, especially the one on the long and dense paper on perceived motion which is notoriously cryptic in places. The second paper on figural organization makes for much lighter reading, particularly given the compelling illustrations Wertheimer used to drive home his points. The book also contains excellent chapters by Robert Sekuler and Lothar Spillmann bringing the story up to date on subsequent research on, respectively, the perception of motion and the state of the gestalt rules of perception. Both chapters amply confirm the lasting importance of Wertheimer's pioneering studies.
From a historical point of view, a shortcoming of the book is that the discussion of Wertheimer's findings against their historical background is cursory. Wertheimer's play on the number of brightnesses in the quotation at the beginning of this review is a critique of an earlier tradition (‘the old theory’, in Koffka's words) in perceptual psychology, as briefly noted in the book. However, the discussion is superficial. A firmer editorial hand might also have avoided the inconsistency of the claim on p. 116 that Wertheimer's short-circuit hypothesis ‘is both well-known and wrong’ compared to that on p. 256 where the same hypothesis is said to be ‘partly – but only partly – substantiated’. But in spite of such sporadic shortcomings, here is a highly useful volume, of great interest to those interested in the history of perception research and gestalt theory in particular.
