I want to thank Dipali Mukhopadhyay for her thorough, and quite generous, review of my book. I am flattered that she found my attempt to trace the micropolitics of peripheral conquest and local resistance in international politics persuasive. There is much we agree on: the limits of military power as an explanation for patterns of peripheral conquest, the multifaceted nature of conquest as both an act of coercion and governance, and the importance of “the local” in shaping relations between core and periphery.

Since I have limited space, I will focus on what I take to be Mukhopadhyay’s main concern, namely, the question of whether cases of colonial-era conquest are relevant to understanding present-day cases of foreign-led state-building. This question is not only relevant to the book, where I include a case study of the Iraq occupation alongside those of British imperial conquest, but also raises broader questions about how we use historical cases to understand contemporary politics. In general, international relations scholars tend to draw a stark distinction between imperial rule and related political phenomena. The Correlates of War dataset separates colonial conquests, or “extra-systemic wars,” from both civil and interstate wars. Studies of state-formation tend to emphasize the emergence of the Weberian-state in Europe, rather than colonial- or post-colonial forms elsewhere around the world. Are such distinctions justified?

One reason why these phenomenon should be separated concerns the motives of powerful states: colonial powers sought to dominate distant societies for venal motives while contemporary states seek to rebuild war-torn societies for altruistic reasons. But the actual motives of colonial powers and contemporary state-builders are much more variegated than this formulation implies. Some act to remove perceived security threats, others to promote economic interests, still others to advance an ideological agenda. And whatever their particular motives, all seek to use their political dominance to refashion the political institutions of targeted societies. Perhaps colonial powers and external nation-builders differ in their goals—colonial powers sought to impose more minimalist, authoritarian, and extractive states, while current nation-builders seek to construct stronger, more liberal, democratic states. Yet this also draws too sharp a distinction. First and foremost, both colonial powers and nation-builders seek stability, and have proved willing to sacrifice ancillary ambitions to achieve it.

Maybe the real distinction concerns the means— colonial powers relied primarily on coercion and repression, while foreign nation-builders favor some combination of diplomacy and economic aid. Yet, as I highlight in the book, the support of prominent elites is crucial to colonial powers and nation-builders alike. Neither the application of coercion nor the forging of consensus is possible in the absence of capable intermediaries who can connect foreign powers with local societies. Elite fragmentation likewise is a crucial asset, either because it provides opportunities for colonial powers to play “divide and rule” or for foreign nation-builders to promote “cross cutting cleavages.” All state-builders employ some combination of compulsion and consent, and social factors inevitably shape their capacity to do so.

What has changed are not the causal mechanisms that drive state-building, but the political context in which they operate. Social ties between external powers and local actors remain critical, but foreign nation-builders are often drawn to regions where they possess a paucity of such connections. The manipulation of elite divisions remains a central feature of state-building, yet foreign occupiers face significant pressure to cede power quickly to elected governments. In short, foreign-led nation-building is similar in character to its historical counterparts, but takes place in a much less permissive environment. Rather than bracket off the past, we should draw on the historical record to understand how changing material and normative conditions constrain external powers’ capacity to remake peripheral societies.