‘Rule of law’ is a notoriously contested concept. So much has been written about rule of law in general and in China specifically that one often despairs of coming across something truly new and interesting – a problem that admittedly worried me more when I was the editor of The Hague Rule of Law Journal. Samuli Seppänen’s Ideological Conflict and the Rule of Law in Contemporary China: Useful Paradoxes certainly presents a new and interesting perspective.
As the subtitle indicates, Seppänen highlights the paradoxical aspect of many rule of law claims. Taking statements about rule of law as performative speech acts, he suggests (p 2) that ‘interventions in the rule of law discourse are better seen in terms of their performative qualities rather than as analytic propositions, descriptive statements or as good faith arguments.’ The focus, thus, is on the intended and actual effects of what was said rather than the conceptual content, logical consistency, or internal coherence. He demonstrates (ibid) that ‘various paradoxical, contradictory and otherwise implausible arguments about rule of law’ play an important role in debates about legal reforms. More specifically, he argues that the contested, ambiguous, and paradoxical nature of the rule of law and rule of law discourse provides certain strategic advantages and can be useful in furthering one’s preferred ideological agenda, regardless of whether that agenda is conservative, liberal, something in between, or something outside the box.
Seppänen’s approach is novel and refreshing. The book is built around an examination of the reflections of ten scholars from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the rule of law: Zhu Suli, Jiang Shigong, Wang Liming, Li Buyun, Ji Weidong, Cui Zhiyuan, Deng Zhenglai, Wang Hui, Xia Yong, and Gao Hongjun. Seppänen also takes up the profoundly paradoxical musings of Luo Gan and Wang Shengjun as representative of official state socialist ideology.
Drawing on these different ‘characters’ or actors in the rule of law drama unfolding in China, Seppänen develops a four-fold classification of ideological positions that motivate rule of law claims: (i) conservative socialism; (ii) mainstream scholarship, which seeks to increase individual freedom and equality by strengthening the autonomy of the legal system while not explicitly challenging the Party’s leading role; (iii) liberalism, which extends the demands for freedom and equality to the political sphere and aims at subjecting the Party to democratic and judicial controls; and (iv) ‘avant-garde’ scholarship, which is opposed in varying degrees to both state socialism and liberalism and hopes to bring about new forms of social order. He emphasizes that he is using these four hypothetical ideological positions as a narrative device, for narrative convenience. They are composed of ‘loose clusters’ of theoretical premises and attitudes about good governance, and reflect shared professional sensibilities about the most pressing problems and their solutions.
Seppänen is a brilliant guide, displaying impressive erudition, offering concise summaries of complex theoretical issues, and providing penetrating insights on a wide range of topics. His discussion of the much-maligned theory of the Three Supremes (the supremacy of the Party, the supremacy of the interests of the people, and the supremacy of the constitution and laws), advanced by then Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun, and roundly derided as self-contradictory and absurd on its face by liberals, demonstrates the benefits of his distinctive approach and by itself justifies the price of the book and the time invested to read it.
The book is, to be sure, an academic book in both the best and worst senses. Seppänen draws on linguistic theories, philosophical pragmatism and every kind of post-x discourse out there, and assumes an understanding of both the rule of law discourse in general and to some extent, political and jurisprudential debates in China. While there are some practical lessons from his analysis, it is not a book aimed at sorting out what the rule of law ‘actually means’ or trying to find ways to measure it or operationalize it. Seppänen does not attempt to assess the merits of the different ideological positions or demonstrate that one perspective is ‘better’ than the others. Nor does he try to draw policy implications from his analysis.
Nevertheless, it is a great read, particularly if readers have some familiarity with the rule of law literature and know – either personally or via their writings – the PRC scholars discussed in the book. While ‘inside baseball’, it is inside baseball at a major league, All-Star level. Everyone should come away with a much better idea of not only what ‘socialist rule of law’ is, but also of the many other perspectives on rule of law advanced by influential academics in China. Readers will also gain a better understanding of how the different perspectives have affected, and will continue to affect, the path of legal reform in China.
After all, the shift in focus to rule of law talk as performative speech acts emphasizes their intended and actual consequences. Indeed, one of the performative functions served by rule of law claims is factional boundary drawing. Claims about rule of law are often shout-outs to your mates—a way of signaling whose side you are on, who the good guys are, and who the bad guys are. While the academics discussed in the book defy easy categorization, jealously defend their intellectual turf and the uniqueness of their perspectives, and in practice form shifting alliances on particular issues, Seppänen has done a superb job in respecting their differences while uncovering important commonalities that provide the reader with a useful perspective for making sense of the many complicated and oftentimes bewildering claims about rule of law in China.
