The name Antoine de Martres is unknown today to students at Toulouse Capitole University. No doubt other jurists such as Jacques Cujas, Maurice Hauriou and Gabriel Marty are more familiar to them in the amphitheater and the lecture theaters. This is perhaps due to Cujas’ contribution to legal humanism and the doctrinal reflection of the two former deans of the faculty of law.
However, between the mid-sixteenth century the twentieth century another figure of Toulouse law stands out. Antoine de Martres was the first of the ten holders of the chair of French law. A brilliant lawyer and doctor in utroque, chosen and appointed by Louis XIV, he held this chair from 1681 to 1695. Toulouse municipal library conserves his handwritten law course dating from 1682. It is entitled ‘Institution au droit français accommodée à l'usage de la province de Languedoc et ressort du parlement de Toulouse’.Footnote 2
‘French law’. This is a primarily doctrinal notion that is of interest to various sources of law. It has attracted attention since the sixteenth century and examines the existence of an ordinary law in the kingdom of France as well as a written law in French.
This course by Antoine de Martres tells us about the content of a new teaching program in French which the monarchy wanted to be taught in all law schools in the kingdom after the Edict of St Germain in 1679. This course was very successful among students because of its application to real life and the practice of law with various sources and documents. It highlighted the legal traditions in the Languedoc in a kingdom where there were separate legal territories. Finally, this document was written in the context of the construction of a national law under the aegis of royal power which wanted greater unification.
This course shows the work of a jurist and a jurist at work. It invites a cross-analysis and a comparison of the textual support, its author, and its content, and thus allows us to grasp the long history of French law.
Antoine De Martres's course presents the law in a didactic and evolutionary way. I have used it as a narrative thread for this brief historical overview of the development of law in France from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. This Professor from Toulouse was interested in multiple sources forming the foundations of what was called ‘French law’ at the end of the seventeenth century. Amongst them, the law was an instrument which consolidated the development of royal law. Its affirmation favored legal unification with the French Revolution, and it was fully expressed in the era of codification in the 19th century, with the erection of new monuments of law.
I. Foundations
A dual movement is apparent within the scope of the construction and development of the Royal state and the affirmation of sovereignty.
First, a law with a national vocation embedded itself between two laws with a universal application, Roman law, and Canon law, as well as the laws of different, more limited spaces (customs and municipal laws).
Second, although medieval legal pluralism continued, a trend towards legal unification was at work under the impetus of royal power.
There were two learned in the Middle Ages which went beyond territorial and political boundaries of medieval kingdoms.
A legal science developed from compilations of Justinian's works in universities from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries.Footnote 3 It was taught in Bologna, Paris, Orleans, Toulouse. … It used rediscovered methods of legal analysis based on Roman law. New legal texts were produced. This legal science was a pragmatic response to society's questions at the time. It contributed to forming a new law from the legal substratum of ancient Rome, which was adapted to the mediaeval powers and economic and social relationships of Renaissance cities.
Amongst the writings produced by the scientia iuris, different forms of presentation existed in connection with the teaching of the glossators, the postglossators and their activity (the consilia). Used for training lawyers, Philip le Bel said in 1312 that Roman law ‘improves the reasoning, provides a doctrine for those who render justice and helps customs to be understood’.
Canon law was the other learned law in the Middle Ages. The church had developed its own law through the action of councils and the Pope. There was a wealth of canons and decisions in private collections from the fourth to the twelfth century. In 1140 the Decretium Gratiani ‘harmonized disharmonized canons’. Besides bringing together disparate texts, this document organized and proposed solutions to various problems. A few years after the Gregorian reform at the end of the eleventh century, and influenced by the revival in Roman law, this work by a monk from Bologna was very wide ranging and incredibly successful. The development of pontifical law in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries encouraged the formation of decretal collections (Gregory IX, Boniface VIII, Clement V). Canon law had a great influence on the life of communities (rules of deliberation and voting, chancellery writing techniques, use of mandates, status of royal agents), justice (inquisitorial procedure, appeal procedure) and on private law (rules for the formation of marriage, consensualism, wills etc).
Thus, during the Middle Ages these two laws, Roman law and Canon law crossed the political boundaries of kingdoms. They also interconnected with other standards, municipal laws, and customs. Municipal laws contributed to the development of legal writing. They were part of the document revolution in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
Customs as non-spontaneous expressions of law were initially oral and were written down from the twelfth century. It was a process of recognition and drafting by the municipal or seigneurial powers in the southern part of the kingdom. Another player also intervened to acknowledge the legal nature of social practices. Royal power exercised control officializing the written recording of customs and inserting custom into a more general legal order. Customs therefore became customary law. Royal intervention became more pronounced from the mid-fifteenth century with the intention of the official record customs in writing (1454 and 1498).
This drafting occurred under the influence of royal commissioners. It had significant effects (reduction in the number of customs, the alignment of customary solutions and the determination of customary law). There was a new step towards uniformity with the movement to reform customs at the end of the sixteenth century. Thus, the Custom of Paris (coutume de Paris) was drafted in 1510 and reformed in 1580. It was presented as a ‘Princess Custom’ and was very influential because its area of territorial application (the area of the Parliament of Paris) and therefore a source of inspiration for other legal territories. There were two areas, the territories of written law in the south and the territories of customary law.Footnote 4
Jurists had developed a theory of jus commune since the fourteenth century. The recognition of specific local rights was added to the ordinary law, i.e., Roman law which was affirmed as being the suppletory law. Their interaction was carefully thought out. An ordinary law and specific rights, a principle, and strictly interpreted exceptions. Roman law was therefore considered to be ‘the law of the land in France’.
Roman law was the subject of a revival in France in the sixteenth century with Bourges the center of its teaching. This marks the separation between southern and northern law. It corresponds to legal reason, to the “ratio scripta”. Recognized as the general custom for the South, the question was debated by customary territories in the sixteenth century. The recognition of Roman law as a substitute for custom was questioned. Jurists sought to overcome the diversity of customs. Charles Du Moulin was one of them. In his view, Roman law was not the ordinary law of France for the customary territories. He advocated harmony and the union of the customs of France in the middle of the sixteenth century. The idea of a common customary law was formulated. This was the dream of jurists for some time to come. This path nevertheless encouraged the comparison of customs and the discovery of common solutions.
The medieval jus commune was replaced by the ambition for a national law. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, legal scholars promoted the idea of a French law based on the customary substrate. Antoine de Martres of Toulouse described this by presenting, firstly, ‘general French law’ (Roman law and canon law) and secondly, ‘purely French law’ with canonical constitutions (an expression of Gallicanism), royal ordinances, written customs, and usages. Amongst these sources, the exercise of legislative power was the decisive instrument for achieving legal uniformity in the kingdom and unity under the law.
II. Instrument
French mediaeval kings were compared to Roman emperors. Enjoying the same powers, the King was recognized as having the power to legislate. The mediaeval king's political and legal power was affirmed in different areas. Royal legislative power developed even if private law remained a more limited field of royal intervention for a time. Legitimization and the exercise of royal power to legislate highlights the importance of this new normative instrument for the kingdom. There was a similar development in other European territories.
Described as a “Living law” and taking advantage of the revival of Roman law, the king of France also drew on the pope's legislative power and the practice of the papal chancellery. The king's lawyers and advisers promoted the idea that he was “Emperor in his kingdom” and therefore not subject to the temporal power of the pope. They developed and legitimized the King's legislative power. The ability to issue new norms, to modify old ones or to repeal them was postulated. He acted “with a certain science, complete power and royal authority” in the interest of the common good. Decisions were taken in the royal council. The idea of a medieval monarch deciding alone was outmoded, replaced by a process of dialogue and exchange with other players (cities, Estates General).
There was a movement to consolidate royal legislative power from the sixteenth century. In Jean Bodin's view, this power is the primary mark of sovereignty for the king who can ‘pass and repeal’ laws. It was said that “what the king wants has force of law’ (Qui veut le roi, se veut la loi)(Loisel). The royal state invoked this maxim in the medieval continuity to develop its action in many fields. It relied on reforming ordinances usually in connection with the Estates-General (Villers-Cotterêts in 1539 and the obligation to use the French language when drafting legal acts). These were catch-all statutes covering justice, the royal domain, taxation, universities, the general police force of the kingdom and private law.
Royal legislative action took the form of codification ordinances, to rationalize, standardize, and unify the law. They were developed by Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who wished to “put everything necessary for establishing fixed and certain jurisprudence into a single body of ordinances”. They served the purpose of Louis XIV. The work undertaken from 1665 onwards resulted in the drafting of five statutes: the Civil Ordinance (1667), the Ordinance on Water and Forests (1669), the Criminal Ordinance (1670), the Ordinance on Commerce (1673) and the Marine Ordinance (1681). Another ordinance for the colonies and the condition of slaves was drafted in 1685.
The exercise of legislative power nevertheless led to criticism and resistance to the royal courts when registering the king's laws. The parliaments also contributed to the rule of law, especially through rulings. They applied Roman law more emphatically from the sixteenth century onwards, particularly in the southern provinces with the model of paternal and marital power. Roman law and custom remained the primary sources of private law. Although royal laws concerning family law were still relatively rare, the law on the formation of marriage became secularized after taking and reinforcing the provisions of Canon law. However, it was not until the eighteenth century that ordinances relating to specific issues of private law like the law of gifts or wills developed with Chancellor Aguesseau.
The authority of court judgments and their creative role was recognized in old French private law. The ‘jurisprudence of judgments’ and the work of the ‘arrêtistes’ based on ‘notable judgments’ contributed to this. Doctrinal work developed with compilations of judgments which reached a wider audience thanks to printing. There was a European legal publication market. New media developed with dictionaries, compilations of legal problems, treatises, etc.
It was through the law that the law was unified. This was developed by political thinkers and jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and was influenced by naturalism. Divine law, natural law and human law, their relationship and separation were questioned in the continuity of ancient and mediaeval considerations and other influences affecting the conception of law with rationalism and utilitarianism. There was a shift in the eighteenth century notably with Rousseau from the King's laws to a law as the expression of the general will. A legicentrism developed, with a cult of law and the belief in the law's capacity to transform society. Its highpoint was the transfer of sovereignty from the King to the nation at the start of the French Revolution. Its importance was underlined during the constitutional debates in 1789 to balance what was considered to be the greatest power and avoid despotism. Legicentrism was the order of the day ; society must be regenerated through law. Law fixed the boundaries of freedom, security, freedom of expression and private property. It was the instrument through which unity was achieved in matters of territorial and administrative authority. It was imposed on the legal actors such as judges with the conception of the judge as the ‘mouth of the law’ and the refusal to give judges the ability to interpret the expression of the sovereign will. The uniformization in the application of the law was entrusted to the Court of Cassation (1790) but the National Assembly had the last word through the mechanism of the legislative referral and the creation of an interpretive law. Referral to the national assembly was suppressed in 1837 and the Court of Cassation became a normative authority. However, the law was still a powerful instrument for creating law in relation to other normative bodies. This movement was accentuated by codification, an instrument of legalism which created monuments of law.
III. Monument
The nineteenth century is the century of codification which is understood as the instrument of legicentrism. It began with the revolutionary and Napoleonic codifications and ended with the German codifications.
Although the French revolution succeeded in developing a Criminal Code it failed in its work of civil codification. The French codification experience resumed with the drafting of five legal monuments from 1804 to 1810 (the Civil Code, Civil Procedure Code, Commercial Code, Criminal Investigation Code, and the Criminal Code).Footnote 5 These codes organized the law for French society in a more lasting way. For instance, many provisions of the Civil Code even though they may have been clarified and interpreted by the case law, changed little until the mid-twentieth century, in particular family law, where the main reforms occurred during the 1960s and 1970s.
The Commercial Code however was frequently changed. The law which was imposed in 1807 quickly proved to be unsuitable for economic needs and the Industrial Revolution, and the legislator had to intervene regularly from the 1830s onwards, for example the use of company law. French codifications have nevertheless been cornerstones in the construction of other national laws. They have influenced numerous areas in particular Europe, dominated after Napoleon's conquests and countries which have come under the sway of French law, with this influence extending to newly independent countries in Latin and Central America. The tripartite structure of French civil law and its substantive rules have been adapted to local social and legal requirements.
However, the idea of the codification of the law was the subject of debate in Europe and codification and the French model were debated by German jurists (Anton Thibaut and Friedrich Karl von Savigny) from 1810. In the opinion of the second, who founded the German Historical School, the role of legal commentators was essential. He had a scientific conception of the law, as the spirit of the law emanating from the convictions of the people, which therefore could not enclose and frozen in a code.
The nineteenth century which was the century of codification was also the century of a renewal of legal doctrine promoting a scientific approach. The new codes were taught in the restored law schools and the Imperial University. Dedicated to training practicing lawyers, they became the place for the development of a legal doctrine. The exegetical method was joined by the historical and comparative approach to law in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was the time of doctrinal constructions, of the systematization of law, the development of new editorial supports with treatises and reviews. The authority and identity of the doctrine were expressed by Aubry and Rau, Gény, Saleilles and Hauriou. For example, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, François Gény questioned legicentrism. He promoted a new form of pluralism of sources of law, with custom inspired by the thinking of the German Historical School. Others, such as Edouard Lambert, rejected this conception.
The contemporary period has been characterized by an ever-increasing number of laws and regulations, and a shift in control of the law from the legislature to the executive. The evolution of French law is also part of the process of European construction over the last fifty years, with the influence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Beginning with the evocation of French law by the Toulouse jurist Antoine de Martres in 1682, this rapid journey from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century is intended to paint a picture of a legal landscape through its sources, the action of various actors and the movements at work in the formation of a national law in relation to the construction of the modern State. From legal pluralism to the codification of the nineteenth century, this history can be read in the particular light of the place and role of the law, and in its relationship to the forms of creation and expression of law, both then and now.
