The diminution of an East-West divide in recent scholarship on the Hellenistic Mediterranean is a welcome one and this book represents just one reason why. Examining the resources of manpower and public finance, it offers a comparative study of the five great players of Polybius’ symploke: Rome, Carthage, Antigonid Macedonia, Ptolemaic Egypt and Seleucid Asia. Not only does Taylor shed light on the eventual success of Rome and on the astonishing scale of the Punic Wars — the ‘clouds in the West’ that made such an impression on Agelaus of Naupactus — he presents a revealing analysis of these different powers as ‘conscription states’ or ‘taxation states.’
T.'s approach is positivist. The four chapters essentially serve as appendices for a final set of ‘Conclusions’, where the real argument is presented. In these four chapters, T. examines the evidence for military deployments and state finance. No reader will agree with all of the assumptions and data used here, and plenty will be hesitant when it comes to believing the numbers in the sources; I am not convinced, for example, that when Vulso's booty of roughly 23 million denarii was used to refund tributum, the entire sum was distributed or that the repayment covered all of that year's tributum. Moreover, T.'s schematic analysis necessarily relies on comparing like with like, so that all transactions are taken to be equivalent. Details such as fungibility (were different revenues earmarked for specific expenditures?), predictability (could leaders assume revenues next year?) or investment returns (could kleroi or euergetism affect future costs or revenues?) are flattened here. Moreover, the haphazard nature of our sources means that data tend to appear in snapshots of this or that year, which can prevent like-for-like comparisons. Yet T. is well aware of all this, and despite the scope for quibbles, it is unlikely that disagreements will be on a scale to undermine the final argument.
That argument has revealing dimensions. The overall claim is that the Seleucids and Ptolemies extracted vastly more money than any of their competitors and had access to enormous quantities of men, but that they could not convert this into strategic advantage due to high political and fiscal costs. Their positions as outsiders within their own realms meant that they had to spend much more on euergetism, lavish courts and other political devices to generate legitimacy. They also lacked the political privilege of risking serial losses; a run of defeats was too likely to result in rebellion or assassination. Macedonia and Rome, by contrast, enjoyed the benefit of domestic cohesion, with higher rates of extraction. As Republics, Carthage and Rome had the political advantage of being able to attach defeats to discarded leaders and thus to leverage their great resources for sustained wars, even in the face of crushing defeats. What emerges is a new explanation for Roman triumph. Though the Republic had much lower revenues than its competitors — even if lack of evidence sheds little light on Carthage here — and did not have an appreciably deeper pool of troops, its soldiers fought for much less pay than others. This more than compensated for Rome's lack of revenue. Rome did not have more men and certainly did not have more public money, but it did have a capacity to deploy more paid soldiers.
Along the way, T. makes a series of excellent contributions. He notes coincidences of Roman military pay and coin weight (112), shows that, despite deep reserves, deployed Roman armies tended to be outnumbered in battles (170–2), and that Carthage's deployment of men more than matched Rome's for much of the Hannibalic War. We should be long past the point of ‘centring’ the great kingdoms in our understanding of this period; T. shows how Spaniards and Gauls were central to the clash between Carthage and Rome, and wonderfully describes the Battle of Zama as ‘the last battle in the Numidian Civil War’ (71). All of this provides plenty of scope for future research. The role of Cisalpine Gaul in the third and second centuries begs questions of how this area's extractive capacities compared (and whether any data might be summoned). T. also provokes questions about how the ‘conscription’ and ‘taxation’ approaches of ancient states served to stimulate or stifle the redistribution of wealth.
This book represents a rare and impressive breadth of research across the ancient Mediterranean and sheds new light on a critical period in Western history. Its conclusions will be fundamental to future study of an age-old but still highly relevant area of enquiry.
