Political theorists have long been engaged with theological issues, but in recent years empirical and historically-oriented political scientists have shown an increased interest in religion. This book performs a valuable service by placing a set of empirical/historical studies in a broader theoretical framework. It can therefore be informative for both political theorists and other political scientists, and indeed other social scientists as well. The book is divided into two parts. The first, which contains essays by three well-known political theorists (William A. Galston, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and Thomas L. Pangle) establishes the basic theoretical framework, while the second applies that framework to specific cases (David Novak on Judaism, John Witte, Jr. on Puritanism, Pratap Bhanu Mehta on Hinduism, Abdulaziz Sachedina and Sohail H. Hashmi on Islam, and Roberto Papini on Catholicism/Christian Democracy).
Most generally, the book argues that, contrary to current widely-held belief, religion and the Enlightenment are not incompatible. Or at least not entirely: in the first part, the authors make a distinction between what might be called the moderate Enlightenment, which developed paradigmatically in the English-speaking world and which is compatible with robust religious belief and a public role for religion, and the radical Enlightenment, which emerged most fully in continental Europe and which is militantly anti-religious, or at least requires the utter privatization of religion. (This good Enlightenment/bad Enlightenment dichotomy is somewhat similar to the one made by Jurgen Habermas, in a different theoretical context, between communicative rationality and subject-centered reason, as well as distinctions made by both Pope John Paul and Pope Benedict and by philosophers of science such as Michael Polanyi.) In the second part, the authors go on to argue that various religious traditions are not only compatible with the conception of reason found in the moderate Enlightenment but may even be (to some extent) its source — that is, various religious traditions contain elements that could have developed (or in the case of Christianity, or at least Protestantism, did develop) into the ideas of tolerance and democracy characteristic of the Enlightenment.
If this analysis is correct, then religious believers should not fear the Enlightenment, or rather the moderate Enlightenment, because it can be compatible with their own religious practice; and secularists, or at least moderate secularists, should not fear religion, because it does have the resources to embrace tolerance and democracy. Indeed, religious belief can actually strengthen tolerance and democracy, which Elshtain and Pangle argue are ultimately given a very weak foundation by the radical Enlightenment, at least when its full implications are worked out.
Political theorists should be familiar with the general thrust of the first set of essays, but at the same time can still learn from them; for other political scientists, these essays can serve as an excellent introduction to current theoretical debates about religion, the Enlightenment, and democracy. The essays in the second part of the book are quite interesting, but since they focus on fairly specific issues it is impossible for non-specialists to judge their adequacy; they probably would be best read by scholars from other fields as introductions.
Although this volume has many strong points, there are a few issues that could have been addressed more adequately.
First, the editors and authors, even as they critique the radical Enlightenment, seem to have uncritically accepted the Enlightenment's own narrative of early modern (Western) history, i.e., that the Enlightenment vision of religious tolerance developed as a response to the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries. But recent historical scholarship has argued that the so-called wars of religion really had relatively little to do with religion and are better understood as the birth-pangs of the modern secular state. (See William T. Cavanaugh's The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict for an introduction to this literature.) A consideration of this issue could have actually strengthened the argument the editors and contributors wish to make.
A somewhat more general issue that could have been addressed is whether modern secularism is itself best understood as essentially a degenerate form of Christianity, an argument associated with political theorists such as Eric Voegelin and frequently made by both Christian theologians and Islamic commentators. A consideration of this argument again could possibly have strengthened the book's argument and perhaps led to a more nuanced description of the moderate Enlightenment.
Finally, although the authors express grave doubts about the purely secular Enlightenment, it could be argued that they still give it too much credit. Generally speaking, the essays in this collection imply that Western liberal democracy has been weakened by secularism and could be strengthened by the right kind of religious belief, but they still seem to see present-day Western societies as essentially sound. There is, however, considerable evidence that Western liberal societies are in serious trouble, with not only major environmental problems but the likelihood of increasingly severe financial difficulties and, most importantly, a rapidly growing demographic crisis. Once again, the book's argument could have been strengthened by a somewhat more critical assessment of secular liberal democracy.
Ultimately, what the above points show is that despite considerable recent criticism, postmodern and otherwise, the secular/radical Enlightenment still remains the dominant Western paradigm, so much so that even its critics perhaps give it more than its due. But if this book is widely read, then political scientists will be more aware of recent reassessments of both the Enlightenment and the relationship between religion and liberal democracy, which could indeed result in not only a new understanding of Western liberal democracy but the development of new, non-Western versions of tolerance and democracy.
