Deficits have become ever more central to politics in the US and other parts of the world since Morgan's book appeared in 2009. Despite closing his analysis with Bush, he was able to add a brief epilogue on the Obama presidency and he ends with the thought that Obama faces a formidable task with the “historic opportunity to put America's economy and its government on sound and sustainable foundations” (265). Events over the last year do not give much reason for optimism – but political leaders in the States might learn a lot from reading Morgan's account of deficits over the past five presidencies. Certainly, there is little need for Morgan to start as he does with apologies for writing about such an apparently off-putting topic that he thinks is of interest only within the Beltway. As he remarks somewhat defensively, the topic is central to politics. His dispassionate and sensible account is a breath of fresh air in an increasingly heated debate fuelled by Tea Party rhetoric.
The basic story is clear from the statistics. At a peak after the war, public (federal) debt stood at 108·6 percent of GDP in fiscal year (FY) 1946. In the 1950s, it was on average 58·2 percent of GDP, falling to 26·7 percent in the 1970s; interest payments were respectively 7·6 and 7·4 percent of the budget. The low point of debt was 26·1 percent of GDP in FY 1980. In the 1990s, debt rose to 46·1 percent of GDP and interest to 14·6 percent of the budget. The peak was 49·4 percent of GDP in FY 1993. The level of debt then fell to an average of 36·4 percent of GDP and interest payments to 8·8 percent of the budget in 2000–8. The rise and fall of the debt reflect the trends in budget deficits on which Morgan focusses. In the thirty-two years between 1977 and 2001, there was a surplus in only four years. Of course, things have deteriorated since he wrote and Morgan's comment in the introduction that “perpetual deficits have not yet produced a day of reckoning in the form of a crisis of public finance” now reads rather quaintly.
Morgan's focus is very much on the role of the Presidents rather than on the wider policy debates. He argues that the incumbent of the White House has the authority to set the terms of the national budget, so less time is spent on Congress or the wider political scene. The approach is largely narrative, providing a detailed account of each President's attempt to grapple with the issues of the budget. One obvious conclusion is that Democratic Presidents have lower deficits than Republicans. But it is not just a matter of balancing the budget; it is how that is done. Reagan pointed out that “all balanced budgets aren't created equal” (12), and he went on to quote Milton Friedman's comment that an unbalanced budget with spending of $200b is better than a balanced budget with spending of $400b. In other words, deficits could be reduced by increasing revenue at a high level of spending, or by cutting spending at a low level of revenue.
Carter attempted to cut deficits by efficiency in government and instilling fiscal prudence, reducing spending in order to control inflation – so that it was then difficult to deal with social problems as expected by Democratic voters. Reagan cut taxes and spent on defence with less success in reducing domestic government spending, which he felt was far too high, so leading to very high peacetime deficits. At the same time, private saving was low, leading to overconsumption, underinvestment and dependence on foreign loans. Reaganomics became the curse of the American political economy, which can only be lifted by raising taxes, reducing consumption, or becoming more productive. The first Bush did try to restore the budget, and accepted the need to increase revenues in 1990. Many Republicans saw his policy as an act of betrayal, making them all the more determined to cut spending so that the chances of a bipartisan solution disappeared. Clinton followed some of the same approach as Carter: more reliance on the market and less on government to produce prosperity, priority of monetary over fiscal policy, and elimination of the deficit. He actually managed to balance the budget at a high level of revenue, and he even delivered surpluses in some years, so preserving the activism of the New Deal/Great Society against Republican attempts to return to balance at a low level of revenue. Success was fleeting and partial, for nothing was done to solve the problem of low saving, large trade deficits, and reliance on foreign loans. The second Bush abandoned discipline. In Morgan's somewhat unkind metaphor, he “abandoned the fiscal sobriety of the 1990s to binge on an expensive budgetary cocktail of tax cuts, defence expansion, and expensive program growth” (206). He left the budget and the system of entitlements in a mess. This narrative is told in a clear and sensible manner, and the route to the current problems is mapped out with perception.
Ideally, Morgan's ambition to put the budget at the centre of recent American history needs a wider frame of reference, with more attention to the general principles and themes which are not always readily teased out from the detailed narrative. The deficit is, after all, residual after dealing with both spending and revenue, and more attention should be paid to both sides of the equation. Morgan does realize the point which is apparent in the statistics. On the spending side, entitlements – mandated by earlier legislation, and index-linked – grew from 26·2 to 59·8 percent of the budget between 1960 and 2000, which put pressure on other areas of spending such as defence or discretionary domestic programmes. Some discussion of these spending choices would help to set the problems of Presidents in a wider perspective. As Morgan notes, the decisions to cut defence or domestic spending were intensely partisan. They are certainly not just matters that were of concern within the Beltway. On the other side of the equation, revenue was needed to cover the spending, and this did not increase sufficiently. Social insurance and retirement contributions rose from 11·0 percent of federal receipts in FY 1950 to 36·8 percent in 1990, and then fell to 32·2 percent in 2000. Personal income tax increased from 39·9 percent of receipts in 1950 to 49·6 percent in 2000. Meanwhile, corporation income tax fell over the same period from 26·5 percent to 10·2 percent, and excise taxes from 19·1 percent to 3·4 percent. Morgan realizes that this shift in revenue had consequences for the deficit. He points out that increasing revenue to reduce the deficit meant higher direct taxes paid by individuals, which were the most politically sensitive form of taxation. Although the remark is obviously true, it begs the major question: why did the structure of revenue change in the way it did? In Britain, the share of individual income tax fell with a greater dependence on VAT; in the USA, there is no federal sales tax, and the fiscal system is unbalanced. The politics of deficits cannot be really understood without considering the wider fiscal politics of the United States.
Morgan's book is a very valuable resource on a major topic. It should be of great interest within the Beltway and also in the wider world if he could pull out some of the major themes in a more accessible way from his highly scholarly and detailed account. A bibliography would also aid others who wish to follow up some of the topics.
