João Resende-Santos's carefully researched new book explores when and why states engage in military emulation—that is, when and why states deliberately imitate some other aspect of another state's military system. This is an important question; substantial and sustained change is costly, and thus often rare, for organizations, and major reforms in military recruitment, staffing, promotion, and officer development have implications that extend beyond the organization itself. Building very self-consciously and systematically off the seminal theorizing of Kenneth Waltz, Resende-Santos elaborates what he repeatedly calls “the neorealist theory of emulation.” This theory is usefully evaluated outside the usual European context: he has plumbed archives and other primary sources in the major powers of late–nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century South America, and his case studies of interstate competition among, and military innovation in, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are well structured.
In Resende-Santos's view, emulation is one among several strategies states may pursue—separately or more typically in combination—to counter a deteriorating strategic situation and bolster effective military capacity (pp. 66–75). States may mobilize internally: They may spend more on defense; they may innovate, designing new military organizational forms; or they may emulate, copying proven innovations. States may also mobilize externally, by acquiring allies and riding free on their efforts. Because it is comparatively dependable, emulation, rather than innovation, is more likely at the upper end of the threat spectrum. However, because it is costly, states will often prefer to engage in external balancing, and the availability of allies reduces the need for emulation (pp. 89–90). Finally, states, Resende-Santos maintains, copy those systems that have recently proven effective on the battlefield, in wars among the great powers (pp. 75–83).
The core argument is easily summarized: “The higher the level of threat a state faces, the more prompt, rapid, and extensive will be its military emulation” (p. 90). According to the author, the most vulnerable of the South American powers, Chile, was therefore the first to engage in substantial emulation, in the mid-1880s: Argentina's rise, growing U.S. hostility, and Chile's lack of powerful allies drove it to undertake major military reforms under German guidance—universal and obligatory conscription, professionalization of the officer corps, the development of a powerful and autonomous general staff, and the adoption of new military technologies. Chile's military buildup compelled Argentina to modernize its armed forces in nearly as thoroughgoing a fashion as its rival. Because Brazil enjoys natural defenses and close relations with the United States, its emulation was comparatively late, uneven, and shallow.
This book is a valuable contribution to scholarship. Resende-Santos sheds light on the sources of military power and organizational change and expands the range of balancing behavior, and he usefully shows that structural-realist theoretical logic can “travel.” But the book is also not quite as satisfying as it might have been. First, there is a troubling conceptual slipperiness. The author points out that emulation does not require the wholesale implantation of foreign institutions in native soil. But if “similarity” is the standard (pp. 10–11), he never explains how similar a change must be to count as emulation and when imitation slides into mere inspiration. For instance, in Chile, conscription was not fully obligatory or universal, and it involved short terms of service, yet Resende-Santos treats it as emulation (p. 137). Similar deviations from the German model in Brazil are portrayed, however, as evidence of minimal German influence over that country's military institutions (p. 255).
Relatedly, it is sometimes not clear what evidence would falsify this account. Because other forms of balancing might always be employed (p. 43), both nonemulation and emulation are consistent with the theory's expectations under many circumstances. Argentina's military modernization was delayed, Resende-Santos explains, due in part to its free riding on the anti-Chilean U.S.-led coalition. But an immediate Argentine military modernization would also have been a conceivable response to the country's worsening security situation and thus confirmation of the neorealist emulation story.
Second, the book is often too self-consciously and rigidly neorealist. Resende-Santos insists that it is not valuable or feasible to marry unit-level variables with his systemic analysis (pp. 23–24), yet domestic politics necessarily features centrally in his case studies. Coalitions must form to overcome institutional resistance, and it is hardly obvious that they do so in response to international conditions. In fact, the 1891 civil war in Chile seems to have played a crucial role in breaking the opposition to military reform (pp. 143–47). Domestic opposition in Argentina compelled reformers to scale back their ambitions (pp. 212–15). And the author admits that he cannot exclude a domestic explanation for the Brazilian pattern (pp. 274–78). Chile and Argentina persist with German-style reforms after World War I, contrary to expectations, and Resende-Santos explains these anomalies by invoking internal military politics and “deeply rooted” commitments (pp. 182, 238). In the end, he admits that, across all three cases, domestic factors affected “the timing, pace, and scale of military emulation” (p. 300). This is hardly a small concession, given that these are among the “key aspects of military emulation” that his “neorealist theory” promises to explain (pp. 2–3).
More broadly, there is more of a role here for constructivist insights than Resende-Santos allows. An international authority structure, casting Europeans as teacher and non-Europeans as student, shaped military emulation. Their cultural positioning as backward, not just battlefield performance, led South Americans to look to Europe. As Brazil's war minister stated in 1899, his nation “must adopt … the principles and the perfections sanctioned by experience of the more advanced nations” (p. 47, emphasis added). Furthermore, across South America, as in Europe, conscription was directed internally as well as externally. It would bolster military power, but perhaps equally importantly, this “school for the nation” would build a cohesive national political community. Perhaps this was “mere rhetoric” as far as officers were concerned, but it was essential for building a political coalition supportive of reform, and this dominant discourse may have been among the conditions of possibility for the adoption of the mass army.
That said, Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army poses an important question, extends neorealist theorizing in innovative directions, and brings new and relevant evidence to bear. This book will rightly find its way onto graduate syllabi on military innovation and change, the consequences of war and interstate competition, and the dynamics of state formation.
