Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 ce), one of Islam's most famous and influential scholars, was well versed in Islamic law, theology, mysticism, and philosophy. Modern scholars have much debated the part each of these fields played in his writings, especially the role of philosophy in his teachings vis-à-vis mysticism and orthodox views. The present book continues the discussion on the nature of al-Ghazali's attitude toward philosophy and philosophy's role in the formation of his perception of mystical cognition and eschatology. Alexander Treiger claims that although al-Ghazali criticizes Ibn Sina's views in both fields, he bases his mystical cognition on Ibn Sina's teachings.
In order to achieve his goal, the author puts forward some assumptions in his introduction to the book: al-Ghazali is a theologian in the broad sense of the term, that is, a scholar who discusses God and humanity as well as the connections between them; Ibn Sina's philosophy can explain al-Ghazali's teachings; to arrive at true conclusions concerning al-Ghazali, one should deal with all his works synoptically; al-Ghazali's ideas are substantively consistent, notwithstanding the inconsistency in terminology and presentation; and his way of introducing his thoughts is pedagogic rather than scientific. It seems to me that Treiger refers here to guidelines rather than methodological devices, because each of these assumptions can be demonstrated or refuted. For example, the author assumes that one should treat all of al-Ghazali's treatises synoptically, implying that there is no development in his teachings. This is a statement to be proved and not a methodological device.
However, the author's presentation of his assumptions at the outset of the book allows for easier reading in the pages ahead, for the reader has the foundations of the work in mind. In addition, he supplies a list of al-Ghazali's works in chronological order along with other tables that help the reader to understand the material. Accurate translations of key passages demonstrate the various points of discussion, and the footnotes are a rich reference source not only for al-Ghazali's scholarship but also for corresponding ideas in Greek and Muslim philosophy as well as in Judaism and Christianity.
The introduction is followed by four chapters in which Treiger discusses the basic terms of mystical cognition: heart, intelligence, knowledge, unveiling, tasting and witnessing, and inspiration and revelation. The fifth chapter deals with al-Ghazali and the philosophical tradition.
I largely agree with the author's position on the influence that Ibn Sina exerted on al-Ghazali's perception of mystical cognition. However, on some points Treiger's approach is one-sided, and on others he could have added corroboration for his thesis from al-Ghazali's writings. First, to introduce al-Ghazali as a non-mutakallim is somewhat misleading, for al-Ghazali cannot be classified by any one criterion, neither as a theologian in the broad sense of the term nor as a Sufi; al-Ghazali was well versed in the principal sciences of Islam, and he interwove all of these disciplines into his writings. His main work, Ihyaʾ ʿUlum al-Din (The Revivification of the Sciences of Religion) constitutes an amalgamation of all Islamic branches of learning. For example, prior to al-Ghazali no one wrote as extensively on the secrets of the principal precepts of Islam (arkān al-islām) as he did. Moreover, al-Ghazali's attitude toward the mutakallimun is ambiguous, in contradiction to Treiger's statement (p. 95) that al-Ghazali always speaks of them with disdain. (See Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in al-Ghazzali, Jerusalem 1975, pp. 385–88.)
Second, Treiger does not refer to the important role of syllogism in al-Ghazali's thought. He even claims that syllogism plays no role in witnessing (mushāhada, p. 63) and that al-Ghazali dispenses with syllogism (p. 77, and see pp. 94ff and p. 156, n. 2). In Kitab al-Tafakkur, Ihyaʾ, vol. IV (The Book of Syllogistic Thinking), al-Ghazali states that all depends on syllogistic reasoning. For him “the highest aim of tafakkur is to build the innermost part of the mystic (ʿimārat al-bāṭin) so that he will be worthy of coming close to God and even to the point of being annihilated in Him” (fanāʾ). Al-Ghazali says in this book that such reasoning derives from a divine light illuminating the heart of the mystic (in the case of prophets and saints) or more usually as a result of the mystic's study.
In Kitab al-Imlaʾ fi Ishkalat al-Ihyaʾ (The Book of Dictation Regarding the Difficulties in the Ihyaʾ), which was written as a response to criticism raised against the Ihyaʾ, he states, “as for the traveling and the way, we mean by them the traveling of the heart through the device of discursive reasoning (ālat al-fikr) in the way of the intelligibles” (fī ṭarīq al-maʿqūlāt). (See Ihyaʾ, al-Maktaba al-Tijariyya al-Kubra, Cairo: n.d., 5:15, l and 3 lines from the bottom.) Thus, al-Ghazali creates a direct connection between the Sufi way and syllogism. This assertion, of course, supports Treiger's thesis and regards al-Ghazali's approach as closer to that of Ibn Sina. (For an extensive analysis of al-Ghazali's view of syllogism, see my forthcoming “Al-Ghazali and the Rationalization of Sufism,” in the proceedings of Islam and Rationality: The Impact of al-Ghazālī, International and Interdisciplinary Conference at Ohio State University, 10–12 November 2011, organized by Professor Georges Tamer.)
Although Treiger is correct in maintaining that the unity of al-Ghazali's teachings is preserved throughout his career, sometimes signs of development in his thought are noticeable, as Treiger himself observes in his discussion of the term dhawq (tasting) (p. 55). As noted, the translations of the texts are accurate and clear. However, the translation of tanbīḥ al-nafs al-kullī [sic] li-l-nafs al-juzʾ [sic] al-insānī as “the Universal Soul's intimation to a particular human soul” (p. 66) does not convey the exact meaning. Nabbaha means “to stir up, to call one's attention,” and the li in li-l-nafs is al-lām li-taqwiyat al-ʿāmil, which strengthens the verbal power of the infinitive of nabbaha. Hence, a more precise translation would be: “in inspiration the Universal Soul stimulates the particular soul so that the latter can attain knowledge.” Khayālāt are not “erroneous ideas” (p. 67) of the one who expects God's revelation but “false imaginations.”
The methodological question of whether one can incorporate treatises attributed to al-Ghazali but suspected as unauthentic into the discussion of al-Ghazali's doctrines is not resolved here; however, Treiger does deal with such works in a qualified and prudent manner. In a discussion of authenticity, the criteria of language, syntax, and style ought to be considered when attempting to determine true provenance, and one should not be satisfied, as Treiger is, with the criterion of content alone (p. 147, n. 52).
The index of the book is not always reliable, and in a cursory examination of it I detected some lacunas in regard to Binyamin Abrahamov, Hermann Landolt, Michael Marmura, Herbert Davidson, and Frank Griffel. Ayman Shihadeh (p. 150, n. 12) is absent.
The observations presented here do not diminish my appreciation for the quality of the scholarship Treiger has achieved in this volume. This is a very instructive treatise accompanied by many instances of evidence and translated passages. To be sure, this contribution to the literature does not end the debate on al-Ghazali, who introduced a great variety of sometimes contradictory views, but it qualifies as a very sophisticated and valuable discussion of al-Ghazali's teachings. No doubt students of Islamic theology and philosophy in general and those who are interested in al-Ghazali's thought in particular will greatly profit from this volume.
