For years, the Sino-Russian relationship has been seen as a puzzle, if not a problem, for area specialists as well as general theorists of international relations. During the first thirty years of bilateral relations (1949–79), the two communist giants switched from allies to adversaries. Now their domestic political systems are completely different. Moscow and Beijing, nonetheless, have steadily elevated their ties into a strategic partnership. How do the two largest powers on the Eurasian continent manage to overcome their ideological differences? What are the main factors behind the current normalcy in their interactions? Will the current state of reciprocity sustain itself given the steady rise of China and significant recovery of Russia? What are the implications of all of this for the West and, particularly, the United States?
The editor and contributors of this much needed volume made a rather compelling argument that “China-Russian relations should be viewed for what they are: a pragmatic relationship that is based on shared common interests, but is not without its fault lines…” (p. 8). In this regard, they do not think the publicly articulated Sino-Russian strategic partnership relationship is a useful depiction because it tends to magnify the partnership's strengths. The goal of the book is to reevaluate the strengths/similarities and weaknesses/differences in the Sino-Russian strategic partnership.
For this reviewer, this is a rather pragmatic assessment of a pragmatic relationship. Or, to borrow from Bismarck's timeless remarks about Russian power: the Sino-Russian relationship is perhaps not as strong or as weak as it appears.
The volume is divided into five sections: assessing the overall relationship (Gibert Rozman, Andrew Kuchins, and Elizabeth Wishnick), economic relations (Richard Lotspeich and Erica Downs), defense relations (Kevin Ryan and Jing-Dong Yuan), regional issues (Central Asia by Charles Ziegler and Northeast Asia by Leszek Buzynski), and Taiwan (Jeanne Wilson and Shelley Rigger). For area study students and professionals, each of these chapters stands by itself with fresh data and penetrating analyses on topics ranging from arms deals to petro-politik to economic integration or lack thereof. The authors also provide separate analyses of Chinese and Russian views concerning the overall relationship, economics, and defense of Taiwan. Together, those chapters present a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the interactive dynamics between Moscow and Beijing.
The book also provides a testing case for general theories of international relations: how and why do states go to war or make peace or do anything in between? Authors in this volume document plenty of differences that would lead the two down the path of animosity again: rising vs. declining power; communism vs. democracy; Confucianism vs. Christianity; a non-western nation deeply integrated into the global economic system still dominated by the West vs. a western nation remaining in a league of its own raw-material based economy; not to mention the element of race (Caucasian vs. Yellow) as a deep-seated source of mutual suspicion, particularly on the Russian side. How does one explain the long span of this stable, if not strategic, relationship?
While realists point to an almost ubiquitous “American factor” acting as a powerful external constraint for the political elites of both countries, those who hold to a liberal view of the international order would find evidence of a steady process of institution building and reciprocity between the two sides. The numerous committees and subcommittees at all levels of government may not work efficiently. They have not been able to overcome those mutually held suspicions, misperceptions, and even animosity accumulated over the centuries. Those institutions nonetheless serve as interfaces for both sides to meet and to dialogue with their counterparts on regular basis. For constructivists, this long stability in Sino-Russian relations is a sign of the norms and rules being developed in inter-state relations. After a long historical learning curve, Moscow and Beijing may have finally moved away from the love-hate oscillation and towards more pragmatic expectations and complex reciprocity. Such an interactive mode—which is routine and even boring compared with the more dramatic and exciting cold war geopolitical realignment—requires, nonetheless, delicate management. For Moscow and Beijing, the alternative is perhaps unthinkable.
Given these useful features of the volume, there are a few misses. The title sounds more about forecasting even though the bulk of the volume is descriptive and analytical regarding what has happened. There is also an apparent typo, or conceptual confusion, on page 8 where the editor dismisses the usefulness of the publicly articulated Sino-Russian strategic partnership relationship, “as it gives rise to the temptation to magnify the partnership's strength or overstate the differences (emphasis added) between the two countries.” Logically, to this reviewer, effort to magnify, or exaggerate, the strength of something should be accompanied by a similar effort to minimize, or understate, its weakness and problems, not vice versa.
