It is hard to get Adam Smith right. There is still a perception of him, despite much recent scholarship to the contrary, as the founder of a laissez-faire capitalism that feeds on the lower passions of unbridled self-interest and Ayn Rand-like individualism. What we can safely say is that Smith promoted a competitive market economy (not capitalism as we understand it today), the division of labor (which he predicted would result in greater prosperity), the pursuit of self-interest (rightly understood), limited (not weak) government, and the rule of law. He differs from modern economists in his firm belief that the market was necessarily part of a larger moral order.
Smith was, moreover, a harsh critic of his own philosophy, what he called the system of natural liberty. This is clearly established by Rasmussen's careful and well-reasoned comparison between Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Smith read Rousseau's devastating criticisms of commercial society and agreed with many of them. According to Rasmussen, both acknowledged “that commercial society necessarily produces great inequalities; that an extensive division of labor can exact an immense cost in human dignity by rendering people feeble and ignorant; that an emphasis on wealth and material goods can encourage moral corruption; and that the desire for wealth often leads people to submit to endless toil and anxiety in the pursuit of frivolous material goods” (7). Thus the question arises, why did Smith promote a commercial society that had so many shortcomings?
The answer to this question is twofold. First, Smith and Rousseau start from different operating premises. Rousseau compares present society with an Edenic state of nature against which it appears paltry, indeed. Given the way he sets up the problem, Rousseau can outdo even Augustine and Freud in his analysis of the discontents of civilization. Smith, on the other hand, compares commercial society with the kinds of society that preceded it. On this historical basis, he judges it superior in significant ways. It indisputably created more wealth, and while inequalities were inevitable, they were fewer in commercial society. Against the charge that wealth corrupts, Smith argued to the contrary that the discipline of the marketplace generated its own kind of virtue—a prudent man given to decency, honesty, cooperative habits, promise keeping, self-control, and adherence to the rules of fair play. Finally, widespread public education could offset the debilitating effects of specialized labor and clarify the true nature of happiness.
The second part of the answer has to do with their different views of the relationship between society and morality. For Rousseau, we are not, by nature, social beings; society is the root of alienation and unhappiness. For Smith, we are profoundly social beings, and morality is based on sentiments shaped by sympathetic fellow feelings. When we place ourselves in the position of others, we naturally approve or disapprove of their actions, and we are similarly judged by others. This is not only not a bad thing but is the substance of morality. Smith optimistically thought this mechanism would lead us to act virtuously. Morality is generated by our social interactions. What we collectively approve tends to be good (i.e., praiseworthy); what we collectively disapprove is by contrast bad (i.e., blameworthy). This is no magic formula, but Smith believed it worked well enough to create “the harmony of society.” In this regard morality is formed much as markets are, by the actions and judgments of many actors.
Smith did not have a high regard for the merchant class. He thought they were “a constant conspiracy against the public,” always scheming to maximize their profits not only in collusion with each other but as often with government. Against this always present form of corruption, Smith recommended “wise laws.” Commercial society can only operate effectively as part of a network of interacting social institutions that include education, family, religion, the militia, and law. But an important part of this moral ecology is the institution of government itself. Rasmussen shrewdly observes that Smith's “central aim in promoting commerce is political more than economic—that is, his chief aspiration is liberty and security rather than wealth” (137). He supports this claim with a quotation from The Wealth of Nations: “Commerce and manufacturers gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals … by far the most important of their effects.”
That is why strong government is important for Smith—“limited but strong” government, although he did acknowledge that government would become larger and take on more responsibilities as society expanded. One of its principal duties, he writes in Wealth of Nations, is “protecting every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, the duty of establishing the exact administration of justice.” He did not know the economies of scale we know today, the large and impersonal corporation, the separation of management and ownership, and heavy dependency on the deceptions of advertising and lobbying. But we can infer clearly enough his response. The recent buccaneering practices of economic players in an unregulated market (think mortgage meltdown) would have appalled him. He would have seen this as a relapse into the kind of mercantilism he rejected. It is good to remind ourselves that today as in Smith's time government has a primary duty of “establishing the exact administration of justice.”
Rousseau, for his part, by no means gave up on the possibility of morality in society. He devised certain solutions which might enable us to “reconstruct some of the conditions or experiences of the state of nature in the civilized world” (41). He mentions three specifically: the proper kind of education, citizenship in a virtuous republic by means of the social contract, and a life of solitude and contemplation. Rousseau thinks these inadequate solutions and unlikely to work in the modern world. Rasmussen seems to agree. He calls them “ultimately impractical” and says few people take them “fully seriously and at face value today (for good reason)” (48). I am puzzled by this judgment. I think they are very good proposals, indeed, Rousseau's pessimism notwithstanding. As a matter of fact, they are very similar to Smith's own proposals for dealing with the shortcomings of commercial society, particularly with respect to education and political oversight.
Rasmussen concludes his study with the judgment that Smith's defense of commercial society is on balance “preferable to the historical alternatives” (170). He makes his case convincingly. At the same time, he reminds us that the benefits of commercial society are as yet limited to a few North Atlantic countries and extending these benefits is “an immensely important and difficult task” (171). Relief of poverty was one of Smith's major aims. Many economic ideologues today who invoke his name forget the Smith “who railed against poverty and the selfish greed of the rich and powerful and who constantly emphasized the need for a strong central government to enforce rules of fair play and state supported education to remedy the division of labor's potentially stultifying effects” (175).
Remembering that Smith would make us a healthier society.
