In 1989, an internal government memorandum observed that ‘the refugee issue in Poland has been present since 1984, steadily growing in scale’ and warned that the absence of appropriate procedures threatened the political and social interests of the state. The document called for the development of new mechanisms to manage what was now described as an ‘influx of refugees’.Footnote 1 Five years after officials had first identified refugee movements as an administrative problem, however, the state still lacked both an adequate legal framework and the institutional capacity to respond effectively. As transit migration expanded, the gap between existing institutions and the demands placed upon them became ever more apparent.Footnote 2 This article examines how the Polish administration responded to this issue during the second half of the 1980s and traces the improvised measures that preceded the more systematic reforms that were introduced during the transition of 1989–91.
Scholarship on Polish migration and asylum policy has focused predominantly on the post-1989 period. Existing research has examined the consolidation of refugee governance during the democratic transition, Poland’s incorporation into European migration regimes and, more recently, state responses to the migration crisis of 2015–16 and the crisis at the Polish–Belarusian border in 2021.Footnote 3 Within this body of literature, refugee policy has usually been interpreted as a product of post-communist state formation and European integration. At the same time, recent historical scholarship has questioned the assumption that Poland’s engagement with refugees began only after 1989. Lidia Zessin-Jurek argues that refugee studies have largely treated refugee reception as a post-Cold War phenomenon, leaving earlier historical experiences and administrative practices outside the analytical frame.Footnote 4 This reassessment parallels broader interpretations of Poland’s transformation, which view the transition as a process unfolding over several years rather than as a sharp rupture in 1989. As Michał Przeperski argues, the transformation is better understood as a process that began in the second half of the 1980s and continued into the early 1990s. Although his analysis does not address migration policy, it offers a useful framework for examining institutional change across the late socialist and early post-communist periods.Footnote 5 Building on these perspectives, the article argues that refugee governance in Poland took shape before 1989 and continued to develop during the democratic transition.
Studies addressing the socialist period have primarily conceptualised Poland as a country of emigration, with much less attention paid to its role as a country of immigration. As demonstrated by Dariusz Stola, around 1.5 million Polish citizens left the country during the final decade of communist rule, a pattern that has largely informed historical interpretations of mobility under late socialism.Footnote 6 By the mid-1980s, however, Poland also began to experience new forms of cross-border mobility that followed two parallel patterns. One such event was the East German migration crisis of 1989, when thousands gathered at the West German embassy in Warsaw, which has been widely examined in Cold War historiography.Footnote 7 Another new form of mobility involved migrants from the Global South who used Poland as a transit corridor to Western Europe. As Saskia Sassen argues, the late 1980s brought a rapid increase in asylum movements across Western Europe and a corresponding tightening of asylum and border policies.Footnote 8 In 1987, Jonathan Moore, director of the US Bureau for Refugee Programs, contrasted Western Europe’s willingness to accept Eastern Europeans with its preference for ‘regional’ solutions for non-Europeans, warning that this could become a ‘racial and xenophobic problem’.Footnote 9 Poland’s encounter with transit migration formed part of this European shift, even though its institutions were largely unprepared for the challenges it created. Previous studies by Marek Szonert, Oxana Shevel, Agnieszka Kosowicz, R. A. Stainsby and Cezary Milosiński have highlighted this phenomenon from different perspectives.Footnote 10
Building on this scholarship, the article offers a more detailed reconstruction of how Polish state institutions identified, interpreted and managed transit migration between 1984 and 1991. It also examines how international asylum dynamics influenced Polish responses before the country’s incorporation into European migration regimes. The analysis advances three main arguments. First, from the late 1940s to the 1970s, Poland had largely admitted refugees and political exiles in solidarity with communist and other left-wing movements. In the 1980s, its authorities faced a different situation: migrants whose arrival was not part of that policy, who did not intend to settle in Poland and who could not easily continue their journeys to Western Europe. Existing legal provisions, reception arrangements and state capacities proved inadequate, which left humanitarian organisations, government bodies and travel agencies to improvise solutions. Second, the transit crisis along the Polish–Swedish route between 1988 and 1990 intensified these challenges. Sweden’s decision to return migrants arriving through Polish territory and to treat Poland as a de facto ‘first country of asylum’ prompted stricter visa controls, closer cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and new forms of inter-ministerial coordination. In doing so, it accelerated the transition from ad hoc measures to more structured forms of refugee governance. Third, the institutions established after 1989 cannot be understood without taking into account the experience of the late socialist period. Although the improvised measures of the 1980s did not amount to a coherent refugee policy, they shaped the debates, administrative practices and institutional legacies that were inherited by the governments of the early 1990s. Accordingly, institutionalisation is understood here not as the existence of a fully developed refugee regime before 1989, but as the emergence of administrative practices, coordination mechanisms and policy proposals that were later formalised during the democratic transition. More broadly, the Polish case supports Guiraudon and Joppke’s observation that migration policies and migration patterns shape one another. Attempts to regulate transit migration redirected movement, altered migrants’ legal position and encouraged greater reliance on commercial intermediaries, forged documents and smuggling networks.Footnote 11
This article draws primarily on archival materials from the Archive of the Institute of National Remembrance, including internal memoranda, inter-ministerial correspondence, reports of the Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs (MFA) and security service records. These are supplemented by records from the Polish Archive of Modern Records and the US National Archives and Records Administration. Together, these sources reveal how Polish authorities understood, debated and addressed the emergence of transit migration. Because the article examines the emergence of refugee governance, it analyses these records as evidence of institutional responses to cross-border mobility. The analysis begins in 1984 because this is when the archival record first identifies refugee movements as a recurring problem to be discussed across multiple institutions. Although earlier cases of political asylum had occurred, it is only from 1984 onward that the records document sustained official attention to transit migration and the challenges it created. The term ‘transit migration’ is used here as an analytical shorthand for movements involving foreigners who entered Poland legally or irregularly but were unable to continue their journeys to destinations in Western Europe. It does not imply that all migrants shared the same motivations or that Poland was simply a temporary stop on a predetermined route. Instead, the term reflects how Polish authorities understood and managed these new patterns of mobility.Footnote 12 Following Khalid Koser, migrants’ legal status is understood as dynamic, not fixed. Many of the individuals discussed here entered Poland legally but became irregular when their onward journeys were interrupted, their visas expired or their documents were destroyed. Others applied for asylum after they were no longer able to continue their journeys.Footnote 13
At the same time, the archival documents are read not as a transparent record of migration, but rather as administrative texts that show how the state interpreted, categorised and governed cross-border mobility. Terms such as ‘refugee’, ‘migrant’ and ‘illegal migration’ are therefore understood as categories used by contemporary officials and are not treated as analytical classifications.Footnote 14 Unless otherwise indicated, they are used in the sense in which they appear in the archival record. The documents also demonstrate that state institutions lacked a consistent vocabulary for describing either these movements or the people involved. Different agencies referred variously to refugees, migrants, ‘foreigners from capitalist countries’ or even ‘groups of refugees of black nationality’, reflecting both the political language of the period and uncertainty about how to classify new forms of international mobility.Footnote 15 Although many migrants were officially designated as ‘refugees’, this label often reflected administrative practice and did not constitute a formal determination of refugee status under international law.Footnote 16 Claims about Swedish policy are based exclusively on Polish diplomatic reports and institutional correspondence and are therefore limited by the perspective of the Polish administration. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on how Polish authorities understood, interpreted and responded to Swedish policies, not on how those policies were formulated in Sweden.
The article is divided into three parts. The first section examines how Polish authorities first identified transit migration as an administrative concern and why the existing legal and institutional framework proved incapable of addressing it. The second part analyses the improvised responses that were developed between 1984 and 1988, focusing on the role of government agencies, the Polish Red Cross (Polski Czerwony Krzyż, PCK), the Catholic Church and the UNHCR in managing migrants stranded in Poland. The third section examines the rapid expansion of transit migration along the Polish–Swedish corridor in 1989–90, the role of travel agencies and smuggling networks and how Swedish returns accelerated the transition from ad hoc responses to more systematic forms of refugee governance.
The Recognition of Transit Migration
Poland did not accede to the 1951 Geneva Convention or its 1967 Protocol, a position shaped by its place within the Soviet bloc and by scepticism towards what the authorities regarded as Western-dominated approaches to refugee protection.Footnote 17 The Office of the UNHCR was viewed with similar suspicion.Footnote 18 Without participating in the international refugee regime, the Polish People’s Republic never developed a comprehensive asylum system. Instead, it relied on the constitutional provision on political asylum, codified in Article 75 of the 1952 Constitution, which authorised protection for individuals persecuted for activities consistent with socialist internationalism and national liberation. In practice, asylum was granted selectively and in line with the Polish government’s foreign policy priorities. Between 1946 and 1949, over 14,000 Greek and Macedonian refugees were admitted to Poland during the Greek Civil War. They were followed by much smaller groups, including communist activists from the United States, Yugoslavia and Italy, more than 100 Spanish communists, several dozen Iranian and Indonesian leftists during the 1950s and 1960s and more than 100 Chilean refugees after the 1973 coup.Footnote 19
The Chileans were the last sizeable group admitted as political refugees. The rise of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union ‘Solidarity’ (Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy ‘Solidarność’) in 1980 and the declaration of martial law in December 1981 sharply reduced cross-border movement to and from Poland. Domestic instability and worsening economic conditions also gave the government grounds to refuse political asylum, as illustrated by its decision not to admit members of Iran’s Tudeh Party in the early 1980s despite their ideological affinity with the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza).Footnote 20 After martial law was lifted in July 1983, restrictions on cross-border travel were also eased. At the same time, growing foreign debt increased the state’s need for hard currency. Therefore, Polish consulates became more willing to issue tourist visas, anticipating that visitors would not only spend money in Poland but also exchange foreign currency at the official state rate.Footnote 21 International travel thus became not only a political issue, but also a source of much-needed revenue. So long as visitors complied with entry regulations, officials paid little attention to either the purpose of their stay or their onward travel. Some travellers, however, used these more permissive travel arrangements to reach Western Europe through Poland. This pattern first came to the attention of the Polish administration in 1984, when the Swedish government informed Warsaw of a growing number of asylum seekers travelling through Poland to Sweden and requested Polish cooperation to address the problem.
On 26 September 1984, the Polish ambassador to Sweden, Maria Regent-Lachowicz, was summoned to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where officials requested that the captains of Polish ferries operating on the Gdańsk–Nynäshamn route hold the passports and identity documents of ‘people from the Middle East’ until their arrival in Sweden, arguing that this would prevent them from destroying their documents during the crossing. Regent-Lachowicz reported to Warsaw that the Swedish authorities had observed a growing number of Palestinian, Lebanese and Pakistani nationals using Polish ferries to enter Sweden.Footnote 22 Four days later, Tanar Lindström, head of the Immigration Police in Ystad, summoned a representative of Polish Baltic Shipping (Polska Żegluga Bałtycka) and informed him that the Swedish government had decided to return Lebanese and Palestinian nationals whose asylum applications had been rejected by sending them back on the same ferries on which they had arrived.Footnote 23 Shortly afterwards, Sweden returned around 100 people to Poland. Many lacked both the financial means to remain in Poland and the option to return to their countries of origin. As the MFA warned in an urgent memorandum of 5 October 1984, ‘Due to their situation and the resulting desperation, they pose a serious threat.’Footnote 24 This memorandum marks an important shift in how Polish officials understood refugee movements because it both records the first returns from Sweden and shows that humanitarian vulnerability was already being interpreted as both an administrative and a security problem. Concern was not focused on migrants’ national or ethnic origins but on their uncertain legal status, lack of resources and the state’s limited capacity to deal with their presence. The arrival of forty Palestinian refugees in October 1984 soon exposed another problem, as Poland had no procedures for people who neither qualified for political asylum under the existing system nor intended to settle in the country.Footnote 25
During 1985 and 1986, the Polish authorities became aware of a growing number of foreigners who entered Poland legally but were unable either to continue their journeys to Western Europe or to return to their countries of origin. Each case exposed the same problem: these travellers operated outside the scope of established asylum mechanisms, yet they could not simply be left without assistance. In December 1985, a group of twenty-three Sri Lankan nationals arrived in Poland hoping to continue their journey to Western Europe. With no established arrangements for stranded transit migrants, the Catholic Church provided temporary accommodation in a Caritas care home, where the group remained for more than six months. The Church also looked abroad for assistance. A US embassy cable records that an official of the Polish Episcopate approached the embassy as part of efforts to find a Western country willing to accept the group as refugees. The embassy replied that the United States had no programme for Tamils and could offer no assistance.Footnote 26 One month later, a second group of thirty-two Sri Lankans entered Poland as part of a tour organised by the state travel agency Orbis. Unable to travel onward because they lacked visas for other European countries, they stayed in accommodation provided by the PCK for almost three months. Other cases soon followed. In November 1986, a group of Ghanaians became stranded at Warsaw’s Okęcie Airport after being refused entry to their intended destinations. Later that month, eleven Lebanese nationals, including six adults and five children, spent several days in a railway station after being left without accommodation before receiving assistance from the PCK. Although they held valid Hungarian visas, they lacked the financial means to continue their journey. To resolve this, Polish authorities purchased their tickets to Budapest, enabling them to leave the country.Footnote 27
By 1987, these incidents no longer seemed isolated. Instead, they revealed a recurring pattern of movement for which institutions had neither anticipated nor found an effective response. Poland was not alone in facing this problem. In August 1985, for example, East German diplomats informed their Polish counterparts that they too had encountered a growing number of what they described as ‘tourists from Middle Eastern countries’ travelling through East Germany to Denmark and Sweden using invalid or falsified documents. According to the report, these movements were creating ‘domestic complications’ and generating tensions with the Danish and Swedish governments.Footnote 28 The Danish connection also became visible in Warsaw. In May 1987, several Lebanese nationals occupied the Danish Embassy and began a hunger strike after failing to obtain visas. Polish security forces forcibly removed them from the premises.Footnote 29 By late 1987, the Danish Embassy in Warsaw reported a noticeable increase in asylum applications submitted by newly arrived foreigners, further indicating that Poland had become part of a transit corridor linking Eastern Europe with Nordic countries.Footnote 30 What had begun as a series of isolated incidents had become an administrative challenge. The following section examines how Polish authorities responded to this new phenomenon in the absence of a refugee system.
Managing Transit Migration without a Refugee System
The recognition of the issue of transit migration confronted Polish authorities with a problem their institutions were not designed to handle. Under the 1963 Act on Foreigners, the Minister of Internal Affairs decided asylum applications in agreement with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 31 Earlier admissions had largely concerned communist and other left-wing political exiles seeking refuge in Poland. Many of the new arrivals instead intended to travel onward but could not do so, and the law established no clear arrangements for their accommodation and support. Because no government agency had clear responsibility for these cases, humanitarian assistance initially came mainly from PCK and, in some instances, the Catholic Church. After the Second World War, the communist authorities progressively brought the PCK under their control. In 1951, figures close to the regime replaced its earlier leadership and the organisation became a mass association supported by the state budget. The 1964 law formalised government oversight and set out its roles in health education, social assistance and humanitarian relief.Footnote 32 As Maren Hachmeister argues, the PCK practised a form of ‘socialist humanitarianism’ – it worked under state supervision while retaining room for humanitarian action and cooperation with the international Red Cross movement.Footnote 33 The PCK had also assisted Greek and Macedonian refugees, including through family reunification efforts.Footnote 34 Its involvement in the late 1980s thus built on earlier refugee relief work, although it had no formal responsibility for deciding asylum claims. Government agencies only gradually put improvised solutions in place.
The arrival of a group of Palestinian refugees in October 1984 put this approach to the test. The PCK assumed responsibility for their care, initially housing them in the conference hall of its headquarters before transferring them to one of its training and recreation facilities. An emergency measure soon evolved into the standard response. Conference facilities, holiday homes and other forms of accommodation were used to shelter refugees while officials negotiated their transfer to third countries. In this respect, the arrangement resembled the accommodation provided to Chilean exiles in 1974, who had first been housed in guesthouses and holiday homes before settling permanently in Poland. The Palestinian group, however, was never intended to settle in Poland. The accommodation was meant to bridge the period until resettlement elsewhere, but despite diplomatic efforts, only some members of the group were admitted by third countries, while the others returned to Beirut.Footnote 35
This approach was soon repeated in other cases, although responsibility for the refugees fell to different organisations. In December 1985, for example, twenty-three Sri Lankan nationals were housed by the Catholic Church in a Caritas care home. One month later, the PCK took responsibility for a second group of thirty-two Sri Lankan nationals who had entered Poland on an Orbis tour but were unable to continue their journey to Western Europe. They were accommodated at a holiday resort in Jachranka, where they remained for almost three months.Footnote 36 The repeated involvement of the PCK and Caritas suggests that temporary accommodation had become a substitute for a formal reception system. By early 1986, government agencies accepted that these improvised arrangements were no longer sufficient. In January, the MFA concluded that the rising number of stranded migrants called for a dedicated reception centre that would centralise accommodation and improve coordination among the institutions involved. Although the proposal acknowledged the weaknesses of the arrangements already in place, no such facility was created.Footnote 37
Transit migration was also attracting international attention. During discussions over the Sri Lankan cases, the UNHCR representative, Klaus Feldmann, visited Warsaw to discuss possible solutions with Polish officials. His visit reflected a common understanding in both the Polish administration and the UNHCR that ad hoc measures could no longer accommodate the growing number of stranded migrants. The negotiations allowed some of the Sri Lankan group to continue their journey to Western Europe, while the Polish authorities expected the UNHCR to cover the costs of accommodation and onward travel.Footnote 38
Legal and administrative obstacles nevertheless remained unresolved. Their consequences became particularly clear in February 1987, when thirty-seven Iranian refugees, including eight children, reached Warsaw. Having entered Poland through the travel agency Orbis under the guise of tourism, they had fled repression under Khomeini’s regime. The PCK recorded severe psychological distress, including threats of collective suicide, and placed them in temporary accommodation in Warsaw.Footnote 39 Although some were eventually resettled in Scandinavia, others remained in legal limbo at the Zalesie Holiday Centre near Warsaw. By June 1988, after more than a year of uncertainty and deteriorating living conditions, five refugees occupied the headquarters of the PCK in protest. During a meeting attended by representatives of the PCK, the MFA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they described their prolonged confinement as ‘living like animals, only sleeping and eating’. Officials attributed the deadlock to financial limitations, unsuccessful requests for assistance from the UNHCR and the absence of a legal framework for recognising political refugees. No lasting solution emerged and the protesters returned to Zalesie, highlighting the limits of Poland’s improvised reception system.Footnote 40
Other archival records describe similar incidents in which migrants facing deportation threatened self-harm to prevent their deportation to their countries of origin. These actions reflected not only profound desperation but also a genuine fear of imprisonment, torture or other forms of physical violence in countries such as Iran and Iraq. On 10 November 1987, for example, two Kurdish families comprising ten people arrived in Warsaw from Budapest without valid Polish entry visas and carrying forged Swedish documents. After being informed that they would be returned to Baghdad, they threatened to harm themselves and their children with knives, prompting border guards to halt the deportation. The incident drew in multiple actors, including the Iranian ambassador, representatives of the UNHCR and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. After diplomatic negotiations, the Swedish government agreed to admit the families, who departed for Stockholm on 23 November 1987.Footnote 41
Between 1984 and 1988, the PCK assisted around 320 refugees, which underscores the extent to which humanitarian organisations compensated for the absence of a state reception system.Footnote 42 By early 1988, the PCK was supporting fifty-seven foreign nationals, most of whom were housed at the Wisła Holiday Centre in Zalesie Górne, while a further nine stayed at a similar facility in Białobrzegi. Originally built as seasonal holiday resorts, these facilities consisted largely of simple camping cabins and offered only basic living conditions. They were poorly suited to refugees arriving in poor physical condition or requiring medical care, especially during the winter months, when many remained there for extended periods, sometimes almost a year. Accommodation was only one of the difficulties. Officials also reported a rising number of migrants carrying forged visas, particularly Swedish ones, as well as passports that had been deliberately destroyed or declared lost after arrival. Without valid identity documents, deportation became more difficult and migrants remained in Poland for longer periods. At the same time, obtaining replacement travel documents from foreign consulates was often impossible or undesirable because return could expose people to repression in their countries of origin. Together, these problems show how humanitarian concerns, legal constraints and day-to-day administrative practice overlapped, exposing the limits of the temporary measures on which the Polish authorities depended.Footnote 43
These recurring problems forced the state administration to reconsider its approach. As the number of stranded migrants increased, officials faced situations that the legal framework could not adequately address. Many holders of short-term visas remained in Poland after their permits had expired, while others failed to comply with foreign-currency exchange requirements. Orders requiring them to leave the country often proved impossible to enforce, which exposed the limited legal and institutional tools available to the authorities. In February 1987, the Passport Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposed a series of measures, including tighter controls over the issue of transit and short-term visas to nationals of selected countries and closer scrutiny of visa applications that had been submitted abroad. It also recommended creating a dedicated reception centre to centralise responsibility for accommodating migrants, improve coordination among state institutions and facilitate onward resettlement or return. The proposal echoed earlier discussions within the MFA, which suggests that the idea of a dedicated reception centre had steadily won support within the administration.Footnote 44
These debates marked the first attempt to define institutional responsibility for refugee protection. Central to them was the idea of creating a reception centre, but they also addressed the respective roles of government agencies and humanitarian organisations. The PCK played a leading role by drafting the ‘Rules of Procedure for Foreign Nationals in Poland Seeking Assistance from Polish Institutions’, a document intended to clarify institutional responsibilities and the financing of assistance.Footnote 45 The exchanges also exposed important differences within the administration. The Ministry of Internal Affairs initially argued that the 1963 Act on Foreigners provided a sufficient legal basis and opposed separate refugee legislation.Footnote 46 As the number and complexity of cases increased, however, this position shifted. Officials accepted that the legal framework no longer matched the practical problems created by transit migration and began considering new solutions. Among the Ministry’s proposals was extending the maximum period during which ‘problematic’ foreigners could be detained beyond the 48-hour limit in order to arrange transport, obtain travel documents and provide escorts where necessary.Footnote 47 These debates show that reform developed incrementally through practical experience, not through a single legislative initiative.
As the debate continued, Polish officials also looked to institutional models developed in other European countries. One example came from Spain, where the Madrid Centre for the Detention of Foreigners opened in November 1988. Designed to accommodate up to 120 undocumented migrants or people awaiting removal, the facility permitted detention for up to 40 days before transfer to prison or release.Footnote 48 Polish officials viewed the Spanish centre as a more structured response to irregular migration. They also recognised, however, that creating a comparable institution would require financial resources unavailable to a state in deep economic crisis.
By early 1989, the improvised solutions introduced over the previous four years were no longer sustainable. In February, the PCK submitted an urgent memorandum to the MFA warning that the system had become financially and organisationally untenable. Without a dedicated reception centre, the PCK continued to rely on rented hotels, guesthouses and holiday homes while covering a substantial share of the costs from its own budget. Under its 1985 statute, the PCK’s funds could come from membership dues, state subsidies and resources allocated for assigned tasks, as well as income from property and economic activity, donations and public collections.Footnote 49 Reimbursements from the UNHCR remained irregular and diverting resources from the organisation’s other humanitarian work became a concern within the PCK itself. The memorandum also described mounting administrative and social problems. Conflicts in accommodation centres, tensions with local communities and the lack of recognised refugee status for many migrants made providing long-term accommodation more and more difficult. Despite the departure of many migrants, the situation of those who remained in Poland had still not been resolved. The PCK therefore renewed its call for a dedicated refugee facility and a stable mechanism to reimburse the costs of assistance.Footnote 50
The memorandum was forwarded by the MFA to Aleksander Kwaśniewski, then Minister and Chairman of the Socio-Political Committee of the Council of Ministers, who urged the Minister of Internal Affairs, Czesław Kiszczak, to prepare a comprehensive response to the refugee question.Footnote 51 By then, the need for reform was widely accepted within the state administration. The timing, however, was unfavourable. The appeal coincided with the conclusion of the Round Table negotiations and the political transformation of 1989, which shifted the government’s attention to domestic reforms and preparations for the partially free elections. As a consequence, proposals that had first been advanced in 1986 were largely shelved. As Oxana Shevel has observed, refugee policy in Poland rarely became a political priority. Instead, responsibility remained largely in the hands of the executive administration, where officials played a decisive role in shaping both the direction and the pace of reform.Footnote 52
Transit Networks and the Institutionalisation of Refugee Governance
By 1988, transit migration through Poland had become more organised. Sweden was the principal destination, whereas Poland served as a transit country for migrants travelling from the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Many entered Poland on tourist visas obtained through travel packages offered by the state-owned Polish Airlines LOT or other travel agencies before continuing to Świnoujście, where they boarded ferries to Sweden and applied for asylum. This route expanded as a result of increasing migration flows, gaps in Polish regulations, the commercial activities of state-owned enterprises and the emergence of organised smuggling networks.Footnote 53 It also coincided with the political and institutional transformation of the late communist period, when the state’s capacity to monitor and regulate cross-border mobility was weakening and when market reforms introduced in December 1988 allowed private individuals to establish businesses, including travel agencies.
The scale of this movement became evident during the second half of 1988. In response to the growing number of people arriving from Poland to seek asylum, the Swedish authorities introduced stricter passport controls at the port of Ystad. Whereas almost all applicants had been granted protection until the mid-1980s, Sweden was now facing a sharp increase in asylum applications, with around 25,000 cases awaiting a decision. The annual number of asylum applications reached nearly 20,000 in 1988 and exceeded 30,000 the following year.Footnote 54 During October and November 1988 alone, around 200 people – primarily Kurds from Iran, Iraq and Turkey – arrived on ferries from Poland and immediately sought asylum. Another concern was the growing number of migrants travelling without valid identity documents. Polish officials reported that passports were often destroyed during the crossing, while their Swedish counterparts suspected the widespread use of forged Swedish visas. Reports also indicated that counterfeit visas were being sold in Warsaw hotels and even at Okęcie Airport, reinforcing concerns that smuggling networks were facilitating transit through Poland.Footnote 55
Swedish media closely followed these developments, often linking the rise in asylum applications to smuggling rings operating between Poland and Sweden. Newspaper reports described the open sale of forged visas in Warsaw hotels and other public places, sometimes allegedly in the presence of border authorities.Footnote 56 One Swedish police officer reportedly remarked that Polish officers were ‘either blind or corrupt’, which captures the frustration of Swedish officials with what they considered to be ineffective border controls.Footnote 57 Polish diplomatic correspondence also reported that Swedish authorities regarded many of those arriving from Poland as economic migrants, arguing that they were exploiting the Swedish asylum system and did not qualify for refugee protection.Footnote 58 The issue also featured prominently in bilateral contacts. During consultations between the Polish Embassy in Stockholm and Swedish law enforcement authorities, Swedish representatives argued that organised smuggling networks were facilitating irregular migration under the guise of tourism. They maintained that these networks operated across several countries and remained difficult to dismantle despite closer cooperation between the two states.Footnote 59
Polish archival records demonstrate that officials were also tracking the growing role of intermediaries involved in document fraud and irregular migration. Reports prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that migrants arriving in Warsaw could purchase forged Swedish visas, often for around $100, before travelling by train to Świnoujście and boarding ferries to Sweden. Some reports traced the production of counterfeit visas to locations outside Poland, including Lebanon and Hungary, which underlines the transnational nature of these networks.Footnote 60 The route exploited weaknesses in visa controls and identity verification on both sides of the Baltic and made transit migration even harder to control. The same records indicate that the security services had detailed knowledge of how these smuggling networks operated. They identified intermediaries, methods of document forgery and the main transit routes. Yet this intelligence rarely translated into effective enforcement. Ongoing institutional reforms, limited experience in investigating transnational migration and the need to cooperate with foreign partners restricted the capacity of law-enforcement agencies. The records also document corruption within the Citizens’ Militia (Milicja Obywatelska, MO), Poland’s police force during the socialist period. Several reports describe officers accepting bribes in exchange for ignoring visa irregularities or failures to register foreigners, in some cases for as little as $10. Such practices further weakened efforts to control transit migration.Footnote 61
The authorities did occasionally act against individual facilitators. One example was Husain Fahd, a Palestinian from Beirut, who was arrested in November 1989 at Warsaw’s Forum Hotel. Fahd was suspected of acting as an intermediary in the smuggling ring. At the time of his arrest, officers found a forged Danish travel document, several counterfeit Swedish visa forms and a substantial amount of foreign currency, indicating his central role in the operation. In January 1990, the Polish authorities deported Fahd to Denmark and barred him from re-entering Poland for two years.Footnote 62 By mid-1990, however, police reports still described a thriving market for forged passports in Świnoujście, where hundreds of migrants gathered in the hope of boarding ferries to Sweden or Denmark.Footnote 63 Individual arrests therefore had little effect on the wider infrastructure that supported transit migration.
While individual intermediaries distributed forged visas, the transit corridor also depended on a network of travel agencies operating inside and outside Poland. Some were officially registered and organised travel that formally complied with Polish entry regulations while facilitating onward movement to Scandinavia. One example was Al-Rafideh Travel Services in Warsaw, which was run by Albert Mansour. On 28 October 1989, the agency arranged the arrival of fifty-two Lebanese nationals on a LOT flight from Larnaca. Although they did not have Polish residence or transit visas, Mansour assured border officials that they would remain in Poland for no more than 24 hours before continuing their journey. The following day, they boarded a ferry to Sweden. The Ministry of Internal Affairs subsequently questioned the authenticity of their Swedish visas and concluded that the journey formed part of a larger smuggling operation.Footnote 64
State-owned enterprises likewise became part of this migration infrastructure, although not intentionally. Most migrants entered Poland on tourist packages sold by Polish Airlines LOT through its travel agency, Air Tours, which had agreements with several foreign travel agencies, including Middle East Tourism in Damascus. These arrangements allowed travellers to obtain tourist rather than the more restrictive transit visas, enabling them to remain in Poland while attempting to continue to Sweden.Footnote 65 Under one agreement, the Syrian agency deposited $15,000 as security to cover the costs of migrants who failed to leave Poland as planned. The archival record shows, however, that these guarantees rarely covered the financial burden created when onward travel failed.Footnote 66
Similar travel packages were marketed in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to a Swedish police mission investigating asylum seekers arriving from Dubai, excursions to Poland were sold for $350.Footnote 67 Swedish authorities reported that most participants never returned to the UAE, indicating that the trips had been planned from the outset as a route to Sweden. After arriving in Warsaw, many purchased ferry tickets and continued to Sweden, where they sought asylum. Polish and Swedish officials also identified a common practice involving travel documents. Before reaching Sweden, some migrants removed the page containing their UAE residence permit from their passports, which made return to Dubai difficult as re-entry without a valid residence visa was almost impossible. Destroying immigration documents likewise complicated efforts to establish migrants’ legal status and often prolonged their stay in Poland when onward travel failed.Footnote 68 The full extent of these travel arrangements is difficult to determine. Polish diplomatic reports nevertheless show that Swedish authorities suspected that LOT and associated travel agencies profited from the sale of tourist packages that facilitated transit migration. Reliance on commercial air routes and intermediary networks also made the route more vulnerable to disruption. As Western European states tightened border controls, migrants were stranded in Poland, turning what had functioned as a transit corridor into a diplomatic and administrative challenge for the Polish authorities.Footnote 69
Transit migration became more geographically diverse during 1989. Refugees reached Poland through a growing number of routes before attempting to continue to Western Europe, often using LOT connections. One example involved two Iranian nationals, Barzegar Abbas and Khajeh Nezhad Bahram, who arrived in Warsaw from Beijing on 26 April 1989 intending to travel to Stockholm. When their Swedish visas were found to be counterfeit, they were returned to Beijing, only to be sent back to Warsaw after the Chinese authorities refused them entry. They then applied for political asylum in Poland, arguing that return to Iran would expose them to repression. Although they were allowed to remain, Poland had no procedure for examining their applications. As a result, they spent several weeks in the transit zone of Warsaw’s Okęcie Airport while officials decided how to deal with their case.Footnote 70 The same pattern appeared on other international routes. Because LOT was the only Eastern European airline operating direct flights to Delhi, the Warsaw–Delhi connection developed into another transit route. In December 1989, the West German authorities returned ninety-six Indian nationals who had travelled from Warsaw to Frankfurt on allegedly fraudulent visas. Polish consuls in India also reported a marked increase in visa applications, particularly from Afghan refugees presenting themselves as tourists. As Warsaw came to see many of these applications as attempts to use Poland as a gateway to Western Europe, visa screening became more restrictive and more applications were rejected.Footnote 71 By early 1990, transit migration through Poland was no longer limited to the Baltic ferry corridor. Commercial air routes, travel agencies and smuggling networks had become integral parts of the system. Isolated police operations and temporary administrative measures no longer matched the scale of the problem, which increased pressure for institutional reform.
Some migrants whose onward journeys failed eventually applied for asylum in Poland.Footnote 72 Applications were submitted through the PCK, which collected the necessary documentation and forwarded individual case files to the UNHCR in Geneva. This differed from the formal procedure for seeking asylum in Poland, under which applications were submitted through the relevant provincial Citizens’ Militia headquarters, mirroring ad hoc measures.Footnote 73 The procedure often took many months, which left applicants dependent on temporary accommodation and humanitarian assistance while awaiting a decision.Footnote 74 By early 1990, the refugee population in Poland had also changed. According to the PCK, sixty-five refugees remained under its care, most of them Somali nationals, alongside smaller groups from Ghana and Zaire. Many could no longer continue their journey, while the UNHCR had rejected their asylum applications. Neither resettlement nor repatriation offered a realistic solution because of limited diplomatic contacts, logistical challenges and a lack of financial resources. Cases such as these strengthened the conviction within the administration that migration policy required fundamental revision.Footnote 75 In February 1990, the Passport Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs warned of mounting ‘immigration pressure driven by economic factors’ and called for a more restrictive visa policy.Footnote 76
By early 1990, transit migration through Poland had reached a scale that reshaped Polish–Swedish relations. Between January and February alone, approximately 1600 migrants travelled through Poland to Sweden.Footnote 77 The numbers rose further in March, when more than 1000 refugees – primarily from Lebanon, Ethiopia and Somalia – arrived in Sweden via Poland within a single week.Footnote 78 The pressure on the Swedish asylum system increased accordingly, turning what had previously been treated as an administrative problem into an urgent diplomatic issue. In response, the Swedish MFA summoned the Polish ambassador for consultations in late February 1990. According to Polish diplomatic correspondence, State Secretary Pierre Schori called for coordinated action to reduce irregular migration through Poland. He urged Warsaw to tighten visa controls and raised the possibility of Poland acceding to the 1951 Geneva Convention, noting that Hungary had already done so.Footnote 79 The Polish Embassy in Stockholm reported that Swedish officials regarded accession not only as a humanitarian commitment but also as a condition for closer bilateral cooperation in managing migration across the Baltic.Footnote 80
These exchanges exposed the dilemma facing the Polish government. Officials in the MFA accepted that the existing approach to refugee protection could no longer continue, yet accession to the 1951 Convention raised serious financial and political concerns. During consultations in Warsaw in March 1990, Swedish representatives themselves acknowledged that implementing the Convention would require significant financial resources.Footnote 81 Internal memoranda prepared by the Passport Bureau likewise stressed that ratification would have to be reconciled with Poland’s difficult economic situation. Rising unemployment, an acute housing shortage and the anticipated costs of supporting refugees led officials to warn that expanding social assistance could provoke domestic opposition. The debate therefore reflected not only international pressure but also the realities of political and economic transformation.Footnote 82
In response to rising numbers of migrants and diplomatic pressure from Stockholm, Warsaw introduced stricter visa controls on 15 March 1990. Under the new regulations, visa applications submitted by nationals of Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, Kenya and Zaire required prior approval from the Polish MFA. The new rules did not stop the flow. On 18 March, 251 people – predominantly Iraqi nationals – arrived in Warsaw on LOT flights, followed by 150 Algerians on 19 March and fifty-two Ethiopians on 20 March. Most travelled on to Świnoujście, where they attempted to board ferries to Sweden.Footnote 83
Swedish criticism intensified as arrivals continued. According to Polish diplomatic cables, Swedish officials argued that Poland had failed to implement the measures agreed during bilateral consultations on 14–15 March 1990. They blamed the continued flow on weak border controls, administrative shortcomings and smuggling networks.Footnote 84 On 21 March, Sweden went a step further by announcing that migrants arriving by ferry at Ystad would be returned to Świnoujście. In effect, Sweden treated Poland as the first country responsible for receiving them, even though Poland had not yet acceded to the 1951 Geneva Convention or its 1967 Protocol.Footnote 85 That same day, Swedish police returned ninety-four migrants to Poland. Only thirty-seven held Polish visas, all of which had expired before they reached Sweden, which meant that Poland was therefore under no legal obligation to readmit them. Nevertheless, the authorities agreed to do so on humanitarian grounds, particularly because the group included thirty-six children.Footnote 86 The decision immediately exposed the consequences of the new policy. Many expected to continue their journey to Sweden and reacted angrily to their forced return, causing disturbances at the port of Świnoujście. The unrest underscored how Swedish policy of externalising migration control placed the immediate humanitarian and administrative burden on Polish authorities, who still lacked a functioning refugee system.Footnote 87
Sweden’s return policy quickly increased the number of migrants in Świnoujście, where more than 350 people were already waiting to continue to Ystad. Polish officials nevertheless believed that the true number was considerably higher.Footnote 88 In the days after the first returns, Swedish authorities sent approximately 400 additional migrants back to Poland. By the end of March 1990, nearly 1000 foreign nationals had gathered in Świnoujście and the surrounding area.Footnote 89 Holiday centres, hotels and private lodgings provided temporary accommodation, but available places were rapidly running out.Footnote 90 Most migrants had little money and depended on humanitarian assistance.Footnote 91 By treating Poland as the ‘first country of asylum’, Sweden confronted Warsaw with obligations for which it had neither the legal framework nor the administrative capacity.Footnote 92 The PCK, which had taken the lead in providing humanitarian assistance, was already operating under severe financial limits. Most migrants, however, had no intention of seeking asylum in Poland.Footnote 93 Sweden remained their destination, while Poland was expected to perform the functions of a country of asylum despite serving primarily as a transit state. The figures reflected this disparity as only seven to fifteen people applied for asylum in Poland each day, while far greater numbers continued to seek protection in Sweden.Footnote 94
These concerns were raised during consultations with a visiting UNHCR delegation on 30 March 1990. According to the Polish record of the meeting, the delegation questioned both the legal basis and the practical effects of Sweden’s return policy. Polish representatives argued that most migrants had entered the country on tourist visas and had never intended to seek asylum there. Treating Poland as the first country of asylum was therefore difficult to justify. At the same time, they stated that the government would observe the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention even before accession, while stressing that this political commitment did not create the same legal obligations as ratification.Footnote 95
Warsaw viewed Sweden’s policy against the backdrop of political change in Eastern Europe. Internal memoranda show that Polish democratic transition had altered its international position. The collapse of communist rule and the government’s declared plan to accede to the 1951 Geneva Convention encouraged the belief that Poland could assume a larger role in refugee protection, even though it still lacked the necessary structures. The end of communist rule also changed the political terms on which Sweden considered returning asylum seekers to Poland. Once Poland was no longer treated as a communist state, these returns became more acceptable politically and diplomatically than they had been during the Cold War.Footnote 96 Poland’s own diplomatic declarations reinforced this expectation. In November 1989, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski announced that the government planned to accede to the 1951 Geneva Convention. Poland had not yet ratified it, but the declaration signalled a move towards international refugee standards and shaped the expectations that Sweden placed on Warsaw.Footnote 97
Refugee governance in Poland did not emerge independently of wider European change. On the contrary, the migration corridor linking Poland and Sweden shows how domestic administrative adaptation unfolded alongside changing approaches to migration management across the continent. The scale and speed of the migration flows also influenced Swedish policy. By the late 1980s, its reception system was under growing pressure as asylum applications increased sharply, which forced the expansion of reception facilities from a handful of municipalities to almost the entire country. Providing accommodation steadily displaced labour market integration as the central concern of refugee policy, while asylum became an ever more contentious political issue. This formed an important backdrop to Stockholm’s efforts to reduce arrivals via Poland.Footnote 98 Sweden’s response also reflected the internal logic of its welfare-based integration model. Its commitment to providing newcomers with equal access to employment, housing, education and social assistance had long been accompanied by the assumption that immigration had to remain compatible with the state’s reception capacity.Footnote 99 Sweden’s policy may also have reflected the broader convergence of European asylum and migration policies that culminated in the Dublin Convention and the Schengen framework. If so, the pressure placed on Poland can be understood not only as a bilateral response to rising asylum applications but also as part of a European shift towards assigning responsibility for asylum seekers to the first country of arrival. Whatever the precise motivations behind Swedish policy, the returns fundamentally changed Poland’s position by accelerating reforms that had previously remained at the planning stage.
Sweden’s return policy transformed refugee protection from a recurring administrative concern into an immediate governmental priority.Footnote 100 The Polish authorities now faced the prospect of accommodating growing numbers of migrants returned from Sweden. In response, the government adopted a series of emergency measures. Visa requirements for nationals of specific African and Middle Eastern countries were tightened, border officials received stricter instructions on admitting passengers without valid onward documentation, and the MFA reviewed visa-issuing practices at Polish consulates in Kuwait, Lebanon and Syria. At the same time, Warsaw requested technical and humanitarian assistance from the UNHCR and asked the organisation to assess the rapidly deteriorating situation.Footnote 101 In April 1990, a UNHCR fact-finding mission inspected accommodation facilities and evaluated the administrative response, concluding that the living conditions provided for refugees in Poland were satisfactory:
Both the site visit and discussions with the refugees led the mission members to conclude that the conditions under which the refugees were living, as provided by Poland, were very good. Among the refugees were many educated individuals – doctors, teachers and lawyers – who, on every occasion, expressed their gratitude to the Polish authorities for everything they had done for them, for their humane treatment and for the living conditions provided.Footnote 102
This favourable assessment concerned accommodation and treatment. It did not resolve the questions of asylum procedure and onward travel that had brought the refugees to Poland, which still lacked the legal and administrative capacity to process rising numbers of asylum seekers and returnees. The UNHCR visit nevertheless had several immediate consequences. Its assurances that no refugee would be returned to their country of origin despite Poland’s non-accession to the 1951 Geneva Convention helped end a hunger strike by forty-two refugees sheltering in a church in Świnoujście.Footnote 103 The delegation also produced one of the first systematic assessments of the refugee population in Poland. Interviews with around 500 migrants showed that the group was far from homogeneous. While some clearly met the criteria of the 1951 Convention, others had left their countries primarily for economic reasons or were attempting to join family members already living in Western Europe. This assessment confirmed the complexity of the migration flows confronting Poland and demonstrated the limits of treating all arrivals as a single administrative category. According to Polish diplomatic reports, the UNHCR visit also influenced subsequent discussions with Sweden. Evidence of widespread document fraud, forged visas and expanding transit migration reinforced Swedish concerns about the corridor through Poland. At the same time, the humanitarian burden placed on Poland prompted Stockholm to suspend further returns temporarily, while the Swedish Red Cross and the Ministry of Labour offered financial assistance to support refugee accommodation.Footnote 104
As the crisis continued, Polish authorities encountered mounting difficulties in accommodating the expanding refugee population. By spring 1990, hundreds of migrants were housed in the Dolna Odra and Gródek holiday centres near Świnoujście. The larger facility accommodated 267 refugees but had been leased by the PCK only until 15 May 1990.Footnote 105 With the start of the summer holiday season, the premises had to be returned to commercial use, which forced the relocation of approximately 450 refugees to facilities near Warsaw.Footnote 106 The move highlighted the absence of a permanent refugee reception system, as reception still depended on improvised and short-term arrangements. Prolonged uncertainty over legal status and future resettlement also fuelled tensions among the refugees. At the same time, the growing concentration of migrants generated unease in some local communities. In May 1990, these tensions culminated in the murder of a 23-year-old Syrian refugee by a young Polish man. Although the circumstances of the attack were specific, the incident showed that the refugee crisis was no longer limited to government administration and diplomatic relations but was beginning to have wider social consequences.Footnote 107 By mid-May 1990, the PCK was assisting 803 refugees, the highest number recorded since the transit crisis began.Footnote 108 Most were dispersed across hotels and motels around Warsaw, reflecting the absence of a permanent reception infrastructure.Footnote 109
Although Polish policy makers generally agreed that accession to the 1951 Geneva Convention was necessary, financial constraints delayed ratification until the autumn of 1991. The crisis triggered by returns from Sweden nevertheless prompted the government to introduce new administrative measures without waiting for accession.Footnote 110 In March 1990, the Council of Ministers established the first inter-ministerial body responsible for coordinating refugee affairs, appointing Deputy Minister of Health Krystyna Sienkiewicz to head the newly created Government Task Force for Refugees.Footnote 111 This marked the first attempt to coordinate refugee policy across government ministries instead of relying on ad hoc action by individual agencies.Footnote 112 The creation of the Task Force institutionalised responses that had begun to emerge during the late socialist period, marking continuity as much as change. Poland’s experience also differed from that of Czechoslovakia. As Oxana Shevel observes, refugee institutions there initially emerged within a humanitarian frame that emphasised repaying the debt to countries that had sheltered Czechoslovak exiles during the communist period. In Poland, by contrast, refugee governance took shape primarily in response to the practical challenges of transit migration and, increasingly, to the need to manage cross-border mobility and strengthen state administrative capacity.Footnote 113
At the same time, the PCK assumed primary responsibility for refugee accommodation and received a government allocation of 10 billion złotys to cover the associated costs. Even so, daily expenditure reached 60–70 million złotys, illustrating the financial burden created by the continuing arrival of refugees and returnees.Footnote 114 What had initially been conceived as emergency measures became permanent features of the emerging refugee system.Footnote 115 One tangible result was the decision to establish the first dedicated refugee reception centre at Dębak, near Warsaw. Established in a former Ministry of Internal Affairs recreation facility, it opened on 3 April 1992 and replaced the dispersed network of hotels and holiday resorts previously used to accommodate refugees.Footnote 116
The scale of migration through Poland to Sweden cannot be reconstructed with complete precision because the surviving records are incomplete and fragmentary. Swedish authorities estimated that approximately 7000 foreign nationals reached Sweden via Poland between November 1988 and April 1990. This figure should, however, be treated as an administrative estimate and not as a comprehensive count of everyone who transited Polish territory during that period.Footnote 117 By the spring of 1990, the flow had begun to decline. Around 1800 foreigners applied for refugee status in Poland during 1990, while fewer than 300 remained in the country the following year.Footnote 118 The decline coincided with stricter visa procedures at Polish consulates, which substantially reduced the number of migrants entering Poland on tourist visas. As the immediate crisis subsided, Polish–Swedish relations shifted from confrontation to cooperation. Stockholm agreed to admit a number of refugees under family reunification provisions and accepted individuals residing in Poland who had already been recognised as refugees by the UNHCR. Bilateral cooperation also expanded in the field of migration management, with Sweden providing training and technical assistance to the Polish police and border services.Footnote 119
Conclusions
By the mid-1980s, Poland played a dual role within European migration regimes. While remaining chiefly a country of emigration, it also became an important transit corridor for migrants travelling from the Middle East, Africa and Asia to Western Europe.Footnote 120 These movements confronted Warsaw with forms of mobility that existing institutions had not been designed to manage. Unlike earlier recipients of political asylum admitted on ideological grounds, many of the new arrivals neither intended to settle in Poland nor could easily continue their journeys westward. Refugee protection thus became less of an instrument of foreign policy and more of a practical administrative challenge. This article has shown that the initial responses were improvised and lacked a systematic framework. Responsibility was divided among the PCK, the Catholic Church, government ministries and international organisations, while holiday centres and hotels substituted for a permanent reception system. Archival records show how the Polish administration experimented with new forms of coordination, introduced procedures for situations not covered by legislation and adapted to a new pattern of transit migration.Footnote 121
The transit crisis on the Polish–Swedish route in 1989–90 marked a turning point. Sweden’s return policy exposed the limits of the existing system and turned transit migration into an urgent governmental and diplomatic issue. It accelerated measures that had already been under consideration, including stricter visa controls, closer cooperation with the UNHCR, inter-ministerial coordination and the planning of a permanent reception centre. Although Poland did not accede to the 1951 Geneva Convention until 1991, many of the administrative practices that later formed the basis of its refugee protection system had already been introduced. Accession to the Convention did not create a system of refugee governance in Poland. Instead, it formalised and expanded administrative practices that had already begun to develop in response to transit migration.
The Polish–Swedish migration corridor emerged immediately before the institutionalisation of a new European approach to asylum responsibility, exemplified by the Dublin Convention of June 1990.Footnote 122 The events of 1989–90 also anticipated practices that were later formalised through readmission agreements and the safe third country principle.Footnote 123 Although Poland was not yet part of these arrangements, the events of 1989–90 coincided with a European shift towards assigning responsibility for asylum seekers to the country of first arrival and limiting secondary movements. The Polish case therefore demonstrates how national administrative change developed at the same time as changes in European migration policy. As Randall Hansen argues, European cooperation on asylum did not reduce the role of the nation-state but often enabled governments to pursue domestic migration objectives through coordinated action.Footnote 124 The Polish–Swedish case illustrates this dynamic. Refugee governance was shaped through bilateral cooperation, diplomatic negotiations and administrative decisions taken in Warsaw, with European institutions playing only a limited role.
These findings suggest that the origins of refugee governance in Poland cannot be explained solely by democratic transition or European integration because many responses later incorporated into the post-1989 asylum system originated before either process had been completed. The continuity identified here was not primarily one of personnel but of administrative practice. Proposals first advanced during the late socialist period – including dedicated reception facilities, inter-ministerial coordination, cooperation with the UNHCR and more systematic visa management – were consolidated, expanded and formalised after 1989. This interpretation complements existing accounts of Polish migration policy by showing that important elements of the emerging system predated Poland’s accession to the international refugee regime. It also indicates that refugee governance in East-Central Europe did not follow a single path. In Czechoslovakia, humanitarian considerations initially played a central role; in Poland, refugee institutions developed primarily in response to transit migration and the practical demands of managing cross-border mobility.
Acknowledgements
I thank the three anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. In preparing this article, I used ChatGPT (OpenAI, model GPT-6.1) for proofreading, minor language polishing and checking compliance with the CEH style guide.
Funding statement
Research was supported by the National Science Centre, Poland, under research project no 2019/35/D/HS3/03581.
Przemysław Gasztold is an assistant professor in the Department of State Protection and Constitutional Order, Faculty of National Security, at the War Studies University in Warsaw and a research fellow at the Historical Research Office of the Institute of National Remembrance. His research focuses on intelligence studies, international terrorism and the Soviet bloc’s relations with the Global South. He is a member of the organising committee for the ‘Need to Know’ intelligence conference, the managing editor of Security & Defence Quarterly (Poland) and a member of the editorial boards of Komunizm: system–ludzie–dokumentacja (Poland) and National Security and the Future (Croatia). In 2024, he received the Tudjman Scientific Excellence Award at the Zagreb Security Forum.
