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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 June 2005
Collective Preventive Diplomacy: A Study in International Conflict Management. By Barry H. Steiner. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 255p. $50.00.
In recent years, international scholars and policymakers have focused considerable attention on the moral and political challenges of collective action by major states to defuse ethnic conflict within smaller states. Among the most important recent studies examining these issues are the United Nations General Assembly Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) and the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001). Barry H. Steiner's study of collective efforts to prevent and resolve conflict is a welcome contribution to this literature. Steiner examines how and why major states join together for preventive diplomacy purposes. He draws from eight cases, ranging from the Greek revolution of the 1820s to the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, and employs Alexander George's method of focused, structured comparison to distill lessons about the nature of great-power collective action.
In recent years, international scholars and policymakers have focused considerable attention on the moral and political challenges of collective action by major states to defuse ethnic conflict within smaller states. Among the most important recent studies examining these issues are the United Nations General Assembly Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) and the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001). Barry H. Steiner's study of collective efforts to prevent and resolve conflict is a welcome contribution to this literature. Steiner examines how and why major states join together for preventive diplomacy purposes. He draws from eight cases, ranging from the Greek revolution of the 1820s to the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s, and employs Alexander George's method of focused, structured comparison to distill lessons about the nature of great-power collective action.
Steiner's analysis distinguishes between interventionist and insulationist action. The former includes the familiar range of conciliatory or coercive options by which major states seek to manage conflict between violent antagonists within a targeted smaller state. The latter refers to actions that are designed to defuse the conflict as a source of friction among the great powers themselves, with little regard for the needs of the primary antagonists. Insulation seeks to contain the conflict and avoid great-power disputes by heading off unilateral intervention.
The insulationist dimension of collective action has been neglected to date in the preventive diplomacy literature. Insulation is important, however, in laying the foundations for subsequent great-power intervention. In the early stages of a conflict, it is easier for states to agree to insulate than to intervene. But the act of cooperating to insulate enhances the motivation for intervention and increases its potential effectiveness. States initially come together to protect their own interests and prevent the pursuit of unilateral advantage, but as conflict dynamics unfold, they are often motivated to seek an end to the conflict through collective action.
Steiner identifies important differences between conciliatory and coercive intervention. The former is easier to undertake and more likely to occur in cases where the local conflict is not of compelling interest to the major states. On the other hand, the usefulness of conciliatory action is “severely limited” (p. 138) and fails to address the security dilemmas that often propel conflict. Coercive intervention involves a much greater commitment and occurs only where the major powers are strongly motivated to act. Among the “transitional” developments that increase the motivation for shifting from conciliatory to coercive collective action are humanitarian emergencies, military involvement by outside states, and provocations against peacekeepers. The effectiveness of coercive action is often limited by the perception of antagonists that the collective threat of force lacks credibility. Here, the prior commitment to insulation can be problematic, since states that have previously limited their involvement have difficulty convincing antagonists of their newfound commitment to coercive action.
The cases show, as other studies have found, that the motivation for collective intervention is usually low, and that states often fail to heed ample early warnings of impending crisis. The ability of states to prevent worsening ethnic conflict can be enhanced, the book proposes, by a “previously created early warning regime” (p. 207) to detect and legitimate collective involvement. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe is a prototype for this type of regime on a regional basis, and a similar effort has been proposed for the UN in the Lakhdar Brahimi Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) to the Security Council.
The book's findings on the harmful effects of great-power unilateral intervention are relevant to the current crisis in Iraq. The cases confirm that unilateral intervention “is the most important obstacle to defusing the local conflict” (p. 199). Unilateral intervention disrupts political relations among the great powers themselves. In every case studied, “outside military intervention complicated maintenance of internal stability” within the targeted country (p. 122).
Steiner's study suffers from a tendency to belabor obvious points (for example, that inadequate great-power unity impedes collective action) and from a limited set of cases. The criteria for selecting cases are not specified, other than a desire to avoid the problems that arise from large case samples, which often lack detail and nuance. The cases are diverse and span a long time frame but otherwise have no obvious commonality. The examples of coercive intervention involve the use of military force, but not economic sanctions. Only one of the cases is from the 1990s, when the number of ethnopolitical conflicts was at its height, while half are from the nineteenth century.
The author contends that the state today “remains as important for collective preventive diplomacy as it did in the 19th century” (p. 61). This is a point many scholars would dispute. His own analysis shows that the media and nongovernmental groups play an important role in dramatizing humanitarian emergencies and violent provocations, which can increase the collective motivation to intervene.
The cases reflect a distinctly European bias (all occurred in Europe or involved European powers). This ignores important recent examples of regional powers in Africa and other continents engaging in collective insulation and intervention. States such as South Africa or Nigeria are not “great powers” in the conventional sense of the term, but they are influential in regional settings and recently have exerted significant effort toward collective preventive diplomacy. Some attempt to distill lessons from such experiences would be of much greater relevance to the contemporary challenges of preventing deadly conflict than an examination of the Belgian revolution of the 1830s.
Despite these limitations, Collective Preventive Diplomacy is an important book that breaks new ground in analyzing the dynamics among the great powers that determine the prospects and patterns of collective action to defuse ethnic conflict in smaller states.