I

At the beginning of March 1634, Wentworth sent a letter to each of the king's principal secretaries of state, Sir John Coke and Sir Francis Windebank, offering his opinion on the role of viceroy. In his brief but revealing account, he began with a stinging attack on those who advised the king ‘to put jealouse restraints and qualifications upon his deputye’, accusing them of having ‘narrow and circumscribed harts’. Such counsel was not just detrimental to the king's interest but was also recommended by those ‘not acquainted w[i]th that sincerity and candour w[hi]ch can only qualifye a man to serve yt Kingdom & Crown worthyly’. He continued his discourse by outlining the importance of having a deputy whom the king trusted. ‘The place is a place of highest hono[u]r wherin the soveraignty it selfe is imbarqued in some measure w[i]th him’, Wentworth maintained, ‘and if he bee lessened in either he growes either scandalous for want w[i]th his owne doores, or contemned abrode.’ In other words, to constrain the authority of the lord deputy was to constrain the king's sovereign power itself. This was crucial for the workings of government: if the viceroy lost the support of the monarch then his position was simply untenable. Drawing on this, Wentworth subsequently emphasized the absolute necessity of possessing authority and countenance. Should the lord deputy not have the ‘means to gratifye some, as well as to punish others’, he asserted, ‘men will rather run from him then come a neare him [and] abandon him’. This is all the more interesting because he concludes with a short discussion on the appropriate penalty for breaching the monarch's trust or corrupting justice in respect of the king's subjects: ‘Appoint justices, send for him presently over, give him his chardge, make him answere it strickly at the perill of his head, and for my owne part I shall desire no spareing.’ Yet in bringing the errant deputy to trial, he insisted that the case be examined in England, as it was the only place, in his opinion, that guaranteed a fair hearing.Footnote ¹⁵

Regardless of the irony in his statements, Wentworth's views on the responsibilities of the viceroy is highly significant. That he structured his commentary in the third person in order for it to be construed as a neutral perspective served as a means to test Charles's pulse (the king's refusal to grant Wentworth's requests for an earldom meant that the latter was constantly paranoid about his ability to assert sufficient control).Footnote ¹⁶ He disclosed his opinions to Coke and Windebank because he was confident that they would be accurately communicated to the king.Footnote ¹⁷ Not only was he endeavouring to gauge Whitehall's standpoint in regard to the duties expected of him, but he was also trying to ensure that both sides were in agreement about his precise role. But because Wentworth was never exactly sure where he stood with Charles, it is reasonable to assume that the points he outlined were a true reflection of his own personal views. The content plainly had defensive undertones. He was fully aware that the downfall of many of his predecessors was due in no small measure to malicious rumours at court.Footnote ¹⁸ If anything, he accentuated the dangers of being absent from Whitehall – a concern for every seventeenth-century courtier. When Wentworth was appointed lord deputy, Edward Nicholas observed: ‘never was there as yet such an officer that lost not ground att Court throughe his absence, and envy of maligne persons’.Footnote ¹⁹ This was no doubt at the forefront of Wentworth's thoughts when he castigated those who undermined the viceroy. Though not explicitly named, he was certainly referring to the earls of Salisbury and Pembroke, whose latest intervention had challenged Wentworth's plans to demolish the family tomb of Richard Boyle, earl of Cork, in St Patrick's Cathedral.Footnote ²⁰

The emphasis that Wentworth placed on authority is especially notable. His staunch defence of the lord deputy's need for unconditional support was based on the conviction that it enhanced ‘good government’. Furthermore, it was an essential platform for promoting his agenda. Bemoaning the many difficulties which Ireland presented enabled him to manipulate the king's secretaries and, with any luck, Charles as well. A deputy who lacked influence, he claimed, would never be able to tackle the problems that demanded urgent attention. By subtly hinting that this was a matter which fundamentally touched upon the king's sovereign power, Wentworth skilfully intertwined his own interests with the concerns of the crown.Footnote ²¹ It was a persuasive contention, masking his personal ambitions. But it was an argument he firmly believed in too. In his youth, his father wrote to him: ‘if yow desire authoritie or degree of hono[u]r, yow must make meanes for itt’.Footnote ²² Wentworth's letters to Coke and Windebank clearly show that he made every effort to secure such means. Research has drawn attention to his being a self-professed Stoic, making much of the fact that he read the letters of Justus Lipsius during his tour of France in the winter of 1612–13.Footnote ²³ Still, it comes at the expense of overlooking the influences that were nearer at hand. Sir William Wentworth's advice resonates almost self-evidently with his son's core principles. There is an evident correlation between the paternal advice that Wentworth received as a boy and the values he espoused in later years: ‘he that wilbe honoured and feared in his cuntrie must beare countenance and authority’, Sir William shrewdly observed, ‘for people are servyle, not generous and do reverence men for feare, not for loue of their vertues which they apprehend nott’.Footnote ²⁴ This echoed much of what Wentworth was both in favour of and attempted to practise as the king's representative in the north and in Ireland.

Wentworth's call to bolster the deputyship marked a crucial period in the formation of his designs for government. Whereas his relationship with Charles continued to be uneasy, paradoxically his recommendations reflected a growing confidence in royal policy. Playing on the king's need for greater efficiency was in itself a sound tactic. In reality, Wentworth's suggestions stemmed from a succession of favourable decisions which had the effect of enhancing his position as viceroy. This is a crucial point. The views he expressed in his letters to Coke and Windebank cannot be analysed solely in an Irish context. They were part of a wider political scenario in which his driven conduct was already apparent. It was no coincidence that Nicholas remarked in December 1631 that Wentworth was ‘a strong champion for the King in all affaires, and by his profitable services in the country hath gotten very good credditt with his Majestie’.Footnote ²⁵

Earning Charles's respect in a short period of time as lord president must surely be an essential aspect in any comprehensive assessment of Wentworth's agenda. Rather than focusing narrowly on Ireland as a model of authoritarian government, consideration must be extended to include his administration in the north. The common elements are plain to see. Six weeks after Wentworth assumed his post in Ireland, Don Miguel Nicholaldie, the Spanish ambassador in London, noted ‘your … success in that government, in which I hear you are become already like a Spanish Vice-Roy in what is befitting the greatness of the Lieutenant of his Majesty, and the honour of so eminent a dignity’.Footnote ²⁶ Nicholaldie's comments are important inasmuch as they highlight Wentworth's immediate impact in Ireland. Yet they also imply that the new viceroy's style of governing was not a cause of surprise, having its origins in earlier phases in his career. Taken alongside Nicholas's assertion, both statements reveal that Wentworth already had a formidable reputation. The obvious conclusion is that his initial success in Ireland derived from his skills, trials, and experiences as lord president of the Council of the North.

II

When news broke of Wentworth being offered the deputyship, his friend and kinsman Sir Edward Stanhope attempted to dissuade him by bluntly describing Ireland as ‘a factious, faythless, proude, poore natione’.Footnote ²⁷ Such pessimistic viewpoints typified English attitudes. The kingdom's constant state of flux brought about by war, the predominantly Catholic population, and the historically close relations with Spain meant there was an inherent negativity in any consideration of Irish affairs. Wentworth shared this outlook. Derogatory comments about those in Ireland become increasingly evident in his correspondence after he arrived in Dublin.Footnote ²⁸ More importantly, as a member of the committee for Irish affairs on the English privy council, he witnessed at first hand the degree to which faction prevented Dublin Castle from implementing effective policies. In 1631 he heard a cause in the Star Chamber where the former lord deputy, Henry Cary, Viscount Falkland, sued several of his opponents including the vice-treasurer, Francis Annesley, Lord Mountnorris, for defamation. ‘Factions betweene persons of quality in yt realme I doe conceive to bee the cheif cause of many disorders raigning there’, Wentworth declared in his verdict; ‘the king by that meanes is deceived in execucon of justice, when his ministers doe bandy one against another. And though the bedd be changed yet doth the disease asyet continewe.’Footnote ²⁹

Wentworth's judgment in this case laid bare his intense dislike of faction. He resented the fact that ‘good government’ was hampered by personal disputes. Equally irritating was the way in which justice had been abused. But while his condemnation of Irish officials’ conduct is fascinating in light of his impending appointment, it is better understood within a broader framework. The ‘disease’ that Wentworth referred to stemmed from his own frustrations with local factions that dogged the Council of the North at York. His tone intimated a degree of sympathy for Falkland's troubles, which were not far removed from the problems he confronted as lord president.

Admittedly, drawing comparisons between the Irish privy council and the Council of the North should be treated with caution. As C. V. Wedgwood contends, they were two totally different jurisdictions in two very different environments and she correctly points out that the northern territories had no colonial aspect or any rivalry between competing ethnic groups.Footnote ³⁰ Furthermore, Wentworth's treatment of unruly individuals who threatened to undermine his administration had subtle differences. At York it was born of necessity to ensure efficiency, but his agenda in Ireland placed an emphasis on imposing his will in order to appease Charles's desire for conformity. Such distinctions are critical in any analysis of Wentworth's executive. Nevertheless, his plan to tackle faction – seeking consensus in the north while sowing seeds of division in Ireland – was built on political skills that were as much the product of hard experience as intelligence. They required shrewdness in observing people: what motivates them as individuals and how they operate collectively in political groupings. Wentworth's management of faction is therefore better examined as part of a continuum. As Julia Merritt observes, the north acted as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for his viceroyalty.Footnote ³¹ Pursuing these lines of investigation has obvious advantages, not least the fact that it can help us understand why Wentworth was confident in his ability to ‘govern the native by the planter and the planter by the native’ just six months after his arrival at Dublin.Footnote ³²

G. C. F. Forster's enlightening article on faction and government in Yorkshire during King James's reign shows the extent to which the northern administration was riven by strife. He observes how rivalries emanated from a desire for local leadership, especially between newly established or emerging families and reputable, long-standing households.Footnote ³³ These contests consequently affected the business of the council, since the powers of magistrates and owners of manorial jurisdiction were often entangled with private feuds. Wentworth played his part in this too. His dismissal from office as custos rotulorum is a case in point. As he presided over the West Riding Quarter Sessions in July 1626, he received a note informing him of his removal with immediate effect. To add salt to the wound, he was replaced by his arch-rival, Sir John Savile, who had been battling with Wentworth for local prominence.Footnote ³⁴

Forster's work, then, provides an excellent platform for understanding the complex dynamics of local government in Yorkshire. Unfortunately, he does not shed much light on the problems within the council.Footnote ³⁵ It is equally regrettable that his analysis terminates with the death of James. The ‘forced loan’ was a defining moment in northern politics, exacerbating underlying tensions among the gentry and diminishing the council's credibility as a governmental institution.Footnote ³⁶ In April 1626, for example, Wentworth was notified of a skirmish at the council table between Lord President Scrope and Savile, the president's understudy, when the latter decided ‘to complye with the complaynt of the cuntry’ as a means of distancing himself from the unpopular policies enforced by the crown.Footnote ³⁷ Their mutual hostility dominated proceedings in the administration for the next two years. In September 1627, when Wentworth was confined in the Marshallsea, Christopher Wandesford revealed that ‘Sir John hateth my lord [Scrope] and Sir Arther [Ingram] for combining together to overthrowe the king's service.’Footnote ³⁸

The fraught events of 1626–7 placed a considerable strain on the council and should be factored into any estimation of the obstacles awaiting Wentworth. Despite the assurances secured by the Petition of Right, it did little to alleviate the antagonism caused by the privy seals. Wentworth's protracted rivalry with Savile reached its zenith once he assumed the presidency. Resentment between the loan refusers and the loan collectors failed to subside.Footnote ³⁹ Co-operation among council members was at its lowest ebb. This was reflected in Wentworth's opening address as lord president. Stressing the importance of the ‘joint individual wellbeing of soverainty and of subjeccion’, he warned them that he was ‘not ignorant how some distemper'd minds have of late very farr endeavoured to divide the consideracions of the two; as if their ends were distinct, not the same, nay in opposition; a monstrous, a prodigious birth of a licentious conception’. His objective was clear and succinct: the council could only be efficient if there was a harmonious environment. ‘Unity inwards amongst ourselves; uniform justice outwards to such as come before us’, he exclaimed, maintaining that they were ‘the acquir'd habits of this Council’. He subsequently launched a pre-emptive attack against prohibitions, ‘the bleeding evil’ that undermined the jurisdiction of the administration at York. In so doing he looked to

The absence of the council's records reinforces the importance of Wentworth's speech. His criticism provides a rare insight into the factious character of the northern council during a pivotal phase in Charles's reign. While reconstructing the routine business is challenging, Wentworth's correspondence offers some idea of what the council had to contend with and how factional politics frustrated the workings of government.

Among the Strafford papers is a report by Wandesford about a council meeting which quickly descended into chaos owing to irreconcilable differences among members. Forwarding the minutes to the absent lord president, Wandesford's account illustrates how matters were quickly hijacked by personal feuds.Footnote ⁴¹ Having settled the business of Sir Conyers Darcy, the debate shifted to where the decrees should be read. From there it transformed into an argument between Sir Arthur Ingram, secretary of the council, and the principal lawyers, Sir William Ellis and Sir Gerard Lowther.Footnote ⁴² Ellis insisted on the judgments being read in the presence of the vice-president. This was promptly queried by Ingram, who claimed that it was not necessary to prolong the business by requiring the vice-president's attendance. He immediately found himself under attack from Lowther, who called for evidence of such precedence. Ingram apparently resented the tone of questioning. He maintained that he would present the decrees to the vice-president when called upon, and alluded to the king's legal instructions by way of insult. With the atmosphere becoming increasingly tense, Ingram reminded Lowther that they shared the privilege of being the eldest knights of the council and thus he deserved the respect of his peers. Fearful of hostilities being exacerbated, Wandesford intervened as chairman, imploring his fellow councillors ‘to avoyde that misinterpretation these differences and debates are subiect to’. His efforts were in vain. Matters came to a head when Ingram, after further taunts from Lowther, ‘replyed passionately clapping his hands upon the table’ and subsequently stormed out of the room ‘in a greate radge’.Footnote ⁴³

Issues of precedence were not, of course, unusual in heated political debates. Still, the fact that they became the source of conflict underlines the difficulties in getting business done. The response of both Wandesford and Ellis was one of frustration. Orders by the former that Ingram return to the chamber, so that the decrees could be settled and the rest of the proceedings concluded, exemplify Wandesford's irritation.Footnote ⁴⁴ But Ellis's remarks are a further indication of how councillors continually sought opportunities to score points against their opponents. His contention that it was impossible to reason with Ingram was undoubtedly true, but arbitrarily dragging alleged misdemeanours of the secretary's son into the debate served little purpose other than to bring the council into disrepute. Precisely what those transgressions were is unclear but Wandesford's account suggests that there were no grounds to follow them up with a complaint to the king. It was quite likely a hollow threat, but it nonetheless illustrates the extent to which the northern administration was hampered by faction. Sure enough, when Ingram came back after his outburst, he resumed his disagreement with Lowther, at which stage Wandesford ‘desyred quietness again and that we should resolve the bysiness in hand’. Once more, his pleas fell on deaf ears. Ingram continued ‘speaking very vehemently’, to which Ellis responded, ‘this is always your manner, you will heare nobody but yourself’.Footnote ⁴⁵ When Ellis was accused of attacking Ingram's clerks during Scrope's presidency, it was clear that their quarrel was more deeply rooted than their initial contention appears.

While the business of the council was eventually done, it was nevertheless an uphill struggle. There was even a break in the meeting, when Ellis recommended a private discussion with Ingram and his legal colleagues, Lowther and Sir Thomas Tildesley, to resolve the impasse. That any progress was made was an achievement in itself. Yet it is also worth noting the domineering influence that Wentworth possessed. After several failed attempts to restore order, Wandesford warned the councillors of the danger of incurring the wrath of the lord president. Just as Lowther sought to put conditions on the decrees, Wandesford reminded them that ‘by no means that promise would nether please my l[or]d nor be for our honors but manifest a divisyon amongst our selves’. Only then was there any kind of end to the procrastination. Was Wandesford playing to Wentworth's self-image as the man with direct access to the king? Quite possibly, but then it must also be considered that the report hardly flattered his leadership skills if such meetings were seen as typical. A key role for Wandesford was to offer a frank opinion in contrast to the double-talk of gentry figures who hoped to curry favour with the lord president.Footnote ⁴⁶ Wentworth's dislike of lawyers, especially Ellis who had earlier crossed swords with him, would certainly lend support to Wandesford's assessment.Footnote ⁴⁷ Indeed, the conduct of all those present at the council meeting was a fairly accurate reflection of the manner in which Wentworth portrayed them in later instances.

The problems afflicting the council are crucial in understanding Wentworth's political development. While his absence from the meeting was in some ways unfortunate, it is fair to assume that disruptive influences of this kind existed even when he was present. He was destined to experience the same challenges in Ireland: his intervention in the spat between Cork and Sir Adam Loftus during the examination of Richard Blacknall bears a striking resemblance to Wandesford's demands for silence between Ingram and Lowther. According to Cork, he and Loftus continued to argue ‘till the L[ord] deputie towld vs to be quiet, but we multeplying our vnkynd conceipts one vppon the other, then the L[ord] deputie required and comaunded us both to be silent’.Footnote ⁴⁸ Cork's account serves to illustrate the existence of similar rivalries among Irish councillors and how they too interfered with the important affairs of council business.

Viewed in this light, Wentworth's ability to manage faction made him the best candidate for asserting the king's authority. His selection as lord deputy may well have been prompted by allies at court who, his contemporaries claimed, felt threatened by his success and preferred to keep him far from the corridors of Whitehall.Footnote ⁴⁹ At the same time, we cannot overlook the probability that his transformation of the north into an efficient, well-organized administrative body under difficult conditions was the prime factor in his appointment. The greatest obstacle that his predecessors encountered in Ireland was contending with the hostile and divisive Irish privy council. Writing to Sir Charles Coote, Falkland noted how Wentworth benefited from the ‘freeness from faction – for that tyranny shall have noe more dominion over hym – w[hi]ch he wyll sooner fynd them then I cann discerne heare, and w[hi]ch I desire w[i]th the first to heare what he fynds’.Footnote ⁵⁰ Wentworth was obviously aware of what awaited him. Within months of his being appointed, both the master of the rolls, Sir Francis Aungier, and the general of the army, Sir Charles Wilmot, informed him of the factious nature of the council. Wilmot cautioned him: ‘you may fynde yourr assistants in Counsell keen to followe youe with united hartes, which I feare, youe will fynde some troble’.Footnote ⁵¹ Thus Wentworth's capacity to adapt to such situations singled him out as a minister who could deliver the king's interest.

III

There are other examples of how Wentworth's northern experiences proved an ideal springboard for Ireland. In the early months of his presidency of the Council of the North, clear patterns emerge showing the progressively authoritarian nature of his administration. As has already been noted, he identified prohibitions and writs of habeas corpus by the common law courts as the chief impediment to effective rule in his opening speech in December 1628.Footnote ⁵² They weakened the legal capacity of the council, since anyone dissatisfied with a judgment in York could have a case transmitted to London to reverse the verdict. Stressing the need to free the president and his courts of these constraints, Wentworth persuaded Charles in March 1629 to have Attorney General Heath examine the instructions which defined his judicial powers.Footnote ⁵³ Heath was subsequently ordered to make alterations whereby the courts of Westminster could be prevented from interfering with the northern government's prosecutions. Such modifications were highly significant: under the new guidelines, common law courts were not only prevented from granting prohibitions, but they were also limited in their capacity to compel the council to release prisoners before they submitted.Footnote ⁵⁴ It was a major achievement for Wentworth. Under the new ruling, the government at York was allowed to exercise its own jurisdiction. More importantly, the revised instructions reinforced the lord president's strengthening hand.Footnote ⁵⁵

While Wentworth argued that the amendments were necessary to stabilize the administration, in private he saw them as giving greater scope to make his mark, especially against his opponents. That much was apparent over the following months when he sought to push his advantage further by targeting his adversary, Sir John Savile. Savile found himself before the Star Chamber against Wentworth in a libel suit stemming back more than three years.Footnote ⁵⁶ The case did not go unnoticed at Whitehall. In June, Charles sent a strongly worded letter warning the lord president not to transgress from the commission and instructions, after hearing that ‘p[ro]ceedings before our said Councell growe much more p[er]plexed and our subiects often disappointed of the iust fruits of their suits there then in the happie raignes of Queene Eliz[abeth] and our blessed ffather’.Footnote ⁵⁷ The king's admonition is revealing. First, it confirms that Charles was still wary of Wentworth, despite the numerous honours he had bestowed on him over the previous twelve months. Second, it provides a real insight into Wentworth's political aspirations. He was not content to be seen merely as a figurehead with restricted powers in a territory ridden by faction. Using Heath's alterations to strengthen his position was a bold move and proves that he intended to push the limits of his authority as far as he could. Moreover, it reveals that Wentworth saw opportunities in employing the law as a bullying tactic against those under his jurisdiction (a method he subsequently replicated in Ireland to great effect). The reprimand may have been a setback to his designs, but it offers a foretaste of his penchant for efficient government with little regard for constitutional restraint.

This inclination was more clearly articulated in July 1631. For much of the first half of that year, Wentworth was embroiled in several bitter disputes with members of the gentry. The disrespect shown to him and the continued attempts to undermine his position convinced him that measures had to be taken to uphold the honour associated with the role of the king's representative. Consequently, he induced John Egerton, earl of Bridgewater and lord president of the Council in the Marches of Wales, to join him in a petition to Charles requesting that no grant of place or fine in their courts should pass the signet without due notification.Footnote ⁵⁸ He no doubt calculated that Bridgewater encountered the same hostilities in Wales and that their shared grievances were best served by presenting a united front.Footnote ⁵⁹ Not only would acting in concert strengthen their hand, but it would also have the additional advantage of making Charles less suspicious of Wentworth's intentions in virtue of his earlier reproof. Whether he would have got the king's approval if Bridgewater was not on board is debatable. It is nonetheless significant that Wentworth drafted the petition, and the energy which was put into the proposition mainly came from him. His eagerness to obtain greater influence over the provincial courts underlines his discomfort with the instructions that were put in place to prevent the lord president and council from asserting too much control over the northern territories. At the very best, it illustrates his proclivity for strong government based on prerogative rule. By chipping away at his mandate, Wentworth was essentially moulding a new set of guidelines to implement a more tightly controlled administration.

The best example of this was, ironically, not of his own doing but arose from growing resentment towards his rule. In May 1632, Sir Thomas Gower was summoned to the court at York on charges of speaking scandalous words against the king's attorney and Wentworth's friend, Sir George Radcliffe, while serving as justice of the peace.Footnote ⁶⁰ Since Radcliffe was Charles's legal representative in the north, the case took on added importance as Gower's outburst could be interpreted as an attack on the crown. Accordingly, Gower refused to submit before the council, maintaining that he could not receive a fair trial and expressing concerns about becoming another victim of the lord president's heavy-handed treatment of opponents. His claim had some basis, but he needed more substance to justify his actions. In his affidavit, therefore, Gower declared that he was unable to find counsel to represent him because ‘they refused alledging Mr Ratcliffe to be soe powerfull their that it would be much p[re]iudice to them’.Footnote ⁶¹ Consequently, he fled to London and in the process committed contempt of court. Wentworth was not prepared to let this pass: with precedent to support him, he issued a commission of rebellion empowering the serjeant-at-arms to arrest Gower. In so doing, however, the lord president pushed his jurisdiction beyond his remit. This, in turn, became the focus of the controversy. Gower petitioned the privy council for release in November, on the basis that the Council of the North had no authority to arrest him.Footnote ⁶² His demands were promptly dismissed. The case was referred to Attorney General Noy, who was ordered to discover from Radcliffe what article in the instructions gave the northern council the right to make an arrest in London.Footnote ⁶³

A successful judgement was critical if the council was to gain credibility as an organ of royal government. Moreover, Wentworth's plans to rule in absentia while he was in Ireland depended on a favourable outcome. His plea to the privy council on 1 December is quite revealing:

How influential Wentworth's appeal was when Noy returned with his report approving of the council's conduct can only be a matter for speculation, not least because the lord president had clearly exceeded the instructions of 1628.Footnote ⁶⁵ Yet one thing is clear: Wentworth's somewhat forceful statement reflects his tightening grip on power and coincided with the embryonic stages of the trademark policy of ‘thorough’, which was so enthusiastically pursued by him and his close ally Bishop Laud of London in targeting self-interest and legalistic prevarications. Indeed, there was a fundamental shift in his attitude from when he started out as lord president to Gower's indictment in 1633. He was more confident in pushing his own agenda – a confidence that was manifestly based on Charles's intention to rule without parliament. For the Personal Rule to function effectively, he knew the king had to back his ministers at all costs. What is more, most of those at court recognized it too.Footnote ⁶⁶

Gower's return to York in February 1633 to answer his original charges was a defining moment for the northern administration. The case highlighted the need to redefine the jurisdiction of the council. No doubt eager to augment his position before departing for Ireland, Wentworth remained in London in the early months of 1633, lobbying the king for greater powers.Footnote ⁶⁷ Given the recent turn of events there would be no better opportunity to tilt the balance of power in favour of the court at York. Ingram's resignation as secretary of the council gave him the break he needed to make alterations to the new ‘Commission and Instructions’.Footnote ⁶⁸ While the majority of the fifty-seven articles were restatements of the directives of 1628, there were four noteworthy alterations.Footnote ⁶⁹ Article 19 authorized the president to hear and determine cases according to the course of proceedings in the Star Chamber, and to impose penalties (such as fines), provided that they were not less than had been appointed by any Act of Parliament. Article 23 empowered the council by injunction to stay proceedings in any court of common law, while article 28 was revised so that the council could send its serjeant-at-arms to make arrest in any jurisdiction of the realm without the permission of the chancellor. Finally, a clause inserted in article 47 allowed depositions and examinations at York to be held as evidence in other courts if parties were dead or abroad.Footnote ⁷⁰

The adjustments made a significant difference. First, they gave greater discretionary powers to the president's court. Second, the extension of the council's authority beyond its jurisdiction enabled Wentworth to track down remorselessly those who opposed his rule, thereby discouraging the prospect of further complaints. Third, he secured for himself a guarantee from Charles that no changes would be made to any articles without consulting him first.Footnote ⁷¹ Above all, the articles provided the platform from which Wentworth could effectively govern from a distance.Footnote ⁷² By the same measure, the reforms were not well received. Many of the gentry regarded the new commission as an instrument for the king's representative to encroach upon their liberties. Inevitably the growing resentment directed at Wentworth's forceful rule continued to smoulder until opportunity knocked at his trial in 1641, where the revised instructions featured as the first article in the list of grievances against the lord president.Footnote ⁷³ Among the witnesses to testify was John Gower, son of Sir Thomas Gower, while his allies John Musgrave and ‘F. Thorpe’ added their support to allegations of Wentworth acting illegally. Even Edward Hyde later commented that the court at York ‘hath so prodigiously broken down the banks of the first channel in which it ran, as hath almost overwhelmed the Country, under the sea of arbitrary power, and involved the people in a labyrinth of distemper, oppression, and poverty’.Footnote ⁷⁴ Although historians have failed to pick up on this, the significance of the complaints by the Yorkshire gentry should not go unnoticed. Their concerns plainly show that contemporary observers were very mindful of the link between Wentworth's two spells of government.

IV

As significant as the reforms were in enhancing Wentworth's authority, they should not be viewed in isolation. To do so is to miss the point. The manner in which he increased his powers was part of an adaptable style of governing, as much before as after his appointment to the deputyship. Successfully altering the instructions was consistent with similar measures he carried out in Ireland. Only twelve months previously, in February 1632, he had drafted a list of propositions concerning the Irish government in which he stressed the need for greater influence in order to run the kingdom more efficiently. His track record in the north proved that he could deliver on those promises. Charles's consent to the proposals is significant not just because it marked the most critical period in Wentworth's political career, during which time he succeeded in effectively commanding two separate jurisdictions. It was also the fact that he achieved it through the proper legal channels, thereby making it almost impossible for his enemies to challenge the legitimacy of his actions.

The 1632 propositions reveal the true intent of Wentworth's designs for Ireland: no suit by way of reward was to be moved by any of the king's Irish ministers until the revenue was resolved; no confirmation of reversion of offices was allowed to be had or licensed; the deputy was to be given full power of patronage of the martial and civil list, with the assurance that the king would not permit any grants of such places; and no new office could be created without the deputy's knowledge.Footnote ⁷⁵ Its effect was to refer every major decision that concerned Irish affairs to Wentworth and thus ensure that nothing would bypass the government. This was a key development because the implementation of the propositions cut the link between Charles and his Irish subjects, while at the same time facilitating policies that trampled on their traditional rights.

The most important aspect of Wentworth's proposals was the way in which they complemented the key articles in the instructions. For example, the second proposition asked ‘that there be an express caveat entered with the secretaries, signet, privy-seal, and great seal here; that no grant, of what nature soever concerning Ireland be suffered to pass till the deputy be made acquainted, and it hath first passed the great seal of that kingdom’.Footnote ⁷⁶ All of this bears a striking resemblance to the petition Wentworth sent to Charles in 1631. Convincing the king to enter it into the instructions no doubt encouraged him to make the same request when drafting the propositions for the Irish government. He justified his proposal by asserting that it ensured accountability and transparency because ministers could be compelled to explain ‘their negligence or unfaithfulness’ if occasion should warrant. The parallels with recent successes in tightening his grip on the northern administration are patent. Presenting a similar course of action for Ireland suggests that he not only had a good idea of what awaited him, but also that he judged the problems within the Irish government in the same light as those he experienced at York.

From this perspective, the second proposal was not the only provision which can be associated with the guidelines outlined for the presidency. The fourth proposal read ‘that no particular complaint of injustice or oppression be admitted here against any unless it appear the party made his first address to the deputy’.Footnote ⁷⁷ It was arguably the most contentious recommendation. Preventing disgruntled Irish subjects from reversing the original verdict by going to the Westminster courts was vital if Wentworth's authoritarian plans were to progress. He was mindful that factions within the Irish privy council were a major factor in Falkland's dismissal, so a request to reinforce the deputy's authority was entirely plausible.Footnote ⁷⁸ Blocking protestations against him and frustrating potentially dangerous rumours from getting to Whitehall was controversial but, crucially, Wentworth had precedent based on what he had achieved in the north. Evaluating his Irish proposals in the immediate context of the improvements he had made in the jurisdiction of the Council of the North is therefore essential: specifically, where he was permitted to adjudicate over offences consistent with the proceedings in the Star Chamber. In both circumstances he argued that such measures protected the honour politics of the king's representative and his administration. Indeed, Wentworth's influence in the direction of royal policy should not be underestimated. He may well have increased his chances of promoting his agenda by playing on Charles's insecurities. At a minimum, it was a practical demonstration of the concentration of powers which convinced the king of the need to strengthen the deputyship. But the fact that no other minister achieved such a feat was indicative of Wentworth's willingness to push the limits of his authority to the edge.

Continuity, then, played a major role in Wentworth's preparations. There are also noticeable similarities in the political rhetoric he employed to encourage greater cohesion and co-operation between the king's representative and subjects. His speech to the Irish parliament in July 1634 is revealing in this regard. Although the focus was finding a solution to the financial crisis, there are a number of correlations with his opening address to the northern councillors six years previously. At the heart of both speeches was an appeal to put the concerns of the crown ahead of private interest – the cancer of ‘good government’. Calling on members to overcome personal feuds and rivalries may have been standard practice but it was also a sign of Wentworth's determination to tackle vigorously such ‘perverse and malevolent spirits’.Footnote ⁷⁹ ‘Let no such narrow, inward considerations possess you’, he proclaimed to those in attendance at the Irish parliament, ‘but roundly and chearfully apply yourselves to the contentment of his Majesty after your long peace, let your encrease be that of our best grounds.’ Stressing his point, he referred to a quote from Spenser's ‘Defence of Lord Grey’: qui majore ubertate gratiam quietis referre solent (‘those who enjoy a greater measure of peace are accustomed to render gratitude’).Footnote ⁸⁰ He cited the exact same phrase in his opening address to the northern council. The circumstances he was relating to were not dissimilar either: criticizing the conduct of ‘distemper'd minds’, he stated in no uncertain terms how ‘subjects must lay down their lives for the defence of Kings’ before turning to Spenser as a way to reinforce his argument.Footnote ⁸¹

Wentworth's use of the same quotation was no coincidence. There are other comparisons of note, particularly in his sustained attack against those intent on ignoring the need to settle the affairs of the Irish kingdom. ‘This is the most mischievous principle that can be laid in reason of state’, he argued, and was at pains to highlight how the interests of the crown and the interests of the king's subjects were interlinked. He appealed to them ‘to study this not perfunctorily but conscientiously’ and warned them of the consequences: ‘that it fall not unto you as water upon the ground, which is not to be gathered up again’.Footnote ⁸² It harked back to his plea to the northern councillors when he called for unity in order to make the administration more efficient. ‘We must apply a square courage to our proceedings,’ he declared, ‘not fall away as water spilt upon the ground, from that which is once justly, warrantably done.’Footnote ⁸³ On both occasions he used the analogy of spilt water as an ultimatum. It was a subtle but unambiguous statement, forewarning his opponents that resistance would not be tolerated.Footnote ⁸⁴

The most notable feature of both speeches is the manner in which Wentworth articulated his political principles and the policy of his administration. Members of the northern council and Irish parliament respectively were left in no doubt about his intentions. Confronting faction was central to his programme for government, as his assault on prohibitions clearly indicates. The circumstances in Ireland were no different. Wentworth repeatedly made reference to Charles's expectation of ‘the honour of your trust’ and underlined the importance of parliamentary business not suffering from ‘poor suspicions or jealousies to vitiate your judgments … strike not therefore upon the same rock of distrust’. He warned against private meetings being convened when parliament was in session (probably intended as a snipe at the Old English in particular) and vowed to ‘punish the transgression with a heavy and severe hand’. Furthermore, particular emphasis was put on the dangers of religious, ethnic, and economic divisions which threatened the ratification of the six subsidies.Footnote ⁸⁵ His address to the Irish houses of parliament suggests that Ireland and the north held much in common. Consideration of this viewpoint might explain how Wentworth accomplished so much in such a short period of time.

V

When Roe commented on the lord deputy's success in the Irish parliament, it was very much in line with the accolades that Wentworth received from his allies in England.Footnote ⁸⁶ Managing a diverse and delicately balanced assembly was undoubtedly impressive, and the significance that historians have placed on it is justified. Despite the sizeable corpus of work on Wentworth, however, it is remarkable that so little attention has focused on the formative years of his political agenda. This is in part explained by the direction of scholarship, which has generally concentrated on three particular stages of his career: the turbulent parliamentary years in the 1620s, his deputyship in Ireland, and his dramatic fall from grace in 1641. What is more, these investigations tend to be examined in isolation, instead of taking a wider perspective when assessing Wentworth's ambitions. Conspicuous by its omission is the lack of any thorough analysis of his presidency of the north. As a result, historians of Caroline England and Ireland have underestimated the importance of such a critical phase in the development of his skills. By not considering past experiences they have overlooked clear patterns in his ruthless desire to establish prerogative rule and efficient government.

There is compelling evidence that the confidence Wentworth displayed in executing his plan was constructed on the solid foundation of his accomplishments. In this regard, the north can be seen as a useful political prelude, if not actually a rehearsal, to the challenges he faced in Dublin. Among other things, it is evident that he had a taste for power: barely six months after he assumed office at York he had to be cautioned by the king not to exceed the articles established in the instructions. Yet by the time he set sail for Dublin in July 1633, that mandate had been considerably revised in favour of giving him far more flexibility in the imposition of his authority. In exactly the same way, he set about devising the list of propositions for the deputyship, which he drafted in February 1632. What is striking is the similarity between the two mandates for government. Such a comparison clearly reveals a direct link between Wentworth's vision of the roles of president and viceroy. The parallels do not end there. In establishing greater control over his administrations, the measures he introduced to eliminate faction are also consistent. One of the defining characteristics of his rule was the means by which he used the law as an effective instrument of intimidation. For example, the charge of rebellion against Gower carried strong resonances with the accusations of mutiny against Mountnorris, in 1635.Footnote ⁸⁷ It begs the question: why were the victims of Wentworth's Irish administration so ill prepared prior to his arrival? The warning signs were clear to see.Footnote ⁸⁸

Three conclusions become inescapable. First, Wentworth's desire for stronger government was already apparent before he had assumed the deputyship, not to mention his appointment. Second, his endeavours to implement the same initiatives in Ireland that had been so successfully executed in the north show that his style of governing and eagerness to consolidate prerogative rule was not some kind of spontaneous response to a uniquely Irish environment. Rather it was the product of an accumulated and tested experience that could be applied ready-made in a different but not entirely dissimilar political setting. As the observations of both Nicholas and Nicholaldie indicate, Wentworth's methods were already the subject of debate before he made any impact as deputy. Finally, the fact that he adopted the same approach in both jurisdictions demonstrates that he viewed the challenges at York and Dublin in a similar light. Significantly, he was not alone in realizing this. The grievances presented by members of the Yorkshire gentry at Wentworth's trial prove that they also noted comparisons, albeit belatedly and to their considerable cost.