In November 1921, just over two years after the British and Afghan governments had opened talks, their representatives signed the Anglo-Afghan Treaty. Until almost the last moment, Sir Henry Dobbs, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Chief Government Representative (Britain's chief negotiator), doubted whether any useful agreement could be reached with the Afghan government. However, the negotiations were concluded with a treaty which, contrary to the expectations of many—particularly observers in Delhi—successfully secured Afghan agreement to provisions regarded by the British as crucial to India's security on its frontier, internally and internationally. The treaty after all defined the border and the relationship of both countries to the frontier tribes. It also set the legal framework for the relationship between India and Afghanistan which remained in place until Indian independence.
In contrast to the most detailed existing account of the negotiations produced by the diplomatic historian Ludwig Adamec,Footnote 1 this article explores for the first time the critical role played in the making of the Treaty by Dobbs, the ‘man on the spot’. In 1949, Kerr Fraser-Tytler—writing to some extent from his own experience—described how individual officers often had to—or chose to—act on their own authority, at times with significant and not always intended results.Footnote 2 Since then, how the ‘man on the spot’ could affect what happened within British India and its relationship with the countries and tribes both on its borders and beyond as well as with the British government in London, has been much discussed, notably by Malcolm YappFootnote 3 and then more recently by Ben Hopkins,Footnote 4 Magnus Marsden,Footnote 5 Christian TripodiFootnote 6 and Martin Bayly.Footnote 7 Moreover, the complexity of ‘tribal’ relations with state authorities and their representatives, together with the diversity and agency of frontier communities, has been foregrounded in Marsden and Hopkins's Fragments of the Afghan Frontier as well as in studies by, among others, Mark Condos and Elizabeth Kolsky.Footnote 8
Yapp and Tripodi consider the influence of the ‘Politicals’ in the Indian Civil Service of whom Dobbs was one. This article, therefore, assesses the impact that a ‘Political’, in this case Dobbs, could have as chief negotiator when he worked not in frontier areas but at the very centre of difficult diplomatic negotiations with a sovereign state on India's borders, Afghanistan. Afghanistan occupied a key place in India's strategic considerations and in 1921 had only recently taken from India control of its own foreign relations. Many of the issues in these negotiations were the issues that ‘Politicals’, such as Dobbs, sought to influence. These officials were important both in relation to the exercise of their immediate responsibilities often on the frontier and, as far as Indian security was concerned, dealing with issues that encompassed borders, relations with the tribes, relations with neighbouring Afghanistan and potentially hostile foreign powers such as Soviet Russia or the Turks. Moreover, their success hinged on winning the agreement of the various parties involved, all of whom had differing priorities—in Dobbs’ case, the Afghan government, ministers in London, and the Viceroy in Delhi. The negotiating process was also further complicated by the complex and volatile international situation. ‘Politicals’ influence, Yapp writes, largely depended on their control of information. Policy decisions were frequently the result of how and how far their ideas were modified in line with the different interests and attitudes of superior authorities in India and likewise in line with decisions taken between London and Delhi.Footnote 9
In the context of these international negotiations, the following discussion points to differences and delays among decision-makers as a factor that simultaneously helped and hindered Dobbs in relation to delivering the best outcome as he saw it. In these treaty negotiations, his clear and firm views reflected his experience and so this article demonstrates just how far they affected the negotiating process and influenced the final results. But although Dobbs as the chief negotiator was central to the discussions with the Afghans, there is little or no sense of the occasionally key part that he played in Adamec's detailed account. On three occasions, for instance, it took between six and eight weeks for the British government to agree on Dobbs’ instructions. During those periods and while the international situation was continually changing, he juggled the tricky task of preventing a breakdown in negotiations while keeping open the possibility of reaching agreement without weakening the British position. This article accordingly focuses on the crucial final phase, showing for the first time how—in the midst of conflicting views and indecision—Dobbs’ ‘on the spot’ advice encouraged a critical change in tactics that determined the nature of the deal which was eventually struck.
Moreover, the approach taken here to Dobbs’ role in the twists and turns of the negotiations has been prompted by new material not previously available to historians, namely Dobbs’ recently-discovered letters and personal papers.Footnote 10 Dobbs, writing mainly to his wife, perhaps not unexpectedly emphasised his own part in the proceedings and presented his actions in a favourable light. However, the letters bring out aspects that he could not cover in either official correspondence or in his reports, precisely the sources on which Adamec's account is based. Dobbs’ letters provide for the first time his personal views on the negotiations, and this fresh perspective in turn has also required a reappraisal of the better-known official sources.
Background to the Treaty
The 1921 Anglo-Afghan Treaty was drawn up to define the relationship between British India and Afghanistan. It followed on from the agreement reached at Rawalpindi in August 1919 which had ended the hostilities in the Third Afghan War. The hostilities had been initiated in May by the new Amir Amanullah, who, following the murder of his father Amir Habibullah, had claimed the throne from his uncle, Nasrullah, and was looking to divert his opponents by undertaking a military adventure against British India. After a little over three weeks, Amanullah sued for peace.
Less than two weeks after talks opened, on 8 August 1919, the chief negotiator at Rawalpindi Sir A. H. Grant achieved agreement. He had been able to conclude the discussions so speedily for two reasons. First, the Amir had demanded that the British government relinquish the control over Afghan foreign relations that it had exercised for forty years and instead recognise Afghanistan as a fully independent state. Amanullah had made it clear that this was non-negotiable. The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, who had been persuaded that the risk of fighting restarting must be avoided at all costs, authorised the concession, wishing to strengthen Amanullah's position as he believed that this would improve the prospect of greater stability in Afghanistan.Footnote 11 Second, in the interests of arriving at a speedy settlement, difficult issues were to be avoided. Grant thus obtained Afghan agreement to a somewhat minimalist text establishing peace. All hostilities were to cease immediately. Other provisions included a prohibition on the import of arms through India, the ending of the Indian subsidy to Afghanistan, and acceptance of the Indo-Afghan frontier as previously recognised together with a British commission to demarcate any undefined sections. The agreement also incorporated a provision that after six months the Government of India would accept an Afghan mission to discuss matters of mutual interest and the re-establishment of friendly relations provided that the Afghan Government's conduct had shown that it sincerely wanted to regain British friendship.Footnote 12 At the same time, the Government of India had acknowledged the full independence of the Afghan state in a side letter.
The narrow scope of this Rawalpindi Agreement, as it was known, however, had left a number of issues outstanding between the two parties. Among these were the matters on which the Amir's predecessors Abdur Rahman and Habibullah had given undertakings that had been reinforced by the payment of generous Indian subsidies. These arrangements had included an understanding that Afghanistan and India would not interfere with the frontier tribes beyond each other's borders. Keen to demonstrate Afghanistan's now fully independent status by concluding a formal treaty, two months after the Rawalpindi Agreement was signed, Amanullah approached the King Emperor and the Government of India about opening talks.
The Rawalpindi Agreement marked a fundamental shift in the formal relationship between Afghanistan and British India. Anglo-Afghan relations had long been driven by British perceptions of the risks to Indian security and stability on its borders and beyond, and by their view of how best to safeguard British India. Ben Hopkins argues that British threat perceptions, driven by its fear of France and then Russia (the ‘Great Game’), set the framework within which its officials viewed Afghanistan.Footnote 13 Britain sought to delineate a frontier between India and Afghanistan and then control India's side of it (the ‘close border’ policy). Influenced by contemporary European ideas of states and borders, Britain's focus was on a physical frontier rather than on an understanding of the people within the region.Footnote 14 Despite this, Britain made two failed and disastrous interventions in Afghanistan in 1842 and 1878 in which they sought to dominate the region as a whole by installing pliant rulers in Kabul against the wishes of the tribes. After the 1878 catastrophe, the British briefly favoured a fragmented Afghanistan in the hope that this would allow no-one to control the region. The Russian attempt to dominate Afghanistan through the promotion of its own candidate as Amir then led to a third approach, namely to support Amirs who were independent within borders established by Britain which in turn would control relations with those beyond the established frontiers.Footnote 15 These included not only Russia and Persia but also the tribal areas on the Indian side of the border.Footnote 16 However, shortly after his accession, Amanullah had launched the Third Afghan War as a result of which Britain had agreed to relinquish this control at Rawalpindi.
As Christian Tripodi observes, Indian control of Afghan foreign policy had been far from comprehensive.Footnote 17 Thus, Abdur Rahman had ignored the British prohibition on making direct contact with foreign powers and had been in touch with various states including Russia. During the First World War, his son and successor Habibullah had flirted with enemy powers but stopped short of actions that would have compromised Afghan neutrality.Footnote 18 These circumstances had led the Viceroy Lord Chelmsford to suggest that little of value was being given up since Britain had anyway not been able to control Afghan external relations.
Tripodi also presents British imperial control of Afghan foreign policy as anachronistic, as did at the time Chelmsford who favoured a ‘modern’ approach, together with the Secretary of State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu. Chelmsford believed that Afghan independence should be accepted as a matter of principle, whatever its implications for India's relationship with its neighbour.Footnote 19 This approach introduced a further novel element into the situation. Earlier agreements had been made personally with Amirs Abdur Rahman and Habibullah. This time, Amanullah insisted that the agreement be a treaty between the British government and his own. As Tripodi points out, the Government of India now had to “construct a frontier policy that preserved a delicate diplomatic relationship with its strategically important neighbour and satisfied British India's wider strategic concerns”.Footnote 20 Furthermore, Afghan contacts with the tribes on the Indian side of the border remained a critical element in their relations with India. Indeed Amanullah later informed Dobbs that his best fighters in the Third Afghan War had been members of tribes located on the Indian side of the border.
However, abandoning Indian control over Afghan foreign policy was not as ‘straightforward’ as Tripodi claims,Footnote 21 especially when the different views in both London and Delhi are considered. In London, ministers had reluctantly acquiesced in the Rawalpindi Agreement and its recognition of Afghanistan's independence—India making the excuse that time pressure had made it impossible to obtain London's prior consent. Nonetheless, the authorities in London deplored the tactics and consequent “surrender of prestige”.Footnote 22 Curzon, Britain's Foreign Secretary and former Viceroy who was an old-fashioned imperialist, saw no reason to change policies that he believed had worked well for many years. This view was shared by some Government of India officials as well. This latter group wanted to see India reassert its former control over Afghanistan's external relations and, as before, to cement any agreement with a subsidy.Footnote 23
A difficult context for the British negotiator
In October 1919 when the Amir asked for talks to start, it was British India that appeared to be in the less favourable negotiating position, notwithstanding the discrepancy in the respective strengths of the two parties. India's failure to press on in 1919 had made the Amir “doubtful of our strength” and in consequence to think that he could extort great concessions.Footnote 24 Amanullah's success in achieving at Rawalpindi what he most wanted—complete independence from India—when the fighting had not gone Afghanistan's way encouraged this view. The fact that India had surrendered valuable bargaining counters without securing anything in return further supported the Amir's belief that India was so weakened that it would have no choice but to give in to whatever Afghanistan demanded. Indeed, the Permanent Secretary at the India Office Sir Arthur Hirtzel commented privately to Dobbs, “it looks to me as though your predecessor has got us into an almost insoluble difficulty”.Footnote 25
This unfavourable starting position, from a British perspective, was only one of many factors that placed British India in an apparently disadvantageous position. Afghan negotiating success at Rawalpindi, as Ludwig Adamec writes, enabled the Amir to represent that he had triumphed over British India.Footnote 26 The Afghans’ straightforward objective also gave them a distinct advantage. Afghanistan's aim was “to sell her friendship in the dearest market and at the moment when it is most valuable”.Footnote 27 Thus, its government was conducting separate negotiations with the British and with Bolshevik Russia at the same time.
India, on the other hand, was facing a range of unfavourable challenges, both on its doorstep and further afield. It had been worn down by support for British struggles in the First World War and felt under increased financial pressure. In 1919, some regiments were reluctant to fight, and on the frontier the Khyber Rifles’ refusal to do so had led to their being disbanded. The Indian independence movement was picking up speed following the 1919 Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and in the face of the repressive Rowlatt Acts. Resistance and unrest increased, culminating in the Amritsar massacre on 13 April 1919.Footnote 28 These difficulties were compounded by continuing indecision and debate within and between London and the Government of India, difficulties that were often exacerbated by the slowness and unreliability of their communication systems.
On India's borders, the Amir, a supporter of Turkey and the Caliphate, was raising jihad among the frontier tribes, welcoming Indian revolutionaries to Afghanistan, and intriguing with Muslims in Kushk, Ferghana and Bokhara.Footnote 29 Russia, long seen as a continuing threat to British India, was actively supporting Afghanistan. At Kabul, Bolshevik representatives joined Indian agitators and members of the Turkish army who were all promoting the Muslim cause and encouraging Afghanistan against British India. Dobbs when he got to Kabul described it as “simply swarming with Bolsheviks, Turks, Germans and Austrians”.Footnote 30
In the confused and unstable international situation that followed the upheaval of the First World War, therefore, representatives of unfriendly powers had great scope to present elements of this fragmented reality in such a way as to increase Afghanistan's determination to challenge British India. The 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland, for instance, had hinted that there was trouble at the heart of the British Empire. Exaggerating Britain's weakness, the Turks in Kabul had told Afghans that Germany had not really been defeated and would restart the war.Footnote 31 By 1920, the old imperial powers faced active opposition from emerging new nations. Indeed, five years later, Dobbs summed up the general situation in 1920 along the following lines: “from India to Egypt, a welter of resentment against the policy of the British and their allies whose aims were everywhere industriously misrepresented”.Footnote 32
The pressure of world opinion led by the United StatesFootnote 33 further undermined imperial authority, including that of Britain. At the Paris Peace Conference, the Allies recognised that continuing direct rule on the colonial model would no longer be acceptable for countries or provinces previously under German or Ottoman imperial control. In the face of pressure from the Americans and their President Woodrow Wilson, the Allies accepted in principle that these territories should be given the opportunity for self-determination.Footnote 34 Amanullah was well-aware of this change and, moreover, used the argument of self-determination first to suggest that Afghanistan should have been represented at the Paris Peace Conference and then, in the course of the treaty negotiations, in relation to tribes.
The chief negotiator's outlook
As the British Government's Chief Representative, Sir Henry Dobbs led the treaty negotiations in Kabul and the discussions in Mussoorie that preceded them. Against a volatile and constantly changing international background, he faced, on one side, the ambitious opportunism of Afghanistan and, on the other, a kaleidoscope of conflicting government views in London and Delhi as well as extensive delays when sometimes he believed that decisions were very much needed. These circumstances put him in a position to play a critical role in resolving specific issues and taking forward the negotiations, but they also raised questions over which approach he would take.
Dobbs, who took over as Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in September 1919, had followed a career path in the Indian Civil Service career that made him particularly ‘well-equipped’ to conduct the negotiations. He had direct experience of their four main components: borders, the Afghans, the frontier tribes and the wider international situation.
Dobbs’ contacts with borders and with the Afghans had begun in 1903 when he was first British Consul for Seistan and Kain and then British Commissioner on the Russo-Afghan boundary. A year later, he acted as Secretary to Sir Louis Dane's mission to Kabul and in 1906 was in charge of Amir Habibullah's tour of India. In 1921, he regarded Amir Amanullah as sensitive and unreasonable. From his perspective, although the Amir was an autocrat he needed to stand well with his people—this was a main reason for Amanullah's concern about criticisms from Muslim extremists in India—and needed something to support his good opinion of himself and his reputation among his people.Footnote 35
Dobbs also had ten years’ experience with tribes some in the North West Frontier Province, but most in Baluchistan and much of that in 1919 when Afghanistan was fomenting trouble as part of the Third Afghan War. He had resigned from the Foreign Department in 1908 to take a post in Baluchistan, a move which in his view had prevented him from “falling into secretariat grooves”.Footnote 36 This experience had certainly made him a great admirer of that earlier and highly successful ‘man on the spot’, Sir Robert Sandeman. Dobbs admired both Sandeman's ‘tribal system’—creating a community of interest through subsidies and the power of patronageFootnote 37—and his readiness to use force.Footnote 38 Dobbs accordingly wanted to see India bring the frontier tribes under control “and do away with our heel of Achilles”.Footnote 39 “Tribal confidence”, he commented, “is easy to shake but hard to restore”.Footnote 40 While there were officials who acknowledged that violence in frontier environs arose from complex colonial engagements with frontier inhabitants, Dobb's view was that a great deal of force would be necessary on parts of the North West Frontier, particularly in Waziristan, and so he advocated this approach. For him, high-profile military measures represented the most effective means of dealing with unrest there. His handling of the 1918 Marri uprising when he was Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan had persuaded him of the benefits of discouraging local tribes from joining those who were already in revolt. On that occasion Dobbs had contrived to obtain additional military support despite Government of India reluctance.Footnote 41 The revolt was suppressed and tribal hostilities in Baluchistan contained when the Third Afghan War broke out.Footnote 42 Indeed, his manipulation of both the situation and its presentation exemplified the methods of the ‘Politicals’ as described by Yapp.Footnote 43 Moreover in Dobbs’ view, there were now plenty of troops in India to deal with trouble on the frontier, and had been even during the First World War.Footnote 44 In his view, colleagues’ concerns about the extent to which the country had been weakened by war were much exaggerated and overlooked the fact that relative to other powers if not to its past, British India was incomparably stronger.
Dobbs also had firm personal views on the role of treaties and their limitations. As he had always made clear to Lord Chelmsford, he did not accept the Viceroy's assessment that simply because Afghanistan had at times ignored British control over Afghan external relations, the agreement providing for it and abandoned at Rawalpindi had not been worth retaining. He argued that such formal agreements could usefully provide legitimate grounds for pursuing points of concern.Footnote 45 But, as he also commented, “a treaty alone [would] not bring peace” and particularly on the frontier he believed that a treaty needed to be underpinned by obvious strength if the Afghans were to observe it.Footnote 46 Moreover, the fact that Afghanistan was now a sovereign independent state making its own diplomatic agreements created a direct link between tribal, frontier and international diplomatic issues.Footnote 47
Dobbs’ apparent sensitivity to the contemporary international dimension was in part a likely result of his time as a political officer in Mesopotamia (later Iraq) where he had frequent contacts with politicians and diplomats. Once the Allies had accepted the principle of self-determination, Dobbs believed the movement towards self-government to be inevitable. He was clear that Afghanistan would not voluntarily put its external relations under Indian control and argued that the Afghans should be left free to assemble as many ambassadors as they could and “given rope” even if this meant that the Bolsheviks would be “simply walking into our vacant place in Afghanistan”.Footnote 48 In contrast to previous Indian fears over Russian influence in Afghanistan, Dobbs remained relatively unconcerned, appreciating the weakness of the early Soviet regime at that point. However, he recognised fears about Bolshevik revolutionary ideas and was keen to limit Russian opportunities to stir up trouble within India or on its frontiers—arguably exemplifying the readiness of ‘Politicals’ to assess ‘external’ threats by reference to the Indian situation.Footnote 49
Dobbs may well be recognised as having been the chief negotiator in 1921, but the most detailed existing accountFootnote 50 and indeed Dobbs’ own Reports,Footnote 51 which Adamec makes extensive use of, give little sense of what impact he had on the negotiations. Drawing on accounts in Dobbs’ personal papers and a further reading of official sources, this article now turns to an exploration of how at key points in the negotiations his views and recommendations may have shaped the decision taken. The attitude of Amanullah was a critical factor from a British perspective, and judgements about this depended entirely on Dobbs’ assessments. Indeed, during the crucial final phase in the talks, Dobbs was negotiating alone with the Amir—certainly controlling vital information—an important tool that—again—‘Politicals’ typically used.Footnote 52
The route to the negotiating table
Soon after the Rawalpindi Agreement was signed, Amanullah asked the Indian government to open talks, as provided for in the agreement although—from a British perspective—he had failed to meet its requirement that the Afghan authorities needed to have demonstrated their sincere wish for British friendship before discussions on a ‘treaty of friendship’ could start. After all, he was openly courting the Russians, facilitating their anti-British propaganda, encouraging jihad everywhere including in India, and welcoming Indian revolutionaries to Afghanistan. Since the Government of India expected to include a subsidy in any ‘friendship’ treaty, its officials were looking for some indication that this would not be spent in support of hostile activities. But the Amir claimed that these activities were merely his government exercising the normal freedoms of an independent state. Dobbs, who was at that point Foreign Secretary to the government of India, then suggested a meeting to clear away misunderstandings and “prepare the way for a permanent and friendly agreement”.Footnote 53 The Viceroy issued an invitation in January 1920. The Afghan delegation arrived at Mussoorie where talks began on 17 April 1920.
The British Government in both London and Delhi agreed the main purpose of the Mussoorie Conference was to have a “free and frank” discussion of both Afghan and British positions and to find out what each party wanted from the other.Footnote 54 Dobbs, the Chief British Representative, commented before the start that he personally had “no great hopes” of the conference.Footnote 55 Hence, he had no hesitation in suspending the talks on his own authority after only a week to demonstrate to the Afghans that what he saw as their efforts at intimidation on the frontier were not acceptable. In early June, some six weeks later, talks resumed. On the key issue of the frontier tribes, having admitted that they had intrigued with tribes on the British side, the Afghans made “extravagant” demands to extend their control and tried to use the argument of self-determination. Dobbs, however, left them in no doubt that the British would cede neither territory nor control: “We have to look beyond all things to the safety of our Empire and our frontier and you cannot expect us to give the keys of our gates into other people's hands”.Footnote 56 But Afghan support for a treaty with British India was increasing because Mahmud Tarzi, the chief Afghan representative and Foreign Minister, now compared the power and stability of the British Government favourably with growing doubts about the continued survival of the Bolshevik regime. The Afghans were prepared to accept a general statement that Dobbs had drawn up of what friendly relations should mean, and which both sides regarded as “a sort of charter of our relations”. After some weeks, they were ready to consider a draft “treaty of friendship” prepared by Dobbs. However, the Viceroy was not persuaded the time was right for “friendship” treaty negotiations and rejected Dobbs’ recommendation to start these straightaway. The Conference, Dobbs believed, had achieved its “modest” aims and in view of the Viceroy's decision, Dobbs brought it to a close at the end of July.Footnote 57
Dobbs had proposed moving immediately to treaty negotiations in order to end competition from Bolshevik offers in Kabul and also because he believed the imminent arrival of the Turkish general Jemal Pasha would greatly increase the difficulties of reaching any Anglo-Afghan agreement.Footnote 58 Indeed, despite Afghan disillusion with the Soviets over their machinations in central Asia and especially against the Amir of Bokhara, they were persuaded to agree to an advantageous draft treaty with Bolshevik Russia in September.Footnote 59 In Dobbs’ view, this meant that a great opportunity had been missed. The Amir later supported this view when he alleged that had Britain opened negotiations following Mussoorie the Afghans would not have agreed a draft treaty with the Bolsheviks.Footnote 60
By the autumn, the Government of India was becoming anxious to counteract the growing Russian and Turkish influence at Kabul and judged that wider international conditions were not unpropitious for an agreement. When they received the Amir's request of 6 October to open treaty negotiations, they therefore responded positively and recommended that a mission should be sent to Kabul. However, the British Government in London was reluctant to agree. The contents of the Russo-Afghan treaty were not known and they were not prepared to conclude any ‘friendship’ treaty with Afghanistan unless it was clear that there were no anti-British provisions in that treaty.Footnote 61 The Secretary of State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu, had telegraphed that “the mission could not go, everyone was against it”. The debate continued until 8 December and may have only been ended when a firm telegram, apparently drafted from his hospital bed by Dobbs, helped to secure “a snarling and grudging” acquiescence from Montagu.Footnote 62 The Secretary of State, Dobbs felt, consented to the mission unwillingly, commenting that London was reluctant to override the “deliberate judgement” of the Government of India in a matter “lying so peculiarly within its province”.Footnote 63 But these exchanges had lasted two months and in that time external events had taken a less favourable turn for Britain. The British mission eventually arrived in Kabul on 7 January 1921.
The treaty negotiations: another perspective
Adamec'sFootnote 64 account of the treaty negotiations follows Dobbs’ own Kabul Report Footnote 65 and so divides the treaty negotiations into four phases. This article, in contrast, sees the negotiations as falling into two phases. During the first, the British Government focussed exclusively on trying to secure a “friendship” treaty. The second phase began with the British representative—Dobbs—exploring the possibility of reaching agreement on the alternative of a “neighbourly” treaty. This revised phasing reflects the relative importance of the “neighbourly” treaty that eventually displaced any form of “friendship” treaty and which was the approach taken in the final agreement. This phasing also allows for a fuller discussion of Dobbs’ role which proved to be significant in changing over to and then delivering the former during the second phase.
The essential difference between the “neighbourly” treaty and the “friendship” treaty was that the latter included provision for a generous subsidy to the Afghan government. A subsidy had always been part of earlier Indian agreements with Afghan Amirs and was regarded by the Government of India in Delhi as essential to securing Afghan observance of any treaty provisions. In the second phase of the negotiations, as defined here, Delhi gradually abandoned its traditional approach. This change emerges more sharply mainly because this article contends that Dobbs, the ‘man on the spot’, generally took a hard line and so played a much greater part than appeared to be the case through Adamec's account or indeed Dobbs’ own Kabul Report. Dobbs was determined any treaty should deliver for India. He saw no reason to make concessions without getting something worthwhile in return. Indeed, he believed that failure to secure a treaty was less damaging than agreeing to a weak one because any appearance of weakness would invite Afghan and tribal aggression against India. His firm stance, therefore, affected both the course of the negotiations and the substance of the propositions considered. It influenced the decision-makers, particularly the Secretary of State for India as he moved towards the “neighbourly” treaty approach. The analysis offered here also brings out more fully than Adamec's account the implications of the differences between officials and minsters in London and Delhi over the course of the negotiations and for the treaty.
Efforts to agree a ‘friendship’ treaty: January to September
The starting point for the Kabul negotiations was the draft treaty that Dobbs had discussed with the Afghan delegation at the end of the Mussoorie Conference and which they had then found broadly acceptable, a “friendship” treaty not dissimilar from the agreements made personally with Amanullah's predecessors, Abdur Rahman and Habibullah. Essentially this draft treaty sought to define what would constitute future friendly relations between India and Afghanistan. Its provisions covered main elements in Indo-Afghan policy: the Indo-Afghan border and relationships with the tribes on either side of it, various aspects of each country's external relations and a subsidy.Footnote 66
On the first two elements, the frontier and its tribes, Dobbs’ draft required Afghanistan to abstain from inciting against India's tribesmen within the British boundary and echoed India's long-standing but often ignored agreement with the Amir's predecessors. The draft then reaffirmed Afghanistan's independence. This raised a multiplicity of issues which the two states needed to identify and agree on for the first time. Dobbs directed his efforts towards defining what “friendly relations” might mean in the international community that Afghanistan was so eager to join. The draft also promised a subsidy and other benefits.
Before the formal talks at Kabul began on 13 January, Dobbs raised privately with the Amir and his foreign minister Tarzi the specific external issue of most concern—Afghan's dealings with Soviet Russia. Relying on intelligence sources, Dobbs wanted to make clear, without embarrassing the Amir publicly, that the British “knew everything” about Afghanistan's “tortuous intrigues” with others and in particular that the Afghans and Soviets were close to finalising a treaty.Footnote 67 The official talks then started. Afghanistan had always been short of money and arms. These and other benefits had been promised by the Russians in a treaty that was under discussion. The Afghans thus felt able to press on with extravagant demands for a much larger subsidy, for more control over frontier tribes, and to reopen boundary issues settled by the Rawalpindi agreement. The frequently-repeated British refusal to make any concessions on territory or on the tribes dominated discussions, which almost broke down in February over Dobbs’ hard line on those matters. As discussion continued, Dobbs again privately revealed to Tarzi and the Amir that the British had details of Afghan “double-dealing” with the Soviets over the past two years. (This had been picked up by British intelligence decrypting and reading their telegrams.) He again raised these points outside the official discussions to avoid Afghan loss of face but was unable to exploit Afghan discomfiture because of the delays in his receiving government instructions.Footnote 68
By April, British concerns over Afghanistan's relations with Russia had become the key element in the negotiations and dominated discussions over the next five months. Britain continued to insist on two points. One was that the Afghans themselves should disclose the terms of any Russo-Afghan treaty and the second was that the Russians should not be allowed to establish consulates in Eastern Afghanistan whose sole purpose—the British alleged and the Afghans admittedFootnote 69—was to foment trouble against British India. The Afghans were very hostile to such conditions which they believed would constrain their freedom of action in external relations, and suspected India of trying to reassert the control that it had formerly exercised.
Both Dobbs and Lord Chelmsford did not think that Afghan dealings with Russia should prevent treaty negotiations going ahead.Footnote 70 London, however, was adamant that Afghanistan had to break with Russia if friendship talks with Britain were to continue. By the spring, the Amir's increasing disenchantment with the Bolsheviks, largely because of their treatment of Muslims in central Asia (most notably the Amir of Bokhara), again offered an opportunity for Britain. However, at the same time, differences of view, uncertainty and delays, particularly within the Government of India, meant Dobbs found himself unable to take advantage of the situation.
Matters were not helped from Dobb's perspective by the fact that decisions were no longer being referred to Lord Chelmsford who had believed that what was important was to get “a satisfactory and lasting settlement”.Footnote 71 The new Viceroy, Lord Reading, who had arrived via the legal profession and the woolsack, was unfamiliar with the Indian context. This lack of previous Indian experience made him very dependent on his officials, something that Dobbs found frustrating. In Afghan matters, the main official involved was Denys Bray who was acting Foreign Secretary while Dobbs was heading the Kabul mission. Dobbs expressed concern to the Permanent Secretary in the India Office in London about what he regarded as a lack of knowledge about Afghanistan in the Government of India Foreign Department.Footnote 72 When Lord Reading ventured to approach Dobbs directly because Bray was “travelling”, Dobbs crossly told his wife that he had had to send the Viceroy “some simple and fundamental truths about the Afghans which a baby should have known”.Footnote 73 Dobbs also thought he could not trust “the philosophical and paradoxical Bray to be firm and very great firmness will be needed immediately towards Afghanistan and the tribes”.Footnote 74 Again, from Dobbs’ perspective, the cautious Bray won Reading's support for a series of what Dobbs regarded as “weak” positions and this put Reading at odds with Dobbs. In correspondence with his wife in which Dobbs was free to express his personal prejudices and air office rivalries, he commented that he suspected Bray of hoping that Dobbs’ differences with the Viceroy would increase Bray's chances of taking over from himself as Foreign Secretary.Footnote 75
In fact in April Dobbs had proposed what in his view constituted a generous offer that he argued might have persuaded the Amir to break completely with the Russians. Bray and Reading, meanwhile, were advocating what he judged to be a less attractive offer and making a number of concessions with which Dobbs did not agree. These included a compromise on the Russian consulates that depended on Russian undertakings not to cause trouble and which Dobbs opposed. As the Permanent Secretary at the India Office in London Sir Arthur Hirtzel subsequently informed Dobbs, the Foreign Department under Bray had contrived to ensure that Dobbs’ proposals were not seen promptly because the relevant telegrams were sent on to London by sea mail. At the same time, Bray's Foreign Department had also delayed forwarding telegrams to Dobbs from the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, in which the latter made clear his strong opposition to offering concessions and his readiness to support a persuasive offer to win over the Afghans in an attempt to separate them from Russia. According to the Permanent Secretary, he had found it necessary to warn Reading about Bray's interference.Footnote 76 Dobbs commented, “It is bad enough to have all our natural opponents at Kabul and to deal with them; but when you have your own people at loggerheads, it is much worse”.Footnote 77 Undoubtedly, there were different approaches advocated by key officials during this period, and Dobbs felt personally aggrieved as a result.
Either way, these delays meant that by the time Dobbs eventually received the necessary authorisation to make an offer,Footnote 78 the opportunity to act had passed. While the Afghans were holding talks with the British, Russian and Turkish representatives were active in Kabul. During the two months that it had taken to decide on Dobbs’ proposals, Afghan links with Russia strengthened and “the Afghans’ enthusiasm for a close understanding with the British had evaporated and they extended their demands”, which they then increased beyond the promises made by the Russians. These demands ranged widely from a larger subsidy to concessions on the tribes. By 14 July an impasse had been reached when the Afghans refused to consider the British requirement to consult on matters affecting Indo-Afghan interests. Kabul maintained that this amounted to British control over their foreign policy and was unacceptable: Dobbs in response told the Afghans to “take time for reflection”.Footnote 79
This standoff marked the start of what Dobbs described as the most “trying” phase of the negotiations. Jemal Pasha, the former general who had been part of the Ottoman Empire's ruling triumvirate during the First World War, was in Kabul advising on the army. His influence had been increasing while the Afghans had also continued to draw closer still to Russia. Kabul promised to sign the draft treaty with Russia and a few days later on 19 July the alliance was celebrated with a banquet at the Afghan Foreign Office. Anti-British feeling was intensifying and more anti-British articles appeared in the Afghan press. Afghan antagonism was further increased by what they regarded as Curzon's demeaning refusal to receive an Afghan delegation because he insisted it should deal with the India Office rather than the Foreign Office. In addition, London's refusal to recognise the Amir's right to use the title ‘Majesty’, together with Foreign Office objections to an Italian treaty with Afghanistan on the grounds that Afghanistan was located within the British sphere of influence, all fuelled Afghan suspicions that Britain did not recognise or adequately respect their independent status and was intent on re-establishing its control.Footnote 80
Relations continued to deteriorate. The Afghans began to advance ever more impossible demands from a British perspective. On 31 July the diplomatic mailbag was seized and Dobbs suspended negotiations until it was returned on 21 August. He continued to press the British requirement that no Anglo-Afghan treaty could be agreed unless the Afghans disclosed in full all the terms of their treaty with the Russians. The response was two letters on 28 August, one “couched in the language of studied insult”, another telling Dobbs he could read about the treaty in the press.Footnote 81 However, Afghan interest in reaching an agreement with Britain had not entirely disappeared. The Afghan government decided to avoid a breakdown by withdrawing the letters in the face of Dobbs’ threat to leave unless this happened. Continuing negotiations with the British also gave Kabul more leverage with the Russians. But the British remained adamant about their disclosure requirement.Footnote 82 The Afghan response was first to threaten and then to ratify a treaty with Soviet Russia. The Government of India was horrified at the prospect that the situation might deteriorate to the extent that no “friendship” treaty would be arrived at. Bray sent “frantic telegrams” telling Dobbs that “we must have one at any price”,Footnote 83 and a debate began about what concessions should be made to persuade the Afghans to sign. Dobbs, however, rejected these “forebodings”. He believed that the Afghans and Russians were “more afraid of us than we are of them”. He also observed that the Afghans had admitted that Indian agitators were “a broken reed” that the frontier was quiet and the tribes tired of Afghan promises. Dobbs, therefore, recommended making no concessions, believing instead that there was a chance that the Afghans might accept the original position “if I push it home with apparent determination to break with them in default now”.Footnote 84 Dobbs’ view was that a weak treaty with watered down and unenforceable terms was worse than no treaty at all, and he commented to his wife that if he was not satisfied he would make the Afghans be so insulting that “not even a worm” would consent to make a treaty.Footnote 85
Taking a new route: a “neighbourly” treaty: September to November
Dobbs’ opposition to a weak treaty and his forcefully expressed view that there was a chance that the Afghans would accept the British terms without any concessions if he pressed them hard strengthened the Secretary of State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu's opposition to making any of the compromises suggested by the Government of India. He withdrew the authority he had given earlier to propose a weaker “friendship” treaty—the so-called “pis-aller” or last resort draft—in the face of Afghan refusals of full disclosure of the Russo-Afghan treaty terms. He commented that any “pis-aller” treaty would be “not merely humiliating but inexpedient and unwise at this junction”.Footnote 86 The British Government position now set out by Montagu was to conclude a “friendship” treaty without making any concessions. If this was not achievable, then he authorised offering instead a “neighbourly” treaty. This would be a treaty as between two civilised powers. It would establish reciprocal rights to send envoys and consuls and set up other “neighbourly relations” but unlike the “friendship” treaty, it would not commit the British government to the payment of any subsidy.Footnote 87
Dobbs immediately warned that the Afghans continued to want what he regarded as unacceptable concessions and recommended the “neighbourly” treaty as the most attractive option.Footnote 88 The Viceroy, advised by Denys Bray, continued to press for a “friendship” treaty. They argued that a breakdown of the “friendship” treaty negotiations would lead to a serious deterioration of the situation on the frontier, make it impossible to reduce military expenditure from its current high level, and might result in a war that India could not afford. In addition, they contended that failure to agree a “friendship” treaty would also exacerbate India's internal problems, and that the Afghans would observe a treaty only in return for money.Footnote 89 Dobbs did not share this gloomy view while the Secretary of State for India commented, “I do not underestimate the disadvantages of a breakdown but I am not convinced they are so great as apprehended by you [in Delhi]”.Footnote 90 He was also doubtful that a subsidy would effectively ensure Afghan observance of any treaty.Footnote 91 Undeterred, the Government of India continued to press its case until after six weeks of debate agreement was reached on 12 September that Dobbs should leave if the Afghans continued to refuse to disclose the full details of the Russian treaty. Dobbs then managed to obtain the Government of India's agreement to suggest the “neighbourly” treaty which his latest instructions from them had not included.Footnote 92 The Afghans still refused to make a full disclosure and so on 18 September, as agreed, the British prepared to leave Kabul. While he got ready to go, Dobbs sent two of his officials to raise the possibility of concluding a “neighbourly” treaty with the Afghan Foreign Minister, Tarzi. According to Dobbs, Tarzi appeared willing to open discussions on this new basis and the Afghans seemed pleased that there was no breakdown.Footnote 93
For Dobbs this was a turning point. On 19 September, the final phase of the negotiations opened with official discussions on a “neighbourly” treaty, which contained no subsidy, no preferential customs arrangements, and no concessions on frontier tribes. A few days later, the Amir elected to conduct the negotiations himself directly with Dobbs and exclude his Foreign Secretary, Tarzi, who among the Amir's advisers was losing ground to the pro-British Nadir Khan. Dobbs then decided to negotiate alone with the Amir and in Persian, on the basis that the Amir would not brook opposition or contradiction with others present. Dobbs later observed that acting alone had paid off although it had carried obvious risks.Footnote 94 The Amir responded quickly to the “neighbourly” proposals by making a counter offer of an exclusive “friendship” treaty with Britain: he undertook to agree to all the points previously rejected and to repudiate his treaty with Russia.
Dobbs continued to advocate the “neighbourly” treaty because he judged it unlikely that the Amir would meet or keep to British requirements for a “friendship” treaty.Footnote 95 In his view, there was a real possibility that no agreement would be reached and so he recommended considering an exchange of ministers.Footnote 96 Despite the Viceroy's claimed “reluctance to differ from the man on the spot”, Dobbs’ advice seems to have prompted him and Bray to suggest further concessionsFootnote 97 in order to conclude a “friendship” treaty. Notwithstanding this shift, the Chief Commissioners stationed on the two frontier territories (Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province) questioned the Viceroy's contention that a “friendship” treaty would allow military expenditure on the frontier to be reduced, although they did acknowledge that it might have a “settling effect”.Footnote 98 Dobbs meanwhile maintained his opposition to offering concessions. He thought Reading suspected him of wrecking tacticsFootnote 99 and was not persuaded by a personal appeal from him to support his “friendly” approach. The Secretary of State contended that the concessions needed would be seen as a climb down, remained strongly opposed to offering them,Footnote 100 and was unmoved when the Viceroy then cited his Council's views to support this position.Footnote 101
Dobbs’ papers indicate that he believed that he had helped to convince the Amir that India wanted some form of friendly relations by continuing discussions even when the Amir refused any concessions, and by showing a willingness to listen to Amanullah's concerns often at extremely lengthy meetings. He saw this as important in persuading the Kabul authorities to avoid a breakdown and to consider maintaining relations even if this would take place on a different basis.Footnote 102 Dobbs took the opportunity of these extensive delays to build up his relationship with the Amir and his entourage through informal contacts. They played tennis.Footnote 103 They placed bets at the races.Footnote 104 More important in winning goodwill, Dobbs helped to arrange for Afghan students to travel through India to Europe—the necessary permissions had previously been refused.Footnote 105
After seven weeks, Dobbs was at last instructed to present the “neighbourly” treaty and to leave if this was rejected. On 9 November, Dobbs put it forward once more and again explained that Afghanistan's treaty with Russia made an exclusive “friendship” treaty impossible. Instead, as he explained, Britain was proposing a treaty that recognised Afghanistan's independence and reflected the normal neighbourly relations that existed between great powers. The Amir, however, responded that he could not accept it because it conferred no advantages on Afghanistan, and so Dobbs again prepared to leave.Footnote 106 At the farewell interview on 12 November, the Amir indicated that he did not want Dobbs to go, prompting Dobbs to comment there was some “faint chance he [the Amir] may take it [the treaty]”.Footnote 107 Dobbs, who had been very critical of the endless delays in getting his instructions, now asked for and received the authority to modify the draft on the spot because “further delay would be fatal at this stage”.Footnote 108 He then conducted intensive discussions on his own in Persian with the Amir. After two days of talks and some relatively minor modifications, the Amir accepted the revised provisions and signed the treaty on 22 November 1921.Footnote 109 Both sides could amend the treaty before ratification, but the Amir agreed he would not if the British did not do so either.Footnote 110
But Dobbs still needed to get the Amir to reverse a minor boundary change and restore the frontier so that it followed the same line as before the Third Afghan War. Going back on his earlier agreement to do this, the Amir refused. Dobbs later learned that Amullah had done this to placate a significant group in the Assembly that was extremely hostile to the agreement with Britain. Dobbs thought the situation sufficiently sensitive that the Amir should not immediately be pressed over the boundary change which restored the Durand line and involved returning Arnewai to Chitral.Footnote 111 Dobbs, however, was lucky. The Amir was so discomfited by an unauthorised frontier raid and subsequent atrocities by Afghan tribes, which clearly contravened the treaty, that he immediately gave up Arnewai.Footnote 112 The boundary was agreed and the treaty ratified on 6 February 1922.
The treaty, for Dobbs had ultimately achieved a good result, was described as a “treaty of friendship in all but name that gives what we had wished far more cheaply than had been contemplated”.Footnote 113 A number of the treaty provisions finally agreed together with the side letters were very similar to those in the draft treaty that Dobbs had proposed over a year earlier at Mussoorie. These provisions reaffirmed Afghanistan's independence. They provided for diplomatic representation including a Minister at Kabul and for consular representation which effectively excluded Russian consulates from the Indo-Afghan border. There were also customs and postal arrangements. As Dobbs pointed out, there were no subsidies, no advantageous customs deals, and India retained control over arms imports. Both parties committed to giving each other advance notice of any proposed military activity regarded as necessary to keep order among frontier tribes. A side letter on neighbourly duties set out India's expectations on preventing raids, hostile propaganda and non-interference with India's border tribes.Footnote 114 On the tribes, Fraser-Tytler quotes a further side letter recognising that Afghanistan also had an interest in the tribes on the British side of the border and he suggests that this letter gave it a legal basis for interference across the line.Footnote 115 But this was certainly not Dobbs’ stated intention: “This letter cannot be twisted into any admission of a right of influencing or interference”.Footnote 116 Rather, as he explained, it was designed in response to the Amir's wish to have formally recognised his efforts in support of the tribes on the British side of the frontier on whose behalf he had sometimes sought more lenient treatment from the British. The British Government, however, was adamant that it did not want any reference to this. The treaty indeed included nothing to which the British had objected and delivered all the provisions that India had considered necessary for its security apart from providing for a subsidy. On this point, Dobbs argued that, in practice, subsidies provided little leverage because they were unlikely to be withdrawn unless a breakdown was imminent. Released from any treaty obligation on a subsidy, India was in a position to offer Afghanistan unsolicited gifts when it might be advantageous to do so.Footnote 117 British press comment on the treaty was favourable especially on the exclusion of Russia consulates from the Indian border.Footnote 118
Dobbs—the man on the spot—had been able to influence the treaty so that it delivered what he saw as important, and gave away nothing that he thought would be damaging. Some of the techniques that he used in order to achieve his aims were very similar to those employed by the ‘Politicals’ in their spheres of responsibility, including his use of information and how he related specific initiatives to Indian security and strategic objectives.Footnote 119 His intervention at particular stages often proved influential. Notably, his determination that the treaty provisions should demonstrate ‘firmness’ both in relation to the tribes and in relation to the Afghans had encouraged the Secretary of State to resist the compromises constantly advocated by the Viceroy. At the same time, Dobbs applied his proven skill in understanding local situations to the Afghan negotiations. He was firm: on four separate occasions during the year-long treaty discussions, when an impasse was reached, he announced his summoning of transport from Delhi to take the British delegation back to India. However, he also demonstrated sensitivity when handling the Amir and his amour propre—important in preventing a complete and damaging breakdown. In addition to the frequent reassessments that he had to make of the Amir's position and likely future plans, Dobbs also had to consider the international strategic dimension given Afghanistan's newly independent status and determination to play a part on the international stage. In other words, he had to preserve Indian strategic objectives while retaining Amanullah's good will.Footnote 120 Towards the end of the negotiations, he was given authority to make amendments without reference to the government. At last, Dobbs had the scope to settle there and then for the best deal that he could get. The final terms, therefore, depended critically on his judgement. Negotiating in Persian alone with the Amir and using his delegated authority, the terms agreed were what in Dobbs’ view were the best achievable. As argued here, the ‘man on the spot’ could play a key role at various points during the course of the tortuous negotiations and, arguably, most importantly in concluding the final treaty terms.
