This thoughtful study argues that Machiavelli's purpose in his Florentine Histories is to educate friends of liberty by exposing grandi, and especially Medicean, exploitation of the moral rhetoric of republicanism: by speaking and usually behaving generously, mercifully, and humbly toward the people and republic of Florence, the Medici artfully wheedled their way to princely rule, depriving the people of their liberty and outmaneuvering their more ham-handed fellow grandi.
On this reading, Machiavelli sought to correct the aristocratic bias of his chief historiographical rivals, the humanists Leonardo Bruni and Poggio Bracciolini, whose accounts of Florence's past abetted the rule of the grandi in general and that of the Medici in particular by propagating an elitist republicanism. Whereas the humanists’ republicanism cast Florence as the successor to Roman greatness, Machiavelli's more egalitarian republicanism attributes Italy's and Florence's servile condition to the destruction wreaked and corruption insinuated by the very Romans the humanists took as their model. Ancient Roman imperialism, not Christianity, is to blame for modern weakness (64). Both sides in this historiographical struggle agree that the high-water mark of Florentine republicanism was the primo popolo established fleetingly in the mid-1200s, but they differ on its character and significance. The humanists see it as a moment of success on the part of Florentine elites who united the city against foreign domination, whereas Clarke's Machiavelli presents it as a triumph—albeit short-lived—of popular efforts to check the great in the name and for the sake of the rule of law. Far from opposing or circumventing such laws and norms, with prudent patience the Medici appropriated the language, behavior, and institutions of this republicanism with a view to ultimate usurpation of the people and the rule of law. To thwart such machinations, Clarke's Machiavelli counsels republicans to approximate if not actually imitate the model of the openly severe Manlius Torquatus, who sacrificed his own son to the rule of law.
The heart of this rewarding treatment is its careful analysis of the Medici's progressive appropriation, first, of the republic's rhetoric, then, of the republic itself. From Giovanni's deference to popular and governmental expectations in the wake of the Ciompi rebellion, to Cosimo's studied use of benefactions in the name of the patria as means to undermine the patria by widening the web of his family's “friends,” i.e., partisans, to Lorenzo's consolidation of power by painting the Pazzi conspiracy as aimed against the republic rather than against Medici domination of the republic—this sprawling narrative is concisely decoded. Clarke capably navigates what she calls Machiavelli's “multivocality,” uncovering his actual criticism of the Medici from beneath his merely apparent neutrality or praise (i.e., interpreting what is less multivocally known as the author's covert or esoteric teaching).
Also on impressive display is Clarke's wide knowledge and firm grasp of relevant humanist and Roman historians and Roman moral philosophers (as Machiavelli would call them). By placing Machiavelli's history within these contexts Clarke positions herself well to defeat on its own turf the civic humanist interpretation of Machiavelli. For Clarke shows how vastly different is Machiavelli's gimlet view of Florentine grandi from the rosy and often propagandistic picture painted by darlings of the civic humanist interpreters such as Leornardo Bruni. Clarke convincingly argues that, far from extending this humanist tradition, as contended by the civil humanist school of scholarship, Machiavelli breaks with it decisively. The humanists continued to tarry with the nobility—both moral and political—of the ancients, while Clarke's Machiavelli knocks it off its high horse. She does not, however, tack into the arms of a more recent scholarly invention, the populist-democratic reading of Machiavelli, one that has him reject republicanism tour court in favor of an aggressive democratic populism. For she correctly takes this approach to task for mistaking Machiavelli's attack on oligarchic republics as a rejection of republicanism as such and as an embrace of democratism.
As refreshing as is Clarke's treatment of these rival interpretations, the many “isms” in play point to a limitation of the volume: it is most at home on “ideological” and historical ground rather than on more comprehensive philosophic ground—to some degree appropriate for an interpretation of a book of history explicitly devoted to being useful to a particular audience: “liberal spirits.” Yet Clarke seems—occasional caveats notwithstanding—to take for granted both Machiavelli's republicanism (his commitment to some form of republican government and his siding with the people against the great) and the idea that his chief concern is to construct republican institutions that protect the people from the great. These working assumptions keep the radically philosophical character of Machiavelli—the Machiavelli concerned above all with founding as such—from coming into view with force and clarity; but they also seem to beg questions germane to Clarke's thesis. In particular, as gimlet as is Clarke's own eye when it comes to the machinations of the great, she does not turn the same gaze on the people, more or less equating “the rule of law” with the people's will to crush the great and never really grappling with the implications of the most strikingly antidemocratic passage in Machiavelli's corpus, at the beginning of book 3 of the Florentine Histories.
There Machiavelli contrasts the healthy conflicts between the people and the great in ancient Rome with their unhealthy conflicts in modern Florence. He lays the blame squarely at the feet of the Florentine popolo for unjustly and unreasonably seeking to rule all offices themselves with no participation from the great, driving the great to ready ever greater physical force to defend themselves, leading to a cataclysmic showdown and, ultimately, the destruction of the great and therewith the destruction of the only arms-bearing class in the city. At the root of the sickness was the “injurious and unjust” “desire of the Florentine people” to rule alone, without the great, in contrast to the Roman people, who wished to share honors of the great (Florentine Histories 3.1). Because the import of this passage is never really confronted, the question is never asked: Whence this desire of the Florentine people?
If Machiavelli's answer to that question is, as I believe it is, the corrupting influence of Christianity, little evidence of it will be found in Clarke's account. For Clarke rules Christianity out of court early and often, most tellingly when she argues that the cause of centuries-long Florentine and Italian servility is the Roman republic rather than Christianity, as distinct from both of them together, as Machiavelli indicates in Discourses 2.2.2. If the Roman republic ruined Florence and Italy, what has kept them in ruin for centuries? Clarke supplies no explicit answer, but perhaps her analysis offers more evidence than meets the eye. What institution, according to Machiavelli, in addition to—and well before—the Medici, brought a credulous people under its power by cultivating and exploiting a reputation for generosity, mercy, and humility? Clarke's analysis of the Medici may be revelatory of more than the exploits of the Medici.
These limitations notwithstanding, this is by far the best book-length treatment in English of Machiavelli's longest work. Intelligent, erudite, and spirited, it should command the attention of diverse scholars and is sure to help revive interest in Machiavelli's Florentine Histories.
