The Minab Attack
The United States last attacked Iran five months into the second administration of President Donald J. Trump, in June 2025. The president said then that those strikes had “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s “key nuclear enrichment facilities.”Footnote 4 Over the next half-year, talks between the United States and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear program faltered. Iranians took to the streets when the country’s economy collapsed, and security forces responded with beatings, tear-gassings, killings, and other violence.Footnote 5 President Trump promised to come to the aid of Iranian protesters: “We are locked and loaded and ready to go,” he posted on January 2, 2026.Footnote 6 That night, in a raid executed by naval and aerial forces, the United States seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.Footnote 7 Simultaneously, U.S. aircraft carriers and other naval vessels began deploying to the Middle East.Footnote 8 On January 28, President Trump, echoing his administration’s rhetoric of “lethality,” posted: “A massive Armada is heading to Iran…. Like with Venezuela, it is, ready, willing, and able to rapidly fulfill its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary.”Footnote 9
Exactly one month later, the United States and Israel attacked Iran, launching military strikes on the capital, Tehran, and several other sites—including Minab, a city of 100,000 persons located in southern Iran on a waterway that opens onto the Strait of Hormuz.Footnote 10 There, at 10:45 a.m. on a school day, a missile struck a concrete structure surrounded by a playground, dark pavement with the white markings of a soccer pitch, and perimeter walls decorated with pastel-painted murals.Footnote 11 It was the Shajareh Tayyebeh school, described as having been “a colorful, noisy place, full of life.”Footnote 12 The same afternoon several missiles struck nearby, hindering the rescue effort at the school.Footnote 13 Most of the 150 or more civilians killed were schoolgirls and schoolboys; alongside them, more than two dozen schoolteachers. The headteacher was found in the rubble, her arms around children she was evidently trying to protect.Footnote 14 Subsequent investigative reporting suggested that the U.S. military had targeted the school building in the mistaken belief that it lay inside and was part of an adjacent Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval base.Footnote 15
Reaction came quickly, and from many corners. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said the Minab strike “would ‘never be erased from the historical memory of our nation,’” while a one-time congressional ally of President Trump asked “how many more innocent will die?”Footnote 16 The United Nations’ principal education agency admonished: “The killing of pupils in a place dedicated to learning constitutes a grave violation of the protection afforded to schools under international humanitarian law.”Footnote 17 In a reference to those killed at the school, Iran’s World Cup team adopted the moniker “Minab 168.”Footnote 18 Half a year after the strike, as mourners continued to make daily visits to the Minab cemetery where poster-sized photos marked out schoolchildren’s graves, Iranian authorities were reported to have issued indictments for U.S. and Israeli leaders in relation to the strike and other attacks.Footnote 19
In the immediate wake of the strike a spokesperson had said that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was “aware of reports concerning civilian harm resulting from ongoing military operations,” adding, “We take these reports seriously and are looking into them.”Footnote 20 Days later, President Trump weighed in: “No, in my opinion, based on what I’ve seen, that was done by Iran.”Footnote 21 He persisted when presented with evidence that the missile was a U.S.-made Tomahawk, asserting without substantiation that Iran had acquired some.Footnote 22 In mid-June the president “brushed aside” questions about the school-bombing, saying only, “Mistakes are made. War is nasty…. Nobody did that on purpose.”Footnote 23 As of mid-July, reporting indicated that the investigation had “sat for months with a military command while leaders have held off on ordering a critical, standard intelligence review to help determine what happened.”Footnote 24 At the time of this writing, officials had yet to issue any formal statement confirming or disconfirming responsibility for the strike, let alone commit to any form of reparation.
Legal and Institutional Context: Post-1945 U.S. Practice
Most criticism of recent U.S. strikes on Iran has concerned questions of jus ad bellum; that is, whether the attack in question complied with the United States’ domestic laws and international legal obligations respecting the resort to force. Our analysis of the Shajareh Tayyebeh school-bombing focuses on jus in bello; that is, the law governing the conduct of hostilities. To what extent did this strike mark a departure from the pre-2025 trajectory of U.S. practice regarding legal restraints on warfare and the institutionalization thereof? To answer that question, this Essay first summarizes past U.S. practice regarding the legal regulation of armed conflict, particularly relating to efforts to strengthen adherence to protections for children and other civilians. The Essay then demonstrates how a multifaceted reversal of those developments—signaled immediately after President Trump’s election to a second term as president and then implemented during the first year of his second administration—laid the groundwork for the killing of approximately 150 civilians at the school in Minab.
Since 1945, U.S. engagement with international legal frameworks on civilian protection in war has been constant, including: central participation in the negotiation and ratification of the four Geneva Conventions; regular participation in the negotiation of other treaties of international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal law, and arms control; extensive involvement in debates on the scope of customary IHL; passage of relevant domestic implementing legislation; and involvement with mechanisms of IHL enforcement.Footnote 25 To be clear, U.S. engagement has often stirred controversy, given the United States’ demonstrated preference for a wide margin of discretion regarding its own use of military force. To this end, U.S. officials have urged permissive interpretations of international rules and declined to ratify numerous treaties whose terms they had negotiated. Further controversy has attached to U.S. support to states involved in conduct exceeding the limits of even those permissive interpretations, a matter beyond the scope of this analysis.
A key locus of U.S. engagement has been the UN Security Council, where the United States holds a permanent seat and veto power.Footnote 26 The Council has acted since 1999 to minimize the impact of war on children. That year, in its Resolution 1261, the Council “strongly condemn[ed] the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict” by means such as “attacks on objects protected under international law, including places that usually have a significant presence of children such as schools,” and further “call[ed] on all parties concerned to put an end to such practices.”Footnote 27 The United States voted in favor of this and more than a dozen other Council resolutions related to children;Footnote 28 in so doing, it helped to construct a UN agenda that decries wartime deprivation of education and designates attacks on schools as one of the “six grave violations” about which the UN secretary-general and his special representative on children and armed conflict must report annually.Footnote 29 In 2025, the United States endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration, by means of a State Department letter reiterating the U.S. commitment to IHL:
The U.S. Armed Forces have implemented practices to minimize the effects of armed conflict on civilians and civilian objects, including children and schools. We apply safeguards, additional to those required by international humanitarian law, when conducting military operations that may affect schools …. As a case in point, the U.S. Department of Defense is implementing an action plan to improve its ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm caused by military operations…. The United States will continue to support and promote international humanitarian law as the primary framework to protect children and schools during times of armed conflict. We encourage all parties to do the same.Footnote 30
In addition to focusing on IHL in specific relation to schools and children, the United States has engaged in recent decades with each of the core IHL rules most directly implicated in the strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School: the rules on distinction, doubt, and precautions. Although the United States often took a more permissive view on these rules than many other states and authorities, gaps in interpretation had begun to narrow in the period prior to 2025.
Distinction. In the “basic rule” governing the conduct of hostilities, IHL requires belligerents to distinguish at all times between civilians, the civilian population, and civilian objects, on the one hand, and combatants, persons directly participating in hostilities, and military objectives, on the other; military operations and attacks must be directed exclusively at the latter and never at the former.Footnote 31 As applied to buildings like schools, the starting point for this rule is that every object (non-human thing) is either a civilian object or a military objective. Objects do not qualify as military objectives unless “by their nature, location, purpose or use” they “make an effective contribution to military action,” and their “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”Footnote 32 This language, provided in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, is widely accepted as customarily binding, including by the United States.Footnote 33 The same is true of the foremost associated rule of action, namely, that it is prohibited to direct an attack against a civilian object.Footnote 34
Doubt. The key question, of course, is how to apply the rule against attacking civilians and civilian objects amid conditions of uncertainty. Under the prevailing view globally, if there is doubt as to an object’s status, the object is to be presumed civilian.Footnote 35 Consensus on that point obscures a deeper disagreement, however, regarding how much doubt is sufficient to render an attack unlawful.Footnote 36 In that contested space, the United States has long advanced and adopted a permissive approach. Indeed, for many years the Department of Defense Law of War Manual rejected the prohibition against targeting under doubt, asserting: “Under customary international law, no legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons or objects, nor is there any rule inhibiting commanders or other military personnel from acting based on the information available to him or her in doubtful cases.”Footnote 37 This was revised in 2023, so that the current version of the Manual accepts that “commanders and other decisionmakers must presume that persons or objects are protected from being made the object of attack unless the information available at the time indicates that the persons or objects are military objectives.”Footnote 38 Even after this change, however, the United States maintained that commanders need only assess an object’s status in “good faith,” and they may target the object if they have an “honest and genuine belief” that it “is a military objective”—a test that does not demand “a fixed standard of evidence or proof.”Footnote 39 To be clear, this remains more permissive than most interpretations of IHL’s rule on doubt. Nonetheless, the 2023 revision’s narrowing of the interpretive gap was a significant development in U.S. engagement with IHL.
Precautions. A final set of rules relevant to the Minab strike pertains to precautions. Among other precautionary duties, IHL requires belligerent parties to take “constant care … to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects,” and to do “everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects.”Footnote 40 These obligations, which hinge on “feasibility” and “care,” are intrinsically contextual and have been the subject of interpretive debate. Of note in the current context, a view has been advanced in the literature that a “child-sensitive application of the duty of constant care” involving “a conceptual shift to long-term preparatory analysis and planning” is necessary given “the unique way in which conflict impacts children.”Footnote 41 This could be understood to demand the exercise of due diligence in advance of military operations in order to identify schools and similar locations that include concentrations of children.
A key question regarding the requirement of verification is how to understand the feasibility threshold. On the one hand, the influential International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary specified that “even if there is only slight doubt,” planners and decisionmakers “must call for additional information and if need be give orders for further reconnaissance.”Footnote 42 Adding that “evaluation of the information obtained must include a serious check of its accuracy,” the commentary raised concern that conditioning “feasibility” on the success of military operations in general would risk “neglecting the humanitarian obligations prescribed here.”Footnote 43 On the other hand, the United States’ current Law of War Manual uses the term “feasible” rather than “everything feasible,” and it asserts that the rule of precaution is a duty of “due regard or diligence, not an absolute requirement to do everything possible.”Footnote 44 It takes the view that “what precautions are feasible depends greatly on the context,” which requires an assessment of the impact on “mission accomplishment.”Footnote 45
Here, again, the U.S. articulation appears to be more permissive than that of the ICRC (or indeed the language of Additional Protocol I, to which the United States is not party). Nonetheless, the Manual expresses a commitment to the basic precautionary principle. Over the past half-decade, that commitment—as alluded to in the State Department letter endorsing the Safe Schools Declaration—has been bolstered by the adoption of significant institutional mechanisms for reducing civilian harm. In 2022, the Department of Defense adopted the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP).Footnote 46 This was followed in 2023 by the associated Instruction, DoDI 3000.17.Footnote 47 Among other things, the CHMR-AP included the creation of the Civilian Protection Center of Excellence (CP-COE), designed to “serve as the focal point for matters related to civilian casualties and other forms of civilian harm resulting from military operations involving the United States Armed Forces” and to “institutionalize and advance knowledge, practices, and tools for preventing, mitigating, and responding to civilian harm.”Footnote 48
Legal and Institutional Context: Post-2024/Pre-Iran War
What had been a movement toward institutionalizing more civilian-protective legal restraints on U.S. conduct in war changed course soon after the second inauguration of President Trump.Footnote 49 In early 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the firings of the nation’s top military lawyers—the Army and Air Force judge advocates general.Footnote 50 “Ultimately, we want lawyers who give sound constitutional advice and don’t exist to attempt to be roadblocks to anything, anything that happens in their spots,” he said.Footnote 51 Over the subsequent year and a half, the secretary presided over an unusual number of early resignations or terminations of high-profile military commanders and blocked the promotions of others.Footnote 52 The pattern is striking, particularly when juxtaposed with parallel developments relevant to the diminution of restraint in U.S. war-fighting.
Specifically, in the same period, the Department of Defense set about reversing the key achievements of CHMR-AP, the action plan adopted in 2022. Reportedly, on President Trump’s inauguration day, a memo was circulated to “completely dissolve” the CP-COE and dismantle the civilian protection system.Footnote 53 Throughout 2025, PAX and Airwars reported, Secretary Hegseth oversaw the “removal or marginalisation of much of the staff” charged with civilian harm mitigation and response, and made “significant cuts to the CP-COE.”Footnote 54 By year’s end, “just a fraction” of the civilian harm mitigation and response staff remained in their roles, “severely diluting the institution’s doctrinal and operational capacity to mitigate and respond to civilian harm.”Footnote 55 This is reflected in a May 2026 report by the Department’s Office of the Inspector General, which concluded that the Department “did not fully implement any of the CHMR-AP objectives by the end of FY 2025 … stall[ing] their CHMR-AP implementation and revers[ing] progress in some areas.”Footnote 56 As a consequence, the inspector general determined, the Department “may not comply with DoDI 3000.17, the policy required by 10 U.S.C. § 134.”Footnote 57 Taking note of the Army’s proposals to eliminate the action plan and the Department of Defense instruction, together with the Department’s proposal that Congress repeal the statutory requirement for the Civilian Protection Center, the inspector general found that the resulting uncertainty led to parts of the Department falling “inactive in their CHMR-AP responsibilities or actions to implement the CHMR-AP.”Footnote 58
Indeed, what had been a focus on mitigating civilian harm quickly morphed into one on “lethality.” On multiple occasions, Secretary Hegseth contrasted the aim of “maximum lethality” with a “tepid legality” that needed to be purged from the military.Footnote 59 In March 2026, he announced that he had ordered “a ruthless, no-excuses review” of the military’s legal offices, adding, “Everything gets measured against one standard: Does it make us more lethal in competition, in crisis, or in combat?”Footnote 60 President Trump, too, had urged “lethality” in one of his first executive orders.Footnote 61 Another executive order renamed Secretary Hegseth’s agency the “Department of War” and retitled him the “Secretary of War,” to express an “ability and willingness to fight and win wars on behalf of our Nation at a moment’s notice, not just to defend.”Footnote 62 Secretary Hegseth elaborated on the reason for the change, asserting, “We fight to win. We unleash overwhelming and punishing violence on the enemy. We also don’t fight with stupid rules of engagement. We untie the hands of our warfighters ….”Footnote 63 When asked in January 2026 about limitations to U.S. action under his leadership, the president replied, “I don’t need international law,” and indicated that he could rely instead on his “own morality.”Footnote 64
The Minab Strike as a Mark of Shifting U.S. Posture on Legal Restraint in War
These prior developments are crucial to legal appraisal of the February 28, 2026 attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School, and to that attack’s material and symbolic significance in the shifting U.S. posture toward legal restraint in war.
Legal Appraisal
As an object “normally dedicated to civilian purposes,” a school is a paradigmatic example of an object that IHL presumes to be civilian.Footnote 65 To date no evidence has been presented indicating that Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary was purposed or being used to make an effective contribution to military action.Footnote 66 To the contrary, all available information shows it to have been a functioning school, in session at the time of the strike—a civilian object where hundreds of civilians were present, most of them young children. Nevertheless, expert analysis of satellite imagery of the impact,Footnote 67 coupled with the apparent use of a precision-guided BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), indicate strongly that the Shajareh Tayyebeh structure was the target of the missile that directly hit it.Footnote 68
If the structure was indeed the target, IHL’s rule on doubt requires examination of what those engaged in the targeting understood about the building at the time. By the approach in the United States’ current Law of War Manual, inquiry would focus on whether the authorizing commander acted under conditions of doubt. On that view, the presumption that an object is civilian might not control if it were determined that doubt was distributed across the military institution but not sufficiently concentrated in the mind of any individual decisionmaker involved in approving the target or authorizing the strike. But the Minab strike raises serious concerns even by this relatively permissive, commander-centric approach. Reportedly, it was “widely known” that the database from which the military drew this target was outdated.Footnote 69 Nonetheless, “[s]enior US military commanders bypassed warnings in critical databases that intelligence about potential targets in Iran was severely out of date,” a CNN investigation reported, adding that the commanders did so despite “messages indicating the intelligence was based on years-old intelligence that needed to be re-vetted.”Footnote 70 The messages “were embedded in a system used for developing targets,” and that system “required a senior officer to approve adding a site to the strike list.”Footnote 71 A strong case thus can be made that these messages instilled, in anyone who saw them, a degree of doubt sufficient to preclude authorizing attacks on the enumerated targets without further vetting.Footnote 72
Whether or not the targeting violated the rule of doubt, IHL’s precautionary obligations were also applicable. Even assuming the United States’ traditionally more permissive approach to feasibility, the available facts are damning. The strike reportedly relied on a target set that had been identified prior to what was a war of choice—at a time when the United States exercised complete control over its own planning calendar and when the feasibility of target verification was therefore at its apex.Footnote 73 In other words, it was a scheduled, deliberate strike, selected prior to the onset of the pressure that accompanies ongoing active hostilities.Footnote 74 Although the Department of Defense Law of War Manual includes factors that might constrain feasibility, in this instance those factors were absent, or at least greatly mitigated by the selection conditions.Footnote 75 The Manual is clear: “with more time and resources available in planning an attack during the deliberate targeting process, planners and analysts may need to gather more information and conduct a more extensive review.”Footnote 76
The likelihood that the pressure to develop targets quickly intensified once President Trump decided to attack Iran does not undercut this conclusion.Footnote 77 A full month of naval mobilization preceded this war, so the prospect of an attack was sufficiently clear for sufficiently long to fully vet first-day targets. The purported reason why the Shajareh Tayyebeh structure was not a priority for verification in that process is that there was relatively less military urgency associated with striking those fixed targets that did not pose the greatest risk to U.S. forces.Footnote 78 This raises two obvious questions. If it was sufficiently urgent to target this structure on the first day of the war, why was it not a priority for pre-war verification? If it was not sufficiently urgent for such a strike, why not wait for verification before attacking? The answer cannot be that the structure had been identified as a target a decade earlier, given explicit warnings that the underlying data was old and required re-vetting. Per the Law of War Manual, complying with precautionary obligations includes “[re]viewing previously approved targets at reasonable intervals as well as when warranted in light of fresh information and changing circumstances.”Footnote 79 Instead, the administration’s approach from the start appeared to be laser-focused on maximizing the tempo of operations.Footnote 80
Had there been an effort to gather “more information, such as visual identification of the target through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms”—as the Manual demands in such circumstances—targeting analysts would likely have disconfirmed the building’s status as a military objective.Footnote 81 After the attack, open-source investigators quickly identified the building as having been separated from the adjacent IRGC compound for a decade.Footnote 82 Indicators that it was a school included an outdoor play area that was observable on Google Earth “as early as 2017,” as well as distinctive pastel-colored painting on the structure.Footnote 83 The school appeared in Iranian business listingsFootnote 84 and had a “vivid website” and “yearslong online presence”; videos showed a “thriving primary school”; photographs on the website matched the coloring of the walls visible from satellite imagery.Footnote 85 Other satellite images of the courtyard included numerous people whose shadow length, given the time of day, revealed them to be children.Footnote 86 Presumably for one or a combination of these reasons, several years previously, a U.S. “analyst noticed that the building appeared to be a school,” but this observation seems never to have made it to targeting officials.Footnote 87
In assessing these facts, institutional context matters. Whether the attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School can be attributed directly to the aforementioned dismantling of civilian harm mitigation systems and institutional reorientation to “lethality” rather than “tepid legality,” the strike exemplifies the kind of error that such systems had been designed to avert.Footnote 88 Moreover, whether or not the precise institutional configuration of civilian harm mitigation in the United States prior to those changes was or is required by IHL, dismantling these systems without implementing any replacement safeguards (and with no plausible budgetary or other institutional imperative) is itself powerful evidence of a failure to take feasible measures to verify targets and minimize civilian harm.Footnote 89
The U.S. Response
A final noteworthy feature is the United States’ response after the Minab strike when compared with U.S. actions following two previous erroneous attacks. In June 1999, amid its aerial campaign against the former Yugoslavia, the United States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. An investigation commenced immediately, and fewer than three weeks later, an official of the State Department made a 4,500-word oral presentation of its report on that accidental bombing. The presentation detailed the causes of the error, repeatedly apologized, offered condolence payments to victims, and promised to negotiate a payment for damage to Chinese property.Footnote 90 In October 2015, the United States attacked a Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, killing at least thirty people, including patients, hospital staff, and caretakers, and injuring many others. A month later the U.S. commander in Afghanistan approved an internal report of the incident and extended “sincere condolences to the victims of this … tragic, but avoidable accident.”Footnote 91 In April 2016 the declassified version released by CENTCOM found that although “U.S. forces were unaware that they were striking a medical facility,” the attack “had violated both the applicable rules of engagement and the international laws of armed conflict.”Footnote 92 More than 170 persons and families received condolence payments, and the Department of Defense approved $5.7 million for the rebuilding of a Kunduz hospital.Footnote 93 Sixteen service members, including a general officer, were subject to disciplinary or administrative action, including suspension, removal from command, letters of reprimand, counseling, and extensive retraining.Footnote 94
The aftermath of the 2026 Minab strike has been quite different. For months, administration officials variously denied responsibility, dismissed questions, or deflected attention away from the February 28 incident.Footnote 95 In mid-June, President Trump said: “Somebody said it was our missile . . . . But I’ve seen nothing to lead me to believe it was. There were plenty of missiles being flown by other people.”Footnote 96 When asked by Fox News in mid-July whether it was “possible that old intelligence, or a mistake during a very active time in the war led to” the Minab killings, President Trump replied: “It is, but it’s also possible that those images that you have are AI-generated . . . . I don’t think there can be a conclusive report.”Footnote 97 To date, more than six months after the event, the Department of Defense-renamed-War has not published any investigative report,Footnote 98 let alone any analyses like those issued after the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing and the 2015 Kunduz airstrikes. In the just-quoted Fox News interview, President Trump twice declined invitations to commit to releasing the findings of the investigation once they were ready, saying he would need to “speak to the generals that are doing the—because, we mostly have generals” and later “I guess so, I mean I have to ask the military.”Footnote 99 The next day, CNN reported that the administration had not yet conducted the kind of intelligence review which, according to prior U.S. practice, “would almost always be conducted in the immediate aftermath of a noteworthy strike.”Footnote 100 Nor had the United States offered any apologies or compensation, disciplined anyone involved, implemented measures designed to ensure non-repetition, or committed to any such action.
The strike and the subsequent lack of transparency occurred against the backdrop of the United States’ departure from its longstanding support of UN initiatives to minimize the wartime harms done to children. Among the many UN entities from which President Trump withdrew U.S. financial and other participation in January 2026 was the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, which for decades has operated as the clearinghouse for monitoring attacks on schools and the other grave violations about which the secretary-general must report annually.Footnote 101 At a June 2026 Security Council session, U.S. Ambassador Jennifer Locetta stated that “[c]hildren around the world deserve to feel safe, to receive an education, and to have a future,” and then pivoted to assert that “[r]egrettably” the secretary-general’s just-released report on children “brings us no closer to that goal.”Footnote 102 The U.S. ambassador’s remarks aimed specifically at what she characterized as inappropriately equivalent treatment of killings by armed groups and national forces in conflicts other than Iran;Footnote 103 her audience was left to wonder whether the report’s warning about targeted strikes and artificial intelligence also had occasioned the U.S. criticism.Footnote 104
The closest President Trump has come to accepting U.S. responsibility has been to venture that the Minab school strike may have been a mistake.Footnote 105 News outlets’ investigations have pointed in that direction. But our analysis makes clear that mistakes in targeting do not excuse attacks such as the strike on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School on February 28, 2026. Strikes conducted amidst prohibited levels of doubt, or without taking required precautions, will compel a finding that IHL has been violated. And such mistakes may be called to account, at least if the 1939 Athenia sinking cited at the start of this Essay is any indication. There, too, a civilian object was struck on the first day of a war, claiming about a hundred lives. There, too, one side to the conflict tried to foist responsibility onto the country which had been attacked.Footnote 106 Little happened—until 1946, when Women’s Royal Naval Servicemembers working at Nuremberg discovered that the sinking had been a mistake and that the attacking U-boat’s logbook had been tampered with in order to hide the fact. The accused admirals were compelled on the witness stand to admit the incident, and the judgment of the International Military Tribunal memorialized their admission.Footnote 107
Ultimately, available information strongly indicates that the United States violated its precautionary obligations under IHL in the Minab strike, and potentially the principle of distinction, as operationalized through the rule on doubt. Following the institutional and rhetorical developments of the preceding year—and given clear deviations from the requirements of IHL as the United States itself understands them in formal documents—that violation stands out as a point of inflection in the United States’ approach to the protection of children in armed conflict, to civilian harm mitigation more generally, and to legal restraint in war. The apparent error that led to the strike is precisely the kind of event that civilian harm mitigation processes and a focus on legality and restraint are supposed to avert. As the deadliest U.S. strike against civilians or civilian objects in decades, the attack on the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary School seems destined either to mark intensifying U.S. rejections of legal restraint in war or to catalyze resistance to such rejections.
