The relatively unknown Andrade federal court case of 1935 might have severely limited Mexican immigration and undermined Mexican Americans' status, Patrick D. Lukens argues, had it not been for the intervention of the Roosevelt administration, the Mexican government, and Mexican American civil rights activists. In the Andrade decision, a federal judge in New York ruled that the Mexican immigrant Timoteo Andrade could not naturalize because he was not a “free white person,” and naturalization at the time was limited to aliens who were “free white persons, [or African]” (1). Lukens emphasizes that this ruling could have limited, if not ended, Mexican immigration, since those ineligible to naturalize were also prohibited from immigrating. It also likely would have diminished Mexican Americans' already low status in the United States, subjecting them for instance both to the Plessy v. Ferguson ruling allowing separate facilities for different racial groups, and to numerous state land laws that prevented aliens ineligible for citizenship from buying land.
Lukens examines in his book why such a significant case did not have this effect and instead remained at the margins of history. He concludes that three different interest groups – the FDR administration (especially the State Department), the Mexican government, and Mexican American civil rights activists – all contributed to neutralizing Andrade. He shows how FDR's State Department went to “great lengths” to do what he calls “a remarkable thing for Latino/as, but not necessarily for the benefit of civil rights” (xiv). Instead, the State Department's agenda was foreign relations: it hoped to prevent the decision from having negative repercussions on US–Mexico relations, particularly during a decade in which FDR had worked hard to build his “Good Neighbor Policy” and promote better relations with Latin American countries like Mexico. The State Department developed and implemented an administrative policy that classified Mexicans and Mexican Americans as white, and reflected, Lukens concludes, “a relatively new direction in policymaking, administrative law” (5). The case has remained relatively unknown, Lukens deduces, both because of the triumph of this administrative policy and because the two governments made sure the embarrassing case did not receive much publicity.
Lukens's study is particularly interesting when it focusses on the story of the case and its aftermath – the personalities involved, the litigation, and the Roosevelt administration's and Mexican government's attempts to neutralize it. By reminding scholars about the Andrade case, this book enriches the literature on the FDR administration, Latinos, and legal and policy history during the 1930s. It also adds to recent studies that have enriched historians' understanding of how US–Mexico relations helped shape domestic civil rights and immigration policies as far back as the 1930s. Finally, it contributes to a rich body of literature on the fluid nature of race, specifically helping reveal the relationship between politics and the making and unmaking of racial identities and categories.
