I frequently tell my graduate students that a good indicator that a piece of work has attained the status of a classic is the extent to which it is cited irrelevantly. Although I have been vaguely conscious in the years since this article was published that it has turned up in a lot of footnotes, I have not followed its career in the literature closely enough to be able to tell whether by this austere criterion it qualifies.
The idea for the article occurred to me more or less fully blown one sunny California afternoon in 1965 or 1966 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. That evening I described to my wife why I thought such an article would fill a significant intellectual gap, bringing together large and disparate sets of time series data, organized in a theoretically informed way. I thought this would give a coherent picture of a big piece of the historical development of the U.S. House of Representatives, which I was studying at the time.
The Center provided resources and help in putting the time series together, and, luckily, the argument worked pretty well once they were all assembled. The theoretical framework was adapted mostly from Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. The historical focus was greatly informed by ideas percolating among a stimulating group of students of the House with whom I was then in close communication, notably H. Douglas Price, who in turn had been influenced by Samuel Huntington's imaginative work on political development.1
The influence of invisible colleagues enabling individual achievement cannot be overestimated in my opinion. See Richard Fenno's discussion of the House group from which I drew sustenance (Fenno 1998).
That, to the best of my recollection, is where this article and its much less well-known companion article on the seniority system, published in the Review in 1969, came from (Polsby Gallaher and Rundquist 1969). I still think they are good articles, and I am glad others have found them useful. They are best understood, I think, as a historical description of a particular institution rather than as themselves a “theory” specifying causes and effects with broad automatic application to other legislatures or institutions. Many other legislatures have, to be sure, institutionalized, but not necessarily in the historically contingent way the House did. I have written about this with reference to the British House of Commons, which as I see it institutionalized in accordance with its own constitutional logic sometime in the seventeenth century (see Polsby, especially p. 207 footnote 26).
The main theoretical claim that this article makes is that various elements of institutional practice—growing adherence to boundaries, increased internal complexity, and increasing reliance on universalistic criteria for internal decision making—hung together and cohered to produce the organizational structure of the contemporary House of Representatives. The relevant middle-range theoretical ideas come, I suppose, from organization theory, and I would hope that somewhere down the line this article might prove useful in understanding organizations not configured as hierarchies, as so many organizations that actually get studied are. I would like especially to acknowledge the influence of my teacher Charles E. Lindblom in pushing my ideas in this direction (see especially Lindblom 1959).
In the 38 years since “Institutionalization” was published, there has been much good work by many scholars on the history of the House and more generally on Congress. Just a short while ago in How Congress Evolves, I tried to account for more recent trends in congressional development, focusing on somewhat different variables (parties, elections, demographic and technological changes) and a different time period (Polsby 2004). Despite the differences, the mode of argument pursued in “Institutionalization” helped me write my new book, as I hope it may have helped others.

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