In this extraordinary new book, Frederick Luis Aldama argues vigorously that most of what passes for “theory” in the humanities is worthless or worse, the work of “high priests of poststructuralism” who “seem to be dishing out healthy servings of a philosophical Idealism that lead only to endless speculation” (xiii) and that we must turn instead to the discipline of cognitive science if we are to understand why and how the humanities matter. Aldama's understanding of cognitive science relies heavily on the work of Patrick Colm Hogan (specifically Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts: A Guide for Humanities and The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion), and carries with it the conviction that once we understand our biology, we will understand why the class struggle supersedes all other forms of intraspecies difference:
We have nature and only nature. … [T]he human (higher-minded) self is a self as formed in a society that is itself formed in history, which has been in recent times formed by the class struggle. So even before the self is ethnic or gendered, it is formed in relation to the class struggle (that has guaranteed rights and laws opposite to the interests of a ruling class) within the framework of the modern nation-state. Thus, to understand today's self is to subordinate gender, race, sexuality and ethnicity to an understanding of it as formed and developed within a capitalist society. (12)
The “thus” is a nice touch: in place of the old scientific Marxism, Aldama here proposes a new neuroscientific Marxism—and a series of daringly monocausal explanations of society and culture, as when he suggests that capitalism “has led to the development of the huge famines and epidemics like AIDS” (68) and that “music and its ancillary lifestyles are only ever about the escape into and utter consumption of capitalist mass culture” (159). To go along with this scientific return to the primacy of class, Aldama insists on a return to philosophical realism: “Concepts are objective and true,” he writes, “when they correspond to reality” (18). Yes, it is good to have that little problem cleared up once and for all.
Aldama proceeds to critique Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, and Hardt and Negri for their inattention to the material base, but it is only when Aldama discusses the work of Edward Said that things turn really strange. Said is faulted for his “sidestepping of any historical accountability … as well as for the juggling of all sorts of texts (historical, anthropological, and literary) in any way without having to account for history and what has happened in history” (79). Aldama's underlying claim is that “in spatializing material reality, [Said] spiritualizes it,” and the claim is duly footnoted—but the footnote is even stranger, because it cites Said saying that the Palestinian struggle is “all about territory and contested space and dispossession” (295). For some reason, Aldama sees this as an evasion on Said's part, for, “having rejected Marx as an intellectual guide for his political activity, Said was blind to the realities of the Middle East. He didn't see, for example, that for over half a century the Middle East has been a powder keg ready to explode precisely because the Palestinian question was never properly solved by imperialism” (90–91). Aldama, therefore, concludes that Said's concepts did not correspond to reality: “Said's constructivist and relativist position vis-à-vis reality is irrational and reactionary. … [S]uch an approach not only eliminates all the inconveniences of the Marxist analysis of political and historical situation, but also fails to account fully for the concrete case of the creation of, say, the state of Israel on the basis of the expulsion of the Palestinians” (91–92). I love that “say,” but I love even more the chutzpah of someone willing to claim that Edward Said did not adequately understand the dispossession of Palestinians as a result of the creation of the state of Israel.
Aldama's treatment of British cultural studies is equally strange. Charging that “the Birmingham Cultural Studies group looked to marginal groups like youth subcultures (subway muggers and punk rockers, for example) as the force of social transformation” (66), Aldama faults Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson and “their studies of working-class youth populations” for being ignorant of the fact that, “as any perfunctory check of the enormous amount of evidence available readily shows, there is absolutely no indication to suggest that a subculture has the power to alter social reality in a revolutionary fashion” (178). Leaving aside Aldama's grievous misunderstanding of Dick Hebdige's argument in Subculture, it bears noting that neither Williams nor Thompson conducted studies of working-class youth. Rather, they wrote seminal works on the history of the English “culture and society” debate and the history of the English working class—works that Aldama would evidently do well to consult. Similarly, when Aldama chastises “Williams, Hebdige, Hull [sic], Gilroy” for their “mysticizing of working class and racially disenfranchised groups” (187), he demonstrates not only that he is unfamiliar with the spelling of Stuart Hall's surname but also that he rather aggressively missed the point of Hall and his colleagues' Policing the Crisis (1979), which, far from making heroes of “subway muggers,” demonstrated that the British press's manufacturing of the mugging crisis was testimony to a post-sixties racist, nativist backlash and betokened the rise of the New Right. Indeed, Policing the Crisis famously predicted the election of Mrs. Thatcher and the shredding of the postwar social contract. Casting the Birmingham group as mystified about politics, in other words, is roughly as plausible as casting Edward Said as blind to the realities of the Middle East.
Most remarkably, when Aldama turns to the history of science, he informs us that “Leonardo da Vinci's helicopter or submarine were conceived of as potentially present but not yet realizable because of the lack of technology; following Newton's scientific explanation of what gravity is, da Vinci saw very clearly that these things could be realized, could be created and produced; at the same time he was extremely aware of the fact that as a subject situated in a specific time and place, he couldn't make actual a helicopter or submarine; the materials, the knowledge, and the technology present in his society were insufficiently developed for the actualizing of an object that could defy gravity” (224). Again, leaving aside the grievous misunderstanding of the submarine's relation to gravity, one has to marvel at Aldama's insistence that da Vinci was “a subject situated in a specific time and place” who somehow managed to learn about gravity from Newton despite the fact that Newton was born more than a century after da Vinci passed from this earth. Earlier in Why the Humanities Matter, Aldama had hailed Alan Sokal for revealing “just how reactionary so-called Left theory had become” and how “academic theory had rendered meaningless any real knowledge of the real world that might lead to real change” (58). One wonders, à propos of real knowledge of the real world, what Sokal would make of a humanist who claims that Newton's Principia was an influence on da Vinci's thought. But then, one wonders—as I continue to wonder—what to make of the many extraordinary features of this extraordinary book.
