In her new book, Reclaiming Accountability, Professor Heidi Kitrosser analyzes a vital topic that has become even more important in recent years: the potential for “unchecked secrecy” available to the American president (p. 2). Kitrosser’s concern for this topic is intensified by the facts that, today, the executive branch is better able to act unilaterally than in the past, and also has more means available to effect change without anyone noticing (p. 3). She warns against the potential danger resulting from how “laws can be implemented largely in the dark” (p. 3).
Not everyone views executive secrecy as a major problem. On one side of the debate are “presidentialists,” who are more interested in allowing the president maximum flexibility than in making the office truly accountable to the American public. To Kitrosser, these scholars are putting forth contentions that “can undermine accountability by facilitating largely unchecked information control” (p. 4). Perhaps even more threatening, presidentialists are not interested in debating, but in cutting off discussion altogether (p. 5).
Opposing the presidentialists are Kitrosser and others (sometimes referred to as “congressionalists”) sympathetic to her perspective, “who champion robust roles for Congress and the courts in setting and enforcing statutory checks—checks both internal and external to the executive branch—on presidential power, in overseeing executive behavior, and in carefully scrutinizing executive refusals to provide requested information” (pp. 14–15).
Presidentialists seem to be winning the battle in recent years. Kitrosser describes a political environment in which the president is often aided in his quest for secrecy by—among others—the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, and sometimes even members of Congress and the federal courts, who are, at least in theory, supposed to resist excessive executive branch power grabs (pp. 5–7). The crux of the problem for Kitrosser, a law professor, is that “presidentialism badly misreads the Constitution” (p. 9). She defines presidentialism as consisting of two prongs: “presidential supremacy” and the “unitary executive theory” or “unity” (pp. 10–11). “Presidential supremacy” is Professor Kitrosser’s short-hand term that covers four areas of presidential secrecy: prosecutions for revealing classified information, state secrets privilege, “secret law,” and executive privilege (p. 19). “Unity” is the idea that “executive power belongs exclusively and indefeasibly to the president” (p. 146). As an alternative to presidentialism, the author favors “a substantive accountability framework” (p. 15).
I want to highlight Kitrosser’s main points from three chapters in particular, as they nicely incorporate some of the author’s major themes that are woven into the book. To begin, in Chapter 3, she looks at how the framers’ constitutional structure provides for substantive accountability. As she notes, substantive accountability entails providing the people with “multiple opportunities to discover information relevant to their votes” (p. 47). Formal accountability alone, she argues, is insufficient, because this is really just accountability in name only (p. 49). She argues that Congress’ process of passing laws occurs as part of an open and accountable dynamic, which helps to check even the secret activities of the president by providing the public with some minimal idea of what is going on (p. 45). Presidential supremacists go wrong for Kitrosser when they discount the importance of real, ongoing accountability for executive actions and instead urge Americans to trust the president’s desire for reelection to foster responsible behavior (p. 49).
Next, in Chapter 7, Kitrosser zeroes in on the unitary executive theory. At least some advocates of the unitary executive theory interpret Article II language (specifically, the “take care” and “vesting” clauses) as giving the president the ability (or the potential ability) to personally control everything that occurs in the executive branch, while critics of the theory believe that the president has only the constitutional charge to make sure others are carrying out the laws adequately on his watch (p. 146). To unitary executive theory advocates, the framers made two crucial decisions which constitute proof that they wanted the president to have the ability to be completely hands-on in every aspect of the job: They decided not to have more than one president, and they did not follow through on establishing a formal executive apparatus to advise the president (p. 146).
Kitrosser and other unitary executive theory critics see the above as an “overread[ing]” of what the framers had in mind (p. 147). She argues that an analysis of both the Constitution’s language and early history suggests that the unitary executive is—and has been—much more limited (p. 148). As evidence, she cites the responsibilities owed to the legislature by the Treasury Secretary and the Attorney General during the early years of the Constitution (pp. 150, 151). She contends that these examples show how the framers’ concern here was not to further “unity,” but rather to make sure that substantive accountability was being facilitated (p. 152). Also, she contends that the framers ultimately decided against an executive council because “with its likely secrecy, small size, and lack of clearly delineated functions—[it was] antithetical to accountability” (p. 155).
Finally, in Chapter 9, Kitrosser circles back to some of the concerns raised in earlier chapters with five specific steps that average people can take to start improving the deteriorating conditions that the author identifies. First, she urges “public outreach” (p. 197). Second, she hopes that outreach and additional activities will help bring people together from both sides of the political aisle (p. 197). Third, she urges support for either the “existing accountability tools” we have, or for the people and organizations that already assume this responsibility (p. 197). Fourth, she suggests a renewed focus on fostering executive responsibility and on investing in those who push for positive change (p. 198). Fifth, she encourages those who agree with her prescriptions to attempt to spell out exactly what “presidentialism” means in practical terms, and to consider teaming up with presidentialists to reach a common understanding of the theory (p. 198).
In sum, Heidi Kitrosser’s Reclaiming Accountability is an important contribution to the presidency literature. With this book, she joins other presidential and constitutional law scholars (notably Louis Fisher, among others) by correctly identifying executive branch secrecy as a growing problem, and by noting the threat presented by the unitary executive theory. Beyond that, she has refocused attention on the importance of the separation of powers to maintaining equilibrium in the federal government, a balance that can be disrupted by presidentialism and its advocacy of a strong president as panacea to all of our federal policy challenges. Her separation of powers theory confronts, and effectively debunks, presidentialism. The proper solution to our problems, she argues, is not to simply shrug our shoulders and entrust the president with ever more responsibility (and the power that goes with it). Rather, Professor Kitrosser urges us to turn back to substantive accountability, the solution that “has been with us all along, in the U.S. Constitution” (p. 197).
