Tang

Incorporating the institutions created during preceding periods, the Tang established a more articulated and comprehensive system that served the interests of that much more expansive and enduring polity. For the first time, the Tang clearly distinguished among direct appeals (zhisu), jumping appeals, and gradual appeals (zhuji shangsu). In a law code that has survived and influenced later polities, the Tang stipulated what was permitted and what was forbidden regarding each kind of complaint (Johnson Reference Johnson1997, 415–16; MacCormack Reference MacCormack1996, 28).

Like the Sui, the Tang rulers usually required all complainants to appeal gradually up the established hierarchy: first to local governments, and if dissatisfied, then to upper governments such as the Department of State Affairs (shangshusheng), and finally to the central government (i.e., the three bureaus: the court, the Board of Punishments, and the Censorate). If all of these appeals were unsuccessful, complainants could appeal to the palace gate or beat the drum to get their cases before the ruler (Li Reference Li1992, 192; Qian and Ai Reference Qian and Ai1996, 330). In addition to favoring gradual appeals, the Tang code outlawed jumping appeals. In its words, government offices “must not accept jumping appeals. Jumping appealers and officials who have accepted jumping appeals will all be beaten with forty lashes of the whip respectively.” If, on the other hand, officials wrongly refused appeals that were properly mounted, they would be “punished with fifty lashes of the whip,” a heavier punishment than that meted out to officials who accepted jumping appeals (Johnson Reference Johnson1997, 414–15; Zhangsun Reference Zhangsun1999, 482).

Despite these strict laws designed to enforce a kind of due process, it seems that many complainants still ignored the law and made jumping appeals at times. Indeed, on three occasions—in 722, 840, and 847—because of the mounting number of jumping appeals, several decrees were issued banning certain jumping appeals, especially civil case appeals to the petition box (guihan) and the Censorate (Wang Reference Wang1991, 1231).

Although the Tang prohibited jumping appeals, however unsuccessfully, it allowed three direct appeals under certain circumstances: beating the drum, stopping the royal cart, and submitting to the court (shangbiao). But appealers who took advantage of these venues would be beaten with eighty blows of the bamboo if their appeals proved to be without foundation (Wang Reference Wang1991, 483). The Six Canons of the Tang allowed people who had failed to get satisfaction through all other means to beat the drum, but it seems likely that this privilege was restricted only to people with important cases (Li Reference Li1992, 192).

Aside from the three main forms, there were other forms of direct appeal in the Tang. The fourth legitimate form was the red stone of classical provenance. Liu Junyi argues that complaint drums were established outside the Forbidden Cities of both the Western and Eastern capitals (Chang'an and Luoyang) along with the red stones. Appealers, including the very old and the very young, and those who were mentally or physically incapable of making other forms of complaint, could simply stand beside the red stone (Li Reference Li1992, 192; Liu Reference Liu1996, 1672). Shen Kuo, a prominent Song scholar and scientist, claimed to have discovered the Tang red stone, which was 8–9 feet long and shaped like a human lung (Liu Reference Liu1996, 1672).

A fifth form of direct appeal permitted during the Tang was going up to the palace gate—most likely, as we have seen, the oldest form of complaint in China. During the reign of the famously humane ruler Tang Taizong (r. 626–49), complainants could appeal directly to the princes and the ruler (Dong Reference Dong Hao1990, 20). Much later in the Tang, in 845, a commoner complained at the palace gate that his elder brother had been executed on the false charge of taking a bribe; the head of Jiangdu Township eventually succeeded in having the responsible local magistrate demoted (Liu Reference Liu1975, 173.4500).

The most novel, popular, and famous form of direct appeal in the Tang may have been the petition box, initiated in 686 by Empress Wu Zetian (r. 690–705). The petition box originally had four sides, each of which served a different purpose (Sima Reference Sima1956, 203.6438).Footnote ⁷ The satisfaction of grievances was only one of its purposes—it also addressed letters about criticism, extending mercy, and connecting to the occult. The Six Canons of the Tang noted that the commissioner in charge of the petition box was supposed to “satisfy all grievances occurring under heaven” (Li Reference Li1992, 282). Although the petition box was likely created by Empress Wu to receive secret reports against her enemies (Fang Reference Fang2006, 38), it was later transformed to receive individual complaints. Soon after Empress Wu's death in 705 ce, Tang Zhongzong (r. 705–10) ordered that both officials and commoners who had grievances or had been wrongly punished could deposit their complaints in the petition box (Dong Reference Dong Hao1990, 78).

The Tang system of the petition box continued to be modified over time. In 756, afraid that important messages could be blocked by officials, Suzong (r. 756–62) rejected the suggestion that all letters put into the box should be reviewed by the officials in charge of the box before being memorialized to the throne. In 838 and 840, respectively, Wenzong (r. 827–40) decreed that all letters placed in the petition box were to go directly to the ruler without review by censors and commissioners, and that only people with real grievances, criticism of court policy, or ideas regarding military and state issues who had been blocked by the responsible offices could place their petitions in the box (Wang Reference Wang1991, 1123–25).

The Tang created a complex and comprehensive complaint system as part of its effort to deliver good government based on the Zhou and Han models, hoping to manage a large realm and establish a durable order. Thus, Tang Taizong compared himself to the Duke of Zhou and expressed shame that he had spent more money than Han Wendi (Wu Reference Wu2001, 1.37, 348; Gao Reference Changshan2003, 538). During the reign of Empress Wu, the courageous official Chen Zi'ang, invoking the Han theory of heaven–human interaction, reported that the cries of people with grievances would upset the harmony of heaven and might well bring on disaster (Liu Reference Liu1975, 2147). The prominent poet and onetime director of the Board of Punishments, Bai Juyi (772–846), also connected floods and droughts to inmates' grievances in the prisons (Bai Reference Bai1997, 630).

While the Tang complaint system was more developed and comprehensive than that of previous polities, it, too, was criticized by contemporary scholars and officials for not being able redress many grievances. Although Empress Wu established the petition box, grievances were not reduced in her reign, and they actually were said to have increased. Chen Zi'ang criticized Empress Wu for allegedly turning a blind eye to instances of extralegal torture and execution, which prompted many grievances (Dong Reference Dong Hao1990, 951–52).

Even in 733, during the height of the Tang, many aggrieved people could not find a formal place to complain, but rather had to rely on individual upright officials to satisfy their grievances. When Yuan Renjing, the Supervisor of the Imperial Court (daliqing), whose duty it was to handle complaints, suddenly died, all prisoners cried and chanted, “Why does heaven not show mercy on people with grievances? Why does [heaven] take away our beloved relative [Yuan]? We have reason but no place to complain. How sad!” (Wang Reference Wang1991, 1123). Had any of the complaint systems been as effective as they claimed to be, those prisoners would not have cried out at the death of a single official. In the later Tang, the complaint system allegedly became even less effective. Bai Juyi remarked that late Tang rulers were oblivious to complaints and the roll of the drum was no longer heard (Bai Reference Bai1997, 698).

Because their appeals were blocked, some desperate people mutilated themselves in the capital in order to attract the ruler's attention. Thus, even the relatively humane and concerned ruler Xuanzong issued a decree in 725 imposing forty blows of the bamboo on complainants who mutilated themselves, thereby unacceptably harming the bodies they had inherited from their parents (Fan Reference Fan1965, 1872; Li Reference Li Xibi2003, 894).

The Five Dynasties (907–60) succeeding the Tang inherited most Tang laws, including the petition box. In the late Five Dynasties, many people were reported to be “appealing to the court without passing through either the county or prefectural level.” This obviously enraged Zhou Taizu (r. 951–54), who ordered that all jumping appeals should be refused and “any [jumping appealer] who infringes the law will be punished in accordance with the law” (Dong Reference Dong Hao1990, 543).

Song

Learning a lesson from the Five Dynasties, the Song founder made a number of reforms in the legal and political systems. After creating a centralized system of the rule by civil officials, Song Taizu (r. 960–76) established strict laws. But he was said to have enforced them quite leniently: “Whenever there was any small question about a case, he would reduce the punishment after the report” (Tuo Reference Tuo1977, 4961–62). Additionally, Taizu made a family rule not to execute civil officials. This leniency, based in Confucianism and influenced by Buddhism, was continued by later Song rulers. According to Brian E. McKnight, the Song authorized the “fullest development” (1981, 75) of the act of grace in Chinese history.

In 963, the Song law code was promulgated largely along the lines of the Tang code by “merely attaching new provisions to various sections” (Langlois Reference Langlois1981a, 169; Miyazaki Reference Miyazaki, Cohen, Edwards and Chen1980, 56). The Song, like the Tang, banned jumping appeals and required all subjects to follow all of the steps up the administrative hierarchy in registering their complaints (Miyazaki Reference Miyazaki, Cohen, Edwards and Chen1980, 60–69). Also like the Tang, the Song accepted direct appeals. The Song did modify the Tang law governing self-mutilation, but only to punish that practice more harshly, probably in support of the Confucian value of bodily integrity (Dou Reference Dou Yi1984, 377).

The Song retained the Tang drum and also maintained the Tang petition box by setting up a Public Petitioners Review Office (dengwen guyuan) to manage it (Li Reference Li1979, 582). Under the second ruler Taizong (r. 976–97), the Song created a Judicial Control Office (shenxingyuan) to accept complaints and transmit them to the Court of Judicial Review (dalisi), the Board of Punishments, and the ruler for judgment (Tuo Reference Tuo1977, 4972). Unlike the Tang, the Song made blocking the royal cart the highest level of appeal, not just one of many gradual levels. The Song also established the Complaint Review Office (lijianyuan), which was abolished in 997, although Renzong (r. 1022–63) reestablished it for complaints and comments that had not been getting through to the throne (Yang and Liu 2003, 46). Contemporaries regarded the Complaint Review Office in the Song as ineffective in dealing with appeals because after Renzong restored it, he ordered that any complaint that was unacceptable to it and to the Department of the Drum could be appealed to the director of the office (lijianshi) for investigation (Guo Reference Guo2000, 547). If the office had been effective, such appeals presumably would have been unnecessary.

In both the Tang and the Song, the drum was by law reserved for appealers with grave grievances or crucial state affairs. In the Song, however, the drum could on some occasions be beaten for lesser purposes. In the reign of Taizu, Zhou Weijian, a state erudite (guozi boshi), beat the drum asking Taizu to appoint him as the Gentleman of the Interior of Forest (yubu langzhong) (Li Reference Li1979, 424). This case shows that the drum in the Song was sometimes used irregularly, but also, at least in this case, somewhat effectively.

Although Song Taizu imposed strict laws against jumping appeals (Songda zhaolingji 1962, 198.729), in the late Northern Song, Huizong (r. 1101–25) modified this policy slightly by allowing those who had been beaten more heavily than the law stipulated to file jumping appeals to the Department of State Affairs (shangshusheng). His goal was to rein in harsh officials whose actions belied the ruler's reputation for “leniency” and threatened the very life of the dynasty as it faced powerful northern neighbors (Songda zhaolingji 1962, 198.729, 202.759).

When the Song court was forced to move south from the Central Plain in 1127, it lost much political authority because of “emergent localism” and the “separation of the elite from the state” (Hymes Reference Hymes1986, 210–12). Many local officials “went their own way and the degree of leniency or harshness of the punishments was controlled by persons [rather than by law]” (Tuo Reference Tuo1977, 4962). To regain its fading central power, the Southern Song (1127–1279) was perhaps forced to be more tolerant of jumping appeals (Ebrey Reference Ebrey1993, 246).Footnote ⁸ Some upright local officials in the Southern Song also considered it reasonable for complainants to make jumping appeals to the prefect because magistrates were biased in favor of clerks (Minggong shupan qingmingji 2002, 436). But, as under Huizong in the late Northern Song, in the Southern Song, there were only a limited number of complaints that could get over the heads of local officials. All other categories of jumping appeals were to be punished (Songhuiyao jigao 1978, 6593).

Because Taizu set a model of leniency for officials, later Song rulers, with a firm belief in minben, were at least as lenient as their Tang predecessors toward subjects. Ichisada Miyazaki brought to light a “most unusual judicial” case involving a female commoner who made a failed attempt to murder her husband in 1068. The supreme court and a prefect adopted different positions on this case that pitted filial piety against spousal loyalty, causing it to drag on for a year. This case reveals the care with which the Northern Song state weighed conflicting moral obligations and administered the death penalty (Miyazaki Reference Miyazaki, Cohen, Edwards and Chen1980, 67–69).

Despite the influence of Buddhism and Wang Anshi's rationalism, Song rulers continued to believe in Han notions of heaven–human interaction (Henderson Reference Henderson1984, 119–20). In particular, Song rulers believed that unsatisfied human grievances might cause natural disasters. In 992, for example, Song Taizong worried that judicial injustice might have been the cause of a long and ruinous rain (Li Reference Li1979, 736).

In the standard view, the Song seems to have had more humane judicial policies and to have created a more expansive complaint system than its predecessors. During good times, many people enjoyed the opportunity to appeal to—or even speak with—the ruler without obstacle. Taizong, who often personally reviewed cases in the capital, claimed in 985 that, in recent times, officials had abided by the law and thus commoners were happy. He suggested that this offered a stark contrast to the lawlessness of the Five Dynasties, when aggrieved commoners had no place to complain (Li Reference Li1979, 597). Like Taizong, Southern Song rulers such as Xiaozong (r. 1163–90) and Lizong (1225–65) reportedly also personally reviewed complaints in an effort to satisfy grievances (Tuo Reference Tuo1977, 4995–96).

Nevertheless, even in the Song, this sort of royal concern for commoners' grievances had limited effects. Song Zhenzong was reportedly shocked when he learned that 800 death sentences had been meted out in his name. He ordered the judicial department to review those death sentences to see whether there were any reasons for grievances. But his order was never carried out because the department concluded that such a review would unduly delay the handling of other cases (Tuo Reference Tuo1977, 4975). Although the conscientious ruler Renzong restored the Complaint Review Office for people whose complaints had been blocked by other means, its very restoration was evidence that the existing institutions were not working very well. On the local level, some prefects simply neglected commoners' complaints. In one case, a commoner was tortured to death after being accused of stealing. His father appealed to the prefect and was rejected. When Renzong heard about it, he was so angry that he banished the prefect to a distant place (Tuo Reference Tuo1977, 2556). In this case, the system worked, but how many commoner complainants were lucky enough to have their grievances heard and acted upon by the ruler?

In the late Northern Song, government corruption apparently became more serious. According to one contemporary, most officials, if not all, “use public means to serve their private interests, kill innocent people, and demand bribes from them. Some officials rob people publicly without any fear” (Guo Reference Guo2000, 597). In the Southern Song, many magistrates reportedly never dealt with civil cases and rarely saw either clerks or commoners. Clerks, therefore, were able to decide the rights and wrongs of cases as well as the degrees of punishment, and many took bribes before making their judgments, resulting in numerous grievances (Minggong shupan qingmingji 2002, 42, 49).

Yuan

Recent studies have argued that the Yuan made many contributions to the Chinese legal system. In the words of one specialist, it may have had “one of the most impressive and mature judicial systems that Imperial China ever had for the administration of justice” (Ch'en Reference Ch'en1979, 98). However questionable this argument, it at least shows that the Yuan was not a completely lawless regime and actually had a substantial judicial system. According to Paul Heng-chao Ch'en, the government even allowed the publication of legal documents and model petitions to teach people how to win their cases (Reference Ch'en1979, 89–93). The Yuan complaint system generally followed that of the Song (Langlois Reference Langlois and Langlois1981b, 164). Even before Khubilai Khan (r. 1260–94) reunified China after three centuries of division, he solicited the advice of Confucian scholars and established Chinese government institutions (Rossabi Reference Rossabi1989, 130; Song Reference Song1976, 70). Chancellor Chia in the 1260s and 1270s used the petition box to encourage complainants to assist in curbing official misdeeds (Song Reference Song1976, 80).

Like its predecessors, Yuan law required all subjects to appeal through regular steps. All jumping appealers would be punished with fifty-seven lashes of the whip (slightly heavier than in the past). Only if the local government made a false judgment or repeatedly ignored complaints could complainants appeal to the upper levels. However, the Yuan made another seemingly small but actually very important modification to the system inherited from the Tang and Song. In both the Tang and the Song codes, not only were jumping appealers punished, but also their cases were rejected, whatever their merits. The Yuan code stipulated that jumping appealers should be punished, but it did not provide for their cases to be ignored or flatly rejected. This Yuan law giving jumping appealers more chances of success was inherited by the Ming and Qing.

As in the late Northern and Southern Song, the late Yuan allowed subjects to make jumping appeals in cases “against officials' taking bribes or acting unlawfully” (Song Reference Song1976, 2671). Once again, a weak state apparently tried to use the complaint system as a way to curb the abuses of its own personnel that threatened the very legitimacy of the regime.

The Mongols originally believed in a kind of animism similar to popular forms of Daoism, but they also embraced Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, and Nestorian Christianity in their efforts to rule the known world. They and their Han Chinese advisors also shared the old concept of the Mandate of Heaven and the idea of heaven–human interaction. For example, in 1324, upon the outbreak of some natural disasters, Yuan Taiding convened his officials to discuss their meaning. One official traced the disasters to people's grievances and asked Taiding to rectify his policies in order to satisfy them (Song Reference Song1976, 3781).

Ming

Despite the Yuan's considerable attention to the law, it lacked a complete and formal law code based on the Tang model, and it failed to enforce the laws effectively, especially in its later years. Ming founder Taizu (r. 1368–98), a commoner who barely survived the harsh conditions of the early fourteenth century, rose to power believing that the Yuan had lost the Mandate of Heaven in part because of the laxity of its laws (Dardess 1987, 187; Farmer Reference Farmer1995, 2). Therefore, he set about developing detailed statutes and enforcing them strictly to “ensure the survival of his dynasty” (Farmer Reference Farmer1995, 100). Some observers have argued that Taizu's judicial policies were “unprecedentedly harsh” (Farmer Reference Farmer1995, 44–46; Macauley Reference Macauley1998, 35; Zeng Reference Zeng2002, 201).Footnote ⁹ In fact, Taizu was not as uniformly strict as some think. Although he adopted draconian measures against actual and potential political enemies, he often showed genuine lenience toward lawbreaking commoners (Liu, Xu, and Zheng Reference Liu, Xu and Zheng1994, 205). In general, the Ming code was based on that of the Tang (Jiang and Wu Reference Jiang, Yanhong, Furth, Zeitlin and Hiung2007, 36; Shen Reference Shen1976, 3). Even before he was formally enthroned, Taizu asked his Confucian advisors to teach him twenty articles of the Tang law every day (Zhang Reference Zhang1974, 2280).

Like most of its predecessors, the Ming preserved the gradual appeal system. It also modified the title and function of some old departments and created new ones. For example, in 1378, Taizu established the Office of Transmission (tongzheng shisi) to clear the way for communications from the bottom of the bureaucracy to the top. In 1383, he transformed the Censorate into the Chief Surveillance Office (duchayuan), which had eight chief investigating censors (jiancha yushi). Thus, in the legal complaint system of the Ming, if the surveillance commissioner (anchasi) failed to make a just decision, the complainant could lodge his or her grievance with the regional investigating censors (xunan jiancha yushi). If the judgment was still unsatisfactory, the complainant could go to the Office of Transmission, which was responsible for passing the complaint on to the Chief Surveillance Office. If that office did not accept the complaint or made a judgment unacceptable to the complainant, the complainant could beat the drum to appeal to the throne (Liu and Yang Reference Hainian and Yifan1994, 2.2.43).

While the Ming code continued to prohibit jumping appeals, a practice dating back to the Sui, it initiated an important reform of no longer requiring jumping appeals to be sent back to local governments for resolution. The upper courts seem to have been willing and able to adjudicate any cases that came to them, including jumping appeals (Jiang Reference Jiang2005, 192). To this extent, the Ming system may have been a more “populist” one than its predecessors at least back to Han times.

Throughout the Ming, individual rulers' attitudes toward jumping appeals varied. Many adopted their own ad hoc policies. Believing that the Yuan had fallen because the path between the top and the bottom had been blocked by corrupt officials (Dardess Reference Dardess1983, 186), Ming Taizu encouraged subjects to make jumping complaints against any corrupt and cruel officials, even though such complaints were nominally illegal (Farmer Reference Farmer1995, 105; Long Reference Long1956, 864). Taizu followed this lenient policy toward jumping appealers for a couple of decades before he became exasperated by the many jumping appeals involving petty quarrels or false claims. In 1395, Taizu ordered local governments to choose honest and capable village elders to decide local legal cases. Only important “civil” or criminal cases were to be reported to the local officials. Anyone who bypassed the elders and appealed to regular government officials would be punished for making an illegal jumping appeal (Farmer Reference Farmer1995, 74–75; Long Reference Long1956, 951).

However, as in previous times, the Ming code and the founder's decree outlawing jumping appeals seem to have been ignored by many complainants. In the reign of Xuanzong (r. 1426–35), for example, judicial officials pleaded for stricter sanctions against the increasing number of people who were making allegedly false jumping appeals. As a result, Xuanzong changed the punishment of jumping appealers, whether their claims were true or false, to banishment—far more severe than the former fifty lashes. In 1433, however, Xuanzong found that this harsh law had its own problems. Although it resulted in fewer jumping appeals, commoners' grievances continued to grow in number. Xuanzong thus instructed the judiciary that if the jumping appeals proved valid, complainants should be pardoned without punishment. If the claims proved to be invalid, appealers should be banished (Liu Reference Hainian and Yifan1994, 69). This lenient ruling on jumping complaints may have been part of the reason for an increase in the number of such grievances in later reigns.

Facing what they considered to be “rampant jumping appeals,” Xianzong (r. 1465–87) and Xiaozong (r. 1488–1505) once again imposed stricter controls on them. During most of their reigns, even victims of murder and official corruption were not allowed to make direct appeals in the capital. Unable to satisfy their grievances legally, many appealers used irregular means such as shouting outside Chang'an Gate in Beijing, abusing capital officials, breaking into government compounds, and even taking officials hostage. In 1479, a decree banned all of those activities and stipulated that all violators and their instigators would be cangued (i.e., placed in mobile stocks) for one month or sent to the frontier. Another decree allowed only people with reports of possible rebellion or other secrets to appeal to the capital. Other complainants, such as those whose whole families had been murdered or who had suffered from official corruption, had to appeal step by step from the bottom. Any person in this last category caught making a jumping appeal would be punished (Liu and Yang Reference Hainian and Yifan1994, 256, 300). As a result, even complainants with serious grievances, who had been allowed to beat the drum in the capital in many previous periods, could no longer take their appeals to the capital. Early Ming populism was fading in the face of more bureaucratic authority.

As in the Song, the main methods of making direct appeals in the Ming were beating the drum, blocking the royal cart, and appealing at the palace gate. Ming law provided that any false appeal made by beating the drum or blocking the royal cart would be punished with 100 blows of the bamboo, twenty more than in the Tang. In 1378, to guard against false judgments and to limit the number of defendants condemned to death, Taizu ordered that relatives of criminals who had allegedly committed felonies could beat the drum (Hucker Reference Hucker1966, 100; Long Reference Long1956, 1294). But, as in the Song, subjects in the Ming would sometimes beat the drum for seemingly minor causes. In 1392, a clerk in the Ministry of Personnel (libu) beat the drum after his superior neglected his plea for permission to retire after the death of his mother. Taizu sharply criticized the high official and ordered him to permit the clerk to show his final respects to his mother (Long Reference Long1956, 1294).

As in the case of jumping appeals, some subjects abused the drum office by making frivolous appeals to it. Enraged, the late Ming ruler Shenzong (r. 1573–1620) in 1590 ordered that all people (including even princes) who beat the drum to report minor grievances should be severely punished. But under the inattentive Shenzong, this law was not strictly enforced, and the ruler himself seems to have ignored it. Only four years later, Section Minister (kechen) Wang Jiamo hinted that “whenever there is a report [or a complaint],” the government accepted and reviewed it. He worried that “evil persons (jiantu)” would make ever more “annoying” appeals over minor matters (Liu, Xu, and Zheng Reference Liu, Xu and Zheng1994, 153–55).

Apart from the drum, Taizu in 1378 created the Office of Transmission, which was designed to clear the way for communication between the top and the bottom of the polity. Subjects with grievances could appeal to the Office of Transmission, which was one level lower than beating the drum or blocking the royal cart (Zhang Reference Zhang1974, 2311–12). In 1385, Taizu rejected as too harsh a suggestion that subjects making false complaints to the Office of Transmission should be punished to the same degree as those who brought false charges to the drum or the royal cart. Instead, Taizu said the punishment should only be the same as for those making false complaints to other standard offices such as the Board of Punishments (Zhang Reference Zhang1974, 22).

Despite challenges from the scholar Wang Fuzhi and other critics of the cosmology inherited from the Han period, Ming rulers and officials remained deeply concerned about heavenly warnings that might be related to people's grievances (Henderson Reference Henderson1984, 177–89). In 1392, Taizu dispatched judges and censors to check on prisoners all over the country to find out what possible grievances might be causing a prolonged drought. A Ming local official, Yan Junyan, stated his belief that the unjust death of a single commoner could cause frost to appear in July (Yan Reference Yan2002, 267).

The Ming complaint systems had, like their predecessors, limited efficacy. After the clampdown on jumping appeals during the reigns of Xianzong and Xiaozong, many potential complainants no doubt backed away from appealing. In this period, the Subordinate Censor (zhongcheng), Jiang Hong, reported that officials found it difficult to report complaints to the ruler. The Office of Transmission, which was supposed to receive and transmit people's grievances and suggestions, simply collected minor cases to report and neglected other, more major cases (Chen Reference Zilong1997, 1173). During the reign of Wuzong (r. 1506–21) the management of the prisons was said to be filled with abuses (Zhang Reference Zhang1974, 2324), but the ruler reportedly forbade prisoners' relatives to beat the drum to complain (Long Reference Long1956, 1295). In 1538, Shizong blamed judicial officials in the capital for not “using their hearts” in dealing with cases because they were more concerned with developing bureaucratic connections and protecting the local officials who were responsible for the original decisions (Fu Reference Fengxiang1956, 1910–11).

Some late Ming scholar-officials lodged equally sharp criticisms of the lack of communication between the top and the bottom, but they had different views of who was primarily responsible. The prominent “upright official” Hai Rui (1514–87), for example, argued that even well-intentioned regional officials were too preoccupied with the rituals of welcoming or seeing off other officials to concern themselves with commoners' grievances. In Hai Rui's view, the ruler's irresponsibility was an important cause of the problem (Hai Reference Hai1981, 218, 237). Another late Ming/early Qing scholar, Gu Yanwu, criticized the general weakness of Ming local officials who failed to report the people's grievances to their superiors (Gu Reference Gu1985, 16–17).

Qing

While the Qing founders and their successors tried to maintain their Manchu identity after the conquest of the Ming (Elliot Reference Elliot2001, 34; Goldstone Reference Goldstone and Struve2004, 258; Rawski Reference Rawski1998, 7; Rhoads Reference Rhoads2000), they adopted a legal code that was based heavily on those of the Tang through the Ming (Elliot Reference Elliot2001, 28; Metzger Reference Metzger1973, 33; Zeng Reference Zeng2002, 220). The Qing also established new institutions, such as the Imperial Clan Court (zongrenfu), the Capital Gendarmerie (bujun tongling yamen), and the Frontier Superintendency (lifanyuan). According to Thomas A. Metzger, the Qing was good at changing its laws to meet new situations (Reference Metzger1973, 22–23). The Qing also carried over and modified the complaints systems inherited from earlier dynasties.

The Qing, like its predecessors, required that all subjects appeal gradually through legal steps, and the complaints permitted did not pertain to minor (or civil) cases, such as those involving matrimony and land (huhun tiantu), which were allowed to go only as high as the county or prefecture (Bernhardt and Huang Reference Bernhardt and Huang1994, 1; He and Wei Reference Changling and Yuan1992, 2319; Huang Reference Huang1996).Footnote ¹⁰ Also like its predecessors, the Qing generally tried to outlaw jumping appeals. Both Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) and Qianlong (r. 1735–96), “the most sinified, Confucianized ruler” (Crossley Reference Crossley2000, 3), issued orders that prohibited jumping appeals (Daqing huidian zeli, 124.42; Liu and Yang Reference Hainian and Yifan1994, 1.386).

But the Qing, again like its predecessors, faced the continuing practice of complainants mounting jumping appeals despite their illegality.Footnote ¹¹ In 1736, Qianlong allowed subjects who had been cheated or harmed by clerks (fanyi) of the capital gendarmerie to make jumping appeals to the Board of Punishments or to the Censorate (Reed Reference Reed2000, 16, 86–88). But Qianlong himself soon restored the law against jumping appeals. In 1742, he ordered that officials at any level would be punished if they accepted any jumping appeal (Daqing lüli genyuan 1871, 89.22).

In the Qing, there was nonetheless an important category of cases that have been called “capital appeals” (jingkong). Complainants who had exhausted all judicial remedies at the provincial level could lodge complaints with central organs such as the Censorate and the capital gendarmerie (Ocko Reference Ocko1988, 294).Footnote ¹² The Board of Punishments and the Office of Transmission could also receive capital or jumping appeals. Unlike in the Ming, most of the appeals to the capital were returned to the provincial governments for review, and only a small number of them were reported to the ruler (Na Reference Na1992, 412). This practice caused a problem, especially in cases of complaints against the provincial officials. If such complaints were passed down to the very officials who were their targets, not only would those corrupt officials be likely to escape punishment, but also the appealers would be likely to suffer retaliation (Daqing lüli genyuan 1870, 2.10). Hence, in 1819, an official asked Jiaqing (r. 1796–1820) to order that no capital appeal should be returned to provincial officials. But Jiaqing rejected this proposal, fearing that if it were approved, he would have to resolve all of the cases—including minor civil ones—that were appealed to him (Qing huidian shili 1991, 1006.101).

During the Qianlong reign, a distinction was made between true and false appeals and between criminal and minor (or civil) cases.Footnote ¹³ In 1784, it was decreed that capital appeals made after all legal steps had been exhausted or concerning cases that were particularly grave would be accepted, but only if they proved to be “true”; those complaining about cases that proved to be “false” would be punished (Zhao Reference Zhao2001, 108). Those capital appealers with minor cases (whether valid or invalid) would be punished and their cases would be returned to the local governments. This law again failed to check the increasing number of jumping appeals, as in 1796, Qianlong endorsed a new proposal that central organs should refuse all complaints except those that had already been made at the provincial level. But this policy was soon modified by Jiaqing in the face of growing official corruption and the spreading White Lotus Rebellion. Jiaqing instructed officials in the Censorate and the capital gendarmerie to accept complaints from the people and to report the most serious ones to him. Even those sent back to the provincial level were to be reported onto the ruler every month or two (Daqing lüli genyuan 1871, 89.48, 37–39, 46).

But Jiaqing's new policy was short-lived, apparently because of the pressure of the large number of jumping appeals that probably were inspired by his decree.Footnote ¹⁴ In 1800, Jiaqing complained that every day was filled by jumping appeals, and most of them were frivolous (Huang Reference Huang1996, 6, 218; McKnight Reference McKnight1981, 123).Footnote ¹⁵ Complaints of all kinds and degrees of seriousness were simply being lodged over the heads of local officials and directly to the capital. Therefore, Jiaqing restored Qianlong's strict law against jumping appeals, regardless of whether those appeals were valid or false, but he still allowed the content of the jumping appeals to be considered even after the appealers were punished for having made them. By 1820, however, complainants became bolder, some of them going directly to the court and announcing that they would make their cases only in the presence of the ruler. Infuriated, Jiaqing ordered the Board of Punishments to punish such bold appealers more severely by one more degree than those who reported with sealed complaints (Daqing lüli genyuan 1871, 89.32–34, 55). As in the past, this harsher law failed to check jumping and false appeals during the nineteenth century.

Later Qing rulers generally followed Jiaqing's decree of 1801 against jumping appeals. In one case in 1875, Sun Guoan, a farmer from Jiangsu Province, mounted a jumping appeal to the Office of the Provincial Military Commander (tidu yamen) accusing a county secretary of having embezzled money donated by local people for dredging a river. Sun lied to the central officials, telling them that the local magistrate had not allowed him to file a charge, so he had been unable address his complaint to the relevant provincial offices. Although the Board of Punishments punished Sun in accordance with Jiaqing's decree against jumping appeals, it called all relevant parties and carefully investigated them (First Historical Archives, Xingbu, Jiangsusi, no. 08718).

Unlike in contemporary Tokugawa Japan, where direct appeals to the actual head of state, the shogun, were illegal (Vlastos Reference Vlastos1986, 52–56), in the Qing, some direct appeals were legal and others were illegal. Legal direct appeals were defined similarly to those in the Ming: complainants could beat the drum and appeal at the palace gate. In 1644, a drum, managed by both Manchu and Han officials, was established inside the Censorate and later moved outside Chang'an Gate (Daqing huidian zeli, 124.31, 5.718). In the Qing, certain direct appeals reached the emperor (Metzger Reference Metzger1973, 178; Spence Reference Spence1988, 43), but in general, making direct appeals was not easy. Only appeals regarding grave grievances, evil activities (dajian), national affairs, and those that had followed all legally required steps were permitted (Daqing huidian zeli, 719; Qinding taigui, 11.24–25). The Qing Code outlawed all rushing-the-royal-cart appeals (chongtu yizhang). Violators not only would be beaten with 100 strokes of the bamboo and sent to the frontier, but also their appeals would be rejected (Cheng, Jiang, and Jones, Reference Tianquan, Yongling and Jones1994; Liu and Yang Reference Hainian and Yifan1994, 3.1.254). In 1726, Yongzheng ruled that any unlawful appealer to the palace gates would be cangued for a month if the appeal was valid and beaten with 100 strokes of the bamboo and sent to the army on the frontier if the appeal was false. In 1810, Jiaqing instructed that once their cases were decided, appealers who continued to beat the drum or tried to commit suicide outside the Chang'an gate should be brought to the judiciary for punishment (Daqing lüli genyuan 1871, 89.1, 37).

Probably because legal direct appeals were so difficult, many people, as in both the Tang and the Ming, adopted illegal means in an effort to attract the attention of the ruler. In 1661, Shunzhi felt vexed that there were so many troublesome complainants in the capital who tried to cut their throats to attract court attention (Daqing huidian zeli, 5.718). In 1741, a law stipulated that complainants who shouted loudly about grievances before the Meridian and Chang'an gates, or knelt down in front of the palace gates, or beat the stone lions inside the Chang'an gate, would be punished regardless of whether their appeals were valid or invalid (Liu and Yang Reference Hainian and Yifan1994, 3.30.254, 386–87).

Qing founders such as Shunzhi and Kangxi, like Khubilai, adopted other beliefs such as Buddhism and Islam to win over the Mongols, Tibetans, and Central Asians. They also studied the Confucian canon and presented themselves as Confucian monarchs to “win over Han Chinese literati” (Rawski Reference Rawski1998, 6). As in previous times, Qing rulers and officials were acquainted with Confucian notions such as the son of heaven, parents of the people, and other thoughts such as “people as the base.” In 1740, Qianlong reminded his ministers that the people were the children of both the ruler and the officials (Qinding taigui, 3.7). In the late Qing, Guangxü, who directed the 1898 reform, instructed officials that the state “has always regarded people as the basis” (Daqing guangxu xinfaling 1908, 30.11). Similarly, the mid-Qing governor Chen Hongmou believed that good officials should dedicate themselves to serving the people (Rowe Reference Rowe2001, 328). Most Qing rulers continued to believe in heaven–human interactions. In 1759, for instance, after a long drought, Qianlong ordered officials to check the criminal dockets to ensure that there had been no miscarriage of justice (Rawski Reference Rawski1998, 227).

In the Qing, as in previous dynasties, many grievances remained unsatisfied. After Fang Bao, a Song learning scholar in the Kangxi reign—the beginning of the peaceful and prosperous High Qing period—was imprisoned, he discovered how prison conditions could easily result in many grievances. Rich or powerful prisoners could avoid the death penalty and beating by bribing the jailers, while poor prisoners were tortured and often died, leaving behind possible grievances (Fang Reference Fang1979, 2.325–28). Mark C. Elliot records that the grievances of some Han Chinese could not be satisfied in the Manchu city of Xi'an because of institutionalized Manchu privileges (Reference Elliot2001, 198, 231). During a sorcery scare in 1768, some monks and beggars were beaten and even killed after being unfairly charged with collusion in sedition, one of the Ten Abominations for which amnesties could never be given (Kuhn Reference Kuhn1990).

Even among the small percentage of complainants who successfully got their grievances before the central organs or the ruler, many ended up unsatisfied. One reason for this was that most, if not all, appeals accepted by the central organs were returned to the local governments for resolution. But what happened to those appeals that were sent back to the localities by the court? How many of them found justice or satisfaction at the local level, where the grievances had originated in the first place? According to a report of a censor in 1876, for several decades, no capital appeals were rectified after they were returned to the provincial governments (Haichang Xiaopenglaizhu Reference Haichang1876).

Many grievances were lodged against abuses that resulted from higher officials protecting lower ones, which made the satisfaction of those grievances by lower officials highly unlikely. A memorial of 1883 pointed out that many prefects and governors either paid little attention to local officials' carelessness in handling people's complaints or tried to protect those local officials when grievances were lodged against them. One account found that “only one or two out of every 100 [decisions made by local officials] were reversed [by upper-level governments]” (Zhao Reference Zhao2001, 39). The corruption that became rampant in the late Qianlong reign undoubtedly prompted many grievances among the people. Beatrice S. Bartlett has argued that the Grand Council and its councilor Ho-shen were “beyond the reach of the administrative code” and “unfettered by law” (Reference Bartlett1990, 6, 253–54). Hong Liangji, an upright official in the late eighteenth century, claimed that because of the widespread corruption and collusion among local officials, “only one or two out of a thousand lawsuits of ‘Commoners vs. Officials’ could win” (Qingshi bianzuan weiyuanhui 1960, 4472).